Files
accounted/tests/pg/payment-company-consistency.pg.test.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.8 305f469fc3 harden(db): tenant backstop — payment company-consistency triggers + write-RPC guards (P0-2) (#680)
* harden(security): payment-row company-consistency triggers (tenant backstop)

invoice_payments and supplier_invoice_payments are the only two child tables
carrying BOTH a parent FK and their own company_id. A row whose company_id
disagrees with its parent's company_id is a tenant-isolation defect that would
surface a foreign tenant's payment in this company's AR/AP ledger. RLS scopes
by company_id but never cross-checks the parent, so nothing at the DB layer
guaranteed the invariant.

- Pre-flight DO block: fail the migration loudly (listing offending ids) if any
  existing row already violates child.company_id = parent.company_id, rather
  than arm a trigger over dirty data that can never be updated again.
- enforce_payment_company_consistency(): one INVOKER trigger function
  parameterized on TG_TABLE_NAME, wired BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OF
  (company_id, parent_fk) on both payment tables; raises on mismatch. Matches
  the SECURITY posture of the sibling enforcement triggers in migration 017.
- pg-real coverage in tests/pg/payment-company-consistency.pg.test.ts: matching
  pair inserts ok; cross-tenant insert + cross-tenant UPDATE raise; both the
  customer and supplier side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* harden(security): tenant guards on six SECURITY DEFINER write RPCs (backstop)

bulk_book_transactions, match_batch_allocate, mark_entry_as_opening_balance,
reserve_voucher_range, release_voucher_range and rotate_company_inbox are all
SECURITY DEFINER and EXECUTE-able by `authenticated`, so an authenticated user
could call them via PostgREST with ANOTHER company's p_company_id. Three already
carried an auth.uid()-based membership check and rotate_company_inbox an
owner/admin gate, but the two voucher-range RPCs had NO tenant check at all.

Adds the canonical claims-based guard (mirrors
20260615120000_link_voucher_rpcs_tenant_guard.sql lines 54-69) at the top of
each body: for anon/authenticated callers, membership of p_company_id
(public.user_company_ids()) is required else RAISE 42501; service_role and
no-claims callers (migrations, pg-harness, MCP / API-key paths whose company
scoping happens in TS) bypass BY DESIGN. Each function body is otherwise copied
verbatim from its latest definition; existing GRANTs re-applied.

pg-real coverage in tests/pg/securitydefiner_write_rpc_tenant_guards.pg.test.ts:
per RPC — userA session targeting companyB raises 42501; targeting own company
passes the guard (succeeds or yields a non-42501 domain outcome, documented
inline); a no-claims bare-pool cross-tenant call bypasses the new guard,
proving the service-role / MCP paths are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): renumber tenant-backstop migrations to 20260619130000/130100

PR1 (agent attribution) claimed the 20260619120000 version slot in the same
batch; Supabase migration versions must be unique across the repo, so the
tenant-backstop pair moves to 130000/130100. Filename-only change plus the
matching doc-comment references in the two pg tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(db): restore source comments dropped in copied RPC bodies

The guarded redefinitions of bulk_book_transactions and match_batch_allocate
must be byte-verbatim copies of their latest sources (modulo the inserted
tenant-guard block) so the next CREATE OR REPLACE copy keeps full provenance.
Restores the Round-2/Round-3 compliance-fix annotations that were lost in the
copy. Verified mechanically: zero residual diff vs sources after stripping the
guard block, for all six functions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(db): drop raise-guards from bulk_book/match_batch — they break the jsonb error contract

Local full-migration replay + pg-real run surfaced that prepending the
42501 raise-guard to bulk_book_transactions and match_batch_allocate
changes their error contract for authenticated cross-tenant callers: both
already enforce membership in-function and return structured domain errors
(BULK_BOOK_UNAUTHORIZED / BATCH_UNAUTHORIZED) that routes, MCP tools, and
their existing pg tests branch on. The guard added no isolation (they were
tenant-safe) but broke that contract. The migration now guards only the
four RPCs where it is sound: mark_entry_as_opening_balance (P0001→42501,
still an exception), rotate_company_inbox (already 42501), and the two
genuinely unguarded voucher-range RPCs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(db): compliance-review round — log hygiene, explicit INVOKER, anon revoke, UPDATE-path test

Addresses the compliance-swarm findings on this PR:
- Pre-flight dirty-data check now raises with COUNTS only; the row ids move
  to RAISE NOTICE so error pipelines do not ingest identifier dumps
  (ASVS V8.2.1 / SOC 2 CC6.1).
- enforce_payment_company_consistency() declares SECURITY INVOKER explicitly
  — the default was already INVOKER; this makes the security model
  self-documenting.
- REVOKE ... FROM PUBLIC, anon on reserve/release_voucher_range and
  rotate_company_inbox, matching the mark_entry_as_opening_balance pattern.
- Adds the missing supplier_invoice_payments UPDATE-path trigger probe
  (SOC 2 PI1.3).

Dismissed as by-design: the JWT-claim trust boundary (set_config requires
direct SQL access, which already bypasses by design — same model as
20260615120000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(db): voucher-range compliance guards + FK-rerouting trigger probes

Review round 2 on this PR:

Swedish compliance review (both pre-existing function behaviour, hardened
while the PR owns these bodies):
- reserve/release_voucher_range now refuse closed/locked fiscal periods
  (BFL 5 kap 5§ — the sequence of a locked period is räkenskapsinformation;
  mirrors mark_entry_as_opening_balance).
- release_voucher_range asserts no verifikat exist in the released range
  before rolling last_number back (BFL 5 kap 6-7§ — never re-issue or orphan
  posted verifikationsnummer). Neither guard can fire in the legit SIE-import
  flow, which only releases numbers above its highest inserted verifikat into
  an open period — and the import caller treats a failed release as non-fatal.

Greptile P2: the UPDATE OF <parent_fk> trigger leg was never probed — added
cross-tenant FK-rerouting rejection tests for both payment tables (the
supplier company_id UPDATE probe landed in the previous commit).

Verified: full migration replay on fresh supabase/postgres + 333/333 pg-real
green on an origin/main merge (incl. merged #678).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): release-succeeds probe must persist — callBare rolls back

The legit-path release test asserted last_number after calling the RPC via
callBare, whose BEGIN...ROLLBACK wrapper undoes the UPDATE before the
assertion reads it (caught in CI; the local pre-push replay had validated the
branch's committed state, not the then-uncommitted test). Call the RPC
directly on the pool, like the engine pg tests do for persisting calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 10:42:41 +02:00

204 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* pg-real test for the payment company-consistency triggers
* (20260619130000_payment_company_consistency.sql).
*
* invoice_payments and supplier_invoice_payments are the only two child tables
* carrying BOTH a parent FK and their own company_id. A row whose company_id
* disagrees with its parent's company_id is a tenant-isolation defect. The
* BEFORE INSERT/UPDATE triggers make a mismatched pair impossible to persist
* regardless of how it is written — so these probes go through the superuser
* pool (which bypasses RLS), proving the trigger fires even for the most
* privileged writer.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { getPool } from './setup'
import { seedCompany } from './fixtures'
let arrivalSeq = 0
async function seedCustomerInvoice(params: {
userId: string
companyId: string
total?: number
}): Promise<string> {
const customerId = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.customers (id, user_id, company_id, name, customer_type)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Test Kund AB', 'swedish_business')`,
[customerId, params.userId, params.companyId],
)
const id = randomUUID()
const total = params.total ?? 1000
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.invoices
(id, user_id, company_id, customer_id, invoice_number, invoice_date, due_date,
currency, subtotal, vat_amount, total, vat_treatment, vat_rate, status,
paid_amount, remaining_amount)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, '2026-04-01', '2026-05-01', 'SEK',
$6, 0, $6, 'standard_25', 25, 'sent', 0, $6)`,
[id, params.userId, params.companyId, customerId, `F-${id.slice(0, 8)}`, total],
)
return id
}
async function seedSupplierInvoice(params: {
userId: string
companyId: string
total?: number
}): Promise<string> {
const supplierId = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.suppliers
(id, user_id, company_id, name, supplier_type, country, default_payment_terms, default_currency)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Leverantör AB', 'swedish_business', 'SE', 30, 'SEK')`,
[supplierId, params.userId, params.companyId],
)
const id = randomUUID()
const total = params.total ?? 1000
const arrivalNumber = (Date.now() % 1_000_000) * 1000 + arrivalSeq++
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.supplier_invoices
(id, user_id, company_id, supplier_id, arrival_number, supplier_invoice_number,
invoice_date, due_date, received_date, status, currency,
subtotal, vat_amount, total, paid_amount, remaining_amount,
vat_treatment, reverse_charge, is_credit_note)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, '2026-04-01', '2026-05-01', '2026-04-01', 'approved', 'SEK',
$7, 0, $7, 0, $7, 'standard_25', false, false)`,
[id, params.userId, params.companyId, supplierId, arrivalNumber, `LF-${arrivalNumber}`, total],
)
return id
}
const INSERT_INVOICE_PAYMENT = `
INSERT INTO public.invoice_payments
(user_id, company_id, invoice_id, payment_date, amount, currency)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-05-05', 100, 'SEK')
RETURNING id`
const INSERT_SUPPLIER_PAYMENT = `
INSERT INTO public.supplier_invoice_payments
(user_id, company_id, supplier_invoice_id, payment_date, amount, currency)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, '2026-05-05', 100, 'SEK')
RETURNING id`
describe('invoice_payments — company-consistency trigger', () => {
it('accepts a payment whose company_id matches its invoice', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const invoiceId = await seedCustomerInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const res = await getPool().query(INSERT_INVOICE_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, invoiceId])
expect(res.rows).toHaveLength(1)
expect(res.rows[0].id).toBeTruthy()
})
it('rejects a payment whose company_id is a different tenant than its invoice', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const invoiceId = await seedCustomerInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
// company_id = B but the invoice belongs to A → trigger must raise.
await expect(
getPool().query(INSERT_INVOICE_PAYMENT, [b.userId, b.companyId, invoiceId]),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match invoices\.company_id/i)
// Nothing persisted.
const rows = await getPool().query(
`SELECT id FROM public.invoice_payments WHERE invoice_id = $1`,
[invoiceId],
)
expect(rows.rows).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('rejects an UPDATE that points company_id at a foreign tenant', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const invoiceId = await seedCustomerInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const ins = await getPool().query(INSERT_INVOICE_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, invoiceId])
const paymentId = ins.rows[0].id as string
await expect(
getPool().query(`UPDATE public.invoice_payments SET company_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [
b.companyId,
paymentId,
]),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match invoices\.company_id/i)
})
it('rejects rerouting invoice_id to a foreign tenant invoice (UPDATE OF invoice_id path)', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const invoiceA = await seedCustomerInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const invoiceB = await seedCustomerInvoice({ userId: b.userId, companyId: b.companyId })
const ins = await getPool().query(INSERT_INVOICE_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, invoiceA])
const paymentId = ins.rows[0].id as string
// company_id stays A; only the parent FK is rerouted to B's invoice —
// exercises the UPDATE OF invoice_id leg of the trigger column filter.
await expect(
getPool().query(`UPDATE public.invoice_payments SET invoice_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [
invoiceB,
paymentId,
]),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match invoices\.company_id/i)
})
})
describe('supplier_invoice_payments — company-consistency trigger', () => {
it('accepts a payment whose company_id matches its supplier invoice', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const supplierInvoiceId = await seedSupplierInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const res = await getPool().query(INSERT_SUPPLIER_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, supplierInvoiceId])
expect(res.rows).toHaveLength(1)
expect(res.rows[0].id).toBeTruthy()
})
it('rejects a payment whose company_id is a different tenant than its supplier invoice', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const supplierInvoiceId = await seedSupplierInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
await expect(
getPool().query(INSERT_SUPPLIER_PAYMENT, [b.userId, b.companyId, supplierInvoiceId]),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match supplier_invoices\.company_id/i)
const rows = await getPool().query(
`SELECT id FROM public.supplier_invoice_payments WHERE supplier_invoice_id = $1`,
[supplierInvoiceId],
)
expect(rows.rows).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('rejects an UPDATE that points company_id at a foreign tenant', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const supplierInvoiceId = await seedSupplierInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const ins = await getPool().query(INSERT_SUPPLIER_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, supplierInvoiceId])
const paymentId = ins.rows[0].id as string
await expect(
getPool().query(`UPDATE public.supplier_invoice_payments SET company_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [
b.companyId,
paymentId,
]),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match supplier_invoices\.company_id/i)
})
it('rejects rerouting supplier_invoice_id to a foreign tenant invoice (UPDATE OF supplier_invoice_id path)', async () => {
const a = await seedCompany()
const b = await seedCompany()
const siA = await seedSupplierInvoice({ userId: a.userId, companyId: a.companyId })
const siB = await seedSupplierInvoice({ userId: b.userId, companyId: b.companyId })
const ins = await getPool().query(INSERT_SUPPLIER_PAYMENT, [a.userId, a.companyId, siA])
const paymentId = ins.rows[0].id as string
await expect(
getPool().query(
`UPDATE public.supplier_invoice_payments SET supplier_invoice_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`,
[siB, paymentId],
),
).rejects.toThrow(/does not match supplier_invoices\.company_id/i)
})
})