Files
accounted/extensions/general/shopify/lib/api-client.ts
T
18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00

440 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

import { isUnsafeUrlError, safeFetch } from '@/lib/http/safe-fetch'
import type { ShopifyOrder, ShopifyShopInfo } from '../types'
/**
* Minimal Shopify GraphQL Admin API client for the order feed.
*
* The shop domain is tenant input that the server connects to, and members
* can write `shopify_connections.shop_domain` directly through PostgREST
* (bypassing the connect route's normalisation), so every request here
* re-normalises the stored domain to `<handle>.myshopify.com` and goes
* through `safeFetch`: public addresses only, checked at request time, and no
* redirects followed.
*
* Auth is the client credentials grant: the merchant creates a custom app in
* their own Shopify Dev Dashboard (the admin-created custom apps with
* revealable shpat_ tokens were discontinued 2026-01-01) and pastes the app's
* client id/secret; the server exchanges those for a ~24h access token at the
* start of every run. REST is legacy since 2024, so everything here is
* GraphQL against a pinned API version.
*
* Rate limiting is cost-based (points/second leaky bucket); a throttled query
* comes back as HTTP 200 with a THROTTLED GraphQL error, so both that and
* plain 429/5xx get a short backoff before the error is surfaced.
*/
/** Pinned Admin API version; bump quarterly (supported >= 12 months). */
export const SHOPIFY_API_VERSION = '2026-07'
/**
* Orders per page. The API caps `first` at 250, but query cost is what binds
* here: each order carries nested lineItems/shippingLines connections, and a
* single GraphQL query must stay under the 1000-point ceiling
* (25 * (~1 + lineItems 25 + shipping 5 + overhead) lands well below it).
*/
export const SHOPIFY_PAGE_SIZE = 25
/** Line items fetched per order; more than this drops the line snapshot. */
export const SHOPIFY_LINE_ITEMS_PAGE = 25
/** Shipping lines fetched per order; >5 on one order is effectively unheard of. */
export const SHOPIFY_SHIPPING_LINES_PAGE = 5
const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
const RETRYABLE_STATUS = new Set([429, 502, 503, 504])
const RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [1_000, 3_000]
export interface ShopifyCredentials {
/** Normalized myshopify.com domain. */
shopDomain: string
clientId: string
clientSecret: string
}
/** A run-scoped session: the exchanged token lives ~24h and is never stored. */
export interface ShopifySession {
shopDomain: string
accessToken: string
}
export class ShopifyApiError extends Error {
constructor(
message: string,
/** HTTP status, or 0 for network-level / GraphQL-level failures. */
readonly status: number,
/** GraphQL error code (e.g. ACCESS_DENIED) or OAuth error, if any. */
readonly code: string | null = null,
) {
super(message)
this.name = 'ShopifyApiError'
}
}
/**
* Whether an API error means the credentials themselves are dead (app deleted
* or secret rotated in the Dev Dashboard), as opposed to a transient failure.
* Used to flip a connection to status 'revoked' so the UI offers a reconnect
* instead of the cron retrying forever.
*/
export function isRevokedCredentialsError(error: unknown): boolean {
if (!(error instanceof ShopifyApiError)) return false
return error.status === 401 || error.status === 403
}
/**
* Normalize user input to a bare myshopify.com domain. Accepts the domain
* with or without scheme/path, the bare store handle, and a pasted admin URL
* (admin.shopify.com/store/<handle>). Anything that does not resolve to
* <handle>.myshopify.com returns null: the Admin API only lives there, and
* refusing arbitrary hosts doubles as the SSRF guard (the server never
* fetches a user-controlled hostname).
*/
export function normalizeShopDomain(input: string): string | null {
let value = input.trim().toLowerCase()
if (!value) return null
const adminMatch =
/^(?:https?:\/\/)?admin\.shopify\.com\/store\/([a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*)(?:[/?#]|$)/.exec(value)
if (adminMatch) return `${adminMatch[1]}.myshopify.com`
value = value.replace(/^https?:\/\//, '')
value = value.split(/[/?#]/)[0]
if (!value) return null
if (!value.includes('.')) value = `${value}.myshopify.com`
return /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*\.myshopify\.com$/.test(value) ? value : null
}
/** Error code on a ShopifyApiError when the stored shop domain fails re-normalisation. */
export const INVALID_SHOP_DOMAIN_CODE = 'accounted_invalid_shop_domain'
/** Error code on a ShopifyApiError when the SSRF guard refused to connect. */
export const UNSAFE_SHOP_URL_CODE = 'accounted_unsafe_shop_url'
/**
* Re-run the connect-time normalisation on the STORED shop domain at use
* time and return the https origin to call. The connect route normalises what
* the user typed, but a member can PATCH `shop_domain` straight into the row
* through PostgREST, so the database value is not trusted to still be a
* myshopify.com host. Anything else is refused with a clear, non-retryable
* error instead of fetched.
*/
function shopOriginOf(shopDomain: string): string {
const normalized = normalizeShopDomain(shopDomain)
if (!normalized) {
throw new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify shop domain is not a myshopify.com domain (${shopDomain}); reconnect the store`,
0,
INVALID_SHOP_DOMAIN_CODE,
)
}
return `https://${normalized}`
}
/**
* Map a failure from postJson to the error the retry loop should see. Guard
* refusals (private address, redirect) are terminal: retrying the same URL
* cannot succeed and must not spend the backoff budget.
*/
function asTerminalGuardError(err: unknown): ShopifyApiError | null {
if (err instanceof ShopifyApiError) return err
if (isUnsafeUrlError(err)) {
return new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify host refused by outbound URL guard: ${err.detail}`,
0,
UNSAFE_SHOP_URL_CODE,
)
}
return null
}
function sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms))
}
async function postJson(url: string, body: unknown, headers: Record<string, string>) {
// safeFetch: public address only (checked now, not at connect time), no
// redirects. A 3xx from the host is a failure, never a hop.
return safeFetch(url, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json', ...headers },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),
})
}
/**
* Exchange the custom app's client id/secret for an access token
* (client credentials grant; expires_in ~86400s). Any 4xx here means the
* credentials are unusable (invalid_client, app uninstalled, plan gate), so
* it is reported as status 401 and classified as revoked; 429/5xx retry on
* the normal backoff schedule.
*/
export async function exchangeAccessToken(creds: ShopifyCredentials): Promise<string> {
// Throws (non-retryable) when the stored domain is not a myshopify.com host.
const url = `${shopOriginOf(creds.shopDomain)}/admin/oauth/access_token`
let lastError: unknown
for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length; attempt++) {
let response: Response
try {
response = await postJson(
url,
{
client_id: creds.clientId,
client_secret: creds.clientSecret,
grant_type: 'client_credentials',
},
{},
)
} catch (err) {
const terminal = asTerminalGuardError(err)
if (terminal) throw terminal
lastError = new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify token exchange failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
0,
)
if (attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
throw lastError
}
if (response.ok) {
const body = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {
access_token?: unknown
} | null
if (typeof body?.access_token === 'string' && body.access_token) {
return body.access_token
}
throw new ShopifyApiError('Shopify token exchange returned no access token', 0)
}
if (RETRYABLE_STATUS.has(response.status) && attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
lastError = new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify token exchange ${response.status}`,
response.status,
)
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
const errorBody = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {
error?: string
error_description?: string
} | null
// Only non-retryable 4xx means the credentials are unusable. A 429 that
// survived every retry is still throttling, not revocation: mapping it to
// 401 would classify as revoked and delete the stored credentials.
const credentialFailure =
response.status >= 400 &&
response.status < 500 &&
!RETRYABLE_STATUS.has(response.status)
throw new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify token exchange ${response.status}${
errorBody?.error_description ? `: ${errorBody.error_description}` : ''
}`,
credentialFailure ? 401 : response.status,
errorBody?.error ?? null,
)
}
throw lastError instanceof Error
? lastError
: new ShopifyApiError('Shopify token exchange failed', 0)
}
/** Exchange the credentials for a run-scoped session. */
export async function createShopifySession(
creds: ShopifyCredentials,
): Promise<ShopifySession> {
return { shopDomain: creds.shopDomain, accessToken: await exchangeAccessToken(creds) }
}
interface GraphQLErrorShape {
message?: string
extensions?: { code?: string }
}
/**
* POST one GraphQL query. Retries THROTTLED (HTTP 200 + GraphQL error code),
* 429/5xx and network errors with a short backoff; 401/403 (token expired
* mid-run, app revoked) and ACCESS_DENIED (scope missing) throw a
* ShopifyApiError that classifies as revoked.
*/
export async function shopifyGraphQL<T>(
session: ShopifySession,
query: string,
variables: Record<string, unknown> = {},
): Promise<T> {
// Throws (non-retryable) when the stored domain is not a myshopify.com host.
const url = `${shopOriginOf(session.shopDomain)}/admin/api/${SHOPIFY_API_VERSION}/graphql.json`
let lastError: unknown
for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length; attempt++) {
let response: Response
try {
response = await postJson(url, { query, variables }, {
'X-Shopify-Access-Token': session.accessToken,
})
} catch (err) {
const terminal = asTerminalGuardError(err)
if (terminal) throw terminal
lastError = new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify request failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
0,
)
if (attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
throw lastError
}
if (!response.ok) {
if (RETRYABLE_STATUS.has(response.status) && attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
lastError = new ShopifyApiError(`Shopify API ${response.status}`, response.status)
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
throw new ShopifyApiError(`Shopify API ${response.status}`, response.status)
}
const body = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as {
data?: T
errors?: GraphQLErrorShape[]
} | null
if (body?.errors && body.errors.length > 0) {
const throttled = body.errors.some((e) => e.extensions?.code === 'THROTTLED')
if (throttled && attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
lastError = new ShopifyApiError('Shopify API throttled', 0, 'THROTTLED')
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
const accessDenied = body.errors.some((e) => e.extensions?.code === 'ACCESS_DENIED')
const message = body.errors[0]?.message ?? 'unknown GraphQL error'
throw new ShopifyApiError(
`Shopify GraphQL error: ${message}`,
accessDenied ? 403 : 0,
body.errors[0]?.extensions?.code ?? null,
)
}
if (!body?.data) {
throw new ShopifyApiError('Shopify API returned no data', 0)
}
return body.data
}
throw lastError instanceof Error
? lastError
: new ShopifyApiError('Shopify request failed', 0)
}
/**
* Order fields for the feed. Deliberately NO customer/PII fields (customer,
* email, addresses): they are gated behind Shopify's protected customer data
* program, and the order feed does not need them; the verifikat reference is
* the order name/id. Tax lines, line items and shipping lines carry the
* booking underlag (per-rate VAT, line snapshot) for the Orders page.
* Refunds come inline (plain list, not a connection), so no per-order
* follow-up requests are needed.
*/
const ORDERS_QUERY = `
query OrdersFeed($first: Int!, $after: String, $query: String) {
orders(first: $first, after: $after, query: $query, sortKey: UPDATED_AT) {
pageInfo { hasNextPage endCursor }
nodes {
legacyResourceId
name
test
createdAt
processedAt
updatedAt
displayFinancialStatus
paymentGatewayNames
taxesIncluded
totalPriceSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } }
taxLines { ratePercentage priceSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } } }
lineItems(first: ${SHOPIFY_LINE_ITEMS_PAGE}) {
pageInfo { hasNextPage }
nodes {
name
quantity
discountedTotalSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } }
taxLines { ratePercentage priceSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } } }
}
}
shippingLines(first: ${SHOPIFY_SHIPPING_LINES_PAGE}) {
pageInfo { hasNextPage }
nodes {
title
discountedPriceSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } }
taxLines { ratePercentage priceSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } } }
}
}
refunds {
legacyResourceId
createdAt
totalRefundedSet { shopMoney { amount currencyCode } }
}
}
}
}`
export interface OrdersPage {
orders: ShopifyOrder[]
hasNextPage: boolean
endCursor: string | null
}
export interface ListOrdersOptions {
/** ISO timestamp; orders with updated_at >= this are listed. */
updatedAtMin: string
/** Relay cursor from the previous page's endCursor, or null for page one. */
after: string | null
}
/**
* One page of orders updated on/after the window start, oldest-updated first
* so the caller's cursor advances chronologically. Relay cursor pagination is
* stable across same-second ties, so no offset fallback is needed (unlike the
* WooCommerce client).
*/
export async function listOrdersPage(
session: ShopifySession,
options: ListOrdersOptions,
): Promise<OrdersPage> {
const data = await shopifyGraphQL<{
orders: {
pageInfo: { hasNextPage: boolean; endCursor: string | null }
nodes: ShopifyOrder[]
}
}>(session, ORDERS_QUERY, {
first: SHOPIFY_PAGE_SIZE,
after: options.after,
query: `updated_at:>='${options.updatedAtMin}'`,
})
return {
orders: data.orders.nodes,
hasNextPage: data.orders.pageInfo.hasNextPage,
endCursor: data.orders.pageInfo.endCursor,
}
}
const PROBE_QUERY = `
query ConnectProbe {
shop { name currencyCode }
orders(first: 1) { nodes { legacyResourceId } }
}`
/**
* Verify credentials and read shop metadata. The one-order probe inside the
* query is the authoritative check: it exercises the read_orders scope the
* feed needs, so an app created without that scope fails here (ACCESS_DENIED)
* instead of at 03:15.
*/
export async function testConnectionAndFetchShopInfo(
creds: ShopifyCredentials,
): Promise<ShopifyShopInfo> {
const session = await createShopifySession(creds)
const data = await shopifyGraphQL<{
shop: { name: string | null; currencyCode: string | null }
}>(session, PROBE_QUERY)
return {
name: data.shop?.name ?? null,
currency: data.shop?.currencyCode ? data.shop.currencyCode.toUpperCase() : null,
}
}