c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
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Commits
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f266c386f3 |
chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150)
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp, lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format, lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body + v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas). No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list of things left alone on purpose. tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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18cbc4c30a |
fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f3e4fdcf32 |
fix(providers): stop the Fortnox reconnect loop, and make the attachment scopes opt-in (#1761)
The Fortnox document import needs the archive and connectfile scopes, which the registered Fortnox app does not have. Since #1549 pulled them out of the connect request (they broke every connect with invalid_scope before login), every attachment call fails and the user was told "Koppla om Fortnox och godkann behorigheterna", under a button that reruns an authorize URL still not asking for those scopes. Klura AB followed that loop four times and bought the Fortnox Arkiv module trying to satisfy it. Prod evidence: no Fortnox attachment has ever imported, across 166 companies and 24 consents since the feature shipped, and no live token carries the scopes. The error and the scope list now derive from one flag, FORTNOX_DOCUMENT_SCOPES_APPROVED. While it is false a permission failure maps to a new PROVIDER_DOCUMENT_SCOPES_UNAVAILABLE, which says the permission is missing on our side, that reconnecting will not help, and that the rest of the migration came through; the card offers no button, because no user action can succeed. The attachment scopes also become an opt-in consent rather than part of every connect. Fortnox derives customer licence requirements from what an integration requests, so asking everyone for Arkivplats would put a licence in front of customers who never import a receipt; and keeping it off the default connect caps the blast radius of a wrong portal registration at the underlag flow rather than every Fortnox connection. buildFortnoxAuthUrl already took per-call scopes, provider-client simply never passed any, so this threads documentScopes from that one button through /connect into the authorize URL. A document consent is always a superset of an ordinary one: the callback overwrites the consent's tokens in place, so a narrower grant would revoke the migration's own ledger access. Pinned by a test that holds either way the flag is set, alongside one for the 400-with-behorighet answer that six companies hit between 08-13 and 08-19 and saw only a generic retry for. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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3ec76d39db |
fix(providers): correct Bokio v1 connection validation (#1681)
Fixes #1670 |
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MattssonandClaude Fable 5
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93f81f03e8 |
feat(providers): WINT migration provider behind WINT_MIGRATION_ENABLED (#1446)
* feat(providers): WINT migration provider behind WINT_MIGRATION_ENABLED Adds WINT (wint.se) as a sixth migration provider, built against the OpenAPI specs WINT's own API host serves publicly. Tier A scope: only the partner-facing v1 endpoints are used; the general ledger is fetched as vouchers/accounts and rendered as SIE 4E by our own sie-builder, with opening balances for earlier years derived backward from the current-year Ib anchor. Auth is the user's WINT login exchanged once for a JWT pair; the password is never stored. Ships dark: the wizard shows a disabled "Kommer snart" card, and the server-side /connect gate rejects WINT until WINT_MIGRATION_ENABLED=true. Live verification against a real WINT account is still outstanding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(providers): harden WINT provider per PR #1446 review findings Addresses CodeRabbit and Swedish accounting review feedback in one pass: - Ib anchor selection now uses WINT's unfiltered fiscal-year list, so an active year outside the allowed import window can never silently anchor the wrong year; the voucher chain is extended through the anchor and a per-year fetch failure fails that year loudly instead of sinking the whole migration. - Auth token exchange is strict: only LoginState Success with a complete access+refresh pair mints a consent (a pair without a refresh token is unrefreshable and would break days later). - WintApiError no longer retains full response bodies (bounded 300-char diagnostic; bodies can carry customer data and errors get logged). - sie-builder refuses to render structurally invalid vouchers (missing account number or booking date) and documents deleted-voucher gaps in a #PROSA record per BFL 5 kap 6-7 §. - Account classification: 20xx is equity, 83xx is financial income. - SIE validator accepts EUBAS97 as BAS-based (standard kontoplanstyp; it previously produced a false non-BAS warning on every WINT/Bollbok file). - New tests: resolveConsent WINT refresh flow, credential upsert payload (no mail/password persisted), WINT fetch failure path, EUBAS97 warning regression, builder invalid-data rejection, vi.clearAllMocks hygiene. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(import): pin EUBAS97 acceptance to the exact SIE spec value Review follow-up on PR #1446: match EUBAS97 exactly instead of any EUBAS* prefix, so the non-BAS kontoplan warning stays pinned to the four kontoplanstyp values the SIE 4B spec enumerates (BAS95, BAS96, EUBAS97, NE2007) rather than silently accepting unknown future variants. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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0f1c7c9365 |
fix(import): refuse a Bokio connection that opens a different company (#1315)
A Bokio integration token is scoped to one Bokio company and the company id is typed in by hand, so credentials for the user's other company imported that company's customers, suppliers and invoices with no error at all. Probe /companies/{id} before storing, mirroring the Bjorn Lunden /details probe, and refuse on a confident org-number mismatch.
Also surface the inbox mail body when nothing was attached: it was captured in email_body_text and never read back, which made Gmail's forwarding-confirmation mail unreadable and the forward impossible to complete.
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MattssonandClaude Fable 5
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f24b26a139 |
fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215)
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Sonnet 5
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MattssonandClaude Fable 5
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db8983ba9e |
Add/bokslut (#718)
* feat(arcim-migration): Briox provider with SIE-over-API import - Briox auth via account ID + application token (no app-level credentials); both tokens rotate on refresh and are persisted - New sie-fetcher pulls the general ledger as SIE through the provider API for Fortnox, Briox and Bjorn Lunden - Wizard stops on a failed SIE import and surfaces the real errors instead of proceeding to the misleading migrate-guard message - PROVIDER_SIE_ONLY_FORTNOX renamed to PROVIDER_SIE_NOT_SUPPORTED; new PROVIDER_TOKEN_INVALID for rejected provider credentials Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): per-line accruals (periodisering) on invoices and supplier invoices Defer revenue/costs per invoice line to 29xx/17xx interim accounts with automatic monthly dissolution (nightly cron + catch-up at registration), schedule cancellation on credit, year-end auto-detect exclusion for already-scheduled invoices, invoice-inbox service-period extraction for prefill, and an MCP tool to list schedules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bokslut): iXBRL arsredovisning generation and Bolagsverket digital filing Generate the annual report as iXBRL from a generated taxonomy registry (K2 element lists, taxonomy:generate/check scripts + CI guard), expose it via the fiscal-period API, and add the bolagsverket extension for digital submission to eget utrymme with webhook-driven status tracking (submissions table + pg tests, lifecycle events, year-end wizard UI). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): raise origin-guard test timeout to 20s The dynamic import pulls in the full server module; the parse alone flirts with the 5s default under full-suite parallel load. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add new scripts and documentation for K2 AB taxonomy generation and validation - Introduced `generate-taxonomy-registry.ts` to automate the generation of the iXBRL taxonomy concept registry from official element lists and tuple models. - Added `validate-ixbrl.mjs` for validating generated iXBRL reports against the official taxonomy package using Arelle. - Included new documentation files: - `k2-ab-arsredovisning-elementlista-2024-09-12_rev20250312_sv.xlsx` - `tuple-innehallsmodell-arsredovisning-k2-2024-09-12.xlsx` - `taxonomi-paket-2024-09-12_rev20250312.zip` * Add tests for bookkeeping accruals dissolution and supplier invoices - Implement tests for the POST /api/bookkeeping/accruals/[id]/dissolve route, covering success and error scenarios. - Add tests for the DELETE /api/supplier-invoices/[id] route, including authentication checks and validation of invoice deletion conditions. - Introduce tests for the Arcim migration provider client, ensuring token handling and error classification. - Create tests for the Bolagsverket extension, validating submission role enforcement and environment settings. - Add Zod schemas for Bolagsverket response payloads to ensure proper validation. - Implement tests for MCP server's list accrual schedules, confirming registration and scope mapping. - Add consistency tests for IXBRL document generation, ensuring duplicate facts and XML escaping are handled correctly. - Introduce typed domain errors for accrual schedules to improve error handling in the service. - Add tests for resolving consent with Briox token refresh concurrency, ensuring proper token management and error handling. * fix(tests): update payload size guard comments to reflect recent changes in tool descriptions and ceiling adjustments * fix(gitattributes): mark generated JSON files in bokslut taxonomy as linguist-generated * feat(migrations): add backfill for invoices.journal_entry_id and fallback for next_voucher_number user_id * feat(bokslut): enhance compliance and financial processing features with new submission details and security measures --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattssonandgreptile-apps[bot]
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211033410c |
Fix/import data (#200)
* fix: enhance import data handling and consent management across components * feat: Enhance SIE import functionality with validation and error handling improvements - Added validation errors and warnings state management in SIEImportWizard. - Improved error handling for duplicate, validation, and parsing errors during SIE file import. - Enhanced user feedback with actionable guidance for common import errors. - Updated SIEUploadStep to display validation errors and warnings. - Improved error messages in API routes for better clarity and user experience. - Added file size and type validation in the SIE parse route. - Enhanced parsing logic to provide more detailed error messages for unbalanced vouchers and missing amounts. - Created a new storage bucket for SIE file archival in Supabase with appropriate policies for user access. - Updated tests to reflect changes in error messages and validation logic. * fix: Improve type assertion for response in getPage method * Update extensions/general/arcim-migration/lib/migration-orchestrator.ts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update supabase/migrations/20260408130000_sie_files_storage_bucket.sql Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: Add company ID verification for consent handling in accept and disconnect endpoints --------- Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e42da5c32b |
Staging (#181)
* refactor: remove unnecessary secondary action from EmptyInvoices component * feat: add direct provider layer and provider_consents migration Replace Arcim Sync gateway dependency with direct provider clients for Fortnox, Visma, Briox, Bokio, and Björn Lundén. Adds OAuth config, rate limiting, retry logic, data fetching, and consent storage via new provider_consents/tokens/otc tables. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: migrate arcim extension to direct provider APIs Replace Arcim Sync gateway calls with direct provider API access. Use FortnoxClient.getText() for SIE endpoints that return plain text instead of JSON. OAuth callback now returns HTML with postMessage to communicate with the opener window instead of redirecting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use OAuth popup window instead of new tab Open provider login in a centered popup that auto-closes on completion via postMessage, keeping the user on a single tab. Falls back to redirect flow if popup is blocked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add connection status, consent reuse, and SIE duplicate detection - Add listConsents() to query active consents by company - Add GET /status route returning consents, SIE import history, and entity counts - /connect reuses existing accepted consent instead of creating duplicates, and cleans up abandoned (status 0) consents - /status only returns accepted (status 1) consents - /sie-data checks each file's SHA-256 hash against sie_imports to report per-file import status (alreadyImported, importedAt) - /sie-data blocks on SIE validation failure (mirrors manual upload) - /import-sie validates unmapped accounts and auto-activates missing BAS accounts in chart_of_accounts (mirrors manual upload) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show active connections, SIE file status, and smart re-sync UI - ProviderStep shows active connections with last import date, entity counts, "Synka igen" button, and disconnect option - Already-connected providers greyed out in selection grid - OptionsStep shows per-fiscal-year import status (imported vs new) - SIE toggle disabled with explanation when all files already imported - handleStartMigration skips already-imported SIE files - Auto-skip mapping step and disable SIE on re-sync when up to date - Result step hides empty "0 importerade" rows and shows "Allt är uppdaterat" when nothing new was fetched - OptionRow supports disabled state Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: adjust COMING_SOON_PROVIDERS based on NODE_ENV for development and production * Removed duplicate * Removed duplicate * refactor: redesign reports page navigation from grid boxes to bordered card layout Replace the 4-column grid of uneven TabsList boxes with a CSS grid card using auto-sized columns separated by 1px border dividers. All sections now share equal height via items-stretch, with clear visual separation between groups. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: trigger Vercel deployment * Update supabase/migrations/20260402010000_provider_consents.sql Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update lib/providers/rate-limiter.ts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: re-trigger checks after migration sync --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |