Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/ledger.ts
T
37e50c272d feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) (#1757)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance)

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted
instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID
consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered
Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored
(encrypted) there.

- lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data
  helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret,
  the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret
  headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the
  extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB
  JWT relocation.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against
  OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV
  connection quota, pending ledger row.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens
  to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) +
  sha256(refresh_token).
- app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto /
  agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as
  X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the
  token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never
  exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank.
- The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch
  (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there).
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS.

Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector
branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean;
no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR:
instance-side wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard)

The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs;
what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx,
a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the
upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and
rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
2026-08-31 22:40:55 +02:00

222 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'node:crypto'
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
/**
* The connector connection ledger: proof, without secrets, that a connection
* belongs to a given connector key. Every bank/SKV connection is born through
* the proxy (the consent redirect is ours), so the proxy records it at
* creation and checks ownership on every later use. The upstream handle (EB
* session id, SKV access token) is hashed; the value never rests here.
*/
export type ConnectorService = 'bank' | 'skatteverket'
export function hashHandle(handle: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(handle).digest('hex')
}
export interface LedgerRow {
id: string
connector_key_id: string
service: ConnectorService
company_ref: string
provider: string | null
account_uids: string[]
status: 'pending' | 'active' | 'revoked'
}
/** Active connections for one company under one key and service. Enforces the per-company limit. */
export async function countActiveConnections(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
keyId: string,
service: ConnectorService,
companyRef: string,
): Promise<number> {
const { count, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('connector_key_id', keyId)
.eq('service', service)
.eq('company_ref', companyRef)
.eq('status', 'active')
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger count failed: ${error.message}`)
return count ?? 0
}
/**
* Pending rows count toward quota only while their consent window is open:
* the signed connector state expires after 15 minutes, so an abandoned
* consent stops reserving capacity once its state can no longer activate it.
*/
export const PENDING_QUOTA_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000
/**
* Rows currently holding or reserving quota for (key, service, company):
* active connections plus fresh pending reservations. Used by the /auth
* quota check both before insert (fast reject) and after insert (the
* reservation re-count that closes the concurrent-auth race).
*/
export async function countHeldConnections(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
keyId: string,
service: ConnectorService,
companyRef: string,
now: Date = new Date(),
): Promise<number> {
const freshPendingSince = new Date(now.getTime() - PENDING_QUOTA_WINDOW_MS).toISOString()
const { count, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('connector_key_id', keyId)
.eq('service', service)
.eq('company_ref', companyRef)
.or(`status.eq.active,and(status.eq.pending,created_at.gte.${freshPendingSince})`)
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger count failed: ${error.message}`)
return count ?? 0
}
/** Roll back a just-created pending reservation (lost the quota re-count). */
export async function deletePendingConnectionById(supabase: SupabaseClient, id: string): Promise<void> {
await supabase.from('connector_connections').delete().eq('id', id).eq('status', 'pending')
}
export async function createPendingConnection(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; companyRef: string; provider: string | null; pendingState: string },
): Promise<string> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.insert({
connector_key_id: params.keyId,
service: params.service,
company_ref: params.companyRef,
provider: params.provider,
pending_state: params.pendingState,
status: 'pending',
})
.select('id')
.single()
if (error || !data) throw new Error(`ledger insert failed: ${error?.message}`)
return (data as { id: string }).id
}
/**
* The pending row a signed state belongs to, under the presenting key.
* Precondition for the code exchange at POST /sessions: exchanging a code
* against a state with no pending row would mint an upstream session the
* ledger never records (and cross-flow substitution could smuggle a code
* into a foreign state). The state's own TTL bounds freshness.
*/
export async function findPendingByState(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; pendingState: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('pending_state', params.pendingState)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger pending lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/**
* The ACTIVE row whose refresh-token hash matches, under the presenting key.
* Ownership precondition for the SKV refresh exchange: without it the broker
* was an open refresh oracle for any leaked refresh token.
*/
export async function findByRefreshHash(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; refreshHash: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', 'skatteverket')
.eq('refresh_hash', params.refreshHash)
.eq('status', 'active')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger refresh lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** Activate a pending connection (found by its signed pending_state) with the live handle + accounts. */
export async function activateByPendingState(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; pendingState: string; handle: string; accountUids?: string[] },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.update({
status: 'active',
handle_hash: hashHandle(params.handle),
account_uids: params.accountUids ?? [],
pending_state: null,
activated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
last_used_at: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('pending_state', params.pendingState)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger activate failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** The active ledger row that owns a given handle under a key. Ownership check for reads/writes. */
export async function findByHandle(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; handle: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', params.service)
.eq('handle_hash', hashHandle(params.handle))
.eq('status', 'active')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** The active ledger row that owns a bank account uid under a key. */
export async function findByAccountUid(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; accountUid: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', 'bank')
.eq('status', 'active')
.contains('account_uids', [params.accountUid])
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger account lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
export async function touchConnection(supabase: SupabaseClient, id: string): Promise<void> {
await supabase.from('connector_connections').update({ last_used_at: new Date().toISOString() }).eq('id', id)
}
/** Revoke by handle (DELETE /sessions). Idempotent. */
export async function revokeByHandle(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; handle: string },
): Promise<void> {
await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.update({ status: 'revoked', revoked_at: new Date().toISOString() })
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', params.service)
.eq('handle_hash', hashHandle(params.handle))
.eq('status', 'active')
}