Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
123 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
123 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
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import { isForbiddenOrigin, forbiddenOriginResponse } from '../origin-guard'
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const ENDPOINT = 'https://app.gnubok.se/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp'
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function makeRequest(headers: Record<string, string> = {}, url = ENDPOINT): Request {
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return new Request(url, { method: 'POST', headers })
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}
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describe('isForbiddenOrigin', () => {
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const originalAppUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
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beforeEach(() => {
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delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
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})
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afterEach(() => {
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if (originalAppUrl === undefined) {
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delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
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} else {
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = originalAppUrl
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}
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})
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it('allows requests without an Origin header (server-to-server clients)', () => {
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// claude.ai backend, Claude Desktop, npx gnubok-mcp, Claude Code: none
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// send Origin. This is the path every known MCP client takes.
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expect(isForbiddenOrigin(makeRequest())).toBe(false)
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})
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it('allows a same-origin browser request (Origin host matches Host header)', () => {
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(
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makeRequest({ origin: 'https://app.gnubok.se', host: 'app.gnubok.se' }),
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),
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).toBe(false)
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})
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it('allows same-origin on a Vercel preview host', () => {
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(
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makeRequest(
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{ origin: 'https://erp-base-abc123.vercel.app', host: 'erp-base-abc123.vercel.app' },
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'https://erp-base-abc123.vercel.app/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp',
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),
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),
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).toBe(false)
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})
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it('allows an Origin matching NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL even when Host was rewritten by a proxy', () => {
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = 'https://app.gnubok.se'
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(
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makeRequest(
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{ origin: 'https://app.gnubok.se', host: 'internal-proxy.local' },
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'https://internal-proxy.local/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp',
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),
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),
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).toBe(false)
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})
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it('rejects a foreign Origin (DNS-rebinding / cross-site browser request)', () => {
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(
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makeRequest({ origin: 'https://evil.example.com', host: 'app.gnubok.se' }),
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),
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).toBe(true)
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})
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it('rejects a foreign Origin that only differs by port', () => {
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(
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makeRequest({ origin: 'https://app.gnubok.se:8443', host: 'app.gnubok.se' }),
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),
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).toBe(true)
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})
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it('rejects an opaque "null" Origin', () => {
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expect(isForbiddenOrigin(makeRequest({ origin: 'null', host: 'app.gnubok.se' }))).toBe(true)
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})
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it('rejects a malformed Origin header', () => {
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expect(
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isForbiddenOrigin(makeRequest({ origin: 'not a url', host: 'app.gnubok.se' })),
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).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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describe('forbiddenOriginResponse', () => {
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it('returns a 403 JSON-RPC error envelope', async () => {
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const res = forbiddenOriginResponse()
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expect(res.status).toBe(403)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body).toEqual({
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jsonrpc: '2.0',
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id: null,
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error: { code: -32600, message: 'Origin not allowed' },
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})
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})
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})
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describe('mcp-server apiRoutes origin enforcement', () => {
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// The dynamic import pulls in the full 9k-line server module; that parse
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// alone takes ~4s and flirts with the 5s default timeout under full-suite
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// parallel load. The test is import-bound, not logic-bound: give it
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// explicit headroom instead of letting machine load decide the outcome.
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it('rejects foreign-Origin requests on every /mcp method before dispatch', async () => {
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const { mcpServerExtension } = await import('../index')
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const routes = (mcpServerExtension.apiRoutes ?? []).filter((r) => r.path === '/mcp')
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expect(routes.map((r) => r.method).sort()).toEqual(['DELETE', 'GET', 'POST'])
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for (const route of routes) {
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const res = await route.handler(
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new Request(ENDPOINT, {
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method: route.method,
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headers: { origin: 'https://evil.example.com', host: 'app.gnubok.se' },
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}),
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)
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expect(res.status, `${route.method} /mcp`).toBe(403)
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}
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}, 20_000)
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})
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