Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.8
6be6510d73
* fix(entitlements): gate paid AI document OCR server-side (free-tier leak) Free/manual-tier companies could trigger paid Bedrock OCR (extractInvoiceFields) with no `ai` capability check, on every transport: - invoice-inbox HTTP paths — /upload + email /inbound (shared uploadAndExtract), /items/:id/attach-document, /items/:id/retry-extraction (4 call sites, zero capability refs); - the gnubok_upload_document MCP tool — absent from MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP, so a free-tier API key (incl. the claude.ai connector's minted gnubok_sk_ key) got unlimited AI extraction. This disproved the keys.ts "no MCP tool invokes AI" comment. Fix (money-blocker for the free/paid tier cutover): - Gate the 3 inbox call sites on hasCapability(CAPABILITY.ai). Upload + attach degrade gracefully (document still stored; extraction skipped with reason `no_ai_entitlement`, highest priority in the existing skipReason chain). Retry is an explicit "run AI now" action, so it hard-blocks with 403 capabilityBlockedResponse. - Register gnubok_upload_document -> CAPABILITY.ai in MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP; the dispatcher already enforces the map. Correct the stale keys.ts comment and the misleading "deterministic field extraction" tool description + manifest copy (the extension migrated regex -> AI OCR). Tests: no-AI upload/attach skip + retry 403 (sandbox-skip-extraction), retry 403 (retry-extraction), and the MCP map contract + refined dispatch<->commit parity (capability-maps: upload_document is dispatch-only, no commit counterpart). Self-hosted stays all-on (hasCapability short-circuits). No migration. Follow-up (not in scope): capability-blind DashboardNav (free/paid rails identical) and /chat gated on isVerified not `ai` — see dev_docs/nav_ia_redesign.md Part 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): assert gnubok_upload_document is ai-gated at dispatch The gnubok_upload_document handler runs extractInvoiceFields (Bedrock OCR) inline rather than through the entitlement-gated uploadAndExtract, so the central MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP dispatch check is the only paywall on that transport. Lock it with a test (flagged by PR review as an untested money path) so a free-tier connector key can never reach paid OCR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
92 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Capability keys — the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
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* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
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* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
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* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
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*
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* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
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* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
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*/
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export const CAPABILITY = {
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/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
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ai: 'ai',
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/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
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bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
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/** Skatteverket filing/sync — VAT, AGI, skattekonto — via BankID. */
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skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
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/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
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email_send: 'email_send',
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/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated — identity/lookup is always free. */
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org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
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/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated — identity/lookup is always free. */
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vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
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/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
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currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
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/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free — never hold a customer's data hostage). */
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cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
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/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
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migration: 'migration',
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/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
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bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
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} as const
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export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
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/**
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* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
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* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
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* services only.
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*
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* KEPT FREE on purpose:
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* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login —
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* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
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* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
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* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
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*
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* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
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* as an auth step — what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
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* filing service, not the identity check.
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*/
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export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
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CAPABILITY.ai,
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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CAPABILITY.email_send,
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] as const
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/**
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* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
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* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
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* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
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* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
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* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
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* stay free — the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
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*
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* gnubok_upload_document invokes AI (Bedrock document OCR via
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* extractInvoiceFields), so it is gated on CAPABILITY.ai — the same paywall the
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* HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without this entry a free-tier
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* API key (incl. the claude.ai connector's minted gnubok_sk_ key) could trigger
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* paid AI extraction. bank_sync has no MCP tool (bank sync is cron/HTTP only).
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*/
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export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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// AI document OCR (Bedrock) — the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
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gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
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} as const
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/**
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* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
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* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
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* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
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* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
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* committed once the grant has expired — regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
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* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
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*/
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export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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} as const
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