c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
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Commits
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18cbc4c30a |
fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c77367ac1a |
feat(audit): log trusted-role committed_at overrides to behandlingshistorik (#1490)
* feat(audit): log trusted-role committed_at overrides to behandlingshistorik (#1444) Migrations 20260806150000/160000 let backend writers (service_role, no-claims direct SQL) preserve a preset committed_at on the draft-to-posted transition, but nothing recorded that the transition timestamp was overridden: BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 wants a log of who did what, when. If a trusted-role connection is ever used against a live company, there is now an audit row separating real from preset commit time. - audit_log accepts action COMMITTED_AT_OVERRIDE (types + Zod filter too) - log_committed_at_override() SECURITY DEFINER writer: audit_log has RLS with no INSERT policy and service_role is not guaranteed BYPASSRLS in every harness; EXECUTE revoked from anon/authenticated so PostgREST cannot expose it as an RPC - set_committed_at() calls the writer in the preserve branch; the stamping branch is unchanged from 20260806160000 - pg tests: override row content (preset value, wall clock, jwt role) for postgres and service_role writers, absence on the stamp paths, and the writer's privilege lockdown Closes #1444 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * review(audit): stamp wall_clock with clock_timestamp(), not now() Seeding flows post many entries inside one transaction; now() would pin every override row's wall_clock to the BEGIN instead of the actual transition moment. Captured once so new_state and description agree. Test posts inside an explicit transaction after pg_sleep and asserts wall_clock moved past the transaction start. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MattssonandClaude Fable 5
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cd344b6dbb |
fix(db): enforce balance check on directly inserted posted journal entries (v2) (#1439)
* fix(db): enforce balance check on directly inserted posted journal entries check_balance_on_post only fires on the draft-to-posted UPDATE transition, so any code path that INSERTs a row with status 'posted' directly skipped balance validation entirely. The invariant sum(debit) = sum(credit) on every posted entry was DB-enforced only for the engine's commit lifecycle. Add check_balance_on_posted_insert, a deferred constraint trigger on AFTER INSERT WHEN (NEW.status = 'posted') reusing the existing check_journal_entry_balance() function, which already handles the journal_entries INSERT context via NEW.id/NEW.status. Deferred semantics let an atomic transaction insert header and lines together; zero-line and unbalanced posted inserts are rejected at constraint evaluation. All existing checks stay intact; this only adds coverage. The one first-party posted-INSERT path outside an RPC, the sandbox seed, now books through the bookkeeping engine (createJournalEntry) instead of raw inserts. SIE import already inserts header and lines in a single transaction via its structured RPC and passes unchanged. pg tests cover the new path (zero-line rejected, unbalanced rejected at SET CONSTRAINTS IMMEDIATE, balanced same-transaction insert accepted) and existing posted-entry fixtures move to a transactional insertPostedJournalEntry helper so they stay valid setup. Fixes #327 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): insert list-filters pg fixtures in one transaction The list-filters suite (landed via a sibling merge) inserted posted headers with getPool().query, where each query autocommits: the deferred check_balance_on_posted_insert constraint fired at the header's own commit with zero lines and correctly rejected the fixture. Header and balanced lines now share one BEGIN/COMMIT so the constraint evaluates the complete entry, mirroring the insertPostedJournalEntry helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(seed): insert journal headers as drafts, post after lines land check_balance_on_posted_insert (renamed to apply-time version 20260806130000) rejects a posted header whose transaction has no lines. PostgREST autocommits each request, so every seed path that inserted posted headers first would die with "has zero total": the sandbox seed (ledger history, invoice vouchers, salary vouchers), seed-demo-account and seed-export-data. All now insert draft headers, insert lines, then flip to posted so check_balance_on_post validates the finished verifikat. The sandbox seed keeps its documented no-events design. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): preserve a preset committed_at on draft-to-posted transition set_committed_at() stamped now() unconditionally, so the seed flows that post backdated drafts lost their historical booking timestamps and every demo verifikat read as booked today (CodeRabbit finding on PR 1439). Stamp only when committed_at is NULL: the engine path (drafts carry no committed_at) behaves exactly as before and a posted entry still always has a committed_at; an explicitly supplied value now survives posting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): preserve preset committed_at only for trusted roles The IS NULL guard alone (20260806150000, never shipped; replaced by 20260806160000) let any RLS-permitted member backdate committed_at through PostgREST by presetting it on a draft and posting, which the Swedish accounting review flagged: committed_at is what the BFL 5 kap timeliness checks and behandlingshistorik treat as the genuine transition time. Preset values now survive posting only for service_role/postgres/supabase_admin; authenticated and anon writers always get the now() stamp. Consequence: the sandbox seed (runs as the requesting user) gets committed_at = posting time, accepted and documented in the route; the demo scripts run as service_role and keep their backdated history. pg tests cover all four paths, with the upper timestamp bound CodeRabbit asked for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): restore superseded migration so the preview tracker stays consistent The preview branch had already applied 20260806150000 when the previous commit deleted the file, orphaning the preview's migration tracker ("Remote migration versions not found in local migrations directory"). Restored with a header explaining it is superseded in the same deploy by 20260806160000, so the unguarded semantics are never live on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): decide committed_at trust by JWT claims, not current_user The Swedish review found the current_user guard bypassable: commit_journal_entry is SECURITY DEFINER and granted to authenticated, so inside it current_user is the function owner and a member could preset a backdated committed_at on a direct-inserted draft and launder it through the RPC. The guard now reads the JWT claims role (same primitive as the RPC's own tenant guard): preset values survive only for service_role or claim-less backend connections; authenticated and anon callers are always stamped now(), on both the direct UPDATE and the RPC path (new pg test). Both migration files now carry the identical final body so no unguarded intermediate exists as a standalone applyable unit. Behandlingshistorik logging of trusted overrides is follow-up #1444. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |