Files
accounted/lib/core/bookkeeping/year-end-service.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 f24b26a139 fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215)
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership

The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no
company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise,
while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and
retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could
hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production.

Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already
carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from
COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then
revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised
statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that
are not repeated.

userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a
NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile
rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side

The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain
base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was
minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned
a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post
the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's
consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger.

State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row,
consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and
expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing.
provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client.
provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up.

Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status
oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before
the scoped check ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A)

The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were
documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a
member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept
direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank
statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in
20260416120000; this bucket was left behind.

Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the
uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and
reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which
drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining
legacy prefix objects.

The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid
the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a
uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix
qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail
the whole query instead of filtering the row out.

deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored
pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to
erase.

The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry
run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and
SHA-256 identical before repointing the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events

This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no
downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify
company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and
was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key
falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went
straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user
had been removed from the company kept reading.

Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members
with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead
of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return
a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error
strings with the canonical envelope.

Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is
gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every
other v1 read endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds

A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced
fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and
had become the top application consumer of production database time:
measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds
of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at
7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on
the booking path.

PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a
correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops
Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole
journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side
instead turns that into two indexed round trips.

Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent
entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove
a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at
PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling.

Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query
stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the
truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The
accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead,
since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows.

commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the
read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at

Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh
next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column,
which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor
timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never
applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped
on the newest rows indefinitely.

The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap;
the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with
an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly.
ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change
sort semantics on the route that currently works.

Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every
business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and
date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had
them.

The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters,
because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug
is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard
iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash

The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query
string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow
documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same
Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and
wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a
write that never happened.

dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional
boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write,
and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail
the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call
sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent
cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review

The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so
was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and
re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to
5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0.

Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so
an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still
finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH
would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was
rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the
full tree.

The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that
package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift
went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the
lockfile, never workflow files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json

vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were
byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent
recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up
idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of
daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily.

Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the
whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into
the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its
extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were
already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which
settles the intent.

documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession:
the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is
capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the
integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention.

webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day
on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since
the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line
place to change that.

A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list,
and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they
are named rather than silently rotting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink

There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel
retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven
code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry
captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug
fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email.

This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a
no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an
adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined
by next.config.ts.

Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger
and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application
data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink
calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry
personnummer and financial data.

verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without
touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated
without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The
threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing
the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible.

The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code
actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client
side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not
forwarded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces

Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with
one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven
to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open
decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md.

Structural roots closed:
- resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking
  1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING
- ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document,
  not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed
- sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the
  exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed
- tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed
  CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all
  four baselines now empty
- three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import,
  ungated-extension-route

Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap),
RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag
resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent
polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure
and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/
Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites
with isSwedishUserMessage extended.

Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice,
recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep
work and are verified green together.

13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge.
20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new
DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres).

Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0
errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version

origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping
our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase
apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices

A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and
~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass:

- replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for
  service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid()
  (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a
  Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo
- bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of
  writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns
- credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no
  cross-tenant figures in exception text
- link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end
- personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE
- same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book
  realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse
- receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts
- period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap
- documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout
  reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source
  sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping
- invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression),
  duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran
- match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat)
- refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window)
- KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint
- personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools
- worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths
- MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit
  on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk
- observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted
  stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True,
  cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings
  call removed)

Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers
are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests

* fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215

pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role
GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the
invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() =
'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the
shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a
fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher
migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text,
reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use
public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved.

Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form
instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column,
and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt
failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's
staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit
path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and
gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no
longer renders as already filed.

Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern
(all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215

- restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the
  NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version
  never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch
- replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap
  warning texts and update the pinned test expectations
- drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment
- strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests

renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s
default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 03:34:56 +02:00

1017 lines
37 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
import { createJournalEntry, reverseEntry } from '@/lib/bookkeeping/engine'
import { roundOre, ORE_TOLERANCE } from '@/lib/bokslut/rounding'
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
const log = createLogger('year-end-service')
import { generateTrialBalance } from '@/lib/reports/trial-balance'
import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
import {
fetchPaymentsAsOf,
outstandingAsOf,
todayIsoDate,
type PaymentsAsOf,
} from '@/lib/reports/reskontra-payments'
import { lockPeriod, closePeriod, createNextPeriod, findNextPeriod } from './period-service'
import { generateResultAppropriation } from './result-appropriation-service'
import {
previewCurrencyRevaluation,
executeCurrencyRevaluation,
} from '@/lib/bookkeeping/currency-revaluation'
import { validateBalanceContinuity } from '@/lib/reports/continuity-check'
import type {
YearEndValidation,
YearEndPreview,
YearEndResult,
CreateJournalEntryLineInput,
FiscalPeriod,
JournalEntry,
VoucherGap,
SequenceMismatch,
} from '@/types'
/**
* Validate whether a fiscal period is ready for year-end closing.
* Returns blocking errors and informational warnings.
*/
export async function validateYearEndReadiness(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
fiscalPeriodId: string
): Promise<YearEndValidation> {
const errors: string[] = []
const warnings: string[] = []
// Fetch the period
const { data: period, error: fetchError } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.select('*')
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
// The error/warning strings below are Swedish: they render verbatim in the
// bokslut wizard (a "stays Swedish" surface per .claude/rules/i18n.md).
// The MCP year_end_readiness tool classifies them by regex; keep
// extensions/general/mcp-server/server.ts in sync when changing wording.
if (fetchError || !period) {
return {
ready: false,
errors: ['Räkenskapsperioden hittades inte'],
warnings: [],
draftCount: 0,
voucherGaps: [],
unexplainedGaps: [],
sequenceMismatches: [],
trialBalanceBalanced: false,
}
}
// Check: period must have ended (BFNAR 2017:3 / ÅRL 2:1)
const today = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
if (period.period_end > today) {
errors.push('Perioden kan inte stängas: slutdatumet har inte passerat ännu')
}
// Check: period not already closed
if (period.is_closed) {
errors.push('Perioden är redan stängd')
}
// Check: closing entry doesn't already exist
if (period.closing_entry_id) {
errors.push('Bokslutsverifikation finns redan för perioden')
}
// Check: no draft entries
const { count: draftCount } = await supabase
.from('journal_entries')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('status', 'draft')
const drafts = draftCount ?? 0
if (drafts > 0) {
errors.push(`${drafts} utkast måste bokföras eller raderas innan bokslut`)
}
// Check: voucher continuity across all series
const voucherGaps: VoucherGap[] = []
const { data: seriesRows } = await supabase
.from('voucher_sequences')
.select('voucher_series')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
const seriesToCheck = seriesRows && seriesRows.length > 0
? seriesRows.map((r: { voucher_series: string }) => r.voucher_series)
: ['A']
for (const series of seriesToCheck) {
const { data: gaps, error: gapsError } = await supabase.rpc('detect_voucher_gaps', {
p_company_id: companyId,
p_fiscal_period_id: fiscalPeriodId,
p_series: series,
})
if (!gapsError && gaps && gaps.length > 0) {
const tagged = (gaps as Array<{ gap_start: number; gap_end: number }>).map((g) => ({
...g,
series,
}))
voucherGaps.push(...tagged)
}
}
// Check gap explanations: unexplained gaps block year-end (BFNAR 2013:2 punkt 5.8)
const unexplainedGaps: VoucherGap[] = []
if (voucherGaps.length > 0) {
const { data: explanations } = await supabase
.from('voucher_gap_explanations')
.select('voucher_series, gap_start, gap_end')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
const explanationSet = new Set(
(explanations ?? []).map(
(e: { voucher_series: string; gap_start: number; gap_end: number }) =>
`${e.voucher_series}:${e.gap_start}:${e.gap_end}`
)
)
for (const gap of voucherGaps) {
const key = `${gap.series}:${gap.gap_start}:${gap.gap_end}`
if (explanationSet.has(key)) {
warnings.push(
`Verifikationsnummerglapp i serie ${gap.series} (${gap.gap_start}-${gap.gap_end}): dokumenterat`
)
} else {
unexplainedGaps.push(gap)
errors.push(
`Oförklarat verifikationsnummerglapp i serie ${gap.series}: ${gap.gap_start}-${gap.gap_end}`
)
}
}
}
// Check: sequence counter reconciliation
const sequenceMismatches: SequenceMismatch[] = []
if (seriesRows && seriesRows.length > 0) {
for (const row of seriesRows as Array<{ voucher_series: string }>) {
const { data: seqData } = await supabase
.from('voucher_sequences')
.select('last_number')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('voucher_series', row.voucher_series)
.single()
const { data: maxData } = await supabase
.from('journal_entries')
.select('voucher_number')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('voucher_series', row.voucher_series)
.neq('status', 'draft')
.order('voucher_number', { ascending: false })
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
const sequenceCounter = seqData?.last_number ?? 0
const actualMax = maxData?.voucher_number ?? 0
if (sequenceCounter !== actualMax) {
sequenceMismatches.push({
series: row.voucher_series,
sequenceCounter,
actualMax,
})
if (sequenceCounter < actualMax) {
errors.push(
`Nummerserien i serie ${row.voucher_series} stämmer inte: räknaren står på ${sequenceCounter} men högsta verifikationsnummer är ${actualMax}`
)
} else {
warnings.push(
`Nummerräknaren ligger före bokförda verifikationer i serie ${row.voucher_series}: räknare=${sequenceCounter}, högsta verifikationsnummer=${actualMax}`
)
}
}
}
}
// Check: trial balance is balanced
const trialBalance = await generateTrialBalance(supabase, companyId, fiscalPeriodId)
const trialBalanceBalanced = trialBalance.isBalanced
if (!trialBalanceBalanced) {
errors.push(
`Råbalansen balanserar inte: debet=${trialBalance.totalDebit}, kredit=${trialBalance.totalCredit}`
)
}
// Check: at least some entries exist
const { count: entryCount } = await supabase
.from('journal_entries')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('status', 'posted')
if ((entryCount ?? 0) === 0) {
warnings.push('Inga bokförda verifikationer i perioden')
}
// Check: foreign-currency items open on balansdagen (ÅRL 4 kap. 13 §).
//
// Only a revaluation dated ON balansdagen discharges the duty. The previous
// gate accepted any currency_revaluation verifikat anywhere in the period,
// so one interim run (a June month-end revaluation) silenced the check for
// every item still outstanding on 31 December: "we already did one, so stop
// looking". An interim revaluation says nothing about the balansdagen value.
const { count: balansdagenRevalCount } = await supabase
.from('journal_entries')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('fiscal_period_id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('source_type', 'currency_revaluation')
.eq('status', 'posted')
.eq('entry_date', period.period_end)
// Both states below are warnings, never blockers: nothing in the bokslut
// rules makes an unvalued FX item a bar to closing, and executeYearEndClosing
// runs the revaluation itself in step 2. Escalating would block a close that
// the very next step performs.
try {
const openFx = await countOpenFxItemsAtBalansdagen(supabase, companyId, period.period_end)
// Loudest case first. A row with no exchange_rate is invisible to the
// revaluation: previewCurrencyRevaluation partitions it into
// `unconvertedFx` and drops it, so re-running the year-end will never
// value it. It needs a rate on the invoice, and these rows are typically
// the largest unmeasured exposure precisely because nothing warns on them.
// The old query's `.not('exchange_rate','is',null)`, inherited from the
// revaluation code, excluded exactly this case: a company whose only open
// FX items were unconverted got no warning at all.
if (openFx.unconverted > 0) {
warnings.push(
`${openFx.unconverted} post(er) i utländsk valuta var öppna på balansdagen ${period.period_end} men saknar valutakurs: de kan inte värderas till balansdagskurs (ÅRL 4 kap. 13 §) och utelämnas ur omvärderingen. Registrera kursen på fakturan.`
)
}
// Separate state, separate remedy: these can be valued, they just have not
// been yet. Suppressed only by a revaluation dated on balansdagen.
if (openFx.revaluable > 0 && (balansdagenRevalCount ?? 0) === 0) {
warnings.push(
`${openFx.revaluable} post(er) i utländsk valuta var öppna på balansdagen ${period.period_end} och har inte omvärderats till balansdagskurs (ÅRL 4 kap. 13 §)`
)
}
} catch (err) {
// A failed lookup must not read as "no FX exposure". Say the check did not
// run rather than let silence pass for a clean bill of health.
log.error('year-end: could not measure open FX items at balansdagen', err as Error, {
operation: 'year_end.fx_readiness',
companyId,
entityType: 'fiscal_period',
entityId: fiscalPeriodId,
})
warnings.push(
'Kontrollen av öppna poster i utländsk valuta (ÅRL 4 kap. 13 §) kunde inte genomföras: stäm av dem manuellt innan bokslut'
)
}
// Check: continuity_verified flag from prior year-end
if (period.continuity_verified === false) {
errors.push('IB/UB-kontinuiteten stämmer inte för perioden: åtgärda avvikelserna innan bokslut')
}
// Check: next period state. A pre-existing next period (from SIE import,
// manual creation, or a prior partial run) is fine (we'll reuse it), but
// one with opening balances already booked blocks closing because we
// can't post a second IB on top.
//
// The period name is not interpolated into the message: although the
// name is user-supplied at create time and confined to the company,
// surfacing DB-sourced strings through error paths is the kind of
// injection footgun we'd rather close at the source than rely on the UI
// to escape (text rendering and aria-label propagation differ).
const nextPeriod = await findNextPeriod(supabase, companyId, fiscalPeriodId)
if (nextPeriod) {
if (nextPeriod.opening_balance_entry_id) {
errors.push('Nästa räkenskapsperiod har redan ingående balanser bokförda')
} else {
warnings.push('Nästa räkenskapsperiod finns redan: ingående balanser bokförs i den')
}
}
return {
ready: errors.length === 0,
errors,
warnings,
draftCount: drafts,
voucherGaps,
unexplainedGaps,
sequenceMismatches,
trialBalanceBalanced,
}
}
/**
* Preview year-end closing without persisting anything.
* Shows the net result, closing account, and the journal entry lines that would be created.
*/
export async function previewYearEndClosing(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
fiscalPeriodId: string
): Promise<YearEndPreview> {
// Get entity type to determine closing account
const { data: settings } = await supabase
.from('company_settings')
.select('entity_type')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
const entityType = settings?.entity_type ?? 'aktiebolag'
const closingAccount = entityType === 'enskild_firma' ? '2010' : '2099'
const closingAccountName =
entityType === 'enskild_firma'
? 'Eget kapital'
: 'Årets resultat'
// Get trial balance for individual account balances in class 3-8
const { rows } = await generateTrialBalance(supabase, companyId, fiscalPeriodId)
const resultAccounts = rows.filter(
(r) => r.account_class >= 3 && r.account_class <= 8
)
// Build closing lines: zero each result account
const closingLines: CreateJournalEntryLineInput[] = []
const resultAccountSummary: { account_number: string; account_name: string; amount: number }[] = []
for (const account of resultAccounts) {
const netBalance = account.closing_debit - account.closing_credit
if (Math.abs(netBalance) < ORE_TOLERANCE) continue
resultAccountSummary.push({
account_number: account.account_number,
account_name: account.account_name,
amount: netBalance,
})
// To zero this account: reverse its net balance
if (netBalance > 0) {
// Account has debit balance → credit it to zero
closingLines.push({
account_number: account.account_number,
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: roundOre(netBalance),
line_description: `Closing: ${account.account_name}`,
})
} else {
// Account has credit balance → debit it to zero
closingLines.push({
account_number: account.account_number,
debit_amount: roundOre(Math.abs(netBalance)),
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: `Closing: ${account.account_name}`,
})
}
}
// Final line: transfer net result to closing account (2099/2010)
// Net result = revenue - expenses + financial
// If positive (profit): credit to equity (2099/2010)
// If negative (loss): debit to equity (2099/2010)
const totalClosingDebit = closingLines.reduce((sum, l) => sum + l.debit_amount, 0)
const totalClosingCredit = closingLines.reduce((sum, l) => sum + l.credit_amount, 0)
// netResult must equal, by construction, the signed amount transferred to the
// closing account (2099/2010) by the balancing line below: positive = credit
// = vinst, negative = debit = forlust. It is deliberately NOT taken from
// generateIncomeStatement: that report excludes source_type='year_end'
// entries, and bokslut-flow entries (annual depreciation, dispositioner)
// carry that tag, so the income-statement figure misses them and the
// summary card would mismatch the bokslutsverifikation table (issue #766).
const netResult = roundOre(totalClosingDebit - totalClosingCredit)
const balancingAmount = roundOre(Math.abs(totalClosingDebit - totalClosingCredit))
if (balancingAmount > ORE_TOLERANCE) {
if (totalClosingDebit > totalClosingCredit) {
// More debits than credits → need credit on closing account
closingLines.push({
account_number: closingAccount,
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: balancingAmount,
line_description: `Årets resultat → ${closingAccountName}`,
})
} else {
// More credits than debits → need debit on closing account
closingLines.push({
account_number: closingAccount,
debit_amount: balancingAmount,
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: `Årets resultat → ${closingAccountName}`,
})
}
}
// Fetch fiscal period for closing date
const { data: periodData } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.select('period_end')
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
let currencyRevaluation = null
if (periodData) {
const revalPreview = await previewCurrencyRevaluation(
supabase,
companyId,
periodData.period_end
)
if (revalPreview.items.length > 0) {
currencyRevaluation = revalPreview
}
}
// Advisory check: an AB closing a profit year should normally have booked
// bolagsskatt (Dr 8910 / Cr 2512) in the dispositions step. If no 89xx tax
// account is among the accounts being closed, the profit is untaxed. This
// is a warning, not a blocker: zero tax is legitimate when underskotts-
// avdrag zeroes the taxable result. 8999 is excluded: it is the manual
// result-closing account, not a tax account.
// Scanning resultAccountSummary is equivalent to a full 89xx trial-balance
// scan: it is built from every class 3-8 account with a non-zero closing
// balance, regardless of voucher series, so a booked tax entry cannot be
// missed by this check.
const hasTaxAccount = resultAccountSummary.some(
(a) => a.account_number.startsWith('89') && a.account_number !== '8999'
)
const bolagsskattMissing =
closingAccount === '2099' && netResult > ORE_TOLERANCE && !hasTaxAccount
return {
netResult,
closingAccount,
closingAccountName,
closingLines,
resultAccountSummary,
currencyRevaluation,
bolagsskattMissing,
}
}
/**
* Execute year-end closing for a fiscal period.
*
* 1. Validate readiness
* 2. Run currency revaluation (FX gains/losses to 3960/7960)
* 3. Generate closing preview and check öre balance
* 4. Create closing entry (zeros class 3-8 accounts)
* 5. Set closing_entry_id on the period
* 6. Resolve next fiscal period (reuse existing or create new)
* 7. Lock the period
* 8. Close the period (irreversible, every guard must run before this)
* 9. Generate opening balances in next period
* 10. Validate IB/UB continuity
* 11. Omföra föregående års resultat (2099 → 2098) in the new period (AB only)
*/
export async function executeYearEndClosing(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
fiscalPeriodId: string
): Promise<YearEndResult> {
// 1. Validate readiness
const validation = await validateYearEndReadiness(supabase, companyId, userId, fiscalPeriodId)
if (!validation.ready) {
throw new Error(`Bokslutet kan inte verkställas: ${validation.errors.join('; ')}`)
}
// Fetch the period for dates
const { data: period } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.select('*')
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (!period) {
throw new Error('Fiscal period not found')
}
// 2. Execute currency revaluation BEFORE closing entry
// Revaluation posts to 3960/7960 (class 3/7 result accounts) which
// the closing entry then zeros out.
const revaluationResult = await executeCurrencyRevaluation(
supabase,
companyId,
period.period_end,
fiscalPeriodId,
userId
)
// 3. Get closing preview (now includes revaluation effects in trial balance)
const preview = await previewYearEndClosing(supabase, companyId, userId, fiscalPeriodId)
if (preview.closingLines.length === 0) {
throw new Error('No result accounts to close: period has no activity')
}
// 3a. INVARIANT: closing entry must balance to the öre before commit.
// This guards against rounding drift in previewYearEndClosing: the DB
// balance trigger would catch it too, but we want a clear Swedish error
// surfaced to the user, not a generic Postgres exception.
const preCommitDebit = roundOre(
preview.closingLines.reduce((s, l) => s + l.debit_amount, 0)
)
const preCommitCredit = roundOre(
preview.closingLines.reduce((s, l) => s + l.credit_amount, 0)
)
if (Math.abs(preCommitDebit - preCommitCredit) > ORE_TOLERANCE) {
throw new Error(
`Bokslutsverifikationen balanserar inte: debet=${preCommitDebit}, kredit=${preCommitCredit}`
)
}
// 4. Create closing entry via the journal engine
const closingEntry = await createJournalEntry(supabase, companyId, userId, {
fiscal_period_id: fiscalPeriodId,
entry_date: period.period_end,
description: `Årsbokslut ${period.name}`,
source_type: 'year_end',
voucher_series: 'A',
lines: preview.closingLines,
})
// 4a. INVARIANT: after the closing entry, class 3-8 net must be exactly 0
// (to the öre). If not, we have a logic bug: fail loud rather than
// proceed into IB generation with a corrupt trial balance.
// createJournalEntry has no transactional grouping with the next call;
// the engine commits atomically per-entry via commit_journal_entry RPC,
// so a failure here means we need to reverse the just-committed entry.
try {
const postCloseTB = await generateTrialBalance(supabase, companyId, fiscalPeriodId)
let resultNet = 0
for (const row of postCloseTB.rows) {
if (row.account_class >= 3 && row.account_class <= 8) {
resultNet += row.closing_debit - row.closing_credit
}
}
resultNet = roundOre(resultNet)
if (Math.abs(resultNet) > ORE_TOLERANCE) {
throw new Error(
`Resultatkonton (klass 3-8) saknar nollställning efter bokslut: nettot är ${resultNet} SEK`
)
}
} catch (err) {
// Best-effort reversal of the closing entry before re-throwing.
await safeReverse(supabase, companyId, userId, closingEntry.id, 'closing entry')
throw err
}
// 5. Update fiscal period with closing_entry_id
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.update({ closing_entry_id: closingEntry.id })
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (updateError) {
throw new Error(`Failed to set closing_entry_id: ${updateError.message}`)
}
// 6. Resolve the next period BEFORE locking/closing this one. A pre-existing
// next period is common (SIE import, manual creation, prior partial
// year-end run); reusing it is fine as long as no IB has been booked
// into it. Doing this check after closePeriod would leave the books in
// a half-closed state if a concurrent process posted IB into the next
// period between validateYearEndReadiness and step 8 (TOCTOU race).
//
// The thrown error is intentionally a stable English string with no
// DB-sourced data interpolated: the route layer maps it to a
// structured error code, and the next period name (if any) is surfaced
// only through the structured details payload after explicit checks.
const existingNextPeriod = await findNextPeriod(supabase, companyId, fiscalPeriodId)
let nextPeriod
if (existingNextPeriod) {
if (existingNextPeriod.opening_balance_entry_id) {
throw new Error(
'Next fiscal period already has opening balance entry posted; reverse it before re-running year-end'
)
}
nextPeriod = existingNextPeriod
} else {
nextPeriod = await createNextPeriod(supabase, companyId, userId, fiscalPeriodId)
}
// 7. Lock the period
await lockPeriod(supabase, companyId, userId, fiscalPeriodId)
// 8. Close the period: irreversible per BFL. Every guard that can fail
// on prior state must run before this point.
await closePeriod(supabase, companyId, userId, fiscalPeriodId)
// 9. Generate opening balances in next period
const openingBalanceEntry = await generateOpeningBalances(
supabase,
companyId,
userId,
fiscalPeriodId,
nextPeriod.id
)
// 10. Validate IB/UB continuity and persist result.
// INVARIANT: any account differing by more than ORE_TOLERANCE is a hard
// failure. Best-effort rollback of both the IB entry and the closing
// entry so the user sees a clean state and can re-run the wizard.
//
// Note on atomicity: createJournalEntry uses an atomic commit_journal_entry
// RPC per entry, but the closing + IB entries are two separate commits with
// a period lock/close in between. Once committed, posted entries are
// immutable by DB trigger: true rollback isn't possible. reverseEntry()
// posts a compensating storno entry instead. The closed period was also
// locked & closed, but reverseEntry uses an entry_date that (under the
// period-lock trigger) may be blocked. We attempt reversal but tolerate
// failure, surfacing the original continuity error either way.
const continuity = await validateBalanceContinuity(supabase, companyId, nextPeriod.id)
await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.update({ continuity_verified: continuity.valid })
.eq('id', nextPeriod.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
const overTolerance = continuity.discrepancies.filter(
(d) => Math.abs(d.difference) > ORE_TOLERANCE
)
if (overTolerance.length > 0) {
await safeReverse(supabase, companyId, userId, openingBalanceEntry.id, 'opening balance entry')
await safeReverse(supabase, companyId, userId, closingEntry.id, 'closing entry')
throw new Error(
`IB/UB-kontinuitet misslyckades: ${overTolerance.length} konto(n) avviker. ` +
overTolerance
.map(
(d) =>
`${d.account_number}: UB=${d.previous_ub_net}, IB=${d.current_ib_net}, diff=${d.difference}`
)
.join('; ')
)
}
// 11. Omföra föregående års resultat: move 2099 "Årets resultat" off onto
// 2098 in the new period so it starts the year at zero (aktiebolag only).
// This is a SEPARATE verifikat by design: folding it into the IB entry
// would make the continuity check above fail, since that check reads IB
// solely from the opening_balance entry. Non-fatal: the close and IB are
// already valid and immutable; a failure here is logged and left for the
// retroactive catch-up script (scripts/repair-result-appropriation.ts).
let resultAppropriationEntry: JournalEntry | null = null
let resultAppropriationFailed = false
try {
resultAppropriationEntry = await generateResultAppropriation(
supabase,
companyId,
userId,
nextPeriod.id
)
} catch (err) {
resultAppropriationFailed = true
// alert:true routes this to the observability sink (lib/observability) in
// addition to the log line: a silent accounting failure must not wait for
// a manual audit. The sink is a no-op until a provider is configured, so
// today this reaches the JSON log only. The new period now opens with 2099 still carrying the
// prior result; resultAppropriationFailed below drives a UI warning and the
// catch-up script (scripts/repair-result-appropriation.ts) posts the fix.
log.error('year-end: result appropriation omföring failed (non-fatal)', err as Error, {
operation: 'year_end.result_appropriation',
alert: true,
companyId,
entityType: 'fiscal_period',
entityId: nextPeriod.id,
})
}
// Fetch the now-closed period for the event payload
const { data: closedPeriod } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.select('*')
.eq('id', fiscalPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (closedPeriod) {
await eventBus.emit({
type: 'period.year_closed',
payload: { period: closedPeriod as FiscalPeriod, companyId, userId },
})
}
return {
closingEntry,
nextPeriod,
openingBalanceEntry,
revaluationEntry: revaluationResult?.entry ?? null,
resultAppropriationEntry,
resultAppropriationFailed,
continuity,
}
}
/**
* Generate opening balance entries in the next period from the closed period's
* balance sheet accounts (class 1-2).
*
* Each account's closing balance becomes its opening balance.
* The entry must be balanced (total debit openings = total credit openings).
*/
export async function generateOpeningBalances(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
closedPeriodId: string,
nextPeriodId: string
): Promise<JournalEntry> {
// Get next period for the entry date
const { data: nextPeriod } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.select('*')
.eq('id', nextPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (!nextPeriod) {
throw new Error('Next fiscal period not found')
}
// Get trial balance of closed period (includes the closing entry)
const { rows } = await generateTrialBalance(supabase, companyId, closedPeriodId)
// Filter to balance sheet accounts (class 1-2) with non-zero closing balance
const balanceSheetAccounts = rows.filter(
(r) => r.account_class >= 1 && r.account_class <= 2
)
const openingLines: CreateJournalEntryLineInput[] = []
for (const account of balanceSheetAccounts) {
const netBalance = account.closing_debit - account.closing_credit
if (Math.abs(netBalance) < ORE_TOLERANCE) continue
if (netBalance > 0) {
// Debit balance → opening debit
openingLines.push({
account_number: account.account_number,
debit_amount: roundOre(netBalance),
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: `Ingående balans: ${account.account_name}`,
})
} else {
// Credit balance → opening credit
openingLines.push({
account_number: account.account_number,
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: roundOre(Math.abs(netBalance)),
line_description: `Ingående balans: ${account.account_name}`,
})
}
}
if (openingLines.length === 0) {
throw new Error('No balance sheet accounts with non-zero closing balance')
}
// Verify balance before creating
const totalDebit = openingLines.reduce((sum, l) => sum + l.debit_amount, 0)
const totalCredit = openingLines.reduce((sum, l) => sum + l.credit_amount, 0)
if (Math.abs(totalDebit - totalCredit) > ORE_TOLERANCE) {
throw new Error(
`Ingående balanser balanserar inte: debet=${roundOre(totalDebit)}, kredit=${roundOre(totalCredit)}`
)
}
// Create opening balance entry in next period
const openingEntry = await createJournalEntry(supabase, companyId, userId, {
fiscal_period_id: nextPeriodId,
entry_date: nextPeriod.period_start,
description: `Ingående balans ${nextPeriod.name}`,
source_type: 'opening_balance',
voucher_series: 'A',
lines: openingLines,
})
// Mark next period with opening balance entry
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('fiscal_periods')
.update({
opening_balance_entry_id: openingEntry.id,
opening_balances_set: true,
})
.eq('id', nextPeriodId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (updateError) {
throw new Error(`Failed to set opening_balance_entry_id: ${updateError.message}`)
}
return openingEntry
}
/**
* Open foreign-currency items as they stood on balansdagen, split by whether
* the ÅRL 4 kap. 13 § valuation can reach them at all. The two states have
* different remedies, so they are counted apart rather than summed.
*/
interface OpenFxAtBalansdagen {
/** Carries a usable exchange_rate: revaluable to the balansdagen rate. */
revaluable: number
/**
* No exchange_rate on file, so there is no original SEK value to revalue
* from. Counted rather than dropped, the same contract `unconverted_fx_count`
* carries on the reskontra reports (lib/reports/supplier-ledger.ts): an
* excluded row has to show up as a number somewhere.
*/
unconverted: number
}
/** The subset of an invoice row this check reads. */
interface FxLedgerRow {
id: string
status: string | null
currency: string | null
exchange_rate: number | string | null
total: number | string | null
paid_amount: number | string | null
remaining_amount: number | string | null
paid_at: string | null
}
/** A stored rate is usable only when present and strictly positive. */
function hasUsableFxRate(rate: number | string | null | undefined): boolean {
return rate != null && Number(rate) > 0
}
/**
* Count the foreign-currency receivables and payables that were still open on
* balansdagen.
*
* Measured AS OF balansdagen, not as of now. ÅRL 4 kap. 13 § values monetary
* items at the balance-sheet date, so an invoice settled in March of the
* following year was still an open FX item on 31 December and still had to be
* valued there; the live `status` column only says what is open today. For a
* historical balansdagen the population is therefore widened to invoices dated
* on or before it (including ones settled since) and the outstanding amount is
* recomputed from the payment history, the same reconstruction the reskontra
* reports use (lib/reports/ar-ledger.ts, lib/reports/supplier-ledger.ts). For
* today or a future balansdagen the stored open-invoice state IS the as-of
* state, so no reconstruction is attempted.
*
* Limits, inherited from `outstandingAsOf` and identical to what the reskontra
* reports already accept: an invoice with no payment rows and no `paid_at`
* cannot be dated, so its live outstanding is assumed to have stood at
* balansdagen; and an invoice cancelled or credited since is treated as never
* having been open, because neither event carries a reliable date. The status
* population is kept identical to what the revaluation engine actually acts on
* (`getOpenForeignCurrencyReceivables` / `...Payables`), so the warning never
* points at rows for which no remedy exists.
*/
async function countOpenFxItemsAtBalansdagen(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
balansdagen: string
): Promise<OpenFxAtBalansdagen> {
const isHistorical = balansdagen < todayIsoDate()
const columns =
'id, status, currency, exchange_rate, total, paid_amount, remaining_amount, paid_at'
const receivables = await fetchAllRows<FxLedgerRow>(
({ from, to }) => {
const base = supabase
.from('invoices')
.select(columns)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.neq('currency', 'SEK')
// 'partially_paid' is a live status for customer invoices (payment-sync
// sets it on partial settlements); the unpaid remainder was open on
// balansdagen just like a 'sent' invoice. Kept in lockstep with
// getOpenForeignCurrencyReceivables so this warning never points at
// rows the revaluation engine cannot see.
const scoped = isHistorical
? base
.in('status', ['sent', 'overdue', 'partially_paid', 'paid'])
.lte('invoice_date', balansdagen)
: base.in('status', ['sent', 'overdue', 'partially_paid'])
// Stable total order for correct paging (see fetch-all.ts).
return scoped.order('id', { ascending: true }).range(from, to)
},
{ dedupeBy: (r) => r.id }
)
const payables = await fetchAllRows<FxLedgerRow>(
({ from, to }) => {
const base = supabase
.from('supplier_invoices')
.select(columns)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.neq('currency', 'SEK')
const scoped = isHistorical
? base
.in('status', ['registered', 'approved', 'overdue', 'partially_paid', 'paid'])
.lte('invoice_date', balansdagen)
: base.in('status', ['registered', 'approved', 'overdue', 'partially_paid'])
return scoped.order('id', { ascending: true }).range(from, to)
},
{ dedupeBy: (r) => r.id }
)
// Payment history is only needed to walk a since-settled invoice back to what
// it owed on balansdagen, and only when there is something to walk back.
const receivablePayments =
isHistorical && receivables.length > 0
? await fetchPaymentsAsOf(supabase, 'invoice_payments', 'invoice_id', companyId, balansdagen)
: null
const payablePayments =
isHistorical && payables.length > 0
? await fetchPaymentsAsOf(
supabase,
'supplier_invoice_payments',
'supplier_invoice_id',
companyId,
balansdagen
)
: null
const counts: OpenFxAtBalansdagen = { revaluable: 0, unconverted: 0 }
function tally(
rows: FxLedgerRow[],
payments: PaymentsAsOf | null,
liveOutstanding: (row: FxLedgerRow) => number
): void {
for (const row of rows) {
const total = Number(row.total) || 0
const live = liveOutstanding(row)
const outstanding = payments
? outstandingAsOf(row, total, live, payments, balansdagen)
: live
// Settled on or before balansdagen: nothing was open to value.
if (outstanding <= 0) continue
if (hasUsableFxRate(row.exchange_rate)) counts.revaluable += 1
else counts.unconverted += 1
}
}
// Each side uses its own reskontra's definition of outstanding so these
// counts reconcile with what the user sees there: kundreskontran derives it
// from paid_amount, leverantörsreskontran reads the maintained
// remaining_amount.
tally(receivables, receivablePayments, (r) =>
roundOre((Number(r.total) || 0) - (Number(r.paid_amount) || 0))
)
tally(payables, payablePayments, (r) => Number(r.remaining_amount) || 0)
return counts
}
/**
* Best-effort reversal used by executeYearEndClosing's rollback paths.
*
* Posted journal entries are immutable per DB trigger: we can't truly
* roll them back, only post a compensating storno via reverseEntry().
* Closed/locked periods may also block the reversal date. We swallow
* failures here so the caller can re-throw the original invariant error
* with maximum diagnostic value; the orphaned entries (if any) become
* a manual cleanup task documented in the surfaced Swedish error.
*/
async function safeReverse(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
entryId: string,
label: string
): Promise<void> {
try {
await reverseEntry(supabase, companyId, userId, entryId)
} catch (err) {
log.error(`year-end rollback: could not reverse ${label}`, err as Error, {
operation: 'year_end.rollback',
companyId,
entityType: 'journal_entry',
entityId: entryId,
})
}
}