Files
accounted/app/api/extensions/enable-banking/sync/cron/route.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 cd40127f0e feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API (#2118)
* feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API

The PSD2 sync has fetched the bank's reported balance for years but the
data was stranded (F7): the Bank-page source picker read a cash_accounts
column no sync ever updated (frozen at connect time), reconciliation
hard-coded external_balance to null for bank accounts, and neither MCP
nor the v1 API exposed any balance at all, so the only path to a current
bank balance was logging into the bank.

- getAccountBalance now returns booked + available from the same
  quota-limited BALANCES response (previously all but one type discarded)
- every sync (manual + cron) mirrors balance, available_balance and
  balance_updated_at into cash_accounts, fixing the stale picker
- new cash_accounts.available_balance column (additive migration)
- reconciliation bank kind: external_balance = bank-reported balance,
  plus bank_reported_* fields and fetch timestamp in the bank block;
  difference math stays movement-based and untouched
- reconciliation view shows "Saldo enligt banken ... hamtat {date}"
- MCP gnubok_list_cash_accounts returns the three balance fields; the
  cash_today prompt now reports the bank's figure instead of teaching
  agents to answer with the bookkept 19xx balance
- new GET /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/cash-accounts endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): keep external_balance null for bank sign-offs; never fabricate a zero balance; guard the mirror against stale writers

Post-review fixes from the skeptic pass + CodeRabbit on PR #2118:

- external_balance stays null for the bank reconciliation kind: sign-off
  persists it into account_reconciliations and bokslutsbilagor computes
  closing - external from that row, so a today-balance stored on a
  balansdag sign-off printed a phantom warning-red differens in the
  year-end appendix. The bank-reported figure lives only in the
  timestamped bank_reported_* pair in the bank block, and only when its
  fetch timestamp exists (a balance of unknown age is suppressed).
- AccountOverview no longer falls back to today's date when the balance
  timestamp is missing; the line is omitted instead.
- getAccountBalance returns null on an empty BALANCES response instead
  of fabricating amount 0 with a fresh timestamp; sync keeps the
  previous stored value.
- updateBalancesFromSync only writes over an older-or-missing
  balance_updated_at, so an older sync run finishing later cannot move
  the mirrored balance backwards.
- The inline initial backfill (picker save) now mirrors fetched
  balances into cash_accounts too (accounts_data is deliberately not
  re-written there).
- cash_today MCP prompt mentions the gnubok_call_tool bridge for hosts
  that only see the default catalog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): express the stale-writer guard as two literal predicates for the schema guard

The .or() with a template literal pushed the no-phantom-columns
unresolvable-expression count over its ceiling. Same semantics, two
updates: one for rows with an older timestamp, one for rows with none.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): rank interimBooked (ITBD) as a booked balance type before the generic fallback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 16:16:29 +02:00

650 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript

import { type SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { syncAccountTransactions } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/sync'
import {
runUnattendedReconciliationSweep,
toSweepSummary,
} from '@/lib/reconciliation/unattended-sweep'
import {
isConsentExpiringSoon,
getDaysUntilExpiry,
probeSessionHealth,
SessionExpiredError,
REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE,
} from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/api-client'
import { getEmailService } from '@/lib/email/service'
import {
generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml,
generateConsentExpiryEmailText,
generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject,
} from '@/lib/email/consent-notification-templates'
import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
import { getCompanyIdsWithCapability } from '@/lib/entitlements/has-capability'
import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
import { withCronContext } from '@/lib/api/with-cron-context'
import { errorResponse, errorResponseFromCode } from '@/lib/errors/get-structured-error'
import { getBranding } from '@/lib/branding/service'
import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
import { updateBalancesFromSync } from '@/lib/cash-accounts/service'
import type { StoredAccount } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/types'
ensureInitialized()
// Without this export the route runs under the platform default (60s), which
// is why the sync loop used to self-limit to 50s and starve the queue: ~17
// connections per day against 100+ entitled active connections, so any given
// connection only got an automatic sync every 4-7 days.
export const maxDuration = 300
const MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN = 300
// Connections synced concurrently within one wave. Enable Banking calls are
// I/O-bound, so a small fan-out multiplies throughput without hammering the
// ASPSPs; per-connection error isolation is preserved inside each wave.
const SYNC_CONCURRENCY = 4
/**
* GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/sync/cron
* Automatic daily bank transaction sync
* Runs at 05:00 UTC (07:00 Swedish time)
*
* Sized so one run covers every entitled active connection (Vercel Pro 300s
* timeout, 4-way concurrency). Prioritizes connections not synced for the
* longest time, so anything cut off by the time budget is first tomorrow.
* Deduplication via external_id makes repeated runs safe.
*/
export const GET = withCronContext('cron.bank_sync', async (_request, ctx) => {
const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL
const supabaseServiceKey = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
if (!supabaseUrl || !supabaseServiceKey) {
return errorResponseFromCode('INTERNAL_ERROR', ctx.log, {
requestId: ctx.requestId,
details: { reason: 'Missing Supabase configuration' },
})
}
const supabase = createServiceRoleClient(supabaseUrl, supabaseServiceKey)
// Clean up stale pending connections (older than 1 hour)
const oneHourAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString()
const { data: stalePending } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.delete()
.eq('status', 'pending')
.lt('created_at', oneHourAgo)
.select('id')
if (stalePending?.length) {
ctx.log.info('cleaned up stale pending connections', { count: stalePending.length })
}
let candidateConnections
let entitledCompanyIds
try {
candidateConnections = await fetchAllRows(
({ from, to }) => supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('*')
.eq('status', 'active')
.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
.order('id', { ascending: true })
.range(from, to),
{ dedupeBy: connection => connection.id },
)
entitledCompanyIds = await getCompanyIdsWithCapability(
supabase,
candidateConnections.map(connection => connection.company_id),
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
)
} catch (error) {
ctx.log.error('failed to build entitled bank sync work list', error as Error)
return errorResponse(error, ctx.log, { requestId: ctx.requestId })
}
// Apply the batch limit only after entitlement filtering. Otherwise old
// free-tier rows can permanently occupy the head of the queue and prevent
// every paying connection behind them from syncing.
const connections = candidateConnections
.filter(connection => entitledCompanyIds.has(connection.company_id))
.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN)
ctx.log.info('bank sync work list built', {
candidates: candidateConnections.length,
entitledCompanies: entitledCompanyIds.size,
selected: connections.length,
})
// No early return on an empty set: the health probe below still has work to
// do (a company whose only connection is parked in 'pending_selection' has
// nothing to sync but can absolutely have a dead session).
const startTime = Date.now()
// 230s of the 300s maxDuration for the sync loop; the rest is reserved for
// the health probe pass and response teardown below.
const TIME_BUDGET_MS = 230_000
const baseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'
const results: {
connectionId: string
userId: string
bankName: string
imported: number
duplicates: number
errors: number
// 'skipped' = nothing was fetched from the bank (every account deselected),
// so this run proves nothing about whether the session is still alive. Kept
// distinct from 'synced' because the health probe below keys on it.
status: 'synced' | 'skipped' | 'expired' | 'expiring_soon' | 'error'
daysUntilExpiry?: number | null
}[] = []
// One PSD2 session can back several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), and
// they all carry the same consent_expires. Keyed per (user, session) so a
// user with four companies on one consent gets one warning mail, not four.
const notifiedSessions = new Set<string>()
const notifyKey = (c: { user_id: string; session_id: string | null }) =>
`${c.user_id}:${c.session_id ?? 'none'}`
const syncConnection = async (connection: (typeof connections)[number]) => {
try {
const daysLeft = getDaysUntilExpiry(connection.consent_expires)
const isExpired = daysLeft !== null && daysLeft <= 0
if (isExpired) {
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: 'expired' })
.eq('id', connection.id)
// Send expiry notification, once per shared consent
if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))) {
notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
supabase, connection, 0, true, baseUrl
)
}
results.push({
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: connection.user_id,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
imported: 0,
duplicates: 0,
errors: 0,
status: 'expired',
daysUntilExpiry: 0,
})
return
}
const expiringSoon = isConsentExpiringSoon(connection.consent_expires)
// Send consent expiry notifications at 7-day and 3-day thresholds
if (
expiringSoon &&
daysLeft !== null &&
(daysLeft <= 3 || daysLeft === 7) &&
!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))
) {
notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
supabase, connection, daysLeft, false, baseUrl
)
}
const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
// First sync: 90-day lookback (PSD2 max). Subsequent: 7-day window.
// Gate on initial_sync_completed_at, not last_synced_at: manual "Sync now"
// sets last_synced_at without doing the deep backfill, and we want the cron
// to still fall back to 90 days if the inline activation backfill failed.
const isFirstSync = !connection.initial_sync_completed_at
const lookbackDays = isFirstSync ? 90 : 7
if (isFirstSync) {
ctx.log.info('first sync for connection: using 90-day lookback', {
connectionId: connection.id,
lookbackDays,
})
}
const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - lookbackDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
.toISOString()
.split('T')[0]
// Keep the full list for the DB write-back so we don't drop accounts
// the user has opted out of. Sync only the enabled subset (treating
// undefined as enabled for back-compat with older rows).
const allAccounts = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
const accounts = allAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
if (accounts.length === 0) {
ctx.log.info('all accounts disabled: skipping sync', {
connectionId: connection.id,
totalAccounts: allAccounts.length,
})
results.push({
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: connection.user_id,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
imported: 0,
duplicates: 0,
errors: 0,
status: 'skipped',
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
})
return
}
// Detect SIE overlap: skip auto-categorization if the sync range
// overlaps with a completed SIE import to prevent double-booking
const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
.from('sie_imports')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
.eq('status', 'completed')
.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
// First sync uses strategy=longest to pull the deepest history available
// from the ASPSP. Incremental syncs skip it: the implicit default is
// faster and we already have the older data.
const syncOptions = {
...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
...(isFirstSync ? { strategy: 'longest' as const } : {}),
}
const syncResults = await Promise.all(
accounts.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
supabase,
connection.company_id,
connection.user_id,
connection.id,
account,
fromDate,
toDate,
undefined,
syncOptions
))
)
const totalImported = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
const totalDuplicates = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
const totalErrors = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.errors, 0)
// Batch reconciliation sweep when SIE overlap detected. One scoped run
// per enabled cash account (issue #1298): a pooled run matched every
// same-currency account's transactions against 1930's GL lines and could
// persist a cross-account journal_entry_id.
if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0) {
try {
const reconResult = await runUnattendedReconciliationSweep(
supabase,
connection.company_id,
connection.user_id,
{ dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate },
)
// Stamp the outcome so the UI can render "Vi matchade X av Y" and the
// review surface knows there is something to granska.
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
last_sie_sweep: toSweepSummary(reconResult, { dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate }),
})
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
ctx.log.info('batch reconciliation after sync', {
companyId: connection.company_id,
applied: reconResult.applied,
skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
accounts: reconResult.accounts.map((a) => ({
accountNumber: a.accountNumber,
applied: a.applied,
skippedBelowThreshold: a.skippedBelowThreshold,
})),
})
}
} catch {
// Non-critical
}
}
// Successful sync: update connection and clear any previous error state.
// Write allAccounts (not accounts) so disabled accounts stay in the row.
const completedAt = new Date().toISOString()
let initialSyncFields: Record<string, unknown> = {}
if (isFirstSync) {
// Aggregate returned booking dates across enabled accounts so the UI
// can show "we requested X but the bank returned Y to Z".
const minDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMinBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
const maxDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMaxBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
initialSyncFields = {
initial_sync_completed_at: completedAt,
initial_sync_requested_from: fromDate,
initial_sync_returned_min_date: minDates.length > 0 ? minDates.reduce((a, b) => (a < b ? a : b)) : null,
initial_sync_returned_max_date: maxDates.length > 0 ? maxDates.reduce((a, b) => (a > b ? a : b)) : null,
initial_sync_lookback_days: lookbackDays,
}
}
// Mirror refreshed balances into cash_accounts (what the Bank-page
// picker and reconciliation read); logs failures instead of throwing.
await updateBalancesFromSync(
supabase,
connection.company_id,
connection.id,
allAccounts.map(a => ({
external_uid: a.uid,
balance: a.balance,
available_balance: a.available_balance,
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at,
})),
)
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
accounts_data: allAccounts,
last_synced_at: completedAt,
...initialSyncFields,
...(connection.error_message ? { error_message: null } : {}),
})
.eq('id', connection.id)
results.push({
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: connection.user_id,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
imported: totalImported,
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
errors: totalErrors,
status: expiringSoon ? 'expiring_soon' : 'synced',
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
})
} catch (error) {
// A dead PSD2 session (closed/expired/invalid consent) is a re-auth
// condition, not a transient failure: flip it to 'expired' (same state
// the consent-elapsed branch uses) so the UI offers a reconnect instead
// of a retry. Other errors stay 'error'.
//
// error_message is rendered verbatim on the settings panel, so it gets
// the short Swedish user message in both cases: the raw Enable Banking
// error body (an English JSON envelope) stays in the server log below.
const isSessionDead = error instanceof SessionExpiredError
const failureStatus = isSessionDead ? 'expired' : 'error'
const failureMessage = isSessionDead ? REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE : SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE
// An expired PSD2 consent is the normal end of a bank grant and the row
// is flipped to 'expired' for the user to reconnect: a warning, not an
// error. Only genuine sync failures belong in the error panel.
const failureContext = {
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: connection.user_id,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
consentExpires: connection.consent_expires,
lastSyncedAt: connection.last_synced_at,
}
if (isSessionDead) {
ctx.log.warn('bank session expired for connection', {
...failureContext,
reason: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
})
} else {
ctx.log.error('sync failed for connection', error as Error, failureContext)
}
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: failureStatus, error_message: failureMessage })
.eq('id', connection.id)
results.push({
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: connection.user_id,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
imported: 0,
duplicates: 0,
errors: 1,
status: failureStatus,
})
}
}
// Concurrency is per COMPANY, not per connection: the unattended sweep after
// an SIE-overlap sync is company-scoped (it reconciles every cash account of
// the company), so two connections of one company syncing concurrently would
// run two identical whole-company sweeps whose read-time "unlinked GL lines"
// snapshots race, and both can claim the same journal entry for different
// bank transactions. Grouping keeps one company's connections sequential
// while unrelated companies still fan out.
const companyGroups = new Map<string, typeof connections>()
for (const connection of connections) {
const group = companyGroups.get(connection.company_id)
if (group) group.push(connection)
else companyGroups.set(connection.company_id, [connection])
}
const groups = [...companyGroups.values()]
const syncCompanyGroup = async (group: typeof connections) => {
for (const connection of group) {
// Re-check inside the group too: a company with many connections would
// otherwise run to completion past the budget and eat the health-probe
// and teardown margin before the between-waves check fires.
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) return
await syncConnection(connection)
}
}
// Waves of SYNC_CONCURRENCY company groups: the budget check sits between
// waves, and each connection keeps its own try/catch above, so one slow or
// failing bank affects at most its own wave slot.
for (let offset = 0; offset < groups.length; offset += SYNC_CONCURRENCY) {
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) {
ctx.log.info('time budget reached', { processedSoFar: results.length })
break
}
await Promise.all(groups.slice(offset, offset + SYNC_CONCURRENCY).map(syncCompanyGroup))
}
// Health probe for connections this run did NOT prove alive by syncing them.
//
// A sync failure is the only thing that used to move a connection off
// 'active', which leaves two silent holes: connections the loop skipped
// (capability not entitled, every account deselected, time budget reached)
// and connections that never sync at all because they are still parked in
// 'pending_selection'. Both kept rendering as healthy with a stale
// last_synced_at while their PSD2 session was already dead bank-side, so the
// user read old balances as current. Probing costs one cheap session call
// per connection and only ever acts on a definite 'dead'.
const probeResults: { connectionId: string; bankName: string }[] = []
// Total-elapsed ceiling (measured from startTime, like TIME_BUDGET_MS): the
// probe pass gets whatever the sync loop left of it, with 20s of maxDuration
// spare for teardown.
const PROBE_BUDGET_MS = 280_000
const provenAlive = new Set(
results.filter(r => r.status === 'synced' || r.status === 'expiring_soon').map(r => r.connectionId)
)
const { data: unverified, error: unverifiedError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, company_id, user_id, bank_name, session_id, status, last_expiry_notification_at')
.in('status', ['active', 'pending_selection'])
.not('session_id', 'is', null)
.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
.limit(100)
if (unverifiedError) {
ctx.log.error('failed to fetch connections for health probe', unverifiedError, {
message: unverifiedError.message,
})
}
// Probe per DISTINCT session, not per connection. One session can back
// several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), so probing per row would spend
// four identical API calls on one consent and mark only one company dead at
// a time. A session is one live-or-dead fact: the verdict applies to every
// row holding it.
type UnverifiedConnection = NonNullable<typeof unverified>[number]
const probeGroups = new Map<string, UnverifiedConnection[]>()
// A session that synced successfully for ANY of its companies is alive, so
// skip the whole group rather than re-probing it through a sibling row.
const provenAliveSessions = new Set(
(unverified ?? [])
.filter(c => provenAlive.has(c.id))
.map(c => c.session_id as string)
)
for (const connection of unverified ?? []) {
const sessionId = connection.session_id as string
if (provenAliveSessions.has(sessionId)) continue
const group = probeGroups.get(sessionId)
if (group) group.push(connection)
else probeGroups.set(sessionId, [connection])
}
for (const [sessionId, group] of probeGroups) {
if (Date.now() - startTime > PROBE_BUDGET_MS) {
ctx.log.info('probe budget reached', { probedSoFar: probeResults.length })
break
}
// Per-session isolation, matching the sync loop above: without it a single
// network blip aborts probing for every remaining candidate in the batch
// and the coverage gap stays silent until tomorrow's run.
try {
const health = await probeSessionHealth(sessionId)
if (health !== 'dead') continue
const groupIds = group.map(c => c.id)
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: 'expired', error_message: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE })
.in('id', groupIds)
// Only claim the connections were marked dead once the write landed.
// Notifying (and counting) on an unpersisted update would tell the user
// to re-authorize while the rows still read 'active'.
if (updateError) {
ctx.log.error('failed to mark probed-dead connections as expired', updateError, {
connectionIds: groupIds,
})
continue
}
// One dead consent, one mail, however many companies share it.
const first = group[0]
if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(first))) {
notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(first))
await sendConsentExpiryNotification(supabase, first, 0, true, baseUrl)
}
ctx.log.info('health probe found a dead session', {
connectionIds: groupIds,
sharedAcrossCompanies: group.length > 1,
bankName: first.bank_name,
})
for (const connection of group) {
probeResults.push({ connectionId: connection.id, bankName: connection.bank_name })
}
} catch (err) {
ctx.log.error('health probe failed for session', err as Error, {
connectionIds: group.map(c => c.id),
bankName: group[0]?.bank_name,
})
}
}
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
const totalExpired = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expired').length
const totalExpiringSoon = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expiring_soon').length
const totalFailed = results.filter(r => r.status === 'error').length
ctx.log.info('bank sync summary', {
processed: results.length,
totalImported,
totalExpired,
totalExpiringSoon,
totalFailed,
probedDead: probeResults.length,
})
return NextResponse.json({
processed: results.length,
totalImported,
totalExpired,
totalExpiringSoon,
totalFailed,
probedDead: probeResults.length,
probeResults,
results,
})
})
/**
* Send consent expiry notification email.
* Guards with last_expiry_notification_at to avoid spamming (2-day cooldown).
*
* Paused by default (founder call 2026-07-29, after the probe backlog drain
* mass-emailed 24 users at once): the settings panel and attention surfaces
* already flag a dead connection in-app. Set BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS=true
* to resume sending; the status transitions below run either way.
*/
async function sendConsentExpiryNotification(
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
supabase: SupabaseClient<any>,
connection: Record<string, unknown>,
daysLeft: number,
isExpired: boolean,
baseUrl: string
): Promise<void> {
try {
if (process.env.BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS !== 'true') return
// Check cooldown: skip if notified within last 2 days
const lastNotified = connection.last_expiry_notification_at as string | null
if (lastNotified) {
const hoursSinceNotified = (Date.now() - new Date(lastNotified).getTime()) / (1000 * 60 * 60)
if (hoursSinceNotified < 48) return
}
const emailService = getEmailService()
if (!emailService.isConfigured()) return
const userId = connection.user_id as string
// Look up user email
const { data: userData } = await supabase.auth.admin.getUserById(userId)
if (!userData?.user?.email) return
// Look up company name
const { data: companySettings } = await supabase
.from('company_settings')
.select('company_name')
.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
.single()
const emailData = {
bankName: connection.bank_name as string,
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
renewalUrl: `${baseUrl}/settings/banking`,
companyName: companySettings?.company_name || '',
isExpired,
}
await emailService.sendEmail({
to: userData.user.email,
subject: generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject(emailData),
html: generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml(emailData),
text: generateConsentExpiryEmailText(emailData),
replyTo: getBranding().supportEmail,
})
// Update last notification timestamp
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ last_expiry_notification_at: new Date().toISOString() })
.eq('id', connection.id as string)
} catch (error) {
// Notification failure must not break the cron job: log only.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.error('[bank-sync-cron] failed to send consent expiry notification:', error)
}
}