* feat(domains): dual-domain cutover to app.accounted.se The user-facing app moves to app.accounted.se while app.gnubok.se stays alive for machine traffic (MCP connectors, API keys, third-party OAuth callbacks, webhooks, crons), so no third-party callback registration is on the critical path. - next.config: host redirect app.gnubok.se -> NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL for page traffic only (/api, /.well-known, /_next excluded). Arms itself only once NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL leaves the legacy host, so merging this is inert and the cutover is a pure env flip + redeploy. - skatteverket: redirect_uri pinned via NEXT_PUBLIC_SKV_OAUTH_BASE_URL (Utvecklarportalen registration is slow to change); the OAuth callback now resolves the flow from the state token + stored oauth_user_id via the service client instead of session cookies, which no longer exist on the OAuth host. Legacy same-domain flows fall back to the session. - popup listeners (SkatteverketConnectPanel, AGIPanel) accept postMessage from the pinned OAuth origin; event.source identity check unchanged. - /.well-known discovery docs reflect the allowlisted request host so existing MCP connectors on app.gnubok.se keep a self-consistent issuer/resource after the flip; spoofed hosts fall back to canonical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: log dual-domain cutover decision Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): recency-bound SKV state lookup, exact localhost match in discovery allowlist - The oauth_state lookup now only considers rows updated in the last 10 minutes: bounds how long a leaked/phished authorize URL stays completable, keeps the row set far below PostgREST's 1000-row cap, and surfaces query errors instead of misreporting them as CSRF. - resolveDiscoveryBaseUrl matches localhost/127.0.0.1 exactly; the prefix check reflected spoofed hosts like localhost.evil.example. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
59 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Canonical base URL for v1 surfaces.
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*
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* Use this, NOT `new URL(request.url).host`, when assembling URLs that go
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* into discovery files, OpenAPI specs, or any response a 3rd-party agent
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* caches. The inbound `Host` header is attacker-controlled at the edge; a
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* spoofed value would otherwise poison agent discovery and redirect them
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* to attacker-controlled endpoints.
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*
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* Honours `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` (the same env var the rest of the codebase
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* uses for absolute links). Falls back to `https://localhost:3000` for
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* local development when the env var is unset: this is a deliberate
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* fail-closed default that any production deploy will override.
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*/
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export function getCanonicalBaseUrl(): string {
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const fromEnv = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL?.trim()
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if (fromEnv) return fromEnv.replace(/\/$/, '')
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return 'http://localhost:3000'
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}
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/**
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* Base URL for the OAuth/MCP discovery documents (/.well-known/*).
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*
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* The app is served on two domains since the accounted.se cutover:
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* app.accounted.se for humans and app.gnubok.se for machine traffic
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* (existing MCP connectors and API clients were configured against the
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* legacy host and it can never be retired). RFC 8414/9728 clients validate
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* that the metadata they fetch is self-consistent with the host they
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* fetched it from, so discovery must reflect the host the client actually
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* used. The Host header stays attacker-controlled at the edge, so only
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* allowlisted hosts are reflected; anything else falls back to the
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* canonical base URL.
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*/
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const LEGACY_DISCOVERY_HOSTS = new Set(['app.gnubok.se'])
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export function resolveDiscoveryBaseUrl(request: Request): string {
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const canonical = getCanonicalBaseUrl()
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const host = request.headers.get('host')?.trim().toLowerCase()
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if (!host) return canonical
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let canonicalHost: string | null = null
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try {
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canonicalHost = new URL(canonical).host.toLowerCase()
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} catch {
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canonicalHost = null
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}
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if (host === canonicalHost) return canonical
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if (LEGACY_DISCOVERY_HOSTS.has(host)) return `https://${host}`
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// Exact hostname match: a prefix check would reflect spoofed hosts like
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// localhost.evil.example into the discovery documents.
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const hostname = host.replace(/:\d+$/, '')
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if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '127.0.0.1') {
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return `http://${host}`
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}
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return canonical
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}
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