Files
accounted/app/api/settings/oauth-clients/[id]/route.ts
T
Mattsson 16164ea14c Fix/mcp fixes and bugs (#518)
* feat(voucher): add create voucher and correct entry previews; update commit methods

* feat: add support for pending operations in API key scopes and OAuth client management

- Introduced new API key scopes for reading and approving pending operations.
- Updated the scope groups to include pending operations.
- Added new tools for listing and managing pending operations.
- Implemented OAuth client registration and revocation endpoints.
- Created a UI panel for managing OAuth clients, including registration and revocation.
- Added tests for pending operations tools and OAuth allowlist functionality.
- Implemented a database migration for OAuth client registrations with appropriate policies and constraints.

* feat: Implement OAuth client registration rate limiting and enhance security measures

- Added IP-based rate limiting to the OAuth client registration endpoint to prevent enumeration attacks.
- Introduced a service-role client for allowlist lookups, ensuring trust boundaries are maintained.
- Updated error responses to be uniform across different types of redirect URI validation failures.
- Enhanced tests to reflect changes in OAuth scope handling, ensuring fallback to read-only scopes when no scopes are provided.
- Improved handling of high-risk pending operations, requiring explicit confirmation for approvals.
- Added audit logging for OAuth client revocations and pending operation approvals/rejections to maintain a security audit trail.
- Refactored API key scope management to include default read-only scopes for OAuth-issued keys and added segregation-of-duties checks.
2026-05-18 19:02:42 +02:00

82 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript

import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { requireWritePermission } from '@/lib/auth/require-write'
import { requireCompanyId } from '@/lib/company/context'
import { appendProcessingHistory } from '@/lib/processing-history/append'
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
const log = createLogger('oauth-clients:delete')
/**
* DELETE /api/settings/oauth-clients/[id] — revoke a redirect URI
* registration. Soft-delete via revoked_at so the audit trail survives
* and the same URI can be re-registered later.
*
* Emits an audit event so revocations are visible in processing_history —
* revoking an OAuth client is a security-relevant access-control change
* (SOC 2 CC7.2). Returns 404 when the row is unknown or already revoked
* so callers can surface failures rather than treating "no-op" as success.
*/
export async function DELETE(
_request: Request,
{ params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }
) {
const supabase = await createClient()
const { id } = await params
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
const writeCheck = await requireWritePermission(supabase, user.id)
if (!writeCheck.ok) return writeCheck.response
const { data: rows, error } = await supabase
.from('oauth_client_registrations')
.update({ revoked_at: new Date().toISOString() })
.eq('id', id)
.eq('user_id', user.id)
.is('revoked_at', null)
.select('id, redirect_uri, client_name')
if (error) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: 500 })
}
if (!rows || rows.length === 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'OAuth-klient hittades inte eller är redan återkallad.' },
{ status: 404 }
)
}
// Audit the revocation. Failure to append must not break the user flow —
// the revocation has already happened in the DB. We log the appendError
// so a systematic outage is visible in operations rather than silently
// degraded.
try {
const companyId = await requireCompanyId(supabase, user.id)
await appendProcessingHistory({
companyId,
correlationId: id,
aggregateType: 'System',
aggregateId: id,
eventType: 'OAuthClientRevoked',
payload: {
client_id: id,
// Note: redirect_uri may contain a host the user identifies with their
// own infrastructure but is not PII per Art. 4(1). Stored to satisfy
// SOC 2 CC7.2 "what was revoked" evidence trail.
redirect_uri: rows[0].redirect_uri,
},
actor: { type: 'user', id: user.id },
occurredAt: new Date(),
})
} catch (auditErr) {
log.warn('Failed to append OAuthClientRevoked audit event', auditErr)
}
return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
}