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e7f0070e84
Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
27 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
27 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
import 'server-only'
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import crypto from 'crypto'
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/**
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* HMAC identity verification for PostHog Support (conversations).
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*
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* Without it, a support ticket is scoped to one browser session: the user
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* loses the thread when they switch device, and recovery is by email link.
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* With it, PostHog trusts that this browser really is `distinctId`, so the
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* thread follows the person.
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*
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* The hash MUST be computed server-side. `POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY` is a real
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* secret (it also authenticates external API requests), so it is deliberately
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* NOT `NEXT_PUBLIC_`: it must never reach the client bundle. Only the derived
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* hash crosses to the browser, which is safe because it is per-user and
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* useless without the key.
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*
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* Returns null when the key is unset, which is the normal state for local
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* dev, CI and self-hosted. Callers degrade to unverified (browser-scoped)
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* tickets rather than failing.
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*/
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export function computeIdentityHash(distinctId: string): string | null {
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const secret = process.env.POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY
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if (!secret || !distinctId) return null
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return crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(distinctId).digest('hex')
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}
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