Files
accounted/app/(auth)/auth/callback/route.ts
T
6ac9679fb5 feat(auth): base available login methods off GoTrue providers (#1869)
* feat(auth): base login fields on GoTrue providers

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

# Conflicts:
#	app/(auth)/login/login-client.tsx
#	app/(auth)/register/page.tsx

* fix: address feedback

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* chore: remove hardcoded Google enabled checks

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

# Conflicts:
#	.env.example

* feat: show label when password login is disabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: use MicrosoftMark, correct comment

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: display custom providers

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: show when no methods are available

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: display custom provider labels

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: add SAML login path

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: show when no methods are available

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: display SAML button when enabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: preserve nextPath and broken key

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: redirect test to client

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: expose registerEnabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: provider allowlist and request timeout

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: restore compact labels

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* refactor: move withTimeout implementation to utils

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: include nextPath

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: export function and test case

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: only show SAML button if vars configured

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix(auth): map SAML sign-in error through getErrorMessage

The antipattern ratchet (check:guards, raw-user-error) rejects a raw
error.message reaching a user-visible sink. Route the signInWithSSO
error through getErrorMessage like the other auth error paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013BAzJjXQBa9F5L1U42wUMj
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): GitHub brand mark on the provider button; decision log

GitHub allows its invertocat in solid black/white, so currentColor is
correct; custom OIDC providers keep the generic key icon.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013BAzJjXQBa9F5L1U42wUMj
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 09:13:39 +01:00

347 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

import { createServerClient } from '@supabase/ssr'
import { type NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { hashInviteToken } from '@/lib/auth/invite-tokens'
import { INVITE_COOKIE_NAME } from '@/lib/auth/consume-invite-cookie'
import { safeReturnTo } from '@/lib/auth/safe-return-to'
import { resolveLandingDestination } from '@/lib/company/landing-server'
import { acceptPendingTeamInviteByToken } from '@/lib/company/pending-invites'
/**
* The one `next` destination this callback honours for a fresh session: the
* MCP OAuth consent page. A signup that started from an MCP client's Connect
* popup (issue #1814) confirms its e-mail or completes Google OAuth here, and
* has to land back on consent instead of the dashboard. Consent handles the
* zero-company state itself, which is why this is safe where an arbitrary
* deep link would not be (a brand-new account has no membership to spend a
* deep link on). Same-origin only, via safeReturnTo.
*/
function oauthResumePath(next: string): string | null {
const safe = safeReturnTo(next, '/')
return safe.startsWith('/api/mcp-oauth/authorize?') ? safe : null
}
export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
const { searchParams, origin } = new URL(request.url)
const code = searchParams.get('code')
const token_hash = searchParams.get('token_hash')
const type = searchParams.get('type')
const next = searchParams.get('next') ?? '/'
const resumeOAuth = oauthResumePath(next)
// Collect cookies that Supabase sets during auth so we can
// explicitly forward them on the redirect response.
const pendingCookies: { name: string; value: string; options: Record<string, unknown> }[] = []
const supabase = createServerClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY!,
{
cookies: {
getAll() {
return request.cookies.getAll()
},
setAll(cookiesToSet) {
pendingCookies.length = 0
cookiesToSet.forEach((cookie) => {
// Mirror the cookie into request.cookies so subsequent getAll()
// calls within this request lifecycle return the updated values
// (matches the pattern used in proxy.ts).
request.cookies.set(cookie.name, cookie.value)
pendingCookies.push(cookie)
})
},
},
}
)
let authenticated = false
// Handle PKCE flow (code exchange)
if (code) {
const { error } = await supabase.auth.exchangeCodeForSession(code)
authenticated = !error
}
// Handle token hash flow (email verification / magic link)
else if (token_hash && type) {
const { data, error } = await supabase.auth.verifyOtp({
token_hash,
type: type as 'signup' | 'invite' | 'magiclink' | 'recovery' | 'email_change' | 'email',
})
// Email change never lands silently: with secure email change enabled the
// user must confirm from BOTH addresses, and dropping them on the
// dashboard (or login) with no message is exactly how a half-completed
// change reads as "det funkar inte". The status page tells them whether
// one click remains, the change is complete, or the link was dead.
// Completing the second confirmation returns a session; the first (or a
// click from a logged-out mailbox) does not, which is what separates
// 'done' from 'partial'. Cookies are forwarded so a minted session
// survives the redirect.
if (type === 'email_change') {
const status = error ? 'failed' : data?.session ? 'done' : 'partial'
const response = NextResponse.redirect(
new URL(`/auth/email-change?status=${status}`, origin),
)
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
return response
}
authenticated = !error
}
if (authenticated) {
let redirectPath = next
// Set once a byrå-team invite is accepted below, so the final response
// clears the invite cookie instead of leaving it for a redundant retry.
let inviteConsumed = false
// Password recovery flow: the user just exchanged a recovery token, so they
// have a fresh session whose only purpose is to call updateUser({ password })
// on /reset-password. Skip onboarding / team setup / dashboard redirect.
// The token-hash flow signals this via type=recovery; PKCE has no type, so
// also gate on next === '/reset-password' (only the reset request sets it).
if (type === 'recovery' || next === '/reset-password') {
const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/reset-password', origin))
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
return response
}
// Admin-provisioned invite (auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail, used when the
// installation runs with signups disabled): the invited user now has a
// verified session but no password. Reuse the recovery surface so they
// set one before anything else. The company invite token travels in
// `next` (/invite/<token>); persist it as the pre-auth invite cookie so
// the reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after
// the password is saved.
if (type === 'invite') {
const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/reset-password', origin))
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
const inviteTokenMatch = next.match(/^\/invite\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$/)
if (inviteTokenMatch) {
// Mirrors buildInviteCookie in app/invite/[token]/page.tsx: readable
// by the client auth surfaces (not httpOnly), lifetime matching the
// 7-day invite TTL that the server re-checks on every acceptance.
response.cookies.set(INVITE_COOKIE_NAME, inviteTokenMatch[1], {
path: '/',
httpOnly: false,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60,
})
}
return response
}
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (user) {
// Check MFA status: redirect to verify if factor is enrolled but session is AAL1
const { data: aal } = await supabase.auth.mfa.getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel()
if (aal?.nextLevel === 'aal2' && aal?.currentLevel === 'aal1') {
const verifyUrl = new URL('/mfa/verify', origin)
if (resumeOAuth) verifyUrl.searchParams.set('returnTo', resumeOAuth)
const response = NextResponse.redirect(verifyUrl)
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
return response
}
// Check for pending invite token (set by invite page before redirecting to register)
const inviteToken = request.cookies.get('gnubok-invite-token')?.value
if (inviteToken) {
try {
const tokenHash = hashInviteToken(inviteToken)
// Use the service role client to bypass RLS for invite acceptance
const serviceClient = createServerClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!,
{ cookies: { getAll: () => [], setAll: () => {} } }
)
// Look up company invitation
const { data: invite } = await serviceClient
.from('company_invitations')
.select('id, company_id, email, role, status, expires_at')
.eq('token_hash', tokenHash)
.single()
if (
invite &&
invite.status === 'pending' &&
new Date(invite.expires_at) > new Date() &&
user.email?.toLowerCase() === invite.email.toLowerCase()
) {
// Add user to company
await serviceClient.from('company_members').insert({
company_id: invite.company_id,
user_id: user.id,
role: invite.role,
source: 'direct',
})
// Set active company. Non-fatal on failure (middleware falls
// back to the membership created above) but log so silent
// persistence failures (#701) are observable.
const { error: prefError } = await serviceClient.from('user_preferences').upsert({
user_id: user.id,
active_company_id: invite.company_id,
}, { onConflict: 'user_id' })
if (prefError) {
console.error('[auth/callback] failed to set active company', prefError)
}
// Mark invite as accepted
await serviceClient
.from('company_invitations')
.update({ status: 'accepted' })
.eq('id', invite.id)
// Invited user goes straight to dashboard: no onboarding needed
redirectPath = '/'
// Clear invite cookie and set company cookie on response
const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL(redirectPath, origin))
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
response.cookies.set('gnubok-company-id', invite.company_id, {
path: '/',
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 365,
})
response.cookies.delete('gnubok-invite-token')
return response
}
} catch (err) {
console.error('[auth/callback] invite acceptance failed:', err)
// Fall through to normal onboarding check
}
}
// Byrå-TEAM invite: the company-invite block above only knows
// company_invitations, so a byrå staffer's invite was accepted by no
// server path before landing resolved, and they were funneled to
// /onboarding as a first-timer. Accept it here, BEFORE the silent-team
// check (so no stray "Personal" team is minted) and BEFORE landing
// resolves, so resolveLandingDestination sees the byrå membership and
// sends an owner/admin to /clients. Company-invite and non-invite flows
// are untouched. On success the cookie is cleared on the final response;
// otherwise it survives for the /onboarding + /select-company retry.
if (inviteToken && !inviteConsumed) {
try {
const outcome = await acceptPendingTeamInviteByToken(
{ id: user.id, email: user.email },
inviteToken,
)
if (outcome.status === 'accepted' || outcome.status === 'already_member') {
inviteConsumed = true
}
} catch (err) {
console.error('[auth/callback] team invite acceptance failed:', err)
}
}
// Ensure user has a silent team (for new signups and existing users without one)
const { data: teamMembership } = await supabase
.from('team_members')
.select('team_id')
.eq('user_id', user.id)
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (!teamMembership) {
// Create team via service client (RPC requires auth.uid() which isn't available here).
// Non-fatal: a failure here must not turn a successfully confirmed session into a
// 500 that reads as "signup verification failed". The dashboard / onboarding path
// recreates the silent team when it is missing, so log and continue.
try {
const serviceClient = createServerClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!,
{ cookies: { getAll: () => [], setAll: () => {} } }
)
const teamId = crypto.randomUUID()
await serviceClient.from('teams').insert({
id: teamId,
name: 'Personal',
created_by: user.id,
})
await serviceClient.from('team_members').insert({
team_id: teamId,
user_id: user.id,
role: 'owner',
})
} catch (err) {
console.error('[auth/callback] silent team creation failed:', err)
}
}
// Redirect to the dashboard (it handles zero-company and incomplete
// states), unless the session was created to resume an MCP OAuth
// consent flow: that page handles the zero-company state too. With no
// explicit destination, byrå staff on their byrå's home domain land in
// the cockpit instead (WL-14): this callback is the OAuth/magic-link
// twin of the login page's resolvePostLoginDestination call, covering
// only AAL1 sessions (MFA-enrolled users exited to /mfa/verify above,
// which applies the same rule). Any failure degrades to '/'.
if (resumeOAuth) {
redirectPath = resumeOAuth
} else {
try {
const host =
request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host') ?? request.headers.get('host') ?? ''
redirectPath = await resolveLandingDestination(supabase, user.id, host)
} catch (err) {
console.error('[auth/callback] landing resolution failed:', err)
redirectPath = '/'
}
}
}
// Create redirect and explicitly set auth cookies on the response
const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL(redirectPath, origin))
for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
}
// Keep the invite cookie alive so the /onboarding and /select-company
// pages can retry acceptance via acceptPendingInviteByToken, UNLESS a team
// invite was just accepted above (then the membership exists and a retry
// would only 409). The company-invite success path returns earlier and
// clears the cookie itself.
if (inviteConsumed) {
response.cookies.delete('gnubok-invite-token')
}
return response
}
// Authentication failed: redirect to login with error. Forward a coarse
// flow hint so the login page can show the right copy: a failed signup
// confirmation must not be framed as a failed password reset. On the PKCE
// (?code=) path there is no `type`, so recovery is identified by the
// next=/reset-password marker that resetPasswordForEmail sets, and OAuth
// by the flow=oauth marker that OAuthButton puts in redirectTo
// (provider denials arrive here with ?error and no code); everything else
// defaults to the signup/confirmation framing.
const failedFlow =
searchParams.get('flow') === 'oauth'
? 'oauth'
: type === 'recovery' || next === '/reset-password'
? 'recovery'
: 'signup'
const loginUrl = new URL('/login', origin)
loginUrl.searchParams.set('error', 'auth_error')
loginUrl.searchParams.set('flow', failedFlow)
return NextResponse.redirect(loginUrl)
}