Mattsson
16164ea14c
* feat(voucher): add create voucher and correct entry previews; update commit methods * feat: add support for pending operations in API key scopes and OAuth client management - Introduced new API key scopes for reading and approving pending operations. - Updated the scope groups to include pending operations. - Added new tools for listing and managing pending operations. - Implemented OAuth client registration and revocation endpoints. - Created a UI panel for managing OAuth clients, including registration and revocation. - Added tests for pending operations tools and OAuth allowlist functionality. - Implemented a database migration for OAuth client registrations with appropriate policies and constraints. * feat: Implement OAuth client registration rate limiting and enhance security measures - Added IP-based rate limiting to the OAuth client registration endpoint to prevent enumeration attacks. - Introduced a service-role client for allowlist lookups, ensuring trust boundaries are maintained. - Updated error responses to be uniform across different types of redirect URI validation failures. - Enhanced tests to reflect changes in OAuth scope handling, ensuring fallback to read-only scopes when no scopes are provided. - Improved handling of high-risk pending operations, requiring explicit confirmation for approvals. - Added audit logging for OAuth client revocations and pending operation approvals/rejections to maintain a security audit trail. - Refactored API key scope management to include default read-only scopes for OAuth-issued keys and added segregation-of-duties checks.
91 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
91 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import crypto from 'crypto'
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import { isAllowedRedirectUri } from '@/lib/auth/oauth-allowlist'
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import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
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import { checkRateLimit } from '@/lib/auth/rate-limit-http'
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import { truncateIp } from '@/lib/api/v1/with-api-v1'
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/**
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* RFC 7591 — Dynamic Client Registration.
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*
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* Claude Desktop and self-hosted MCP clients register themselves before
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* starting the auth flow. The redirect URIs they declare are validated
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* against built-in patterns (Claude/localhost) and the user-managed
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* oauth_client_registrations table (self-hosted custom apps).
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*
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* Security model:
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* - Anonymous by design (RFC 7591 §3 allows it); the endpoint does NOT
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* write to oauth_client_registrations — only owner/admin users can
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* insert via /api/settings/oauth-clients. This endpoint just echoes
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* a client_id back to callers whose redirect_uris are already on the
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* allowlist.
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* - Per-/24 sliding-window rate-limit prevents the endpoint being used
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* as a high-rate oracle for enumerating registered URIs.
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* - Error responses are uniform across "built-in", "DB-registered", and
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* "disallowed" so an attacker cannot distinguish between them.
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*/
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const REGISTER_RATE_LIMIT = {
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// 10 attempts per minute per /24 — enough headroom for a developer
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// iterating on a custom MCP client, low enough to make enumeration
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// attacks impractical.
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maxRequests: 10,
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windowMs: 60 * 1000,
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}
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export async function POST(request: Request) {
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// ── IP-based rate limit ─────────────────────────────────────
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const fwd = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')
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const rawIp = fwd ? fwd.split(',')[0]?.trim() : request.headers.get('x-real-ip') ?? undefined
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const ipIdentifier = truncateIp(rawIp || undefined) ?? 'unknown'
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const rl = await checkRateLimit({
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prefix: 'mcp-oauth:register',
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identifier: ipIdentifier,
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...REGISTER_RATE_LIMIT,
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})
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if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
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let body: Record<string, unknown>
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try {
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body = await request.json()
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid_request' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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// Service-role client used for the allowlist lookup. Building it once
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// keeps the per-URI loop from re-instantiating the client and surfaces
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// the trust boundary at the callsite (SOC 2 CC6.1).
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let allowlistClient: ReturnType<typeof createServiceClientNoCookies> | undefined
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try {
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allowlistClient = createServiceClientNoCookies()
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} catch {
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// Env vars missing — built-in patterns still resolve, DB-backed
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// registrations will all return false (fail closed).
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allowlistClient = undefined
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}
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const redirectUris = Array.isArray(body.redirect_uris) ? body.redirect_uris : []
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for (const uri of redirectUris) {
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if (typeof uri !== 'string' || !(await isAllowedRedirectUri(uri, allowlistClient))) {
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// Single error shape regardless of whether the URI is malformed,
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// unknown, or revoked — prevents the endpoint being used as an
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// enumeration oracle for the user-managed allowlist (CC6.6).
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_redirect_uri', error_description: 'Redirect URI not allowed' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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}
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const clientId = crypto.randomUUID()
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return NextResponse.json({
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client_id: clientId,
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client_name: (body.client_name as string) || 'MCP Client',
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redirect_uris: redirectUris,
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grant_types: ['authorization_code'],
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response_types: ['code'],
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token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none',
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}, { status: 201 })
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}
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