* feat: implement findNextPeriod function and integrate into year-end closing logic * feat: add integrity check for PDF documents and enhance user feedback for corrupt files * Refactor year-end service and period creation logic for improved UTC handling and error messaging - Update `validateYearEndReadiness` to assert on stable warning messages without interpolating period names. - Modify `createNextPeriod` to ensure date calculations are performed in UTC, preventing DST-related issues. - Enhance error handling in `validateYearEndReadiness` and `executeYearEndClosing` to avoid exposing database details. - Introduce structured error messages for year-end processes in `structured-errors.ts`. - Add tests for document integrity checks, ensuring proper authentication and error handling. - Implement GUC checks in document versioning to prevent unauthorized modifications and ensure company membership. - Update migration scripts to reflect changes in document immutability enforcement. * fix: add comment to clarify GUC behavior in document supersession logic
110 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
110 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { requireAuth } from '@/lib/auth/require-auth'
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import { validateDocumentMagicBytes } from '@/lib/core/documents/document-service'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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const log = createLogger('documents.integrity')
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const ParamsSchema = z.object({ id: z.string().uuid() })
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/**
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* GET /api/documents/:id/integrity
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*
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* Probes the actual stored bytes against the declared MIME type. Used by the
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* Bilagor modal to surface a clear "this file is corrupt — please re-upload"
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* warning instead of relying on the browser's PDF viewer error UI, which
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* only fires after the user has already tried to view the file.
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*
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* Some legacy MCP uploads landed with non-PDF bytes under
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* `mime_type = 'application/pdf'` because magic-byte validation was added
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* after those rows were written. This endpoint lets the UI detect and steer
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* the user toward replacing them.
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*
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* Response shape is intentionally minimal — { valid: boolean } only. The
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* reason for an invalid result is logged server-side rather than returned
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* to the client to avoid information disclosure (V1.2.5 / GDPR Art 25(2))
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* and to keep this from being a probe surface for storage internals.
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*/
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export async function GET(
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_request: Request,
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{ params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }
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) {
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const { user, supabase, error } = await requireAuth()
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if (error) return error
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const rawParams = await params
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const parsed = ParamsSchema.safeParse(rawParams)
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid document id' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const { id } = parsed.data
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// Filter to the current version. The integrity check is meaningful only
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// on the live file; superseded versions are archived bytes and should
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// not be re-probed (they're already preserved in the version chain
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// exactly as uploaded).
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const { data: doc, error: docError } = await supabase
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.from('document_attachments')
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.select('id, company_id, mime_type, storage_path')
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.eq('id', id)
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.eq('is_current_version', true)
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.single()
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if (docError || !doc) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Document not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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// Tenant membership: even with the user-scoped supabase client below,
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// we want a clear 404 rather than relying on a storage-layer RLS deny
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// (which can present as a generic error). RLS on document_attachments
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// is the primary control; this is defense in depth.
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const { data: membership } = await supabase
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.from('company_members')
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.select('company_id')
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.eq('company_id', doc.company_id)
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.eq('user_id', user.id)
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.maybeSingle()
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if (!membership) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Document not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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if (!doc.mime_type) {
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { valid: true } })
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}
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// Use the user-scoped supabase client so the storage download is subject
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// to RLS on storage.objects, not just the application-layer membership
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// check above. A logic bug in the membership check would still be
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// arrested at the storage layer.
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const { data: blob, error: downloadError } = await supabase.storage
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.from('documents')
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.download(doc.storage_path)
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if (downloadError || !blob) {
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log.error('storage download failed for integrity check', downloadError as Error, {
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documentId: id,
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companyId: doc.company_id,
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})
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Integrity check unavailable' }, { status: 500 })
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}
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// Only the first 16 bytes are needed for magic-byte detection (PDF/PNG
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// use ≤8, WebP needs 12). Trimming here doesn't change bandwidth — the
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// full blob is already downloaded — but it makes the intent explicit and
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// keeps memory churn off the hot path for large PDFs.
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const headerBuffer = await blob.slice(0, 16).arrayBuffer()
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const magicError = validateDocumentMagicBytes(headerBuffer, doc.mime_type)
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if (magicError) {
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log.warn('document failed magic-byte integrity check', {
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documentId: id,
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companyId: doc.company_id,
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reason: magicError,
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})
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { valid: magicError === null } })
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}
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