Files
accounted/.github/zizmor.yml
T
admin e7f0070e84
masterplan-lock / check (push) Successful in 19s
ci / sonar (push) Failing after 21s
security / scan (push) Failing after 1m37s
fix(restore): återställ default branch-filer som raderades av docs-publiceringen (7e33543)
Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i
server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma
strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
2026-11-10 09:37:22 +01:00

31 lines
1.6 KiB
YAML

# zizmor configuration. See .github/workflows/zizmor.yml for why this repo
# audits its own CI.
#
# Suppressions here are reviewed exceptions, not a backlog. Anything added needs
# a reason that says why the generic rule does not apply, so the Security tab
# stays worth reading.
rules:
dangerous-triggers:
ignore:
# zizmor's position is that `workflow_run` is almost always used
# insecurely, and it is right in general: the usual mistake is triggering
# on a fork's build and then checking out that fork's code with secrets in
# scope. Both uses below are the opposite pattern, and both are the
# documented fix for the trigger they replaced.
#
# Stage 2 of the fork-safe compliance review. It holds the AWS secrets and
# a write token, and it checks out ONLY the base repo: fork code never
# executes here. The untrusted PR diff arrives as a downloaded artifact
# and is passed to the model as data. This is precisely what GitHub
# recommends instead of `pull_request_target` + checking out the PR head,
# which is what this workflow used to be.
- swedish-compliance-review.yml
# Re-scans an image that has already been published to GHCR. It checks out
# no source at all and only fires on `conclusion == 'success'` of a
# workflow that itself runs only on main and release tags, so there is no
# untrusted input and no fork ref in reach. The trigger exists to shrink
# the window between publishing an image and gating it from up to 24h
# (the cron) down to the scan's own duration.
- docker-image-scan.yml