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e7f0070e84
Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
80 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
80 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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/**
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* AES-256-GCM for mailbox refresh tokens.
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*
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* A mail grant is the hottest credential this product holds: it reads someone's
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* correspondence, not just their backups. So the key is its own env var by
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* preference (MAIL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, 32 bytes hex) and can be rotated
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* without touching the database password, following the Skatteverket
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* token-store rather than cloud-backup's service-role derivation.
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*
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* The derived fallback exists so local development and self-hosted deployments
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* work before anyone sets the variable; it is the same trust boundary as the
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* database itself, and the purpose string keeps it distinct from every other
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* derivation in the codebase.
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*/
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const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
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function getKey(): Buffer {
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const dedicated = process.env.MAIL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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if (dedicated && dedicated.trim().length > 0) {
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const buf = Buffer.from(dedicated.trim(), 'hex')
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if (buf.length !== 32) {
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throw new Error('MAIL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY must be 32 bytes of hex (openssl rand -hex 32)')
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}
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return buf
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}
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const secret = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
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if (!secret) throw new Error('MAIL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY or SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY is required')
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update('mail-connections:v1:' + secret).digest()
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}
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export function encryptToken(plaintext: string): string {
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const key = getKey()
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12)
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()])
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
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return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, encrypted]).toString('base64url')
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}
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export function decryptToken(ciphertext: string): string {
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const key = getKey()
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const combined = Buffer.from(ciphertext, 'base64url')
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const iv = combined.subarray(0, 12)
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const tag = combined.subarray(12, 28)
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const encrypted = combined.subarray(28)
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag)
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return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(encrypted), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8')
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}
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/**
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* Short-lived signed state for OAuth CSRF protection. Stateless and
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* self-expiring, so a callback needs no database round-trip to be trusted.
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*/
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const STATE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000
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interface StatePayload {
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u: string
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c: string
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e: number
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}
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export function createOAuthState(userId: string, companyId: string): string {
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const payload: StatePayload = { u: userId, c: companyId, e: Date.now() + STATE_TTL_MS }
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return encryptToken(JSON.stringify(payload))
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}
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export function verifyOAuthState(state: string): { userId: string; companyId: string } | null {
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try {
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const payload = JSON.parse(decryptToken(state)) as StatePayload
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if (Date.now() > payload.e) return null
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return { userId: payload.u, companyId: payload.c }
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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