Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/with-connector-auth.ts
T
0ff1b05553 feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly (#1748)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization

A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler
blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache,
zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants
branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the
upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape
X-Connector-Key exists for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403

A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy
answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status
alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour.
Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the
JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months

- GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or
  plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key.
- instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and
  reports the winner's pin.
- extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with
  the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key.
- Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside
  a request scope).
- Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed
  current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes.
- issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
2026-08-31 20:51:17 +02:00

116 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { NextResponse, after } from 'next/server'
import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
import { createLogger, type Logger } from '@/lib/logger'
import { CONNECTOR_KEY_HEADER, CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX } from '../contract'
import { validateConnectorKey, type ValidatedConnectorKey } from './keys'
/**
* Wrapper for the hosted connector endpoints (app/api/connect/*), the
* connector twin of lib/api/v1/with-api-v1.ts.
*
* 1. Extracts the key from `Authorization: Bearer gnubok_ck_...` or, for
* proxied calls where Authorization carries an upstream token, from
* `X-Connector-Key`.
* 2. Validates it through the atomic RPC (rate-limited): 401 unknown /
* revoked, 403 suspended, 429 over the per-minute limit.
* 3. Runs the handler with a service-role client and the validated key.
* 4. Records one connector_usage_events row (metering, never blocking).
*
* These routes are reached by self-hosted instances with a key, never by a
* browser session, so there is no cookie/MFA handling here; the proxy
* middleware already lets /api/* through for bearer callers.
*/
export interface ConnectorContext {
requestId: string
log: Logger
supabase: SupabaseClient
key: ValidatedConnectorKey
}
type ConnectorHandler = (request: Request, ctx: ConnectorContext) => Promise<NextResponse | Response>
export function extractConnectorKey(request: Request): string | null {
// A Bearer value is the connector credential only when it looks like one
// (gnubok_ck_ prefix); otherwise it is an UPSTREAM token on a proxied call
// and the connector key rides in X-Connector-Key. Hashing the upstream
// token instead would 401 every such request. A non-prefixed Bearer with
// no X-Connector-Key still falls through to the format check's 401.
const auth = request.headers.get('authorization')
const bearer = auth?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? auth.slice(7).trim() || null : null
if (bearer?.startsWith(CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX)) return bearer
const header = request.headers.get(CONNECTOR_KEY_HEADER)
if (header?.trim()) return header.trim()
return bearer
}
export function withConnectorAuth(
operation: string,
handler: ConnectorHandler,
options: { service?: string } = {},
): (request: Request) => Promise<Response> {
const service = options.service ?? operation.split('.')[1] ?? operation
return async function wrapped(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
const requestId = `conn_${crypto.randomUUID()}`
const log = createLogger(`connect/${operation}`, { requestId, operation })
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const presented = extractConnectorKey(request)
if (!presented) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Missing connector key', code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_MISSING' },
{ status: 401, headers: { 'X-Request-Id': requestId } },
)
}
const validation = await validateConnectorKey(presented, supabase)
if (!validation.ok) {
log.warn('connector auth rejected', { code: validation.code })
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: validation.error, code: validation.code },
{ status: validation.status, headers: { 'X-Request-Id': requestId } },
)
}
let response: Response
try {
response = await handler(request, { requestId, log, supabase, key: validation.key })
} catch (err) {
log.error('connector handler failed', err)
response = NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Internal error', code: 'INTERNAL_ERROR' },
{ status: 500 },
)
}
response.headers.set('X-Request-Id', requestId)
// Metering: one row per request, never on the critical path.
const endpoint = (() => {
try {
return new URL(request.url).pathname
} catch {
return null
}
})()
const recordUsage = async (): Promise<void> => {
const { error: usageError } = await supabase.from('connector_usage_events').insert({
connector_key_id: validation.key.id,
service,
endpoint,
status_code: response.status,
})
if (usageError) log.warn('usage event not recorded', { err: usageError.message })
}
try {
// Off the response path: the caller should not wait on metering.
// Same pattern as lib/webhooks/dispatch-kick.ts.
after(() => recordUsage())
} catch {
// Outside a request scope (unit tests): record inline.
await recordUsage()
}
return response
}
}