Files
accounted/extensions/general/invoice-inbox/lib/custom-domains.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 237b77a366 feat: custom inbound mail domains, rot/rut payout file, invoice email texts, security hardening (#878)
* fix(security): guard MCP test keys, RLS role gate + voucher RPC guards, /api MFA gate, deps

- MCP: force dry-run / block writes for test-mode API keys in tools/call (extensions/general/mcp-server)
- DB: current_user_can_write role gate on write policies (40 tables) + tenant guards, SET search_path, REVOKE anon on commit_journal_entry / next_voucher_number / detect_voucher_gaps (migration 20260702093000)
- Middleware: MFA (AAL2) gate on cookie-authenticated /api routes via apiPathSkipsMfaGate
- Deps: npm audit fix clears mailparser/linkify-it/nodemailer/svix/uuid highs; xlsx -> SheetJS 0.20.3

Adds unit + pg-real tests. Does not touch in-progress ROT/RUT or invoice-email-texts work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(invoices): rot/rut begäran om utbetalning — HUS XML (V6), payout tracking + settlement, MCP tool

Generates Skatteverkets begäran-om-utbetalning file (schema V6) from paid
ROT/RUT invoices — no submission API exists, the file is uploaded manually
at skatteverket.se. Headless by design for now: API routes + MCP tool
(gnubok_generate_rot_rut_file), no UI surfaces.

- lib/invoices/rot-rut-file.ts: pure XML generator with deterministic
  per-invoice blockers (hours, work type, personnummer, property info,
  mixed rot+rut, XSD limits) + 31 January deadline warnings
- rot_rut_payout_requests(+items) tables: one active begäran per invoice
  (DB triggers incl. reactivation guard), RLS, audit, pg-real tests
- Settlement: POST /settle books debit 1930 / credit 1513 via the engine
  (source_type rot_rut_payout); partial payouts → partially_paid
- Work-type lists corrected against Begaran.xsd: IT-tjänster is rut-only,
  snöskottning/tillsyn/tvätt added (schablontjänster utfört-only)
- Fix: invoice-level fastighetsbeteckning was validated but never
  persisted — now stamped onto rot lines in build-invoice-write; API
  accepts bostadsrätt pair (lägenhetsnr + BRF orgnr, editor UI deferred)
- invoice_items.brf_org_number migration + MCP scope invoices:write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(invoices): per-company editable invoice email texts

Add an "E-posttexter" section under Settings -> Fakturering where the
subject, greeting, body and sign-off of the standard invoice email can
be customized per company in Swedish and English. Fields pre-fill with
the standard texts and only diffs from the standard are stored
(company_settings.invoice_email_texts JSONB), so future improvements to
the stock wording still reach companies that have not customized. Each
field has a reset-to-standard button; cleared fields snap back.

Texts support a fixed placeholder set (invoice number, customer name,
first name, company, due date, amount) substituted at send time in a
single pass; unknown placeholders stay literal. Custom texts are
HTML-escaped after substitution, newlines become <br> in the HTML
variant, and subject lines are flattened to a single header line.
Overrides apply to standard invoices only - credit notes, proforma and
delivery notes keep the stock texts. All send paths (UI, v1 API, MCP
approval, recurring) pick the texts up via the existing settings row.

The Zod schema half of this change (InvoiceEmailTextsSchema in
lib/api/schemas.ts) was inadvertently included in 8291f745.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(documents): accept PDFs with preamble before %PDF- header, surface content rejections as 400

detectFileMagic required the %PDF- signature at byte 0 (BOM aside),
rejecting genuine PDFs that carry a leading newline or junk bytes —
files every ISO 32000 reader opens fine. Now scan the first 1024 bytes
for the signature, matching real-reader behavior. Image types stay
strict at offset 0 to keep the anti-placeholder defense tight.

Magic-byte rejections were also mislabeled as DOC_UPLOAD_STORAGE_FAILED
(500 'Filen kunde inte sparas'), blaming storage for a client-side file
problem. Both upload routes now map them to a new
DOC_UPLOAD_INVALID_CONTENT (400) with an accurate message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(bookkeeping): full keyboard flow for manual journal entry

Enter now drives the whole verifikat flow: verifikationstext drops into
the first row missing an account, konto commits advance to debet, Enter
on an empty debet hops to kredit, and an entered amount jumps to the
next row. Once the voucher balances, Enter opens the review (unchanged
gate) and the auto-focused confirm posts it — including through the
no-underlag warning dialog. Escape in the inline review goes back to
the form.

Also fixes an Enter footgun in AccountCombobox: a bare Enter on a
freshly focused field no longer selects the first account in the list —
selection now requires typing or arrow navigation; otherwise Enter
re-commits the current value or bubbles to the form-level handler.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add custom inbound domains management for companies

- Implemented functionality to allow companies to claim and manage their own inbound email domains via Resend's API.
- Created a new table `company_inbound_domains` to store domain information, including status and DNS records.
- Added necessary RLS policies to restrict access based on user roles (owner/admin).
- Developed functions for domain normalization, validation, claiming, verification, and removal.
- Implemented webhook handling for domain status updates from Resend.
- Added comprehensive tests for RLS, constraints, and triggers related to the new domain management feature.

* fix: address PR #878 review findings and CI failures

- migrations: drop the ai_usage_tracking policy block from the role-gate
  migration — the table was removed by 20260504120000_remove_ai_subsystem
  and only lingers on staging as drift; a from-scratch chain (pg-real,
  Supabase preview) failed on it
- invoice-inbox: never flip a custom domain to verified off a domain.updated
  webhook alone — confirm the receiving capability with Resend first
  (fail-closed); normalize both sides of the orphan-adoption domain match
- rot/rut: block files where begärt belopp exceeds what the buyer paid
  (DEDUCTION_EXCEEDS_PAYMENT); tighten brf_org_number validation to real
  orgnr shapes; parameterize the settlement bank account (19xx, default 1930)
- rot/rut routes: log acting user on financial mutations, stop swallowing
  item mirror errors, narrow response projections (no customer ids through
  the invoice join); document the deliberate inline-XML decision
- documents: stop echoing raw storage-layer error messages to clients

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: round-2 CI + compliance findings on PR #878

- migrations: the role-gate migration targeted automation_webhooks, which
  20260515170000_webhooks_v2 renamed to webhooks on the canonical chain
  (staging kept the old name — drift); gate public.webhooks instead,
  dropping legacy schema-sync policy names defensively. Restore the
  20260623130000 owner fallback in next_voucher_number that the stale
  copied-verbatim body silently reverted (caught by engine.pg locally).
  Full migration chain verified from scratch against supabase/postgres:15.
- mcp: bump the tools/list payload ceiling 44K -> 45K — main's #877
  qualified-identifier schemas plus this branch's rot/rut tool crossed the
  ceiling only in combination; documented in the test's history log.
- rot/rut: refuse partial settlement before Skatteverkets beslut is
  recorded (would bypass the PATCH lifecycle and strand the request);
  block zero-kronor ärenden (ZERO_DEDUCTION); require sekelsiffra 16 on
  12-digit brf orgnr in both schema validation and normalizeBrfOrgNr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: rename branch migrations off main's colliding versions

After the merge with main, two versions were shared by two files each
(20260702100000: rot_rut_payout_requests vs company_settings_dimensions_
enabled; 20260702130000: invoice_email_texts vs pending_operations_add_
create_dimension_value). psql-based CI applies by filename and doesn't
care, but Supabase branching records migrations by version (PK) — the
second file with the same version breaks the preview with a
schema_migrations_pkey duplicate. Neither branch migration is version-
recorded on staging or prod, so renaming to fresh 20260703 versions is
safe; nothing between the old and new positions depends on these objects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope the /api MFA-gate bypass to real Bearer-auth surfaces

Any Authorization header — attacker-controlled — used to skip the AAL2
gate for every /api route, so a stolen-password AAL1 cookie session could
reach cookie-authenticated routes (which ignore the header) by attaching
`Authorization: x`. The skip is now scoped to the surfaces whose auth
contract IS the header (/api/v1 API keys, the MCP endpoint's OAuth
tokens); pure Bearer callers elsewhere (cron secret, signed webhooks)
carry no cookie session and were never touched by the gate, which only
fires for cookie users. Superagent P2 on PR #878.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: normalize path separators in dimension statutory guard scan

The route scan compared walked file paths against a POSIX-path allowlist,
so the suite failed on Windows (backslash separators) while passing on
Linux CI. Normalize the scanned paths to forward slashes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 13:57:59 +02:00

526 lines
20 KiB
TypeScript

import { Resend } from 'resend'
import type { Domain, DomainStatus } from 'resend'
import { domainToASCII } from 'node:url'
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import type { CompanyInboundDomain, CompanyInboundDomainStatus } from '@/types'
function getResend(): Resend {
const apiKey = process.env.RESEND_API_KEY
if (!apiKey) throw new Error('RESEND_API_KEY is required')
return new Resend(apiKey)
}
export type CustomDomainResult<T> =
| { ok: true; data: T }
| { ok: false; status: number; error: string }
// Public mailbox providers a company can never own. DNS verification is the
// real ownership gate — this list only exists to fail fast with a clear
// message instead of a claim that can never verify.
const PUBLIC_EMAIL_DOMAINS = new Set([
'gmail.com',
'googlemail.com',
'outlook.com',
'hotmail.com',
'hotmail.se',
'live.com',
'live.se',
'msn.com',
'icloud.com',
'me.com',
'mac.com',
'yahoo.com',
'ymail.com',
'protonmail.com',
'proton.me',
'fastmail.com',
'gmx.com',
'telia.com',
'comhem.se',
'spray.se',
'passagen.se',
])
// Accepts what users actually paste — "Faktura.Hansbolag.SE.", a full URL, or
// an email address — and reduces it to a lowercased, punycoded hostname.
// Returns null when no valid hostname can be extracted.
export function normalizeInboundDomain(raw: string): string | null {
let value = String(raw ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()
value = value.replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//, '') // strip scheme
value = value.split('/')[0].split('?')[0]
const atIndex = value.lastIndexOf('@')
if (atIndex !== -1) value = value.slice(atIndex + 1)
value = value.replace(/^\.+|\.+$/g, '')
if (!value) return null
// IDN → punycode (blåbär.se → xn--blbr-noab.se). Returns '' when the input
// is not a valid domain.
const ascii = domainToASCII(value)
if (!ascii) return null
return isValidHostname(ascii) ? ascii : null
}
function isValidHostname(domain: string): boolean {
if (domain.length < 4 || domain.length > 253) return false
const labels = domain.split('.')
if (labels.length < 2) return false
if (!labels.every((l) => /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/.test(l))) return false
// TLD must contain a letter — rejects IP addresses and all-numeric TLDs.
return /[a-z]/.test(labels[labels.length - 1])
}
// Returns a Swedish error message when the domain must not be claimed, or
// null when it is claimable. Blocks public mailbox providers, the shared
// inbound domain (and its subdomains), and the app's own domain.
export function validateClaimableDomain(domain: string): string | null {
if (PUBLIC_EMAIL_DOMAINS.has(domain)) {
return 'Publika e-postdomäner (t.ex. Gmail, Outlook) kan inte användas. Ange en domän som bolaget äger.'
}
const reserved: string[] = []
const shared = process.env.RESEND_INBOUND_DOMAIN?.toLowerCase()
if (shared) reserved.push(shared)
try {
const appHost = new URL(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL ?? '').hostname.toLowerCase()
if (appHost) reserved.push(appHost)
} catch {
// No parseable app URL — nothing extra to reserve.
}
for (const r of reserved) {
if (domain === r || domain.endsWith(`.${r}`)) {
return 'Den här domänen är reserverad och kan inte användas som egen domän.'
}
}
return null
}
// `temporary_failure` is a runtime status the Resend API can still return but
// which the SDK's DomainStatus type dropped in 6.16.0 — accept it explicitly.
export function mapResendDomainStatus(
status: DomainStatus | 'temporary_failure',
): CompanyInboundDomainStatus {
switch (status) {
case 'verified':
return 'verified'
// temporary_failure = a previously verified domain failed a DNS re-check;
// Resend keeps the domain active while it retries (~72h). Keep routing
// rather than silently dropping the customer's invoices on a DNS blip.
case 'temporary_failure':
return 'verified'
case 'failed':
return 'failed'
default:
return 'pending' // 'pending' | 'not_started'
}
}
// Status to persist when a claim first registers OR adopts a domain in Resend.
// A freshly-created domain has no DNS yet, so it is always unverified. An
// ADOPTED orphan (left by a crashed earlier claim, or freed by a deleted
// company whose Resend domain was never cleaned up) may still report 'verified'
// from a previous owner — NEVER inherit that. Force the new claimant to re-prove
// DNS control via checkCustomDomainVerification() before any mail routes;
// otherwise a different tenant could re-claim a freed domain and silently
// inherit routing for mail the original owner's MX still delegates to Resend.
// Kept pure so the security rule is unit-testable.
export function resolveClaimedDomainStatus(
wasAdopted: boolean,
resendStatus: DomainStatus | 'temporary_failure',
): CompanyInboundDomainStatus {
return wasAdopted ? 'pending' : mapResendDomainStatus(resendStatus)
}
// Only domains this feature created (receiving-only) may ever be adopted,
// verified, or deleted from Resend here. The same Resend account also holds
// the platform's OUTBOUND domains (e.g. the invoiceservice@ sender): adopting
// one binds a tenant row to production sending infrastructure, and removing
// one would kill outbound mail for every customer.
export function isReceivingOnlyProfile(
capabilities: { sending?: string; receiving?: string } | null | undefined
): boolean {
return capabilities?.receiving === 'enabled' && capabilities?.sending === 'disabled'
}
export async function getCustomDomain(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string
): Promise<CompanyInboundDomain | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`Failed to load custom domain: ${error.message}`)
return (data as CompanyInboundDomain | null) ?? null
}
// A claim that crashed between the Resend create and the row update leaves an
// orphan domain in our Resend account. On the next claim attempt the create
// fails ("already exists") — adopt the existing Resend domain instead of
// dead-ending the user. Safe because removeCustomDomain() never deletes the
// DB row while the domain still exists in Resend, so an adoptable domain can
// never belong to another live company_inbound_domains row.
async function findExistingResendDomain(resend: Resend, domain: string): Promise<Domain | null> {
let after: string | undefined
for (let page = 0; page < 10; page++) {
const { data, error } = await resend.domains.list(
after ? { limit: 100, after } : { limit: 100 }
)
if (error || !data) return null
// `domain` is already normalized (lowercased, punycoded) — run Resend's
// name through the same normalization so an IDN stored in unicode form
// still matches.
const hit = data.data.find((d) => (normalizeInboundDomain(d.name) ?? d.name.toLowerCase()) === domain)
if (hit) return hit
if (!data.has_more || data.data.length === 0) return null
after = data.data[data.data.length - 1].id
}
return null
}
// Claim a custom inbound domain for the company: insert the row, register the
// domain in our Resend account with the receiving capability, and store the
// DNS records the user must publish. The DB insert goes first so the unique
// indexes ((lower(domain)) and (company_id)) serialize concurrent claims
// before we ever talk to Resend.
export async function claimCustomDomain(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
rawDomain: string
): Promise<CustomDomainResult<CompanyInboundDomain>> {
const domain = normalizeInboundDomain(rawDomain)
if (!domain) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, error: 'Ogiltig domän. Ange t.ex. faktura.dittbolag.se.' }
}
const blocked = validateClaimableDomain(domain)
if (blocked) return { ok: false, status: 400, error: blocked }
const { data: inserted, error: insertError } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.insert({ company_id: companyId, domain, status: 'pending' })
.select('*')
.single()
if (insertError || !inserted) {
if (insertError?.code === '23505') {
const message = insertError.message.includes('idx_company_inbound_domains_company')
? 'Bolaget har redan en egen domän. Ta bort den innan du lägger till en ny.'
: 'Domänen är redan registrerad.'
return { ok: false, status: 409, error: message }
}
return {
ok: false,
status: 500,
error: insertError?.message ?? 'Kunde inte spara domänen.',
}
}
const rollback = async () => {
await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.delete()
.eq('id', inserted.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
}
try {
const resend = getResend()
// Receiving only — we never send from the customer's domain, and skipping
// the sending capability keeps the DNS record list minimal.
let resendDomainId: string
let wasAdopted = false
const created = await resend.domains.create({
name: domain,
region: 'eu-west-1',
capabilities: { receiving: 'enabled', sending: 'disabled' },
})
if (created.error || !created.data) {
const adopted = await findExistingResendDomain(resend, domain)
if (!adopted) {
await rollback()
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: `Kunde inte registrera domänen hos e-postleverantören: ${created.error?.message ?? 'okänt fel'}`,
}
}
// Never adopt a domain this feature didn't create — e.g. the platform's
// own outbound (sending) domains, which live in the same Resend account.
if (!isReceivingOnlyProfile(adopted.capabilities)) {
await rollback()
return {
ok: false,
status: 409,
error:
'Domänen används redan för e-postutskick i plattformen och kan inte användas som inkorgsdomän. Använd en underdomän i stället.',
}
}
resendDomainId = adopted.id
wasAdopted = true
} else {
resendDomainId = created.data.id
}
// get() rather than the create response: on the adoption path we have no
// records yet, and get() returns the same shape either way.
const fetched = await resend.domains.get(resendDomainId)
if (fetched.error || !fetched.data) {
await rollback()
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: `Kunde inte hämta DNS-poster: ${fetched.error?.message ?? 'okänt fel'}`,
}
}
// Adopted orphans never inherit 'verified' — see resolveClaimedDomainStatus.
const status = resolveClaimedDomainStatus(wasAdopted, fetched.data.status)
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.update({
resend_domain_id: resendDomainId,
dns_records: fetched.data.records,
status,
verified_at: status === 'verified' ? new Date().toISOString() : null,
last_checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.eq('id', inserted.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.select('*')
.single()
if (updateError || !updated) {
await rollback()
return { ok: false, status: 500, error: updateError?.message ?? 'Kunde inte spara DNS-poster.' }
}
return { ok: true, data: updated as CompanyInboundDomain }
} catch (err) {
await rollback()
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Domänregistreringen misslyckades.',
}
}
}
// Re-check verification with Resend and persist the outcome. verify() kicks
// off Resend's DNS check; get() reads the (possibly updated) status and the
// per-record state shown in the UI.
export async function checkCustomDomainVerification(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string
): Promise<CustomDomainResult<CompanyInboundDomain>> {
const row = await getCustomDomain(supabase, companyId)
if (!row) return { ok: false, status: 404, error: 'Ingen egen domän är registrerad.' }
if (!row.resend_domain_id) {
return { ok: false, status: 409, error: 'Domänen saknar koppling till e-postleverantören. Ta bort den och lägg till den igen.' }
}
try {
const resend = getResend()
await resend.domains.verify(row.resend_domain_id)
const fetched = await resend.domains.get(row.resend_domain_id)
if (fetched.error || !fetched.data) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: `Kunde inte kontrollera domänen: ${fetched.error?.message ?? 'okänt fel'}`,
}
}
// A domain without the receiving capability can never take inbound mail —
// Resend's 'verified' there only reflects sending records. Fail loudly
// instead of ever flipping such a row to verified (guards legacy rows
// bound to a sending domain before the adopt-profile check existed).
if (fetched.data.capabilities?.receiving !== 'enabled') {
return {
ok: false,
status: 409,
error:
'Domänen är inte konfigurerad för mottagning hos e-postleverantören. Ta bort den och använd en underdomän i stället.',
}
}
const status = mapResendDomainStatus(fetched.data.status)
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.update({
status,
dns_records: fetched.data.records,
last_checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
verified_at: status === 'verified' ? (row.verified_at ?? new Date().toISOString()) : row.verified_at,
})
.eq('id', row.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.select('*')
.single()
if (updateError || !updated) {
return { ok: false, status: 500, error: updateError?.message ?? 'Kunde inte spara status.' }
}
return { ok: true, data: updated as CompanyInboundDomain }
} catch (err) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Kontrollen misslyckades.',
}
}
}
// Remove the custom domain: delete it from Resend first, then the row.
// Order matters — the row is only deleted once the domain is confirmed gone
// from Resend (or was never there). Deleting the row while a verified domain
// lingers in our Resend account would let a later claim adopt a domain whose
// MX still receives someone else's mail.
export async function removeCustomDomain(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string
): Promise<CustomDomainResult<{ removed: true }>> {
const row = await getCustomDomain(supabase, companyId)
if (!row) return { ok: false, status: 404, error: 'Ingen egen domän är registrerad.' }
if (row.resend_domain_id) {
try {
const resend = getResend()
// Only delete Resend domains this feature created (receiving-only). A
// row bound to anything else (pre-guard legacy, e.g. an outbound
// sending domain) must never take production infrastructure down with
// it — skip the Resend removal and just drop the row. Safe, because
// the adopt path refuses non-receiving-only domains, so the leftover
// Resend domain is not adoptable by another company.
const fetched = await resend.domains.get(row.resend_domain_id)
if (fetched.error && fetched.error.statusCode !== 404) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: `Kunde inte kontrollera domänen hos e-postleverantören: ${fetched.error.message}`,
}
}
if (fetched.data && isReceivingOnlyProfile(fetched.data.capabilities)) {
const removed = await resend.domains.remove(row.resend_domain_id)
if (removed.error && removed.error.statusCode !== 404) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: `Kunde inte ta bort domänen hos e-postleverantören: ${removed.error.message}`,
}
}
}
} catch (err) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 502,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Borttagningen misslyckades.',
}
}
}
const { error: deleteError } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.delete()
.eq('id', row.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (deleteError) return { ok: false, status: 500, error: deleteError.message }
return { ok: true, data: { removed: true } }
}
// Webhook-side lookup: given the recipient domains of an inbound email,
// return the owning company for the first verified match (recipient order
// preserved). Catch-all by design — any local part on a verified domain
// routes to the company, so a supplier typing fakturor@ instead of faktura@
// still lands instead of silently vanishing (Resend has already accepted the
// message at SMTP; there is no bounce path).
export async function findCompanyForRecipientDomains(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
recipientDomains: string[]
): Promise<{ companyId: string; domain: string } | null> {
const unique = [...new Set(recipientDomains.map((d) => d.toLowerCase()))]
if (unique.length === 0) return null
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.select('company_id, domain')
.in('domain', unique)
.eq('status', 'verified')
if (error || !data || data.length === 0) return null
const byDomain = new Map(
(data as Array<{ company_id: string; domain: string }>).map((r) => [r.domain.toLowerCase(), r])
)
for (const d of unique) {
const hit = byDomain.get(d)
if (hit) return { companyId: hit.company_id, domain: hit.domain }
}
return null
}
// Applies a Resend `domain.updated` webhook event so verification flips
// without the user pressing "Kontrollera igen". No-op when the domain id is
// unknown (e.g. the account's sending domains). Returns whether a row matched.
export async function applyDomainStatusFromWebhook(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
event: { id: string; status: string; records?: unknown }
): Promise<boolean> {
const { data: row } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.select('id, verified_at')
.eq('resend_domain_id', event.id)
.maybeSingle()
if (!row) return false
const status = mapResendDomainStatus(event.status as DomainStatus)
// The event's 'verified' is the domain's mixed sending/receiving status —
// it carries no capability breakdown, so it can reflect sending-only
// records. Mirror checkCustomDomainVerification: confirm the receiving
// capability with Resend before ever flipping a row to verified. On a
// failed lookup or a sending-only profile, keep the stored status (the
// manual "Kontrollera igen" path remains available) — fail closed, never
// route inbound mail off an unproven capability.
if (status === 'verified') {
let receivingConfirmed = false
try {
const fetched = await getResend().domains.get(event.id)
receivingConfirmed =
!fetched.error && fetched.data?.capabilities?.receiving === 'enabled'
} catch {
receivingConfirmed = false
}
if (!receivingConfirmed) {
const { error } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.update({
...(event.records !== undefined ? { dns_records: event.records } : {}),
last_checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.eq('id', (row as { id: string }).id)
return !error
}
}
const { error } = await supabase
.from('company_inbound_domains')
.update({
status,
...(event.records !== undefined ? { dns_records: event.records } : {}),
last_checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
verified_at:
status === 'verified'
? ((row as { verified_at: string | null }).verified_at ?? new Date().toISOString())
: (row as { verified_at: string | null }).verified_at,
})
.eq('id', (row as { id: string }).id)
return !error
}