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accounted/lib/auth/scopes.ts
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.7 32ad6da28c feat(api): v1 invoice + customer reads (Phase 2 PR-A) (#451)
* feat(api): v1 invoice + customer read endpoints (Phase 2 PR-A)

First slice of the Phase 2 invoices vertical. Read-only endpoints landing
in this PR; writes + webhooks land in PR-B and PR-C. After all three a
developer can ship an end-to-end invoicing integration.

New endpoints (all wrapped, scoped, cursor-paginated):
- GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/invoices       — list, filters: status, customer_id, document_type, currency. Cursor on (invoice_date DESC, id DESC). Customer name embedded inline; ?expand=customer for full record, ?expand=items for line items.
- GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/invoices/:id   — detail with embedded customer. ?expand=items,payments.
- GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/customers      — list, filters: customer_type, search (name/org_number prefix), include_archived. Cursor on (created_at ASC, id ASC).
- GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/customers/:id  — detail. ?expand=invoices embeds open invoices in a single round-trip.

Shared infra:
- lib/api/v1/expand.ts — parseExpand() validates ?expand=a,b,c against a per-endpoint allowlist; unknown keys yield VALIDATION_ERROR with the full invalid list and the allowlist (agent-friendly).
- All four routes register with the Zod schema registry so they show up in /api/v1/openapi.json with x-action-risk and use-when / do-not-use-for metadata.
- Compound keyset filter on both list endpoints (per Greptile review on PR #450) — no skipped or duplicated rows on page boundaries.

Tests:
- lib/api/v1/__tests__/expand.test.ts (8 tests)
- app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/invoices/__tests__/route.test.ts (10 tests)
- app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/customers/__tests__/route.test.ts (8 tests)

Full repo suite green (3127/3127), build clean, lint clean on v1 paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): address PR #451 review (Greptile + compliance swarm)

- Greptile P1 (customers search) + OWASP V1.2.5: customer search term now
  escapes both PostgREST .or() delimiters (,()) AND SQL LIKE wildcards
  (% _ \). '100%' searches for the literal string instead of any
  customer containing '100'.
- OWASP V8.2.1 + V16.1: detail endpoints now UUID-validate the :id path
  param before touching the database, and no longer echo the raw id in
  the NOT_FOUND response details. Adds a structured warn log on 404 with
  the queried (id, companyId) for audit purposes.
- V4.5 + Art.25(1) + A.8.3 / A.8.11 + CC6.3 + PI1.3 (~12 findings): every
  select('*') replaced with explicit column lists per the documented Zod
  schemas. Includes joined sub-queries — customer:customers(...),
  items:invoice_items(...), payments:invoice_payments(...). Future
  schema migrations adding sensitive columns must now update these
  projections before the field becomes visible on the public API.
- A.8.5: hardcoded 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' in test fixtures replaced with
  'Bearer test-fixture-not-a-real-key' to avoid false-positive secret
  scanner alerts. Fixture UUIDs upgraded to valid v4 format (Zod 4's
  .uuid() enforces version+variant digits).
- Art.5(1)(f): customer-invoices expansion soft-degrade now logs only
  the error code + message rather than the full Supabase error object.

Pushing back on:
- Art.5(1)(b) org_number in customer list — Bolagsverket-public data
  (same triage as PR #450; required by integration use case)
- Art.25(2) customer_name always-joined — denormalising via trigger is
  a real schema migration for a marginal data-flow gain
- A.8.15 _partial flag on soft-degrade — ?expand is documented as a hint

50/50 v1 tests; 3131/3131 full suite; build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): second-pass review on PR #451 — partial_expansions + fake fixtures

Address the residual compliance-swarm findings after the first fix round:

- CC6.1 (medium): the customer-detail handler now sets
  meta.partial_expansions=['invoices'] when the ?expand=invoices subquery
  fails, signalling the degraded response to the caller without escalating
  to error-level logs (alert fatigue). The primary resource still returns
  with an empty invoices array. New ResponseOptions.partialExpansions
  threaded through buildMeta(). 1 new test for the failure path, plus
  a happy-path assertion that the flag is absent.
- A.8.33 (low): SAMPLE_CUSTOMER fixture's org_number and vat_number
  replaced with 'TEST-0000-0001' / 'SETEST00000001' — cannot be confused
  with real Bolagsverket entries or pass external VIES validation.

Pushing back on:
- CC6.3 (medium) — separate scope for ?expand=items on invoices: every
  accounting API I know (Stripe, QuickBooks, Fortnox) treats line items
  as part of the invoice resource. Splitting would violate principle of
  least surprise for integrators; the plan deliberately treats
  invoices:read as covering the full invoice including items.

3132/3132 vitest pass; build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): third-pass review on PR #451 — PII minimisation refinements

Third compliance-swarm sweep (6 → 0 highs, 4 medium, 2 low). Addressed:

- Art.5(1)(c) personnummer leakage: customer LIST response now masks
  org_number AND vat_number for customer_type IN ('individual',
  'eu_individual') — for sole traders (enskild firma) org_number IS the
  personnummer. Business customers' Bolagsverket-public org_numbers stay
  visible. Detail endpoint (deliberate single-record fetch) unchanged.
- Art.5(1)(c) over-broad invoice-list expansion: ?expand=customer on
  the invoice LIST endpoint now uses a new CUSTOMER_LIST_CONTEXT_COLUMNS
  projection (id, name, customer_type, email, country, archived_at) —
  full address/phone/notes/vat_number stay on the customer DETAIL
  endpoint. Drops PII transmitted in bulk-list contexts by ~60%.
- A.8.15 permission-error differentiation: customer-detail soft-degrade
  for ?expand=invoices now bumps Postgres error class 42 (insufficient
  privilege, RLS denial) to error-level log so Sentry alerts on
  misconfigurations. Transient errors stay at warn.
- PI1.1 ISO-4217 currency: invoice list ?currency now requires
  /^[A-Z]{3}$/ instead of accepting any 3-8 char string. Two new tests.

Pushing back on:
- Art.5(1)(f) UUID logging on 404 — UUIDs have 122 bits of entropy; you
  cannot enumerate the space, so the "log scraping = enumeration" framing
  doesn't hold. Operational audit value > theoretical risk.
- Art.25(1) notes-by-default in customer DETAIL — kept inline. Detail
  is a deliberate single-record fetch; the dashboard shows notes inline;
  agents calling /customers/{id} reasonably expect them. Notes are
  already excluded from the LIST endpoint AND from the invoice-list
  ?expand=customer projection (above).

3135/3135 vitest pass; build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 21:49:22 +02:00

106 lines
3.8 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* v1 REST API endpoint → required scope map.
*
* This is the REST-route analogue of `TOOL_SCOPE_MAP` in api-keys.ts (which
* maps MCP tool names to scopes). Both share the same `ApiKeyScope` registry.
*
* Key format: `<METHOD> <pattern>` where pattern uses `:param` for path
* variables, matching Next.js dynamic-segment conventions (one for one).
*
* Endpoints not listed here are public (no auth) — only the discovery routes
* (`/llms.txt`, `/.well-known/skills`, `/api/v1/health`, `/api/v1/openapi.json`)
* fall into that bucket. Everything else under `/api/v1/` MUST be in this map
* or the wrapper will refuse the request with INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE.
*/
import type { ApiKeyScope } from './api-keys'
/**
* Routes that require authentication but no scope check beyond "is the key
* valid?". The wrapper still validates the key and runs rate limiting.
*/
export const V1_PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
'GET /api/v1/health',
'GET /api/v1/openapi.json',
'GET /api/v1/openapi.yaml',
]
/**
* Map of v1 endpoint pattern → required scope.
*
* Patterns use `:param` placeholders that match a single path segment.
* The wrapper compiles these into regexes at startup and matches incoming
* requests by (method, normalized-path) tuple.
*
* When adding a new endpoint, add it here BEFORE shipping the route file —
* otherwise the wrapper will reject all requests to it.
*/
export const V1_ENDPOINT_SCOPES: Record<string, ApiKeyScope> = {
// Companies
'GET /api/v1/companies': 'companies:read',
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId': 'companies:read',
// Operations (async long-running tasks)
'GET /api/v1/operations/:id': 'operations:read',
// Events (webhook fallback / event log polling)
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/events': 'events:read',
// Customers (Phase 2 PR-A)
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/customers': 'customers:read',
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/customers/:id': 'customers:read',
// Invoices (Phase 2 PR-A)
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/invoices': 'invoices:read',
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/invoices/:id': 'invoices:read',
// Webhooks (Phase 6 — placeholder so the catalogue is complete)
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/webhooks': 'webhooks:manage',
'POST /api/v1/companies/:companyId/webhooks': 'webhooks:manage',
'GET /api/v1/companies/:companyId/webhooks/:id': 'webhooks:manage',
'PATCH /api/v1/companies/:companyId/webhooks/:id': 'webhooks:manage',
'DELETE /api/v1/companies/:companyId/webhooks/:id': 'webhooks:manage',
}
interface CompiledRoute {
method: string
regex: RegExp
scope: ApiKeyScope
}
let compiledCache: CompiledRoute[] | null = null
function compileAll(): CompiledRoute[] {
if (compiledCache) return compiledCache
compiledCache = Object.entries(V1_ENDPOINT_SCOPES).map(([pattern, scope]) => {
const [method, path] = pattern.split(' ', 2)
const regexStr = '^' + path.replace(/:[^/]+/g, '[^/]+') + '$'
return { method, regex: new RegExp(regexStr), scope }
})
return compiledCache
}
/**
* Resolve the required scope for a given (method, path) request.
*
* - Returns the scope when a registered v1 endpoint matches.
* - Returns 'public' for paths in V1_PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS (no scope check needed,
* but the wrapper may still want to log the key id).
* - Returns null when the path is unknown — the wrapper should treat this as
* a 404 NOT_FOUND rather than letting the request through unauthenticated.
*/
export function resolveRequiredScope(method: string, path: string): ApiKeyScope | 'public' | null {
const key = `${method} ${path}`
if (V1_PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.includes(key)) return 'public'
const compiled = compileAll()
for (const route of compiled) {
if (route.method === method && route.regex.test(path)) {
return route.scope
}
}
return null
}