* feat(salary): one-click AGI submission with filing state machine and success feedback The AGI panel required users to know that "Ladda ner AGI-fil" was the generate step, then click submit, signing link, and kvittens manually. A nollkorning filing stalled on "AGI-XML saknas" pointing at a UI path that does not exist. - New primary button "Lamna in till Skatteverket" chains the existing endpoints client-side: generate XML if missing, POST underlag, poll kontrollresultat, create signing link, open Mina Sidor in a tab opened synchronously at click (popup-blocker safe). Inline stepper shows each step; the four old buttons become collapsed advanced/recovery actions, auto-expanded in stale-draft and rejected states. XML download stays visible and free for manual filing. - deriveAgiFilingState() + useAgiSubmission() lift the per-period submission record to the run page: the progress rail and salary hero now render the real state machine (generated, underlag inskickat, vantar pa BankID-signatur, inlamnad med kvittensnummer) instead of telling users to "lamna in" an already-submitted declaration. - Success card with kvittensnummer and signature metadata once signed, plus a toast when a poll flips the state while the page is open. - AGI kvittens cron every 15 min instead of every 2 h so filings signed on another device get stamped and emailed promptly. - Advanced submit also auto-generates, and the stale "Lon -> AGI -> Generera" error text now points at the real buttons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enable-banking): instant OAuth callback feedback and dead-attempt cleanup The bank redirect landed on a blank page for the several seconds the callback spent exchanging the PSD2 session and mirroring accounts, and every failed connect attempt left a status='error' row that rendered forever as an "Atgard kravs" card next to a successful retry, showing duplicate connections to the same bank. - Stream a branded "Slutfor bankanslutningen" progress page from the callback: the shell flushes before the session exchange starts and a script/meta redirect follows when the work completes, with a 30s slow-work escape hatch. Fast outcomes (denial, bad params, unknown state) keep their plain redirects. - Delete never-activated connection rows (no session_id, no accounts_data) on denial or exchange failure, and sweep leftovers for the same bank on the next connect. Established connections keep their "Atgard krävs" card via the accounts_data guard; FKs are ON DELETE SET NULL so deletion has no dependents. - Show "Banken ar ansluten: hamtar dina konton" while the settings panel loads after the callback instead of an anonymous spinner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): reject re-send of issued invoices and gate bookkeeping on the sent flip A direct POST to /api/invoices/[id]/send against an already-issued invoice re-emailed the customer and posted a second revenue verifikat (createInvoiceJournalEntry has no dedup), overwriting journal_entry_id and orphaning the first entry. Only the UI hid the button; the v1 route and the MCP commit executor already rejected non-drafts. - Non-draft invoices now return 409 INVOICE_ALREADY_SENT. - The draft to sent status flip is an optimistic lock (status guard plus row-count check); journal entry, accrual schedules, PDF archival and the invoice.sent event only run for the request that won the flip. - On a flip failure the journal entry is deferred: the row stays draft and a retry re-runs the pipeline, ending with exactly one verifikat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): payment links, failure visibility and sandbox guard for recurring auto-send - sendInvoiceFromSchedule now auto-creates an online payment link via applyPaymentLinkToInvoice before rendering and passes the payment link QR to the PDF: parity with the dashboard and v1 send routes, which recurring invoices silently lacked. - The recurring cron persists last_run_warning both when a claimed run throws (hourly retries stay visible on the schedule) and when a stale schedule is rolled forward, so a deterministic failure can no longer skip a month silently. - Auto-send is blocked for sandbox companies at the email chokepoint (freeze-and-retain: the invoice is still generated as a draft), covering both the cron and the run-now route with one guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(salary): close the Fortnox payroll API gaps (phases 1-4) Payroll now runs end-to-end through the open API, including onboarding a client from another payroll system, with every write staged for approval. - v1: per-employee payslips (list/detail/PDF), payslip line writes, run roster attach/remove, absence ranges (per-day storage), jamkning fields, cutover opening balances (single + atomic bulk PUT), vacation balance + vacation-year-close. PUT added to the wrapper's idempotency/ test-key set (test keys could otherwise write through PUT). - MCP: 10 new tools (get_employee/get_payslip/list_absence/ get_vacation_balance reads + staged update_payslip_line, register_absence, create_employee, update_employee, set_employee_opening_balances, close_vacation_year), executors, risk tiers, op-type CHECK expansions. create_employee encrypts personnummer at staging: pending_operations never holds plaintext. - Scope-map audit retrofit: 11 formerly unmapped tools now scoped; BREAKING for keys that relied on the 4 default-allow writes. - Cutover: employee_opening_balances (derived lock trigger, self-unlocks on run correction), engine YTD/karens/liability integration, Ingaende saldon section in the employee editor. - Arbetsschema-lite: employees.hours_per_week/workdays_per_week drive the hourly/daily divisors; legacy 173/21 preserved exactly at defaults so existing pay math is byte-identical. - Vacation ledger + semesterberedning/arsavslut: recomputed per-year day balances (synced on book/correct, non-fatal), year-close with the min-20 floor, 5-year sparade-dagar expiry to forced payout, and a 2920/2940 drift adjustment via the bookkeeping engine; Semester dashboard card with preview-then-confirm dialog. - Fix: Zod 4 defaults leak through .partial(), which made every sparse employee PATCH fail validation and reset defaulted columns. Migrations 20260713100000/101000/110000/121000/122000 (applied to staging with version rows; prod via merge). vacation_ledger renamed from 20260713120000 to avoid colliding with vat_declaration_totals_rpc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: cut dashboard page-load latency (region, round trips, caching, VAT RPC) The dominant cost was infrastructure: Vercel functions ran in iad1 (Washington D.C.) while Supabase (DB + auth) lives in eu-north-1 (Stockholm), so every request paid 4-5 transatlantic round trips of auth + company resolution before doing any real work (measured 530-1900ms for single-query GETs in prod logs). Pin functions to arn1 and cut the redundant work on top: - vercel.json: functions to arn1, same city as the database - getActiveCompanyId: preference + first-membership queries run in parallel; the fallback result doubles as validation in the common single-company case (one round trip instead of two sequential) - withRouteContext: Server-Timing header and authMs/companyMs/handlerMs in the op-completed log, so latency is attributable per phase - dashboard layout: nav badge counts off the critical path; DashboardNav loads them client-side via the new use-worklist-badges SWR hook with debounced realtime revalidation - swr (new dependency, approved): global provider; useCompanySettings shares one cache entry across consumers and renders from cache on back-navigation instead of re-showing skeletons - /pending: realtime refetch debounced; bulk operations previously fired 4 requests per row-change event - VAT declaration: new get_vat_declaration_totals RPC returns per-account totals, settlement-shape detection (#984) and source_type counts in ONE round trip instead of paging every entry+line through PostgREST. Account lists stay TS-side parameters so ACCOUNT_RUTA remains the single source of truth. Shape-exclusion coverage moved to tests/pg/vat-declaration-totals-rpc.pg.test.ts; DDL already applied to staging. - bundle: CommandPalette lazy-mounts on first Ctrl/Cmd+K, AgentChat dynamic-imports the markdown parser, @vercel/speed-insights (new dependency, approved) added for real-user timings The /salary fetch-waterfall fix from the same effort already landed inside 2084a756. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): settle öre-rounded payments from the mark-paid flow An invoice with öresavrundning shows a rounded "Att betala" on the PDF; the customer pays that amount (up to 50 öre off the stored öre total) and the invoice-page mark-paid flow rejected it with MATCH_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_REMAINING: a dead end, while the bank-transaction match flow already absorbed the residual to 3740. - PaymentBookingDialog now proposes the rounded bank leg plus the 3740 residual line (credit when rounded up, debit when rounded down), resolved via getDisplayTotal from the per-invoice override and company_settings.ore_rounding. - settleInvoicePayment and the v1 mark-paid route absorb the sub-krona residual, gated by planInvoicePaymentForLines: absorption applies ONLY when the caller lines carry the exact residual on 3740; otherwise the strict plan applies (sub-krona partials stay partial, no-3740 overshoots keep the 400), so the GL can never diverge from the AR sub-ledger. - planInvoicePayment absorb-band boundary tightened to >= 1 kr: an exactly-1-kr overshoot used to slip past both the guard and the absorb branch and silently over-record paid_amount (pre-existing on the bank-match path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): resolve all 7 PR compliance findings - ASVS V3.3: per-request CSP nonce on the enable-banking finalize page (mirrors the mcp-oauth consent page); inline scripts are nonce-bound - ASVS V16: decouple callback finalize work from the response stream (eager promise + next/server after()) so a client disconnect cannot drop session persistence or the consent_granted audit emit - ISO 27001 A.8.15: failed audit-event emits log through the structured logger with a stable message for log-based alerting - ASVS V2.3: recurring-invoice cron and run-now routes resolve isSandboxCompany themselves and pass an explicit suppressAutoSend flag (defence in depth around the email chokepoint, freeze-and-retain kept) - ISO 27001 A.8.11: stagePendingOperation rejects plaintext personnummer-bearing keys in params/preview_data (key-based guard; EF org numbers make value-matching unsafe) - ASVS V4.5: employee PATCH body is truly sparse; cleared number fields are omitted instead of resetting DB values to hardcoded fallbacks - ASVS V8.2.1: route-level tests pin the v1 cross-company deny (404 by convention, not 403) on the payslip PDF endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: implement vacation-year basis change validation and error handling - Added tests to block vacation-year basis changes when open balances exist. - Implemented error handling for open-balances guard query failures in the settings route. - Enhanced absence route to reject reversed date ranges with a validation error. - Updated absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert for better performance and reliability. - Refactored salary calculation logic to correctly handle age-based avgifter rates according to Skatteverket's rules. - Improved error messaging for vacation year closure adjustments. - Adjusted employee opening balances handling to preserve audit information during upserts. * feat(settings): add validation to block vacation-year basis change with open balances feat(absence): reject reversed date ranges in absence queries fix(absence): update absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert fix(employee): improve validation for jamkning dates in employee updates fix(opening-balances): ensure created_by field is preserved during upserts test(absence): enhance tests for absence range and date validations test(calculation): add tests for age-based avgifter rates and edge cases test(semesterberedning): validate vacation year closure adjustments and error handling test(employee-opening-balances): update tests to reflect changes in salary_run_employees schema * fix(migrations): implement NOT VALID constraints for pending_operations and add validation migration --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1342 lines
57 KiB
TypeScript
1342 lines
57 KiB
TypeScript
import type { Extension, ExtensionContext } from '@/lib/extensions/types'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import {
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startAuthorization,
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getASPSPs,
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getPreferredAuthMethod,
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deleteSession,
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isSandboxMode,
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SessionExpiredError,
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REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
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SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE,
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type ASPSP,
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} from './lib/api-client'
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import { syncAccountTransactions } from './lib/sync'
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import {
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runReconciliation,
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DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD,
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} from '@/lib/reconciliation/bank-reconciliation'
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import { checkRateLimit } from '@/lib/auth/rate-limit-http'
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import { requireCapability } from '@/lib/entitlements/has-capability'
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import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
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import type { StoredAccount } from './types'
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import type { Transaction } from '@/types'
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// Per-user limits keep one tenant from spamming any single bank handler.
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// Sliding 60s windows: generous enough for legitimate retry, tight enough
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// to prevent UUID probing or status-machine abuse.
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const RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNTS = { maxRequests: 20, windowMs: 60_000 }
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const RATE_LIMIT_SYNC = { maxRequests: 10, windowMs: 60_000 }
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const RATE_LIMIT_DISCONNECT = { maxRequests: 10, windowMs: 60_000 }
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const MAX_ENABLED_UIDS = 50
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/**
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* Enable Banking (PSD2) extension
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*
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* Provides automatic bank transaction sync via PSD2 open banking.
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* This is an opt-in extension: uncomment the import in loader.ts to activate.
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*
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* Required environment variables:
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* - ENABLE_BANKING_APP_ID
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* - ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY (base64-encoded PEM)
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* - ENABLE_BANKING_SANDBOX (optional, for sandbox mode)
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*/
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export const enableBankingExtension: Extension = {
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id: 'enable-banking',
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name: 'Enable Banking (PSD2)',
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version: '1.0.0',
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settingsPanel: {
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label: 'Bankintegration (PSD2)',
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path: '/settings/banking',
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},
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apiRoutes: [
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{
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method: 'GET',
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path: '/banks',
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handler: async (_request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
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const log = ctx?.log ?? console
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try {
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// Detect PSU type from company entity_type
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let psuType: 'personal' | 'business' = 'business'
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if (ctx?.companyId && ctx?.supabase) {
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const { data: company } = await ctx.supabase
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.from('companies')
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.select('entity_type')
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.eq('id', ctx.companyId)
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.single()
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if (company?.entity_type === 'enskild_firma') {
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psuType = 'personal'
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}
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}
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const aspsps = await getASPSPs('SE', psuType)
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const banks = aspsps.map((aspsp: ASPSP) => ({
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name: aspsp.name,
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country: aspsp.country,
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logo: aspsp.logo,
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bic: aspsp.bic,
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}))
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return NextResponse.json({ banks, psu_type: psuType, sandbox: isSandboxMode() })
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} catch (error) {
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log.error('Error fetching banks:', error)
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return NextResponse.json({
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banks: [
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{ name: 'Nordea', country: 'SE', bic: 'NDEASESS' },
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{ name: 'SEB', country: 'SE', bic: 'ESSESESS' },
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{ name: 'Swedbank', country: 'SE', bic: 'SWEDSESS' },
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{ name: 'Handelsbanken', country: 'SE', bic: 'HANDSESS' },
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],
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sandbox: isSandboxMode(),
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})
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}
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},
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},
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{
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method: 'POST',
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path: '/connect',
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handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
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const log = ctx?.log ?? console
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const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
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const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
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if (!user) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
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}
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if (!ctx?.companyId) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const companyId = ctx.companyId
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const blocked = await requireCapability(supabase, companyId, CAPABILITY.bank_sync)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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const { aspsp_name, aspsp_country, psu_type: explicitPsuType, connection_id: reconnectId } = await request.json()
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// Reconnect mode: re-authorize an EXISTING connection in place (no
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// disconnect required). The aspsp identity falls back to the stored row
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// when the client omits it, so a closed/expired session can be renewed
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// with one click. A fresh connect still needs the bank name + country.
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const isReconnect = !!reconnectId
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if (!isReconnect && (!aspsp_name || !aspsp_country)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'aspsp_name and aspsp_country are required' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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try {
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// For reconnect, load the existing connection up front (company-scoped)
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// so we can revoke its dead session and reuse its bank identity.
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let existing:
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| { id: string; bank_name: string; provider: string; session_id: string | null; psu_type: string | null }
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| null = null
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if (isReconnect) {
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const { data, error: findErr } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('id, bank_name, provider, session_id, psu_type')
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.eq('id', reconnectId)
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.single()
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if (findErr || !data) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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existing = data
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}
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// Resolve the aspsp identity. For a reconnect the bank is already
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// known, so derive it authoritatively from the stored row and IGNORE
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// any client-supplied aspsp_name/aspsp_country: the client
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// (BankSyncNowButton) derives the country by string-splitting the
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// provider slug, and trusting that back is needless attack surface
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// (compliance: ASVS V8.2.1/V4.5). A fresh connect has no stored row,
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// so it uses the client values (already required+validated above).
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// The provider slug ends with the country code, e.g. "nordea-se".
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const resolvedAspspName = isReconnect ? existing?.bank_name : aspsp_name
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const resolvedAspspCountry = isReconnect
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? existing?.provider?.split('-').pop()?.toUpperCase() || 'SE'
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: aspsp_country
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if (!resolvedAspspName) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'aspsp_name and aspsp_country are required' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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// Detect PSU type: explicit override > stored type (reconnect) >
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// company entity_type > default 'business'. Reusing the stored type on
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// reconnect is the key fix: re-deriving from entity_type would flip a
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// working 'personal' connection (e.g. an AB owner who signs with a
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// personal Mobile BankID) back to 'business' on every consent renewal,
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// failing at the bank's signing step. The client can still pass an
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// explicit psu_type to switch account type in place.
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let psuType: 'personal' | 'business' = 'business'
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if (explicitPsuType === 'personal' || explicitPsuType === 'business') {
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psuType = explicitPsuType
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} else if (isReconnect && (existing?.psu_type === 'personal' || existing?.psu_type === 'business')) {
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psuType = existing.psu_type
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} else {
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const { data: company } = await supabase
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.from('companies')
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.select('entity_type')
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.eq('id', companyId)
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.single()
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if (company?.entity_type === 'enskild_firma') {
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psuType = 'personal'
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}
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}
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// Resolve the bank's preferred auth method. Handelsbanken (and some
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// other Swedish banks) expose Mobile BankID only as a hidden DECOUPLED
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// method; without this, Enable Banking defaults to the REDIRECT method,
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// which for Handelsbanken *corporate* PSUs cannot complete with Mobile
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// BankID: the user approves in the app and then hits an error. Returns
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// undefined for banks with no decoupled method, leaving them untouched.
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const authMethod = await getPreferredAuthMethod(
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resolvedAspspName,
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resolvedAspspCountry,
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psuType
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)
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log.info('[enable-banking] Starting bank connection', {
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user_id: user.id,
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bank: resolvedAspspName,
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country: resolvedAspspCountry,
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psu_type: psuType,
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auth_method: authMethod ?? '(aspsp default)',
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reconnect: isReconnect,
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})
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// Reject if there's already a recent pending connection for this user+bank
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// to prevent double-click race conditions that confuse the bank's consent
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// flow. Skipped for reconnect: that deliberately re-authorizes a known row.
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if (!isReconnect) {
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const { data: recentPending } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('id, created_at')
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.eq('bank_name', resolvedAspspName)
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.eq('status', 'pending')
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.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
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.limit(1)
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.maybeSingle()
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if (recentPending) {
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const pendingAge = Date.now() - new Date(recentPending.created_at).getTime()
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const STALE_THRESHOLD_MS = 30 * 1000 // 30 seconds: long enough to cover the redirect handoff, short enough that an abandoned attempt doesn't block the user
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if (pendingAge < STALE_THRESHOLD_MS) {
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log.info('[enable-banking] Rejecting duplicate connect: recent pending exists', {
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existing_id: recentPending.id,
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age_ms: pendingAge,
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})
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'En anslutning pågår redan. Vänta och försök igen.' },
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{ status: 409 }
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)
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}
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}
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// Sweep failed attempts that never became a live connection:
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// stale 'pending' rows (abandoned redirects past the threshold)
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// and 'error' rows left by earlier denied/failed connects.
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// DELETE instead of marking 'error': a parked 'error' row renders
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// forever as an "Åtgärd krävs" card, so a failed attempt followed
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// by a successful retry showed up as two connections to the same
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// bank. The session_id/accounts_data guards protect established
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// connections (anything that ever completed the callback has
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// accounts_data); never-activated rows have no dependents, and
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// the transactions/cash_accounts FKs are ON DELETE SET NULL.
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const { data: sweptRows } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.delete()
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.eq('bank_name', resolvedAspspName)
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.in('status', ['pending', 'error'])
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.is('session_id', null)
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.is('accounts_data', null)
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.select('id')
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if (sweptRows?.length) {
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log.info('[enable-banking] Swept never-activated connection attempts', {
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count: sweptRows.length,
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bank: resolvedAspspName,
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})
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}
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}
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const redirectUrl = `${process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback`
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// Generate cryptographic state token for CSRF protection
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const oauthState = crypto.randomUUID()
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if (isReconnect && existing) {
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// Persist the CSRF state to the existing row BEFORE asking the bank
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// to start an authorization. The OAuth callback locates this row only
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// by oauth_state, so writing it first guarantees that once the bank
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// holds a session bound to this state a matching row already exists.
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// If startAuthorization ran first and this UPDATE then failed, the
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// bank session would be orphaned with no row to complete it.
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//
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// Reuse the SAME row: the callback drives it back to
|
|
// pending_selection → active, so existing transactions and the
|
|
// cash_accounts mirror stay linked. Deliberately keep status
|
|
// 'expired' (NOT 'pending') during the round-trip: this row's
|
|
// created_at is old and the cron deletes stale 'pending' rows after
|
|
// 1h: a reconnect must not be eligible for that. Staying 'expired'
|
|
// also keeps it visible in "Åtgärd krävs" so an abandoned reconnect
|
|
// is recoverable. The callback's oauth_state lookup accepts 'expired'.
|
|
const { error: stateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({
|
|
oauth_state: oauthState,
|
|
status: 'expired',
|
|
session_id: null,
|
|
error_message: null,
|
|
psu_type: psuType,
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', existing.id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
|
|
if (stateError) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Database error staging reconnect state', {
|
|
errorMessage: stateError.message,
|
|
errorCode: stateError.code,
|
|
connection_id: existing.id,
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
})
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to update connection: ${stateError.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Best-effort revoke the dead consent at Enable Banking. A
|
|
// closed/expired session is often already gone, so a failure here is
|
|
// expected and non-fatal: the new authorization supersedes it.
|
|
// Logged at WARN so a systematic revoke failure is visible to
|
|
// monitoring (compliance: ASVS V16 / ISO 27001 A.8.15).
|
|
if (existing.session_id) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await deleteSession(existing.session_id)
|
|
} catch (revokeError) {
|
|
log.warn('[enable-banking] Old session revoke skipped (likely already expired)', {
|
|
message: revokeError instanceof Error ? revokeError.message : String(revokeError),
|
|
connection_id: existing.id,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { url, authorization_id } = await startAuthorization(
|
|
resolvedAspspName,
|
|
resolvedAspspCountry,
|
|
redirectUrl,
|
|
oauthState,
|
|
psuType,
|
|
authMethod
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Record the bank's authorization_id for audit/traceability. The
|
|
// callback matches on oauth_state alone (already persisted above), so
|
|
// a failure here cannot orphan the flow: log and continue.
|
|
const { error: authIdError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ authorization_id })
|
|
.eq('id', existing.id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
|
|
if (authIdError) {
|
|
log.warn('[enable-banking] Could not persist authorization_id on reconnect (non-fatal)', {
|
|
errorMessage: authIdError.message,
|
|
connection_id: existing.id,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
connection_id: existing.id,
|
|
authorization_url: url,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fresh connect: create the bank authorization, then persist the new
|
|
// row carrying its oauth_state so the callback can find it.
|
|
const { url, authorization_id } = await startAuthorization(
|
|
resolvedAspspName,
|
|
resolvedAspspCountry,
|
|
redirectUrl,
|
|
oauthState,
|
|
psuType,
|
|
authMethod
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const { data: connection, error } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.insert({
|
|
company_id: companyId,
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
provider: `${resolvedAspspName.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-')}-${resolvedAspspCountry.toLowerCase()}`,
|
|
bank_name: resolvedAspspName,
|
|
authorization_id,
|
|
oauth_state: oauthState,
|
|
status: 'pending',
|
|
psu_type: psuType,
|
|
})
|
|
.select()
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Database error storing connection', {
|
|
errorMessage: error.message,
|
|
errorCode: error.code,
|
|
errorDetails: error.details,
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
bank: resolvedAspspName,
|
|
})
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to store connection: ${error.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
connection_id: connection.id,
|
|
authorization_url: url,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Connect handler error', {
|
|
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
|
|
stack: error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
|
|
name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : undefined,
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
aspsp_name,
|
|
aspsp_country,
|
|
})
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Connection failed' },
|
|
{ status: 500 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
path: '/sync',
|
|
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
|
|
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
|
|
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
|
|
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
|
|
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
const companyId = ctx.companyId
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await requireCapability(supabase, companyId, CAPABILITY.bank_sync)
|
|
if (blocked) return blocked
|
|
|
|
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
|
|
prefix: 'enable-banking:sync',
|
|
identifier: user.id,
|
|
...RATE_LIMIT_SYNC,
|
|
})
|
|
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
|
|
|
|
// Default 120 days: most callers (Sync Now button, post-activation gap fill)
|
|
// want a deep refresh, not a 30-day blip. Cron uses 7-day incrementals separately.
|
|
// Bank may still cap at ~90 days per PSD2 without fresh SCA: asking for more
|
|
// is harmless and surfaces whatever the ASPSP is willing to return.
|
|
const { connection_id, days_back: rawDaysBack = 120 } = await request.json()
|
|
const days_back = Math.min(Math.max(1, rawDaysBack), 365)
|
|
|
|
const { data: connection, error: connectionError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('id', connection_id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (connectionError || !connection) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 'error' is retryable: a transient upstream failure (e.g. ASPSP_ERROR)
|
|
// parks the connection in 'error' while the PSD2 session is still
|
|
// alive, so the UI's "Försök igen" must be allowed through; a
|
|
// successful sync below restores 'active'. 'expired' stays rejected:
|
|
// a dead consent needs re-authorization via /connect, not a retry.
|
|
if (connection.status !== 'active' && connection.status !== 'error') {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection is not active' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// Keep the full list for write-back; sync only the enabled subset.
|
|
// undefined enabled === true for back-compat with rows that predate
|
|
// the per-account toggle.
|
|
const allAccounts = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
|
|
const accounts = allAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
|
|
|
|
if (accounts.length === 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Inga konton är valda för synkning. Öppna "Hantera konton" för att aktivera minst ett.' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
|
|
const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - days_back * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
|
|
.toISOString()
|
|
.split('T')[0]
|
|
const syncStartedAt = new Date().toISOString()
|
|
|
|
// Use ctx.services.ingestTransactions when available
|
|
const ingestFn = ctx?.services.ingestTransactions
|
|
|
|
// Detect SIE overlap: skip auto-categorization if the sync range
|
|
// overlaps with a completed SIE import to prevent double-booking.
|
|
// Reconciliation still links bank transactions to existing GL lines.
|
|
const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
|
|
.from('sie_imports')
|
|
.select('id')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('status', 'completed')
|
|
.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
|
|
// Check if user is a viewer: viewers get rawInsertOnly (no categorization)
|
|
const { data: membership } = await supabase
|
|
.from('company_members')
|
|
.select('role')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('user_id', user.id)
|
|
.maybeSingle()
|
|
const isViewer = membership?.role === 'viewer'
|
|
|
|
// Use strategy=longest when the caller asks for >= 30 days of history
|
|
// (initial sync, manual backfill). Short windows get the implicit
|
|
// default since there's no older data to surface.
|
|
const syncOptions = {
|
|
...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
|
|
...(isViewer ? { rawInsertOnly: true } : {}),
|
|
...(days_back >= 30 ? { strategy: 'longest' as const } : {}),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sieOverlap) {
|
|
log.info('SIE import overlap detected: suppressing auto-categorization', {
|
|
sieImportId: sieOverlap.id,
|
|
fromDate,
|
|
toDate,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
const results = await Promise.all(
|
|
accounts.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
|
|
supabase,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
user.id,
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
account,
|
|
fromDate,
|
|
toDate,
|
|
ingestFn,
|
|
syncOptions
|
|
))
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
|
|
const totalDuplicates = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
|
|
|
|
// When SIE overlap is detected, run a batch reconciliation sweep.
|
|
// The greedy algorithm considers all candidates globally (highest-
|
|
// confidence first) and catches matches the inline per-transaction
|
|
// pass may have missed due to processing order.
|
|
// Skip for viewers: reconciliation updates transactions which viewers cannot do.
|
|
if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0 && !isViewer) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const reconResult = await runReconciliation(supabase, companyId, user.id, {
|
|
dateFrom: fromDate,
|
|
dateTo: toDate,
|
|
// This sweep applies without a human reviewing a dry-run, so
|
|
// never commit low-confidence (fuzzy / date-range) matches.
|
|
confidenceThreshold: DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD,
|
|
})
|
|
if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
|
|
log.info('Post-sync batch reconciliation matched additional transactions', {
|
|
applied: reconResult.applied,
|
|
skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
|
|
total: reconResult.matches.length,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Non-critical: transactions remain uncategorized for manual review
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const syncedAt = new Date().toISOString()
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({
|
|
accounts_data: allAccounts,
|
|
last_synced_at: syncedAt,
|
|
// A successful sync proves the session works again: recover an
|
|
// 'error' connection to 'active' (so the cron picks it up again)
|
|
// and clear any stale failure message from the settings panel.
|
|
...(connection.status === 'error' ? { status: 'active' } : {}),
|
|
...(connection.status === 'error' || connection.error_message
|
|
? { error_message: null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
if (totalImported > 0) {
|
|
const { data: syncedTransactions } = await supabase
|
|
.from('transactions')
|
|
.select('*')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('bank_connection_id', connection.id)
|
|
.gte('created_at', syncStartedAt)
|
|
.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
|
|
.limit(totalImported)
|
|
|
|
if (syncedTransactions && syncedTransactions.length > 0) {
|
|
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
|
|
await emit({
|
|
type: 'transaction.synced',
|
|
payload: { transactions: syncedTransactions as Transaction[], userId: user.id, companyId },
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
imported: totalImported,
|
|
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
|
|
last_synced_at: syncedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Sync handler error', {
|
|
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
|
|
stack: error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
|
|
name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : undefined,
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
connection_id,
|
|
connectionStatus: connection.status,
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// A dead PSD2 session (closed/expired/invalid consent) can't be fixed
|
|
// by retrying: the user must re-authorize. Flip the connection to
|
|
// 'expired' so the UI surfaces the reconnect affordance, and tell the
|
|
// client re-auth is required (reauth_required) so it can offer a
|
|
// one-click "Förnya anslutning" instead of a dead-end error. No
|
|
// disconnect needed: /connect reconnects this same connection in place.
|
|
if (error instanceof SessionExpiredError) {
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: 'expired', error_message: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{
|
|
error: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
|
|
code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED',
|
|
reauth_required: true,
|
|
connection_id: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
{ status: 409 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Non-session failure: the settings panel toasts this error verbatim
|
|
// and renders error_message on the connection card, so both must be
|
|
// the short Swedish message: the raw Enable Banking body (an English
|
|
// JSON envelope) is already in the server log above. Refresh the
|
|
// stored error_message on rows already in 'error' so a failed retry
|
|
// replaces any stale raw body persisted by older code.
|
|
if (connection.status === 'error') {
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ error_message: SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
method: 'PATCH',
|
|
path: '/accounts',
|
|
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
|
|
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
|
|
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
|
|
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
|
|
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// company_id must come from the verified extension context, never fall
|
|
// back to user.id (which is a different identifier dimension and would
|
|
// silently mis-scope queries in multi-tenant deployments).
|
|
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
const companyId = ctx.companyId
|
|
|
|
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
|
|
prefix: 'enable-banking:accounts',
|
|
identifier: user.id,
|
|
...RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNTS,
|
|
})
|
|
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
|
|
|
|
const body = await request.json().catch(() => null)
|
|
const connection_id = body?.connection_id
|
|
const enabled_uids = body?.enabled_uids
|
|
const rawLookback = body?.initial_lookback_days
|
|
const rawLookbackFromDate = body?.initial_lookback_from_date
|
|
const account_mappings = body?.account_mappings
|
|
|
|
if (typeof connection_id !== 'string' || !connection_id) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'connection_id krävs' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(enabled_uids) || !enabled_uids.every(u => typeof u === 'string')) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'enabled_uids måste vara en lista av strängar' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
if (enabled_uids.length === 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Välj minst ett konto, eller koppla bort banken om inga konton ska synkas.' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if (enabled_uids.length > MAX_ENABLED_UIDS) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: `Max ${MAX_ENABLED_UIDS} konton per anslutning.` },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// account_mappings is optional. When present, it's an array of
|
|
// { uid, ledger_account } pairs that route per-account ingest to a
|
|
// specific BAS account (e.g. EUR account → 1932 instead of the default 1930).
|
|
// Restrict to BAS class 19 (kassa/bank). Accepting e.g. 3001 (revenue)
|
|
// or 2640 (input VAT) here would silently misroute every bank-side
|
|
// journal-entry leg into a revenue/VAT account, corrupting both the
|
|
// ledger and momsdeklaration. The chart-of-accounts existence check
|
|
// below is necessary but not sufficient: those accounts likely do
|
|
// exist in the chart, but they're the wrong class.
|
|
const BAS_ACCOUNT_PATTERN = /^19[0-9]{2}$/
|
|
type AccountMapping = { uid: string; ledger_account?: string | null }
|
|
let mappings: AccountMapping[] = []
|
|
if (account_mappings !== undefined) {
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(account_mappings)) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'account_mappings måste vara en lista' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
for (const m of account_mappings) {
|
|
if (!m || typeof m !== 'object' || typeof m.uid !== 'string') {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'account_mappings: varje post kräver uid (sträng)' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if (m.ledger_account != null && (typeof m.ledger_account !== 'string' || !BAS_ACCOUNT_PATTERN.test(m.ledger_account))) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'account_mappings: ledger_account måste vara ett BAS-konto i klass 19 (1900-1999)' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
mappings = account_mappings as AccountMapping[]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// initial_lookback_days only applies on the pending_selection→active transition.
|
|
// Default 120; clamp to [30, 365]. Ignored for selection edits.
|
|
// PSD2 obliges ASPSPs to ~90 days without fresh SCA, but many Swedish banks
|
|
// return more if asked: request 120 and accept whatever the bank gives back.
|
|
//
|
|
// If the client sent initial_lookback_from_date (preferred for fiscal-year-anchored
|
|
// backfills), derive days from that and reject future dates outright. Otherwise
|
|
// fall back to initial_lookback_days (or the 120-day default).
|
|
if (typeof rawLookbackFromDate === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(rawLookbackFromDate)) {
|
|
const from = new Date(rawLookbackFromDate + 'T00:00:00Z')
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(from.getTime())) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'initial_lookback_from_date är inte ett giltigt datum.' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
const diffMs = Date.now() - from.getTime()
|
|
const daysFromDate = Math.ceil(diffMs / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
|
|
if (daysFromDate <= 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'initial_lookback_from_date måste ligga i det förflutna.' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const initialLookbackDays = (() => {
|
|
if (typeof rawLookbackFromDate === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(rawLookbackFromDate)) {
|
|
const from = new Date(rawLookbackFromDate + 'T00:00:00Z')
|
|
// Future/invalid dates already rejected above; days > 0 is guaranteed.
|
|
const diffMs = Date.now() - from.getTime()
|
|
const days = Math.ceil(diffMs / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
|
|
return Math.min(365, Math.max(1, days))
|
|
}
|
|
const n = typeof rawLookback === 'number' && Number.isFinite(rawLookback) ? rawLookback : 120
|
|
return Math.min(365, Math.max(30, Math.round(n)))
|
|
})()
|
|
|
|
const { data: connection, error: connectionError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.select('id, status, accounts_data, bank_name')
|
|
.eq('id', connection_id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (connectionError || !connection) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connection.status !== 'pending_selection' && connection.status !== 'active') {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Anslutningen kan inte konfigureras i nuvarande status.' },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const existing = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
|
|
const knownUids = new Set(existing.map(a => a.uid))
|
|
const unknownUids = enabled_uids.filter(uid => !knownUids.has(uid))
|
|
if (unknownUids.length > 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Ett eller flera konton kunde inte hittas.', unknown_uids: unknownUids },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mirror the enabled_uids guard for account_mappings: without this,
|
|
// a typo'd UID in the mapping list is silently dropped (the entry
|
|
// never lands in the resulting accounts_data) while the response is
|
|
// still 200, leaving the client to believe the mapping was applied.
|
|
const unknownMappingUids = mappings.map(m => m.uid).filter(uid => !knownUids.has(uid))
|
|
if (unknownMappingUids.length > 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'account_mappings innehåller okända konto-uid.', unknown_uids: unknownMappingUids },
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify any provided ledger_account values actually exist in the
|
|
// company's chart of accounts. Prevents users from typing arbitrary
|
|
// numbers via the API and breaking journal entry creation later.
|
|
const requestedLedgerAccounts = mappings
|
|
.map(m => m.ledger_account)
|
|
.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === 'string')
|
|
if (requestedLedgerAccounts.length > 0) {
|
|
const { data: chartRows } = await supabase
|
|
.from('chart_of_accounts')
|
|
.select('account_number')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.in('account_number', requestedLedgerAccounts)
|
|
const validAccountNumbers = new Set((chartRows || []).map(r => r.account_number as string))
|
|
const invalid = requestedLedgerAccounts.filter(a => !validAccountNumbers.has(a))
|
|
if (invalid.length > 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{
|
|
error: 'Ett eller flera bokföringskonton finns inte i kontoplanen.',
|
|
invalid_accounts: invalid,
|
|
},
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const enabledSet = new Set(enabled_uids)
|
|
const mappingsByUid = new Map(mappings.map(m => [m.uid, m]))
|
|
const updatedAccounts: StoredAccount[] = existing.map(a => {
|
|
const mapping = mappingsByUid.get(a.uid)
|
|
return {
|
|
...a,
|
|
enabled: enabledSet.has(a.uid),
|
|
// Apply ledger_account from mapping when present. Explicit null clears it.
|
|
// Absent mapping leaves the existing ledger_account untouched (back-compat
|
|
// with selection-edit calls that don't include account_mappings).
|
|
...(mapping
|
|
? { ledger_account: mapping.ledger_account ?? undefined }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Resolve the effective mirror ledger for every account up front and
|
|
// reject collisions with a 400 — the mirror pass below writes into
|
|
// cash_accounts, whose UNIQUE (company_id, ledger_account) constraint
|
|
// would otherwise fail per-account and get swallowed, leaving accounts
|
|
// silently unmirrored.
|
|
const { allocatePsd2LedgerAccount, upsertFromPsd2, getRevokedConnectionIds } = await import(
|
|
'@/lib/cash-accounts/service'
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const { data: companyCashRows } = await supabase
|
|
.from('cash_accounts')
|
|
.select('external_uid, bank_connection_id, ledger_account')
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
const cashRows = (companyCashRows ?? []) as Array<{
|
|
external_uid: string | null
|
|
bank_connection_id: string | null
|
|
ledger_account: string
|
|
}>
|
|
const existingLedgerByUid = new Map(
|
|
cashRows
|
|
.filter(r => r.bank_connection_id === connection.id && r.external_uid)
|
|
.map(r => [r.external_uid as string, r.ledger_account])
|
|
)
|
|
// Slots held by OTHER connections' PSD2 accounts — an explicit mapping
|
|
// onto one of those would violate the unique constraint. Manual rows
|
|
// are not foreign: upsertFromPsd2 promotes them in place. Rows held by
|
|
// a REVOKED connection are not foreign either: those are orphaned
|
|
// leftovers (disconnect predating the claim release, or a lost demote)
|
|
// and upsertFromPsd2 promotes them in place too. Excluding them here
|
|
// is the self-heal path for companies whose bank was disconnected
|
|
// before disconnect started releasing ledger claims.
|
|
const foreignConnectionIds = [
|
|
...new Set(
|
|
cashRows
|
|
.filter(r => r.bank_connection_id !== null && r.bank_connection_id !== connection.id)
|
|
.map(r => r.bank_connection_id as string)
|
|
),
|
|
]
|
|
const revokedConnectionIds = await getRevokedConnectionIds(
|
|
supabase,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
foreignConnectionIds
|
|
)
|
|
const foreignConnectedLedgers = new Set(
|
|
cashRows
|
|
.filter(
|
|
r =>
|
|
r.bank_connection_id !== null &&
|
|
r.bank_connection_id !== connection.id &&
|
|
!revokedConnectionIds.has(r.bank_connection_id)
|
|
)
|
|
.map(r => r.ledger_account)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const effectiveLedgerByUid = new Map<string, string>()
|
|
const usedLedgers = new Set<string>()
|
|
const duplicateLedgers = new Set<string>()
|
|
const conflictingLedgers = new Set<string>()
|
|
|
|
// First pass: accounts with an explicit or previously mirrored ledger.
|
|
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
|
|
const ledger = a.ledger_account ?? existingLedgerByUid.get(a.uid)
|
|
if (!ledger) continue
|
|
if (usedLedgers.has(ledger)) duplicateLedgers.add(ledger)
|
|
if (foreignConnectedLedgers.has(ledger) && existingLedgerByUid.get(a.uid) !== ledger) {
|
|
conflictingLedgers.add(ledger)
|
|
}
|
|
usedLedgers.add(ledger)
|
|
effectiveLedgerByUid.set(a.uid, ledger)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (duplicateLedgers.size > 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{
|
|
error: 'Flera bankkonton kan inte bokföras på samma konto. Välj olika bokföringskonton.',
|
|
duplicate_accounts: [...duplicateLedgers],
|
|
},
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if (conflictingLedgers.size > 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{
|
|
error: 'Bokföringskontot används redan av ett bankkonto från en annan bankanslutning.',
|
|
conflicting_accounts: [...conflictingLedgers],
|
|
},
|
|
{ status: 400 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Second pass: allocate a free slot for accounts with no ledger at all
|
|
// (legacy connections mirrored before allocation existed, or mappings
|
|
// explicitly cleared). Allocation failure must never block selection
|
|
// save — fall back to the pre-allocator behavior (1930) and let the
|
|
// mirror pass surface any collision per-account, as before.
|
|
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
|
|
if (effectiveLedgerByUid.has(a.uid)) continue
|
|
let allocated: string | null = null
|
|
try {
|
|
allocated = await allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, user.id, {
|
|
currency: a.currency,
|
|
accountName: a.name,
|
|
exclude: usedLedgers,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (allocErr) {
|
|
log.warn('[enable-banking] ledger allocation failed on selection save', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
uid: a.uid,
|
|
error: allocErr instanceof Error ? allocErr.message : String(allocErr),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
const ledger = allocated ?? '1930'
|
|
usedLedgers.add(ledger)
|
|
effectiveLedgerByUid.set(a.uid, ledger)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// accounts_data mirrors the resolved assignment so the picker
|
|
// pre-fills reality on the next open.
|
|
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
|
|
a.ledger_account = effectiveLedgerByUid.get(a.uid)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// State machine: only transition pending_selection → active. Once
|
|
// active, the status field is omitted from the update so the same
|
|
// endpoint can be reused to change account selection without
|
|
// re-asserting a transition that has already happened.
|
|
const updatePayload: { accounts_data: StoredAccount[]; status?: 'active' } = {
|
|
accounts_data: updatedAccounts,
|
|
}
|
|
if (connection.status === 'pending_selection') {
|
|
updatePayload.status = 'active'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update(updatePayload)
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to update account selection', {
|
|
errorMessage: updateError.message,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Kunde inte spara kontoval' }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mirror the user's selection into cash_accounts so routing decisions
|
|
// and reconciliation pick up the new enabled state + ledger mapping
|
|
// without reading the JSONB column.
|
|
{
|
|
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await upsertFromPsd2(supabase, companyId, {
|
|
bank_connection_id: connection.id,
|
|
external_uid: a.uid,
|
|
currency: a.currency,
|
|
ledger_account: a.ledger_account ?? '1930',
|
|
iban: a.iban ?? null,
|
|
name: a.name ?? null,
|
|
balance: a.balance ?? null,
|
|
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at ?? null,
|
|
enabled: a.enabled ?? true,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (cashErr) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to mirror cash_account on selection save', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
uid: a.uid,
|
|
error: cashErr instanceof Error ? cashErr.message : String(cashErr),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const newStatus = updatePayload.status ?? connection.status
|
|
log.info('[enable-banking] Account selection saved', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
enabledCount: enabled_uids.length,
|
|
totalCount: existing.length,
|
|
previousStatus: connection.status,
|
|
newStatus,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
|
|
await emit({
|
|
type: 'bank_connection.account_selection_changed',
|
|
payload: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
bankName: (connection as { bank_name?: string | null }).bank_name ?? null,
|
|
previousStatus: connection.status,
|
|
newStatus,
|
|
enabledCount: enabled_uids.length,
|
|
totalCount: existing.length,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (emitError) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to emit account selection event', {
|
|
errorMessage: emitError instanceof Error ? emitError.message : String(emitError),
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Initial backfill on activation. Run inline so the user has data the
|
|
// moment they finish account selection: no 24h cron wait. Failures
|
|
// here don't fail the PATCH; the cron will retry on its next run
|
|
// (gated on initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL).
|
|
let initialSyncSummary: {
|
|
imported: number
|
|
duplicates: number
|
|
requested_from: string
|
|
returned_min_date: string | null
|
|
returned_max_date: string | null
|
|
} | null = null
|
|
let initialSyncError: string | null = null
|
|
|
|
if (connection.status === 'pending_selection') {
|
|
const accountsToSync = updatedAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
|
|
const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
|
|
const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - initialLookbackDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
|
|
.toISOString()
|
|
.split('T')[0]
|
|
|
|
log.info('[enable-banking] Starting inline initial backfill', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
accountCount: accountsToSync.length,
|
|
lookbackDays: initialLookbackDays,
|
|
fromDate,
|
|
toDate,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
let timeoutHandle: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined
|
|
try {
|
|
const ingestFn = ctx?.services.ingestTransactions
|
|
const syncPromise = Promise.all(
|
|
accountsToSync.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
|
|
supabase,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
user.id,
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
account,
|
|
fromDate,
|
|
toDate,
|
|
ingestFn,
|
|
{ strategy: 'longest' }
|
|
))
|
|
)
|
|
// If the timeout wins the race, the underlying Promise.all keeps
|
|
// running. Without a registered handler, a late rejection from the
|
|
// bank API would surface as an unhandledRejection: Node 22 (the
|
|
// self-hosted Docker runtime) terminates the process by default on
|
|
// those, taking the whole server down. The cron retries the
|
|
// backfill via initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL, so a no-op
|
|
// catch is the right policy here.
|
|
syncPromise.catch(() => {})
|
|
|
|
const TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000
|
|
const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
|
|
timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('initial_sync_timeout')), TIMEOUT_MS)
|
|
})
|
|
const results = await Promise.race([syncPromise, timeoutPromise])
|
|
|
|
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
|
|
const totalDuplicates = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
|
|
|
|
// Min/max booking date across all synced accounts
|
|
const minDates = results.map(r => r.returnedMinBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
|
|
const maxDates = results.map(r => r.returnedMaxBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
|
|
const returnedMin = minDates.length > 0 ? minDates.reduce((a, b) => (a < b ? a : b)) : null
|
|
const returnedMax = maxDates.length > 0 ? maxDates.reduce((a, b) => (a > b ? a : b)) : null
|
|
|
|
const completedAt = new Date().toISOString()
|
|
// Don't re-write accounts_data here: the first update already wrote it.
|
|
// Including it again races with any concurrent writer (e.g. cron firing in
|
|
// the sub-60s window) and would silently overwrite their changes.
|
|
const { error: metaUpdateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({
|
|
last_synced_at: completedAt,
|
|
initial_sync_completed_at: completedAt,
|
|
initial_sync_requested_from: fromDate,
|
|
initial_sync_returned_min_date: returnedMin,
|
|
initial_sync_returned_max_date: returnedMax,
|
|
initial_sync_lookback_days: initialLookbackDays,
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
if (metaUpdateError) {
|
|
// The sync itself succeeded (transactions are ingested) but we
|
|
// couldn't persist that. Falsely reporting success would tell the
|
|
// client "imported N transactions" while the DB still has
|
|
// initial_sync_completed_at = NULL, causing the cron to re-run a
|
|
// 90-day backfill next morning. Surface this as initial_sync_error
|
|
// so the UI shows a "background sync needs retry" warning, and the
|
|
// cron's gate (initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL) will self-heal.
|
|
initialSyncError = `metadata_update_failed: ${metaUpdateError.message}`
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to persist initial_sync metadata after backfill', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
error: metaUpdateError.message,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
} else {
|
|
initialSyncSummary = {
|
|
imported: totalImported,
|
|
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
|
|
requested_from: fromDate,
|
|
returned_min_date: returnedMin,
|
|
returned_max_date: returnedMax,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.info('[enable-banking] Inline initial backfill complete', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
...initialSyncSummary,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (syncError) {
|
|
initialSyncError = syncError instanceof Error ? syncError.message : String(syncError)
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Inline initial backfill failed: cron will retry', {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
error: initialSyncError,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
success: true,
|
|
enabled_count: enabled_uids.length,
|
|
total_count: existing.length,
|
|
...(initialSyncSummary ? { initial_sync: initialSyncSummary } : {}),
|
|
...(initialSyncError ? { initial_sync_error: initialSyncError } : {}),
|
|
})
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
method: 'DELETE',
|
|
path: '/disconnect',
|
|
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
|
|
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
|
|
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
|
|
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
|
|
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
const companyId = ctx.companyId
|
|
|
|
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
|
|
prefix: 'enable-banking:disconnect',
|
|
identifier: user.id,
|
|
...RATE_LIMIT_DISCONNECT,
|
|
})
|
|
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
|
|
|
|
const { connection_id } = await request.json()
|
|
|
|
if (!connection_id) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'connection_id is required' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { data: connection, error: findError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.select('id, session_id, status, bank_name')
|
|
.eq('id', connection_id)
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (findError || !connection) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Revoke PSD2 consent if session exists
|
|
if (connection.session_id) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await deleteSession(connection.session_id)
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to revoke PSD2 session (may be expired)', {
|
|
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
|
|
sessionId: connection.session_id,
|
|
connectionId: connection_id,
|
|
connectionStatus: connection.status,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: 'revoked', session_id: null })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to mark connection revoked', {
|
|
errorMessage: updateError.message,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Failed to disconnect' }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Release the connection's ledger claims by demoting its cash_accounts
|
|
// rows to manual (bank_connection_id = null). The rows themselves stay:
|
|
// transactions.cash_account_id and the ledger history reference them,
|
|
// and upsertFromPsd2 promotes a manual holder in place on reconnect so
|
|
// the same bank lands back on its original BAS account (e.g. 1930)
|
|
// instead of overflowing to the next free slot.
|
|
const { error: releaseError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('cash_accounts')
|
|
.update({ bank_connection_id: null })
|
|
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
|
.eq('bank_connection_id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
if (releaseError) {
|
|
// Don't fail the disconnect: the connection is already revoked, and
|
|
// the allocator / collision guard also skip revoked connections, so
|
|
// the orphaned rows self-heal on the next picker save.
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to release cash_accounts ledger claims on disconnect', {
|
|
errorMessage: releaseError.message,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
|
|
await emit({
|
|
type: 'bank_connection.revoked',
|
|
payload: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
bankName: (connection as { bank_name?: string | null }).bank_name ?? null,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (emitError) {
|
|
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to emit revoke event', {
|
|
errorMessage: emitError instanceof Error ? emitError.message : String(emitError),
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
eventHandlers: [],
|
|
}
|