* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
298 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
298 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import { createServiceClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
|
|
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
|
import { z } from 'zod'
|
|
import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
|
|
import { withRouteContext } from '@/lib/api/with-route-context'
|
|
import { validateBody } from '@/lib/api/validate'
|
|
import { generateInviteToken, getInviteExpiry } from '@/lib/auth/invite-tokens'
|
|
import { getErrorMessage } from '@/lib/errors/get-error-message'
|
|
import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
|
|
import { getMultiUserState } from '@/lib/entitlements/multi-user'
|
|
import { getEmailService } from '@/lib/email/service'
|
|
import { getSenderForCompany, getBaseUrlForBrand } from '@/lib/email/brand-sender'
|
|
import {
|
|
generateInviteEmailSubject,
|
|
generateInviteEmailHtml,
|
|
generateInviteEmailText,
|
|
} from '@/lib/email/invite-templates'
|
|
import { resolveRequestAppOrigin } from '@/lib/domains/trusted-app-origin'
|
|
|
|
// Loads the email extension so getEmailService() returns the Resend
|
|
// implementation instead of the noop default. Without this, the invite email
|
|
// is silently skipped in dev whenever this route is hit before any other
|
|
// init'd route in the process.
|
|
ensureInitialized()
|
|
|
|
const InviteSchema = z.object({
|
|
email: z.string().trim().toLowerCase().pipe(z.string().email('Ogiltig e-postadress.')),
|
|
role: z.enum(['admin', 'member', 'viewer']).default('viewer'),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* First local-part character + *** + domain, e.g. "j***@example.com".
|
|
* Keeps invitee PII out of the log record while leaving enough to tell
|
|
* WHICH invite failed. The logger's own redaction would otherwise replace
|
|
* a raw address with [REDACTED_EMAIL] (lib/observability/redact.ts); the
|
|
* masked form does not match that email pattern, so it survives intact.
|
|
*/
|
|
function maskEmail(email: string): string {
|
|
const at = email.indexOf('@')
|
|
if (at <= 0) return '***'
|
|
return `${email[0]}***${email.slice(at)}`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* POST /api/company/members/invite
|
|
* Invite a user to the current company (e.g., a client as viewer).
|
|
* Only company owners and admins can invite.
|
|
*
|
|
* The accept link (inviteUrl) is ALWAYS returned in the response, whether or
|
|
* not the invitation email went out, so the inviter can share it directly.
|
|
* This is the only place the raw link exists: tokens are stored hashed
|
|
* (lib/auth/invite-tokens.ts), so a self-hosted operator without a mail
|
|
* provider (#1710) or an inviter whose mail bounced would otherwise hold an
|
|
* invitation nobody can accept. There is no re-send for company invites:
|
|
* revoke and invite again to get a fresh link.
|
|
*/
|
|
export const POST = withRouteContext(
|
|
'company_members.invite',
|
|
async (request, ctx) => {
|
|
const { companyId, user, log } = ctx
|
|
const serviceClient = await createServiceClient()
|
|
|
|
// Check caller has permission (owner/admin: stricter than requireWrite)
|
|
const { data: callerMembership } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('company_members')
|
|
.select('role')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('user_id', user.id)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (!callerMembership || !['owner', 'admin'].includes(callerMembership.role)) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Behörighet saknas.' }, { status: 403 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Multi-user seat gate: inviting more people requires the multi_user
|
|
// capability (paid plan or trial). A company in its post-lapse grace
|
|
// window may still invite (its people were promised 20 undisturbed
|
|
// days); only the frozen state blocks. Same envelope shape as
|
|
// capabilityBlockedResponse so the UI upsells consistently.
|
|
const multiUserAccess = await getMultiUserState(serviceClient, companyId)
|
|
if (multiUserAccess.state === 'frozen') {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{
|
|
error: 'Bjud in fler personer med betald plan.',
|
|
error_en: 'Invite more people with a paid plan.',
|
|
capability_blocked: true,
|
|
capability: CAPABILITY.multi_user,
|
|
},
|
|
{ status: 403 },
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const validation = await validateBody(request, InviteSchema, {
|
|
log,
|
|
operation: 'company_members.invite',
|
|
})
|
|
if (!validation.success) return validation.response
|
|
const { email, role } = validation.data
|
|
|
|
// Check if email is already a member of this company
|
|
const { data: existingMembers } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('company_members')
|
|
.select('id, user_id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
|
|
if (existingMembers && existingMembers.length > 0) {
|
|
const memberUserIds = existingMembers.map((m) => m.user_id)
|
|
const { data: memberProfiles } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('profiles')
|
|
.select('id, email')
|
|
.in('id', memberUserIds)
|
|
|
|
const alreadyMember = memberProfiles?.some(
|
|
(p) => p.email?.toLowerCase() === email
|
|
)
|
|
if (alreadyMember) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Denna person är redan medlem.' }, { status: 409 })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for existing pending invite
|
|
const { data: existingInvite } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('company_invitations')
|
|
.select('id, status')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('email', email)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (existingInvite && existingInvite.status === 'pending') {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'En inbjudan har redan skickats till denna e-post.' }, { status: 409 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get company name for the email
|
|
const { data: company } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('companies')
|
|
.select('name')
|
|
.eq('id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
// Generate token
|
|
const { token, hash } = generateInviteToken()
|
|
const expiresAt = getInviteExpiry()
|
|
|
|
// The request host is used only when it is the canonical app host or an
|
|
// exact registered white-label domain. A spoofed Host header falls back to
|
|
// NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL, so neither the email nor GoTrue gets an open
|
|
// redirect target.
|
|
const appOrigin = resolveRequestAppOrigin(request)
|
|
|
|
// Self-hosted installations that turn public signup off in GoTrue
|
|
// (disable_signup) set AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED=true to mirror that config:
|
|
// GoTrue offers no clean server-side read of the setting. Without this,
|
|
// an invitee with no account is routed to /register, where
|
|
// supabase.auth.signUp is rejected with "Signups not allowed for this
|
|
// instance" and the invite dead-ends. Provision the account via the auth
|
|
// admin invite API instead. Hosted keeps the flag unset: nothing in this
|
|
// block runs and behavior is unchanged.
|
|
const signupsDisabled = process.env.AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED === 'true'
|
|
let userProvisioned = false
|
|
if (signupsDisabled) {
|
|
const { data: emailExists, error: existsError } = await serviceClient.rpc(
|
|
'check_email_exists',
|
|
{ email_to_check: email },
|
|
)
|
|
if (existsError) {
|
|
// GoTrue is the authority: attempt provisioning anyway and let a
|
|
// duplicate surface there instead of silently skipping the invitee.
|
|
log.warn('check_email_exists failed; attempting provisioning anyway', {
|
|
message: existsError.message,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!emailExists) {
|
|
// Provision BEFORE the invitation row is written: a failure here
|
|
// leaves nothing half-created behind, so the admin can retry cleanly
|
|
// after fixing the cause (typically GoTrue SMTP configuration).
|
|
// The redirect lands the invitee back on the invite page with a
|
|
// session; /auth/callback routes type=invite verifications to the
|
|
// set-password surface first.
|
|
const { error: provisionError } = await serviceClient.auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail(
|
|
email,
|
|
{ redirectTo: `${appOrigin}/invite/${token}` },
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if (provisionError) {
|
|
const alreadyRegistered =
|
|
provisionError.code === 'email_exists' ||
|
|
/already been registered/i.test(provisionError.message)
|
|
if (!alreadyRegistered) {
|
|
// Never report a silently-successful invite when the invitee
|
|
// cannot actually get an account.
|
|
log.error('invitee auth provisioning failed', new Error(provisionError.message), {
|
|
to: maskEmail(email),
|
|
})
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: getErrorMessage(provisionError, { context: 'auth', statusCode: 502 }) },
|
|
{ status: 502 },
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// The account exists after all (stale check_email_exists answer):
|
|
// proceed exactly as for an existing user.
|
|
} else {
|
|
userProvisioned = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Upsert invitation
|
|
if (existingInvite) {
|
|
const { error } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('company_invitations')
|
|
.update({
|
|
token_hash: hash,
|
|
invited_by: user.id,
|
|
status: 'pending',
|
|
expires_at: expiresAt.toISOString(),
|
|
role,
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', existingInvite.id)
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Kunde inte skapa inbjudan.' }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
const { error } = await serviceClient
|
|
.from('company_invitations')
|
|
.insert({
|
|
company_id: companyId,
|
|
email,
|
|
role,
|
|
token_hash: hash,
|
|
invited_by: user.id,
|
|
status: 'pending',
|
|
expires_at: expiresAt.toISOString(),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Kunde inte skapa inbjudan.' }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send email. email_sent is surfaced in the response so the UI can tell
|
|
// the user when the invitation exists but the mail never went out:
|
|
// previously a send failure was invisible (invite looked sent).
|
|
// Brand mail (WL-13): sender identity and the invite link follow the
|
|
// brand of the company the invite concerns; a company without a brand
|
|
// uses the validated request origin (appOrigin) and sender exactly as
|
|
// before.
|
|
const sender = await getSenderForCompany(companyId)
|
|
const appUrl = sender.brand ? getBaseUrlForBrand(sender.brand) : appOrigin
|
|
const inviteUrl = `${appUrl}/invite/${token}`
|
|
const emailService = getEmailService()
|
|
let emailSent = false
|
|
if (emailService.isConfigured()) {
|
|
const emailData = {
|
|
companyName: company?.name || 'Företag',
|
|
inviterEmail: user.email || '',
|
|
inviteUrl,
|
|
appName: sender.brand?.appName,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const result = await emailService.sendEmail({
|
|
to: email,
|
|
subject: generateInviteEmailSubject(emailData),
|
|
html: generateInviteEmailHtml(emailData),
|
|
text: generateInviteEmailText(emailData),
|
|
fromName: sender.fromName ?? undefined,
|
|
fromAddress: sender.fromAddress ?? undefined,
|
|
replyTo: sender.replyTo ?? undefined,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (result.success) {
|
|
emailSent = true
|
|
log.info('invite email sent', { to: email, messageId: result.messageId })
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.error('invite email send failed', new Error(result.error ?? 'unknown'), { to: email })
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.warn('email service not configured: invite email skipped', { to: email })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
data: {
|
|
email,
|
|
status: 'pending',
|
|
email_sent: emailSent,
|
|
user_provisioned: userProvisioned,
|
|
// The accept link is always returned so the inviter can share it
|
|
// directly, e.g. when the mail bounced or no mail provider is
|
|
// configured (self-hosted without Resend). Same contract as
|
|
// POST /api/team/invite.
|
|
inviteUrl,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
},
|
|
{ requireWrite: true },
|
|
)
|