Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
104 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
104 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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/**
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* Stateless OAuth auth codes.
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* The auth code is an AES-256-GCM encrypted JSON payload containing
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* the user ID, PKCE code_challenge, and expiry.
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*
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* The API key is NOT embedded: it gets created at token exchange
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* after PKCE verification, preventing orphaned keys.
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*/
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const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
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const CODE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000 // 5 minutes
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function getEncryptionKey(): Buffer {
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const secret = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
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if (!secret) throw new Error('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY is required')
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest()
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}
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export interface AuthCodePayload {
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userId: string
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codeChallenge: string
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redirectUri: string
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/**
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* Scopes the user consented to grant the resulting API key. Undefined on
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* codes minted before this field was added: the token endpoint falls back
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* to ALL_SCOPES so existing Claude flows are unaffected.
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*/
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scopes?: string[]
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/**
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* Company shown on the consent page and used to cap `scopes` to the user's
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* role there. The token route binds the key to it and re-checks the role
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* cap against it. Null for an account with no company yet (issue #1814);
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* undefined on codes minted before the field existed, where the token
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* route falls back to resolving the active company itself.
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*/
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companyId?: string | null
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exp: number
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}
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export function createAuthCode(payload: Omit<AuthCodePayload, 'exp'>): string {
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const data: AuthCodePayload = {
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...payload,
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exp: Date.now() + CODE_TTL_MS,
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}
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const key = getEncryptionKey()
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12)
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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const json = JSON.stringify(data)
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const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(json, 'utf8'), cipher.final()])
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
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const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, tag, encrypted])
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return combined.toString('base64url')
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}
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export function decryptAuthCode(code: string): AuthCodePayload | null {
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try {
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const key = getEncryptionKey()
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const combined = Buffer.from(code, 'base64url')
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const iv = combined.subarray(0, 12)
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const tag = combined.subarray(12, 28)
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const encrypted = combined.subarray(28)
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag)
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const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(encrypted), decipher.final()])
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const payload: AuthCodePayload = JSON.parse(decrypted.toString('utf8'))
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if (Date.now() > payload.exp) return null
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return payload
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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/**
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* Verify PKCE: SHA256(code_verifier) must equal the stored code_challenge.
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* Only S256 is supported (plain is insecure and not advertised).
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*/
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export function verifyPkce(
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codeVerifier: string,
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codeChallenge: string
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): boolean {
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const hash = crypto
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.createHash('sha256')
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.update(codeVerifier)
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.digest('base64url')
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return hash === codeChallenge
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}
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/**
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* Hash an auth code for replay tracking.
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*/
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export function hashAuthCode(code: string): string {
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(code).digest('hex')
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}
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