* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted MCP server
JSON-RPC 2.0 server exposing the Accounted bookkeeping engine to MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, etc.). Endpoint: /api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp. Add ?tool_namespace=accounted for the Accounted tool names. Requests without it retain the legacy Gnubok namespace. OAuth and stdio bridges live alongside the API surface: see app/api/mcp-oauth/, packages/accounted-mcp/, and the compatibility package in packages/gnubok-mcp/.
Tool authoring contract
Enforced by tests in __tests__/: these are not style preferences, they're guard rails.
additionalProperties: falseon everyinputSchema. Guarded bystrict-schemas.test.ts. Forces clear rejections on hallucinated fields instead of silent ignores.- Descriptions ≤ 280 chars. Guarded by
output-schema.test.ts. NoArgs:/Returns:/Examples:prose: those belong in JSON Schema. Use agent-native hints ("Use to…", "Call X first", "HIGH risk"). - Staged-operation envelope for write tools:
outputSchema: STAGED_OPERATION_SCHEMA(server.ts). Fields:staged, risk_level, actor, message, preview, period_status?, next?. Thestaged: trueboolean is the explicit completion signal; agents must not infer completion from prose. Do NOT introduce a parallel{ success, shouldContinue, output }envelope. period_statusthreading: any tool that ties to a fiscal-period-bound date (categorize, mark paid, create voucher, correct/reverse entry, approve supplier invoice) passesdateForPeriodChecktostagePendingOperation. Response then includesperiod_status: { period_id, status: open|locked|closed, lock_date }so widgets and agents disable writes without round-trips.- Scope mapping: every new tool needs an entry in
lib/auth/api-keys.tsTOOL_SCOPE_MAP. Missing entries default to deny. - Tests for new write tools: add staging-gate coverage to
__tests__/voucher-tools.test.ts(or a sibling) plus executor coverage tolib/pending-operations/__tests__/voucher-executors.test.tsif the tool stages a newoperation_type.
Determinism / cache stability
Tool definitions (name, description, inputSchema, outputSchema, annotations) are declared as static object literals at module load: no timestamps, no UUIDs, no Date/Math.random in the definition layer. This makes the tools/list JSON payload byte-stable across requests, which lets agent-side prompt caches stay warm. Do not introduce per-request non-determinism into the definitions block. Anything time-bound or random belongs inside execute().
For internal Anthropic API usage (the SDK is called from lib/ai/provider.ts and lib/ai/services/anthropic-family.ts; features such as extensions/general/invoice-inbox/lib/extract-invoice-fields.ts go through getAiService() in lib/ai rather than the SDK directly): annotate stable prefixes with cache_control: { type: 'ephemeral' } and log usage.cache_read_input_tokens for hit-ratio observability. The 1h TTL from the agent-native API plan (item 10) requires the direct Anthropic API; Accounted's Bedrock path defaults to a shorter TTL.
Payload-size watchdog
payload-size.bench.test.ts enforces a tools/list JSON payload ceiling. If the test fires, the right answer is rarely "raise the ceiling". Instead, trim descriptions or set specialized wide tools to catalogVisibility: 'search'. Those tools remain discoverable with full schemas through gnubok_search_tools and callable through tools/call on the wire without bloating the default catalog. Claude.ai only calls tools present in tools/list, so a tool that a user or a skill must call directly stays in the default catalog.
Where things live
server.ts: the tools array + JSON-RPC dispatchertool-result.ts:withNext(),toToolError()response helpersresources/: read-onlyAccounted://URIs, registered inresources/index.ts:company/current,period/active,recent-activity,capabilities,attention,chart-of-accounts,settings/vat-treatments,booking-templates,ledger/context,reconciliation/summarywidgets/: inline HTML widgets (receipt-matcher, vat-review, pending-operations)prompts/: slash-command-style promptsskills/: domain-knowledge skill bodies served viagnubok_load_skillpublic-tools.ts: lazy authentication (issue #1814).ANONYMOUS_METHODS(initialize, ping, tools/prompts/resources listing) and the threePUBLIC_TOOLS(gnubok_search_tools,gnubok_list_skills,gnubok_load_skill) answer without credentials, rate-limited per truncated IP; every othertools/callgets a transport-level 401 +WWW-AuthenticatefromhandleMcpRequestinserver.ts, which is the challenge clients turn into their Connect prompttasks.ts: MCP Tasks extension (io.modelcontextprotocol/tasks): durable handles for long-running tool calls, rows inmcp_tasks(service-role writes only)origin-guard.ts: Origin-header validation on the Streamable HTTP endpoint (DNS-rebinding defence required by the MCP spec)staging-pii-guard.ts: refuses a plaintext personnummer in stagedpending_operationsparams/preview, so every staging tool inherits the encrypt-at-staging ruletool-namespace.ts:?tool_namespace=accountedhandling (accounted_*aliases for the canonicalgnubok_*ids)__tests__/: strictness guards + per-tool coverage