* fix(scoping): skatteverket per company + true pristine gates + scoped dismissals Skatteverket connections become per (user, company): the token table carried BOTH UNIQUE(user_id) and UNIQUE(company_id) (two stacked half migrations), so one connection leaked "connected" onto every company the user belongs to, sync ran the token against the wrong orgnr (behorighet 403), and reconnecting from another company silently moved the row and went dark on the first company's crons. Token reads/writes are now scoped by company through the whole chain (token-store, api-client refresh coalescing, skvRequest and its 21 call sites, resolve-auth, crons, MCP), /skattekonto/saldo answers 401 NOT_CONNECTED for companies without their own row (which is what the page's startkort keys on), and the dashboard connect-nudge counts only the active company's row. Bookkeeping's pristine start card now keys on all-years emptiness via a count probe instead of "no active filters": the default fiscal-year selection counted as a filter, which made the card unreachable on brand-new companies (it showed "inga traffar" instead). Two browser-global localStorage keys become company-scoped with legacy fallbacks: the inbox onboarding dismissal (dismissing on one company hid the card everywhere) and the periodisering auto-detect toggle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(scoping): dedupe cron work per (user, company) + guard the ledger probe CodeRabbit findings on #1610: the skattekonto sync cron still deduped token rows by user_id alone, which would drop every company but one for multi-company operators (the exact scenario the PR fixes); and the all-years ledger probe could leave a stale false behind on a failed refetch, letting the pristine card render unconfirmed. The probe now resets to unknown in flight and carries the fetch generation guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
664 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
664 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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import { refreshAccessToken } from './oauth'
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import { getTokens, storeTokens, deleteTokens } from './token-store'
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import { getSystemAccessToken, invalidateSystemToken } from './system-auth/token-provider'
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import type { SkatteverketTokens } from '../types'
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/**
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* Credential selector for SKV API calls.
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*
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* 'user' : the personal BankID OAuth token (per-user, 65-minute refresh
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* chain). The only mode that existed before the hybrid model.
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* 'system' : Accounted's own Client Credentials token (org certificate),
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* authorized per company via an ombud grant at Skatteverket.
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* Used by background reads; carries no user session at all.
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*/
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export type SkvAuth =
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| { mode: 'user'; supabase: SupabaseClient; userId: string; companyId: string }
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| { mode: 'system' }
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const log = createLogger('skatteverket-api-client')
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// Cap diagnostic-body logging at 200 chars and redact any Bearer token
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// patterns. The audit (V16.1 / A.8.15) flagged that raw 401/403 bodies were
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// being concatenated into user-facing error messages and written to logs
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// without redaction. Diagnostic data still belongs in server-side logs, but
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// not in unbounded form and not in anything that reaches the user.
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const MAX_LOG_BODY_LEN = 200
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const BEARER_PATTERN = /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/=]+/gi
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function safeBodyForLog(body: string): string {
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const redacted = body.replace(BEARER_PATTERN, 'Bearer [REDACTED]')
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return redacted.length > MAX_LOG_BODY_LEN
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? redacted.slice(0, MAX_LOG_BODY_LEN) + '…'
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: redacted
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}
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/**
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* Skatteverket API client.
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*
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* Handles:
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* - Automatic token refresh (transparent to callers)
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* - Required API gateway headers
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* - Rate limiting (4 req/sec per consumer)
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* - Correlation ID generation
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*/
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const DEFAULT_API_BASE_URL = 'https://api.test.skatteverket.se/momsdeklaration/v1'
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const MAX_REFRESH_COUNT = 10
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const TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGIN_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000 // Refresh 5 min before expiry
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// Simple in-memory token bucket for 4 req/sec rate limit
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let lastRequestTime = 0
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const MIN_REQUEST_INTERVAL_MS = 250 // 1000ms / 4 = 250ms
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function getApiBaseUrl(): string {
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return process.env.SKATTEVERKET_API_BASE_URL || DEFAULT_API_BASE_URL
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}
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function getApiGwClientId(): string {
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const id = process.env.SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID
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if (!id) throw new Error('SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID is required')
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return id
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}
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function getApiGwClientSecret(): string {
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const secret = process.env.SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_SECRET
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if (!secret) throw new Error('SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_SECRET is required')
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return secret
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}
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/**
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* Kill switch: when SKATTEVERKET_DISABLED=true, all SKV API calls fail with a
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* single, clear Swedish error. Useful during incidents (provider outage, key
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* rotation, suspended access) to surface a graceful failure mode instead of
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* letting requests hang or leak partial state.
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*/
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function isDisabled(): boolean {
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const v = (process.env.SKATTEVERKET_DISABLED ?? '').toLowerCase()
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return v === 'true' || v === '1' || v === 'yes'
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}
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/**
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* Detect whether we're pointed at SKV's test or prod environment.
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* Used by the UI to surface an obvious badge so the user knows whether their
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* filings will hit Skatteverket's production system.
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*/
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export function getSkatteverketEnvironment(): 'test' | 'prod' {
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const baseUrl =
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process.env.SKATTEVERKET_API_BASE_URL ||
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process.env.SKATTEVERKET_AGD_INLAMNING_API_BASE_URL ||
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process.env.SKATTEVERKET_SKATTEKONTO_API_BASE_URL ||
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DEFAULT_API_BASE_URL
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return baseUrl.includes('api.test.skatteverket.se') ? 'test' : 'prod'
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}
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/**
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* Ensure rate limit compliance (4 req/sec).
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* Delays if the last request was too recent.
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*/
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async function enforceRateLimit(): Promise<void> {
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const now = Date.now()
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const elapsed = now - lastRequestTime
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lastRequestTime = now // Claim the slot immediately to prevent concurrent bypass
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if (elapsed < MIN_REQUEST_INTERVAL_MS) {
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await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, MIN_REQUEST_INTERVAL_MS - elapsed))
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}
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}
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// Coalesce concurrent refresh attempts within this Node.js process. Without
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// this, two parallel SKV requests from the same user (e.g. rapid UI clicks)
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// would both call SKV's /token endpoint with the same refresh_token; SKV
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// rotates that token on first use, so the second call would fail with 401.
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// Cross-process races (separate Vercel function instances) are mitigated by
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// the re-read inside the critical section: if another process refreshed
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// while we waited on the network, we just use that newer token.
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const refreshInFlight = new Map<string, Promise<string>>()
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/**
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* Get a valid access token, refreshing if needed.
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* Throws if no tokens exist or refresh is exhausted.
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*/
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async function getValidToken(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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userId: string,
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companyId: string
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): Promise<string> {
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const tokens = await getTokens(supabase, userId, companyId)
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if (!tokens) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Inte ansluten till Skatteverket. Anslut med BankID först.',
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'NOT_CONNECTED'
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)
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}
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// Token still valid (with 5-min margin)
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if (tokens.expires_at > Date.now() + TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGIN_MS) {
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return tokens.access_token
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}
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// Need refresh: coalesce concurrent attempts per (user, company) row.
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const flightKey = `${userId}:${companyId}`
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const inFlight = refreshInFlight.get(flightKey)
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if (inFlight) return inFlight
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const promise = refreshTokenForUser(supabase, userId, companyId)
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.finally(() => refreshInFlight.delete(flightKey))
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refreshInFlight.set(flightKey, promise)
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return promise
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}
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async function refreshTokenForUser(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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userId: string,
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companyId: string,
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): Promise<string> {
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// Re-read after entering the critical section. Another process may have
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// refreshed while we were waiting; if so, the row now has a new
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// refresh_token and a future expiry: just hand it back.
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const tokens = await getTokens(supabase, userId, companyId)
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if (!tokens) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Inte ansluten till Skatteverket. Anslut med BankID först.',
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'NOT_CONNECTED'
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)
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}
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if (tokens.expires_at > Date.now() + TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGIN_MS) {
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return tokens.access_token
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}
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if (!tokens.refresh_token) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Sessionen har gått ut. Logga in med BankID igen.',
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'SESSION_EXPIRED'
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)
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}
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if (tokens.refresh_count >= MAX_REFRESH_COUNT) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Maximalt antal förnyelser uppnått. Logga in med BankID igen.',
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'REFRESH_EXHAUSTED'
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)
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}
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let refreshed
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try {
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refreshed = await refreshAccessToken(tokens.refresh_token, tokens.refresh_count)
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} catch (err) {
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// SKV's `per`-flow refresh tokens live 65 minutes. Any daily cron (or a
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// user returning the next day) therefore always finds a dead token and
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// gets 404 id_not_found back — that's ordinary session expiry, not a
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// runtime error. Classify it so the crons' quiet buckets and the UI's
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// reconnect flow catch it instead of a raw Error escaping to the logs.
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// SKV speaks several dialects for the same terminal state: 404 with
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// id_not_found / "refresh token is not found", 400 access_denied with
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// "Refresh Token status is expired", and OAuth2's standard 400
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// invalid_grant. Config-shaped 400s (invalid_client, invalid_scope)
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// deliberately stay raw errors: telling the user to reconnect cannot
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// fix those, and mislabeling them re-creates the self-perpetuating
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// reconnect banner from the 2026-07 MISSING_SCOPE incident.
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
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const deadRefreshToken =
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(/\b404\b/.test(message) && /id_not_found|refresh token is not found/i.test(message)) ||
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(/\b400\b/.test(message) &&
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(/refresh token status is expired/i.test(message) ||
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/"error"\s*:\s*"invalid_grant"/i.test(message)))
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if (deadRefreshToken) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Sessionen har gått ut. Logga in med BankID igen.',
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'SESSION_EXPIRED'
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)
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}
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throw err
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}
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const updatedTokens: SkatteverketTokens = {
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...refreshed,
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scope: tokens.scope,
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}
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await storeTokens(supabase, userId, updatedTokens, companyId)
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return updatedTokens.access_token
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}
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/**
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* MuleSoft APIGW contract enforcement, observed verbatim in production:
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*
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* { "error": "The required scopes are not authorized" }
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*
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* The gateway emits this when OUR APIGW client (SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID)
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* has no subscription for the API being called (#973). It is decided before
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* the bearer is ever evaluated, so it says nothing about the user's token.
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*
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* It has to be ruled out explicitly because it contains the substring
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* "required scope", which is how the SKV token-scope rejection used to be
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* detected: that collision classified every gateway 403 as MISSING_SCOPE, and
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* MISSING_SCOPE is in RECONSENT_ERROR_CODES, so a successful reconnect
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* (runPostConnectRefresh -> syncSkattekonto -> 403) instantly re-flagged the
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* token row and the reconnect banner perpetuated itself (#1155).
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*/
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function isApigwScopeContractError(body: string): boolean {
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return /required scopes?\s+are\s+not\s+authorized/i.test(body)
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}
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/**
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* A genuine token-scope rejection: the stored access token predates a scope
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* the service now requires, and only a fresh consent can widen it.
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*
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* Matches the two documented shapes and nothing else: the OAuth `invalid_scope`
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* error code (RFC 6749), and the sentence from SKV's AGI service description
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* (Tjänstebeskrivning v1.7 §4.1.2.2), "The required scope agd has been
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* requested for that access token."
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*/
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function isTokenScopeRejection(body: string): boolean {
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return (
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/invalid_scope/i.test(body) ||
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/required scope\s+\S+\s+has been requested/i.test(body)
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)
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}
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/**
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* Make an authenticated request to the Skatteverket API with the user's
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* personal BankID token. Thin wrapper kept for the ~40 existing call sites;
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* new auth-aware code calls skvRequestWithAuth directly.
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*/
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export async function skvRequest(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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userId: string,
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companyId: string,
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method: string,
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path: string,
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body?: unknown,
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options?: { baseUrl?: string; contentType?: string }
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): Promise<Response> {
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return skvRequestWithAuth({ mode: 'user', supabase, userId, companyId }, method, path, body, options)
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}
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|
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/**
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* Make an authenticated request to the Skatteverket API.
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*
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* Automatically handles:
|
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* - Credential resolution per auth mode (user token refresh, or the cached
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* system CCG token)
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* - Required headers (Client_Id, Client_Secret, correlation ID)
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* - Rate limiting
|
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*
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* Error semantics differ by mode: user-mode 401/403s map to the reconnect
|
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* codes (SESSION_EXPIRED, TOKEN_REVOKED, ...); system-mode failures never
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* touch skatteverket_tokens and map to SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED (run-level
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* credential problem) or OMBUD_GRANT_MISSING (this company has not granted,
|
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* or has revoked, the behorighet).
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*/
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export async function skvRequestWithAuth(
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auth: SkvAuth,
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method: string,
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path: string,
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body?: unknown,
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options?: { baseUrl?: string; contentType?: string }
|
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): Promise<Response> {
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if (isDisabled()) {
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
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'Skatteverket-integrationen är tillfälligt avstängd. Kontakta support.',
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'ACCESS_DENIED'
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)
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}
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let accessToken: string
|
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if (auth.mode === 'user') {
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accessToken = await getValidToken(auth.supabase, auth.userId, auth.companyId)
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} else {
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try {
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accessToken = await getSystemAccessToken()
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} catch (err) {
|
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throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
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err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Systemtoken kunde inte hämtas.',
|
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'SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED'
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)
|
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}
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}
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|
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await enforceRateLimit()
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const url = `${options?.baseUrl || getApiBaseUrl()}${path}`
|
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {
|
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'Authorization': `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
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'Client_Id': getApiGwClientId(),
|
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'Client_Secret': getApiGwClientSecret(),
|
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'skv_client_correlation_id': crypto.randomUUID(),
|
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}
|
|
|
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// contentType defaults to application/json, which is right for moms +
|
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// skattekonto. AGI's POST /underlag takes application/xml: callers pass
|
|
// the XML as a string body and override contentType.
|
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let serializedBody: string | undefined
|
|
if (body !== undefined) {
|
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const contentType = options?.contentType ?? 'application/json'
|
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headers['Content-Type'] = contentType
|
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serializedBody = typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const response = await fetch(url, {
|
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method,
|
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headers,
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body: serializedBody,
|
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signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000),
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})
|
|
|
|
// Handle Skatteverket-specific auth/throttle errors uniformly so callers
|
|
// can catch a single error type rather than parsing status codes inline.
|
|
if (response.status === 401) {
|
|
// SKV returns 401 for two distinct reasons that need different remedies:
|
|
// 1. Genuine token expiry / invalid bearer (user must re-auth)
|
|
// 2. APIGW client lacks subscription for this API (developer portal fix):
|
|
// the bearer is valid but the gateway rejects the call.
|
|
// Read the body and gateway-side headers so we can distinguish and
|
|
// surface a useful message.
|
|
const text = await response.text().catch(() => '')
|
|
|
|
// WWW-Authenticate carries OAuth's machine-readable failure reason
|
|
// (insufficient_scope / invalid_token). The x-skv-* / x-amzn-* / x-api-*
|
|
// families are gateway-side hints SKV's APIGW emits when it rejects the
|
|
// call before reaching the application: the body is often empty in
|
|
// that case so the headers are the only signal.
|
|
const wwwAuth = response.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate') ?? ''
|
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const skvHeaders: Record<string, string> = {}
|
|
response.headers.forEach((v, k) => {
|
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const lk = k.toLowerCase()
|
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if (
|
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lk === 'www-authenticate' ||
|
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lk.startsWith('x-skv-') ||
|
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lk.startsWith('x-amzn-') ||
|
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lk.startsWith('x-api-')
|
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) {
|
|
skvHeaders[k] = v
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
// Diagnostic detail (headers, body) belongs in server-side logs only,
|
|
// not in user-facing error messages. The structured logger redacts
|
|
// sensitive keys and we further cap body length and strip Bearer tokens
|
|
// so the diagnostic is bounded. warn, not error: auth rejections are
|
|
// expected states (expired sessions, stale scopes) and the thrown
|
|
// SkatteverketAuthError below carries the signal to the caller.
|
|
log.warn('401 from Skatteverket API', {
|
|
url,
|
|
statusCode: 401,
|
|
authMode: auth.mode,
|
|
body: safeBodyForLog(text),
|
|
headers: skvHeaders,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (auth.mode === 'system') {
|
|
// A rejected system token is a run-level credential problem (cert,
|
|
// token endpoint, APIGW subscription): drop the cache so the next
|
|
// call mints fresh, and never touch the user token table from here.
|
|
invalidateSystemToken()
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverket avvisade systemautentiseringen. Kontrollera certifikatet ' +
|
|
'och APIGW-prenumerationerna för systemklienten.',
|
|
'SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const lower = text.toLowerCase()
|
|
|
|
// Gateway signature first, mirroring the 403 path. MuleSoft can pair its
|
|
// contract-enforcement body with an OAuth-shaped challenge header, and the
|
|
// scope branch below would then claim a token problem that reconnecting
|
|
// cannot fix: SESSION_EXPIRED and MISSING_SCOPE are both reconsent codes,
|
|
// so either verdict re-arms the banner the user just tried to clear.
|
|
if (isApigwScopeContractError(text)) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverkets API-gateway nekade anropet. Kontrollera att din ' +
|
|
'APIGW-klient (SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID) har prenumeration på ' +
|
|
'denna tjänst i Utvecklarportalen.',
|
|
'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OAuth's standard insufficient_scope marker. SKV sometimes emits this
|
|
// as 401 (rather than 403) when the AGI APIGW evaluates scope before
|
|
// the application sees the token. The remedy is the same as MISSING_SCOPE:
|
|
// disconnect + reconnect to mint a token covering the AGI scope.
|
|
const wwwLower = wwwAuth.toLowerCase()
|
|
if (
|
|
wwwLower.includes('insufficient_scope') ||
|
|
wwwLower.includes('invalid_scope')
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Anslutningen mot Skatteverket saknar nödvändig behörighet för denna ' +
|
|
'tjänst. Koppla bort och anslut igen via Inställningar → Skatteverket ' +
|
|
'för att förnya tokenen med rätt scope.',
|
|
'MISSING_SCOPE'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SKV explicitly declares the token revoked. Body shape observed in
|
|
// production: { "error": "Token has been revoked." } with a generic
|
|
// `Bearer realm="OAuth2 Client Realm"` challenge header. This is a
|
|
// terminal state: the bearer will never come back to life, regardless
|
|
// of refresh attempts (refresh_token from the same family is also dead).
|
|
// Auto-clear the local row so /status stops claiming we're connected
|
|
// and the next interaction forces a clean reconnect. We swallow any
|
|
// delete error: even if cleanup fails we still want to surface the
|
|
// primary auth error to the user.
|
|
if (lower.includes('revoked') || lower.includes('token has been revoked')) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await deleteTokens(auth.supabase, auth.userId, auth.companyId)
|
|
} catch (cleanupErr) {
|
|
log.error('failed to clear revoked token row', cleanupErr as Error, { userId: auth.userId })
|
|
}
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverket har återkallat anslutningen. Detta händer t.ex. om ' +
|
|
'BankID-sessionen avslutats eller om en ny anslutning gjorts från ' +
|
|
'en annan enhet. Anslut igen med BankID för att fortsätta.',
|
|
'TOKEN_REVOKED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// APIGW subscription / client-credential problems: the gateway responds
|
|
// before the bearer is ever evaluated. The user reconnecting won't help
|
|
// here: it's an Utvecklarportalen / APIGW configuration issue.
|
|
// (the APIGW scope-contract body is already handled above)
|
|
const looksLikeApigwIssue =
|
|
lower.includes('client_id') ||
|
|
lower.includes('client id') ||
|
|
lower.includes('subscription') ||
|
|
lower.includes('not subscribed') ||
|
|
lower.includes('apigw') ||
|
|
lower.includes('api key') ||
|
|
lower.includes('consumer')
|
|
if (looksLikeApigwIssue) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverkets API-gateway nekade anropet. Kontrollera att din ' +
|
|
'APIGW-klient (SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID) har prenumeration på ' +
|
|
'denna tjänst i Utvecklarportalen.',
|
|
'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// (B) Empty 401 with no diagnostic header → almost always a gateway/
|
|
// subscription issue rather than a real session expiry. We refreshed
|
|
// the local bearer immediately above, so an empty body with no
|
|
// WWW-Authenticate means SKV's APIGW rejected the call before it
|
|
// reached the application: typically because the APIGW client isn't
|
|
// subscribed to the API at the URL we just hit. Telling the user to
|
|
// "log in again" sends them down a dead end; be explicit about the
|
|
// likely fix instead.
|
|
if (!text) {
|
|
// Extract the API segment of the URL so the message tells the user
|
|
// exactly which subscription is missing. Falls back to the raw URL
|
|
// if parsing fails.
|
|
let apiHint = url
|
|
try {
|
|
const u = new URL(url)
|
|
const parts = u.pathname.split('/').filter(Boolean)
|
|
// Take the first 3 segments, e.g. arbetsgivardeklaration/inlamning/v1
|
|
if (parts.length >= 1) apiHint = parts.slice(0, 3).join('/')
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// keep raw url
|
|
}
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverkets API-gateway nekade anropet utan motivering. ' +
|
|
'Trolig orsak: APIGW-klienten (SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID) har ' +
|
|
`inte prenumeration på tjänsten "${apiHint}" i Utvecklarportalen, ` +
|
|
'eller den lagrade tokenen saknar rätt scope. Kontrollera ' +
|
|
'prenumerationen, koppla annars bort och anslut igen via ' +
|
|
'Inställningar → Skatteverket.',
|
|
'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Sessionen har gått ut. Logga in med BankID igen.',
|
|
'SESSION_EXPIRED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (response.status === 403) {
|
|
const text = await response.text().catch(() => '')
|
|
// Same diagnostic-vs-user-message split as the 401 path: log the body
|
|
// server-side, surface only the actionable Swedish guidance.
|
|
log.warn('403 from Skatteverket API', {
|
|
url,
|
|
statusCode: 403,
|
|
authMode: auth.mode,
|
|
body: safeBodyForLog(text),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (auth.mode === 'system') {
|
|
// Both cases are run-level configuration problems (SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED),
|
|
// but they are fixed with different knobs, so the message must not
|
|
// point at the scope list when the gateway is what refused.
|
|
if (isApigwScopeContractError(text)) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverkets API-gateway nekade systemanropet: APIGW-klienten ' +
|
|
'(SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID) saknar prenumeration på denna ' +
|
|
'tjänst i Utvecklarportalen.',
|
|
'SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if (isTokenScopeRejection(text)) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Systemtokenens scope räcker inte för denna tjänst. Kontrollera ' +
|
|
'SKATTEVERKET_SYSTEM_SCOPES mot tjänstens krav.',
|
|
'SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// With valid system credentials, a 403 means this company has not
|
|
// granted (or has revoked) the behorighet for Accounted's org number.
|
|
// Company-level: the caller downgrades the connection row, other
|
|
// companies in the same run are unaffected.
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Företaget har inte gett Accounted behörighet hos Skatteverket, ' +
|
|
'eller så har behörigheten återkallats i Ombud och behörigheter.',
|
|
'OMBUD_GRANT_MISSING'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// Gateway contract failure, checked first: it wears scope wording but is
|
|
// our APIGW subscription, not the user's token. Reconnecting cannot fix
|
|
// it, and calling it MISSING_SCOPE made every reconnect re-flag the row
|
|
// (#1155). ACCESS_DENIED is deliberately not in RECONSENT_ERROR_CODES.
|
|
if (isApigwScopeContractError(text)) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverkets API-gateway nekade anropet. Kontrollera att din ' +
|
|
'APIGW-klient (SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID) har prenumeration på ' +
|
|
'denna tjänst i Utvecklarportalen.',
|
|
'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// Missing scope on the access token: fires when an existing connection
|
|
// pre-dates an extension that needed a new scope (the AGI/`agd` rollout
|
|
// is the canonical example). The user has to disconnect + reconnect to
|
|
// re-issue a token with the broader scope set; we want to say so
|
|
// explicitly instead of letting it surface as a generic 403.
|
|
// Body shape per SKV's AGI service description (Tjänstebeskrivning v1.7
|
|
// §4.1.2.2): { "error": "invalid_scope", "description": "The required
|
|
// scope agd has been requested for that access token." }
|
|
if (isTokenScopeRejection(text)) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Anslutningen mot Skatteverket saknar nödvändig behörighet för denna ' +
|
|
'tjänst. Koppla bort och anslut igen via Inställningar → Skatteverket ' +
|
|
'för att förnya tokenen med rätt scope.',
|
|
'MISSING_SCOPE'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
// Behörighet saknas: user is authenticated but not authorized for this company
|
|
if (text.includes('Behörighet') || text.includes('behörighet')) {
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Du har inte behörighet att agera för detta företag hos Skatteverket. ' +
|
|
'Kontrollera att du är registrerad som firmatecknare eller deklarationsombud.',
|
|
'BEHORIGHET_SAKNAS'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Åtkomst nekad av Skatteverket (403). Kontakta support om problemet kvarstår.',
|
|
'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (response.status === 429) {
|
|
// Skatteverket may include a Retry-After header. We surface a generic
|
|
// Swedish message: callers can inspect the header on the thrown error
|
|
// if they need to schedule a retry. The 4 req/sec local rate limiter
|
|
// should normally prevent this; a 429 here implies the per-consumer
|
|
// gateway quota was exceeded.
|
|
throw new SkatteverketAuthError(
|
|
'Skatteverket är överbelastat eller har strypt anropen. Försök igen om en stund.',
|
|
'RATE_LIMITED'
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return response
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Structured error for Skatteverket auth/access/throttle issues.
|
|
* The `code` field helps the frontend show appropriate UI.
|
|
*
|
|
* Codes:
|
|
* NOT_CONNECTED : no tokens stored; user needs to run BankID flow
|
|
* SESSION_EXPIRED : 401 from SKV; refresh exhausted or token rejected
|
|
* REFRESH_EXHAUSTED : refresh count hit cap (10) before user re-auth
|
|
* TOKEN_REVOKED : 401 with "Token has been revoked." body; SKV killed
|
|
* the bearer (BankID session ended, parallel connect
|
|
* from another device, or auth-code reuse). Local row
|
|
* is auto-cleared; user must reconnect with BankID.
|
|
* BEHORIGHET_SAKNAS : 403 with "Behörighet" body; user not authorized
|
|
* for this company at SKV (firmatecknare / ombud)
|
|
* MISSING_SCOPE : 403 with "invalid_scope" body; the stored token
|
|
* was issued before the required scope existed.
|
|
* User must disconnect + reconnect. NOT emitted for
|
|
* the APIGW's "The required scopes are not authorized"
|
|
* contract error: that is our subscription gap, and
|
|
* treating it as a token problem made every reconnect
|
|
* re-flag the row (#1155).
|
|
* ACCESS_DENIED : generic 403, and the APIGW contract error above
|
|
* RATE_LIMITED : 429 from SKV API gateway
|
|
* TOKEN_CORRUPTED : stored tokens cannot be decrypted (key rotated
|
|
* or row tampered with); user must reconnect
|
|
* SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED : system (CCG) credential problem: token could not
|
|
* be minted, was rejected, or lacks scope. Run-level:
|
|
* affects every company, fix is configuration-side.
|
|
* OMBUD_GRANT_MISSING: 403 on a system-mode call: this company has not
|
|
* granted (or has revoked) Accounted's behorighet at
|
|
* Skatteverket. Company-level.
|
|
*/
|
|
export class SkatteverketAuthError extends Error {
|
|
constructor(
|
|
message: string,
|
|
public readonly code:
|
|
| 'NOT_CONNECTED'
|
|
| 'SESSION_EXPIRED'
|
|
| 'REFRESH_EXHAUSTED'
|
|
| 'TOKEN_REVOKED'
|
|
| 'BEHORIGHET_SAKNAS'
|
|
| 'MISSING_SCOPE'
|
|
| 'ACCESS_DENIED'
|
|
| 'RATE_LIMITED'
|
|
| 'TOKEN_CORRUPTED'
|
|
| 'SYSTEM_AUTH_FAILED'
|
|
| 'OMBUD_GRANT_MISSING'
|
|
) {
|
|
super(message)
|
|
this.name = 'SkatteverketAuthError'
|
|
}
|
|
}
|