* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored (encrypted) there. - lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret, the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB JWT relocation. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV connection quota, pending ledger row. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) + sha256(refresh_token). - app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto / agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank. - The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there). - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS. Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean; no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR: instance-side wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard) The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs; what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx, a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
89 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
89 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
|
import { z } from 'zod'
|
|
import { validateBody } from '@/lib/api/validate'
|
|
import { withConnectorAuth, type ConnectorContext } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/with-connector-auth'
|
|
import { buildSkvAuthorizeUrl, skvDefaultScopes } from '@/lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth'
|
|
import { reserveUpstream } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/upstream-budget'
|
|
import { countHeldConnections, createPendingConnection, deletePendingConnectionById } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/ledger'
|
|
import { signConnectorState } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/state'
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* POST /api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url
|
|
*
|
|
* The instance asks the connector broker to start a Skatteverket BankID
|
|
* consent for one company. The broker builds the authorize URL against
|
|
* Arcim's registered SKV client, using OUR registered redirect_uri, with a
|
|
* signed connector state that carries the instance's own return URL; the SKV
|
|
* extension callback (on the hosted host) detects that state and bounces the
|
|
* browser back to the instance with the code. The instance keeps its own PKCE
|
|
* verifier and later calls /oauth/token with the code.
|
|
*
|
|
* Tokens never touch us: the token exchange returns them to the instance,
|
|
* which stores them (encrypted) in its own database.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const Schema = z.object({
|
|
company_ref: z.string().min(1).max(200),
|
|
return_url: z.string().url().max(512),
|
|
state: z.string().min(1).max(200),
|
|
code_challenge: z.string().min(16).max(256),
|
|
scope: z.string().max(400).optional(),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
function requireScope(ctx: ConnectorContext): NextResponse | null {
|
|
if (ctx.key.scopes.includes('skatteverket')) return null
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'This connector key does not include Skatteverket', code: 'CONNECTOR_SCOPE_MISSING' }, { status: 403 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hostedRedirectUri(): string {
|
|
const base = (process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SKV_OAUTH_BASE_URL || process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/+$/, '')
|
|
return `${base}/api/extensions/ext/skatteverket/callback`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isOnInstance(url: string, instanceUrl: string | null): boolean {
|
|
if (!instanceUrl) return false
|
|
try {
|
|
return new URL(url).origin === new URL(instanceUrl).origin
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export const POST = withConnectorAuth('connect.skv', async (request, ctx) => {
|
|
const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
|
|
if (scopeError) return scopeError
|
|
const parsed = await validateBody(request, Schema, { log: ctx.log, operation: 'connect.skv.authorize-url' })
|
|
if (!parsed.success) return parsed.response
|
|
const { company_ref: cref, return_url, state, code_challenge, scope } = parsed.data
|
|
|
|
if (!isOnInstance(return_url, ctx.key.instanceUrl)) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'return_url must be on the connector key\'s instance', code: 'CONNECTOR_REDIRECT_INVALID' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
// Quota with a reservation re-count (same TOCTOU fix as the bank /auth):
|
|
// pre-count fast-rejects, the pending row reserves, the post-insert
|
|
// re-count rolls the own row back when concurrent authorizes overshoot.
|
|
const quotaExceeded = () =>
|
|
NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Skatteverket connection quota reached for this company', code: 'CONNECTOR_QUOTA_EXCEEDED', limit: ctx.key.limits.skv_connections_per_company },
|
|
{ status: 403 },
|
|
)
|
|
const held = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'skatteverket', cref)
|
|
if (held >= ctx.key.limits.skv_connections_per_company) return quotaExceeded()
|
|
const budget = await reserveUpstream(ctx.supabase, 'skatteverket')
|
|
if (!budget.ok) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Skatteverket connector is busy', code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED' }, { status: 429, headers: { 'Retry-After': String(budget.retryAfterSec) } })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const signedState = signConnectorState({ kid: ctx.key.id, svc: 'skv', ret: return_url, st: state, cref })
|
|
const redirectUri = hostedRedirectUri()
|
|
const pendingId = await createPendingConnection(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'skatteverket', companyRef: cref, provider: 'skatteverket', pendingState: signedState })
|
|
const heldAfter = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'skatteverket', cref)
|
|
if (heldAfter > ctx.key.limits.skv_connections_per_company) {
|
|
await deletePendingConnectionById(ctx.supabase, pendingId)
|
|
return quotaExceeded()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const authorizeUrl = buildSkvAuthorizeUrl(redirectUri, signedState, { scope: scope || skvDefaultScopes(), codeChallenge: code_challenge })
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ data: { authorize_url: authorizeUrl, redirect_uri: redirectUri, connector_state: signedState } })
|
|
})
|