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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 MattssonandClaude Fable 5
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aabddb592f |
feat(billing): multi-user paywall: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy (#2099)
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a717f03898 |
feat(mcp-oauth): let an account with no company connect and sign up from the OAuth popup (#1814 PR 1) (#1855)
* feat(mcp-oauth): let an account with no company connect and sign up from the OAuth popup Identity unlock for agent-first onboarding (#1814, shape B+). A person with no Accounted account can now connect from an MCP client, create the account inside the Connect popup and finish the OAuth dance. - authorize/token no longer require a company: consent renders a companyless variant and the key is minted with company_id NULL. - validateApiKey returns companyId string|null and binds an unbound key to the user's first company on the first validation after it exists. - MCP server: company-dependent tools and data resources answer with a structured NO_COMPANY_YET error; the company-independent tools still run; telemetry skips when there is no company scope. - /api/events fails closed instead of throwing for an unbound key. - authorize forces TOTP enrollment (not just verification) for password accounts with no factor, since the middleware skips enrollment for zero-company users; BankID-linked accounts stay exempt. - /login forwards next to /register; register, GoogleAuthButton and /auth/callback carry it back to the consent page (callback honours only /api/mcp-oauth/authorize, via safeReturnTo); /mfa/enroll hard-navigates to /api/* destinations like /mfa/verify. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * refactor(company): move getActiveCompanyId out of the next/headers module lib/auth/api-keys.ts needs the resolver for unbound-key binding, but lib/company/context.ts imports next/headers for the legacy company cookie and Turbopack refuses that import on some of api-keys' import paths (the preview build failed). The resolver and CompanyContextError now live in lib/company/active-company.ts; context.ts re-exports them so every caller and test mock is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(mcp-oauth): fail closed on a failed assurance lookup; enroll Back aborts instead of looping Review findings on #1855: requireAal2 let consent through at AAL1 when getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() returned nothing and a verified factor existed. Only a positive AAL2 answer passes now; a failed lookup and the inconsistent verified-factor-at-AAL1 case both step up to /mfa/verify. Back on /mfa/enroll with the consent page as returnTo went straight back into the redirect loop; it now aborts to the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |