* feat(voucher): add create voucher and correct entry previews; update commit methods * feat: add support for pending operations in API key scopes and OAuth client management - Introduced new API key scopes for reading and approving pending operations. - Updated the scope groups to include pending operations. - Added new tools for listing and managing pending operations. - Implemented OAuth client registration and revocation endpoints. - Created a UI panel for managing OAuth clients, including registration and revocation. - Added tests for pending operations tools and OAuth allowlist functionality. - Implemented a database migration for OAuth client registrations with appropriate policies and constraints. * feat: Implement OAuth client registration rate limiting and enhance security measures - Added IP-based rate limiting to the OAuth client registration endpoint to prevent enumeration attacks. - Introduced a service-role client for allowlist lookups, ensuring trust boundaries are maintained. - Updated error responses to be uniform across different types of redirect URI validation failures. - Enhanced tests to reflect changes in OAuth scope handling, ensuring fallback to read-only scopes when no scopes are provided. - Improved handling of high-risk pending operations, requiring explicit confirmation for approvals. - Added audit logging for OAuth client revocations and pending operation approvals/rejections to maintain a security audit trail. - Refactored API key scope management to include default read-only scopes for OAuth-issued keys and added segregation-of-duties checks.
82 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
82 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
|
|
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
|
import { requireWritePermission } from '@/lib/auth/require-write'
|
|
import { requireCompanyId } from '@/lib/company/context'
|
|
import { appendProcessingHistory } from '@/lib/processing-history/append'
|
|
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
|
|
|
|
const log = createLogger('oauth-clients:delete')
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* DELETE /api/settings/oauth-clients/[id] — revoke a redirect URI
|
|
* registration. Soft-delete via revoked_at so the audit trail survives
|
|
* and the same URI can be re-registered later.
|
|
*
|
|
* Emits an audit event so revocations are visible in processing_history —
|
|
* revoking an OAuth client is a security-relevant access-control change
|
|
* (SOC 2 CC7.2). Returns 404 when the row is unknown or already revoked
|
|
* so callers can surface failures rather than treating "no-op" as success.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function DELETE(
|
|
_request: Request,
|
|
{ params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }
|
|
) {
|
|
const supabase = await createClient()
|
|
const { id } = await params
|
|
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
|
|
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const writeCheck = await requireWritePermission(supabase, user.id)
|
|
if (!writeCheck.ok) return writeCheck.response
|
|
|
|
const { data: rows, error } = await supabase
|
|
.from('oauth_client_registrations')
|
|
.update({ revoked_at: new Date().toISOString() })
|
|
.eq('id', id)
|
|
.eq('user_id', user.id)
|
|
.is('revoked_at', null)
|
|
.select('id, redirect_uri, client_name')
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: 500 })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rows || rows.length === 0) {
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'OAuth-klient hittades inte eller är redan återkallad.' },
|
|
{ status: 404 }
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Audit the revocation. Failure to append must not break the user flow —
|
|
// the revocation has already happened in the DB. We log the appendError
|
|
// so a systematic outage is visible in operations rather than silently
|
|
// degraded.
|
|
try {
|
|
const companyId = await requireCompanyId(supabase, user.id)
|
|
await appendProcessingHistory({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
correlationId: id,
|
|
aggregateType: 'System',
|
|
aggregateId: id,
|
|
eventType: 'OAuthClientRevoked',
|
|
payload: {
|
|
client_id: id,
|
|
// Note: redirect_uri may contain a host the user identifies with their
|
|
// own infrastructure but is not PII per Art. 4(1). Stored to satisfy
|
|
// SOC 2 CC7.2 "what was revoked" evidence trail.
|
|
redirect_uri: rows[0].redirect_uri,
|
|
},
|
|
actor: { type: 'user', id: user.id },
|
|
occurredAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (auditErr) {
|
|
log.warn('Failed to append OAuthClientRevoked audit event', auditErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
|
|
}
|