Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
349 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
349 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { withConnectorAuth, type ConnectorContext } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/with-connector-auth'
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import { getAuthorizationHeader } from '@/lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt'
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import { reserveUpstream } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/upstream-budget'
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import {
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activateByPendingState,
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countHeldConnections,
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createPendingConnection,
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deletePendingConnectionById,
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findByAccountUid,
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findByHandle,
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findPendingByState,
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revokeByHandle,
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touchConnection,
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} from '@/lib/connect/hosted/ledger'
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import { signConnectorState, verifyConnectorState } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/state'
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/**
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* Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances (WS3 PR5).
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*
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* The instance calls this with its connector key; the proxy adds Arcim's EB
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* JWT and forwards to Enable Banking. The instance never holds the EB
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* credential; the bank session id it gets back rests on the instance. This
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* route is what makes that split safe: a strict path allowlist (never an open
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* passthrough), per-key + global rate budget on every upstream call, a
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* per-company connection quota checked at authorize time, and an ownership
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* ledger so an instance can only use sessions/accounts it obtained through its
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* own key.
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*
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* Consent handoff: POST /auth's redirect_url is rewritten to OUR hosted EB
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* callback (already registered with EB), and the upstream `state` is replaced
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* by a signed connector state carrying the instance's own return URL. The
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* hosted EB callback (app/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback) detects that
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* signed state and 302s the browser back to the instance with the code, so no
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* new redirect URI has to be registered at Enable Banking per instance.
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*/
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/**
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* The EB base URL must be https (http only for loopback dev): forwardToEb
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* sends Arcim's EB JWT in Authorization, so a plaintext override would ship
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* the credential unencrypted. Resolved lazily so a bad env fails the request
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* (500 via the wrapper), never the build.
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*/
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function ebBaseUrl(): string {
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const raw = (
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process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL_PRODUCTION ||
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process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL ||
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'https://api.enablebanking.com'
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).replace(/\/+$/, '')
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const url = new URL(raw)
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const loopback = url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1'
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if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(url.protocol === 'http:' && loopback)) {
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throw new Error('ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL must be https: the EB JWT is sent in Authorization')
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}
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return raw
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}
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const COMPANY_HEADER = 'x-connector-company'
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const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
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function requireScope(ctx: ConnectorContext): NextResponse | null {
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if (ctx.key.scopes.includes('bank_sync')) return null
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'This connector key does not include bank sync', code: 'CONNECTOR_SCOPE_MISSING' },
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{ status: 403 },
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)
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}
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function companyRef(request: Request): string | null {
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return request.headers.get(COMPANY_HEADER)?.trim() || null
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}
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async function budgetOr429(ctx: ConnectorContext): Promise<NextResponse | null> {
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const budget = await reserveUpstream(ctx.supabase, 'bank')
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if (budget.ok) return null
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ctx.log.warn('bank connector budget exhausted', { scope: budget.scope })
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'Bank connector is busy, try again shortly', code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED', scope: budget.scope },
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{ status: 429, headers: { 'Retry-After': String(budget.retryAfterSec) } },
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)
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}
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// Statuses that must carry no body (RFC 9110). new Response(text, {status:204})
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// throws in undici, so pass a null body through for these.
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const NULL_BODY_STATUS = new Set([204, 205, 304])
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interface EbResult {
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status: number
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ok: boolean
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/** null for the RFC 9110 bodyless statuses. */
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text: string | null
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contentType: string | null
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}
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/**
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* Forward a request to Enable Banking with Arcim's JWT and read the body
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* INSIDE the timeout window: clearing the timer at headers-received left an
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* upstream that stalls mid-body holding the request open forever.
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*/
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async function forwardToEb(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<EbResult> {
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
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try {
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const res = await fetch(`${ebBaseUrl()}${path}`, {
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method,
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signal: controller.signal,
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// A followed redirect would resend the EB JWT to the redirect target.
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redirect: 'error',
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headers: {
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Authorization: getAuthorizationHeader(),
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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Accept: 'application/json',
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},
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...(body !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(body) } : {}),
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})
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const text = NULL_BODY_STATUS.has(res.status) ? null : await res.text()
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return { status: res.status, ok: res.ok, text, contentType: res.headers.get('content-type') }
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout)
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}
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}
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function passthrough(res: EbResult): NextResponse {
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if (res.text === null) {
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return new NextResponse(null, { status: res.status })
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}
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return new NextResponse(res.text, {
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status: res.status,
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headers: { 'Content-Type': res.contentType ?? 'application/json' },
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})
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}
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function pathOf(request: Request): string {
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const idx = request.url.indexOf('/api/connect/bank')
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const rest = idx === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(idx + '/api/connect/bank'.length)
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return rest.split('?')[0].replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/'
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}
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function queryOf(request: Request): string {
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const q = request.url.indexOf('?')
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return q === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(q)
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}
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const HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK = () =>
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`${(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback`
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export const GET = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
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const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
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if (scopeError) return scopeError
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const path = pathOf(request)
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// GET /aspsps — bank list. Rate-budgeted, no ownership.
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if (path === '/aspsps') {
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/aspsps${queryOf(request)}`))
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}
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// GET /sessions/{id} — must own the session.
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const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
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if (sessionMatch) {
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const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
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const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
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if (!owned) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`))
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}
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// GET /accounts/{uid}/balances|transactions — must own the account.
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const acctMatch = /^\/accounts\/([^/]+)\/(balances|transactions)$/.exec(path)
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if (acctMatch) {
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const uid = decodeURIComponent(acctMatch[1])
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const owned = await findByAccountUid(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, accountUid: uid })
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if (!owned) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(uid)}/${acctMatch[2]}${queryOf(request)}`))
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}
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return notAllowed()
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})
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export const POST = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
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const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
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if (scopeError) return scopeError
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const path = pathOf(request)
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const cref = companyRef(request)
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// POST /auth — start a bank authorization for one company.
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if (path === '/auth') {
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if (!cref) return missingCompany()
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let payload: Record<string, unknown>
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try {
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payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const instanceReturn = typeof payload.redirect_url === 'string' ? payload.redirect_url : null
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if (!instanceReturn || !isOnInstance(instanceReturn, ctx.key.instanceUrl)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'redirect_url must be on the connector key\'s instance', code: 'CONNECTOR_REDIRECT_INVALID' },
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{ status: 400 },
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)
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}
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// Per-company connection quota (the sold package). Counting alone is a
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// TOCTOU race under concurrent /auth calls, so the pending row doubles as
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// a reservation: fast-reject on the pre-count, insert, then RE-count and
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// roll the own row back when over the limit. Fresh pending rows reserve
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// quota for the 15-minute consent window (see countHeldConnections).
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const quotaExceeded = () =>
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NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: 'Bank connection quota reached for this company',
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code: 'CONNECTOR_QUOTA_EXCEEDED',
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limit: ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company,
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},
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{ status: 403 },
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)
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const held = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
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if (held >= ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) return quotaExceeded()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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const instanceState = typeof payload.state === 'string' ? payload.state : ''
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const signedState = signConnectorState({ kid: ctx.key.id, svc: 'bank', ret: instanceReturn, st: instanceState, cref })
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const provider = typeof (payload.aspsp as { name?: string } | undefined)?.name === 'string'
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? String((payload.aspsp as { name: string }).name)
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: null
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const pendingId = await createPendingConnection(ctx.supabase, {
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keyId: ctx.key.id,
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service: 'bank',
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companyRef: cref,
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provider,
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pendingState: signedState,
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})
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const heldAfter = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
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if (heldAfter > ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) {
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await deletePendingConnectionById(ctx.supabase, pendingId)
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return quotaExceeded()
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}
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// Rewrite the redirect to OUR registered callback and swap in the signed state.
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const ebBody = { ...payload, redirect_url: HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK(), state: signedState }
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('POST', '/auth', ebBody))
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}
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// POST /sessions — finalize after consent, record the session in the ledger.
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if (path === '/sessions') {
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let payload: Record<string, unknown>
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try {
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payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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// The instance sends back the signed connector state it received. The
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// code is only exchanged AGAINST that state's own pending row: verified
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// signature, this key, bank service, and the row still pending. Without
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// the binding, a code could be exchanged under a foreign or consumed
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// state, minting an upstream session the ledger never records.
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const pendingState = typeof payload.connector_state === 'string' ? payload.connector_state : null
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if (!pendingState) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing connector_state', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const verified = verifyConnectorState(pendingState)
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if (!verified.ok) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid connector state', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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if (verified.payload.kid !== ctx.key.id || verified.payload.svc !== 'bank') {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'State does not belong to this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 403 })
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}
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const pendingRow = await findPendingByState(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, pendingState })
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if (!pendingRow) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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const ebRes = await forwardToEb('POST', '/sessions', { code: payload.code })
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if (ebRes.ok && ebRes.text !== null) {
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try {
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const session = JSON.parse(ebRes.text) as { session_id?: string; accounts?: Array<{ uid?: string }> }
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if (session.session_id) {
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const accountUids = (session.accounts ?? [])
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.map((a) => a.uid)
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.filter((u): u is string => typeof u === 'string')
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const activated = await activateByPendingState(ctx.supabase, {
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keyId: ctx.key.id,
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pendingState,
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handle: session.session_id,
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accountUids,
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})
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if (!activated) {
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// The pending row was consumed between the precheck and now (a
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// concurrent replay of the same state). An unrecorded upstream
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// session must not be handed out: close it and refuse.
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await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(session.session_id)}`)
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'Connector state already consumed', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_CONSUMED' },
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{ status: 409 },
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)
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}
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}
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} catch (err) {
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ctx.log.warn('could not record session in ledger', { err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) })
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}
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}
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return passthrough(ebRes)
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}
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return notAllowed()
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})
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export const DELETE = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
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const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
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if (scopeError) return scopeError
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const path = pathOf(request)
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const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
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if (!sessionMatch) return notAllowed()
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const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
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const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
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if (!owned) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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const res = await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`)
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// Revoke the ledger row only when the upstream delete actually took (or the
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// session is already gone upstream): revoking on a transient EB error would
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// leave the remote session alive but permanently unreachable via the proxy.
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if (res.ok || res.status === 404) {
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await revokeByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
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}
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return passthrough(res)
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})
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function isOnInstance(url: string, instanceUrl: string | null): boolean {
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if (!instanceUrl) return false
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try {
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return new URL(url).origin === new URL(instanceUrl).origin
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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function notAllowed(): NextResponse {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not allowed', code: 'CONNECTOR_PATH_NOT_ALLOWED' }, { status: 403 })
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}
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function notOwned(): NextResponse {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unknown connection for this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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function missingCompany(): NextResponse {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing X-Connector-Company header', code: 'CONNECTOR_COMPANY_MISSING' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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