c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
13
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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f266c386f3 |
chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150)
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp, lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format, lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body + v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas). No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list of things left alone on purpose. tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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18cbc4c30a |
fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1307d4db2e |
fix(oauth): serve RFC 9728 resource metadata at the path-based locations Claude.ai fetches (#1915)
Claude.ai's connector setup derives the protected-resource metadata URL from the MCP server URL and fetches it before any 401 challenge: /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp /api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource Both were 404 (only the root document our WWW-Authenticate header points at existed), which the dialog reported as "Authorization with Accounted failed". One shared builder now serves all three locations; the path-based route answers 404 for any path other than the MCP endpoint. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e92365b86e |
feat(mcp): distribution polish for agent-first onboarding: CIMD, plugin start skill, bridge hint (#1814 PR 4) (#1866)
* feat(mcp): distribution polish for agent-first onboarding: CIMD, plugin start skill, bridge hint Fourth PR of agent-first onboarding (#1814). - The OAuth AS metadata advertises client_id_metadata_document_supported next to the existing `none` token auth, the pair Claude.ai, Claude Code and Codex look for to use CIMD instead of registering a DCR client per connection. authorize/token never keyed on client_id (the redirect-URI allowlist is the trust boundary), so nothing else changes; DCR stays for ChatGPT. - The plugin's start skill no longer sends a user without an account to the website: the /mcp OAuth screen creates the account, and a NO_COMPANY_YET briefing failure routes to the onboarding skill and accounted_create_company. README updated to match. - `npx accounted-mcp` without ACCOUNTED_API_KEY prints the OAuth alternative (Claude Code, Codex, Claude.ai connector) and that the account can be created on the sign-in screen; package README too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(oauth): do not advertise CIMD until redirect URIs are matched against the client document CodeRabbit on #1866: advertising client_id_metadata_document_supported makes Claude and Codex send URL client_ids and expects an exact redirect_uri match against that document; the authorize endpoint only checks the global allowlist and never fetches client metadata. The flag is withheld until an SSRF-safe, cached CIMD fetch with exact redirect matching exists. DCR stays the registration path (stateless, so free). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Fable 5
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dc5aea4a35 |
feat(mcp): speak spec revision 2026-07-28 (stateless core) (#1277)
* feat(mcp): speak spec revision 2026-07-28 (stateless core) Adopt the 2026-07-28 MCP spec revision on the connector endpoint while keeping every handshake-era client (2025-06-18 and earlier) byte-identical: - Accept per-request _meta protocol negotiation (io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion); unsupported versions return UnsupportedProtocolVersionError (-32022) with the supported list. - Implement server/discover (spec MUST): supported revisions, capabilities including the extensions field, identity, instructions, freshness hints. - Decorate results for stateless clients: required resultType, serverInfo in _meta, and CacheableResult ttlMs/cacheScope on tools/list, prompts/list, resources/list, resources/read. - Validate the standard Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name request headers when present (HeaderMismatchError -32020); absence stays accepted. - Declare the ratified MCP Apps extension (io.modelcontextprotocol/ui) in capabilities; the widgets already use the ratified mime type and _meta.ui.resourceUri shape, so no widget changes are needed. - OAuth: include the RFC 9207 iss parameter on every authorization response (success and error) and advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported in RFC 8414 metadata. Resource-not-found already used -32602 and tools/list ordering was already deterministic; both are covered by the new test file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): Mcp-Name covers params.uri, base64 sentinel, version-header consistency Review follow-ups against the transport spec text: Mcp-Name mirrors params.name OR params.uri (resources/read), values arrive base64-wrapped in the =?base64?...?= sentinel and must be decoded before comparison, and an MCP-Protocol-Version header that disagrees with the _meta protocol version is a HeaderMismatch. Absence of any header stays accepted since this server supports handshake-era clients (spec-sanctioned leniency). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MattssonandClaude Opus 4.8
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53e343ee92 |
Bug/invalid imports (#1146)
* feat: add Accounted MCP namespace * fix(bookkeeping): stop flagging verifikat whose underlag lives on a referenced supplier invoice The missing-underlag surfaces only accepted a document directly linked to the entry, so payment verifikat for supplier invoices (doc on the registration entry per design) and entries whose doc was pinned to the bank transaction before matching were falsely flagged; opening the entry showed the referenced doc and cleared the warning client-side, and it came back on reload. - verifikat_without_documents + transactions_without_documents now treat an entry as covered when a supplier invoice referencing it (registration or payment FK, or a supplier_invoice_payments row) carries a document anchored to a journal entry (BFL 5 kap 7 paragraf hänvisning till underlag; anchoring required because the WORM deletion guards key on document_attachments.journal_entry_id) - match-supplier-invoice routes (dashboard + v1) propagate the transaction's pinned document onto the payment verifikat, mirroring the categorize route; migration backfills rows already written (open unlocked periods, company-guarded, never steals a linked doc) - /api/documents/counts, the transactions-page badges, the bulk "Inget underlag krävs" count and the push-notification scheduler share the same reference-aware predicate, so every surface agrees with the RPC - counts route validates journal_entry_ids as UUIDs (they are interpolated into a PostgREST or-filter) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(transactions): align table columns flush with page edges Collapse the checkbox gutter column to zero width and hang the hover-revealed checkbox/expand chevron in the page margins, drop the outer padding so DATUM sits flush left and STATUS flush right, and tuck the overflow-menu dots under the middle of the STATUS header. Applied to both the inbox and history tables so they stay identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(arsredovisning): tie anlaggningstillgangar note to booked depreciation The ARL 5:8 roll-forward note recomputed depreciation from its own day-based linear formula (365.25/12 month length, non-inclusive day count, linear only), drifting ~20 kr per year per asset from the ledger-driven resultat- and balansrakning and misstating non-linear methods entirely. Note figures now come from posted depreciation_schedules rows (the same source disposeAsset reverses), falling back to the engine's computeAnnualDepreciation when nothing is posted; pre-onboarding opening balances iterate prior years through the engine. Adds a note-vs-trial-balance tie-out warning (accounts 1000-1299, over 1 kr) surfaced before download. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(stripe): move connect and sync surface from settings to import page Stripe's transaction feed is a continuous import source in the same category as the PSD2 bank connection, so its connect/sync surface now lives on the import page as a source card (mode=stripe), gated "kommer snart" on hosted like before; self-hosted keeps the full panel. - Import page: Stripe card after Koppla bank, renders the existing StripeSettingsPanel via the settings-panel registry - OAuth callback and panel cleanup return to /import?mode=stripe - Settings > Betalningar retired: nav item removed, route redirects, PaymentsSettingsContent deleted, legacy ?tab=payments mapped - New import.stripe_* strings in sv+en; dead settings_nav.payments removed Crons and sync logic unchanged; payment-link settings stay in the invoicing section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(underlag): paginate missing-underlag cron and harden doc-surface queries Resolve PR review findings on bug/invalid-imports: - notification-scheduler: fetchAllRows on all 5 global reads; past 1000 rows the capped reads produced false "saknade underlag" notifications - bulk-missing: LOOKUP_CHUNK 300->150 so the twice-embedded .or() id list stays under the PostgREST URL limit - bulk-missing + transactions page: UUID-guard the .or()-interpolated id lists, matching documents/counts - match-supplier-invoice (dashboard + v1): log documentId/journalEntryId on the non-fatal doc-link warning - well-known/oauth-protected-resource: document the tool_namespace allow-list - messages/en: reword stripe_description - DECISIONS.md: record the asset ibAck tie-out and Tailwind !important calls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tic): convert registrationDate from Unix seconds to millisecond epoch in lookup and profile tests --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Fable 5
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b420f3e1d9 |
feat(domains): dual-domain cutover to app.accounted.se (#1087)
* feat(domains): dual-domain cutover to app.accounted.se The user-facing app moves to app.accounted.se while app.gnubok.se stays alive for machine traffic (MCP connectors, API keys, third-party OAuth callbacks, webhooks, crons), so no third-party callback registration is on the critical path. - next.config: host redirect app.gnubok.se -> NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL for page traffic only (/api, /.well-known, /_next excluded). Arms itself only once NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL leaves the legacy host, so merging this is inert and the cutover is a pure env flip + redeploy. - skatteverket: redirect_uri pinned via NEXT_PUBLIC_SKV_OAUTH_BASE_URL (Utvecklarportalen registration is slow to change); the OAuth callback now resolves the flow from the state token + stored oauth_user_id via the service client instead of session cookies, which no longer exist on the OAuth host. Legacy same-domain flows fall back to the session. - popup listeners (SkatteverketConnectPanel, AGIPanel) accept postMessage from the pinned OAuth origin; event.source identity check unchanged. - /.well-known discovery docs reflect the allowlisted request host so existing MCP connectors on app.gnubok.se keep a self-consistent issuer/resource after the flip; spoofed hosts fall back to canonical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: log dual-domain cutover decision Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): recency-bound SKV state lookup, exact localhost match in discovery allowlist - The oauth_state lookup now only considers rows updated in the last 10 minutes: bounds how long a leaked/phished authorize URL stays completable, keeps the row set far below PostgREST's 1000-row cap, and surfaces query errors instead of misreporting them as CSRF. - resolveDiscoveryBaseUrl matches localhost/127.0.0.1 exactly; the prefix check reflected spoofed hosts like localhost.evil.example. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Sonnet 5
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.8
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c74b19df1b |
Accounted rebrand + swarm-skill cleanup + bank-reconciliation fixes (#643)
* feat(reconciliation): close the bank-feed loop on voucher links and re-tag mis-typed opening balances
Two related fixes to bank reconciliation correctness:
1. Auto-reconcile on voucher link. Linking an invoice or supplier invoice to
an existing voucher previously advanced only the invoice — the bank
transaction that paid it kept sitting in the Transactions inbox with a null
journal_entry_id. linkInvoiceToVoucher / linkSupplierInvoiceToVoucher now
call autoReconcileTransactionForLinkedVoucher (lib/reconciliation), which
links the bank transaction to the same verifikat when exactly one unbooked
line matches it. Best-effort and post-commit: a failure here never fails the
link. The result surfaces reconciledTransactionId; the inbox row leaves the
list and the UI shows link_success_tx_reconciled.
2. Re-tag mis-typed opening balances. getReconciliationStatus and the GL-line
matching RPCs identify a cash account's ingående balans solely by
journal_entries.source_type='opening_balance'. Companies migrated from other
systems often booked the bank IB as an ordinary voucher (source_type
'import' or 'manual'), so it was never excluded and surfaced as a phantom
reconciliation difference equal to the opening balance. Adds:
- migration mark_entry_as_opening_balance: a GUC-gated carve-out in the
immutability trigger plus a SECURITY DEFINER RPC that validates the entry
(balance-sheet lines only, dated on a fiscal-period boundary), flips the
source_type, and writes an audit row — no blanket data sweep.
- POST /api/reconciliation/bank/mark-opening-balance + MarkOpeningBalanceSchema.
- BankReconciliationView action to trigger it from the IB diff.
The gnubok_create_voucher executor now accepts a typed is_opening_balance flag
and derives source_type='opening_balance' only after validating class 1/2 lines
on the period start, so new IBs land correctly typed.
Covered by lib/reconciliation auto-reconcile tests, voucher-executors tests,
and a mark-entry-as-opening-balance pg-real test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: rebrand gnubok → Accounted and prune swarm agent skills
Product rebrand and skills housekeeping. No runtime behaviour change.
Rebrand: replace user-visible "gnubok" with "Accounted" across docs, READMEs,
in-code comments, doc-site content, MCP skill/resource prose, and the
gnubok-mcp package description. The MCP resource URI scheme is moved gnubok://
→ Accounted:// consistently across resource registrations, the event-type
comment, and the resource/skill tests. Deliberately preserved as stable
identifiers (NOT rebranded): the gnubok-company-id cookie, gnubok_sk_ / gnubok_inv_
token prefixes, the gnubok-mcp npm bridge name, and the AGI <gem:Programnamn>
value (kept 'gnubok' per its source comment — it is the software identifier sent
to Skatteverket and must not churn across visual rebrands).
Skills: remove the 27 swarm-* agent SKILL.md atoms (no longer used; already
absent from the agent_atom_registry in prod), refresh the remaining skill docs,
add the .claude/rules/ path-scoped rule set, and regenerate the
seed_agent_atom_bodies migration + .skill-body-manifest.json via
`npm run skills:generate` so the DB-backed skill bodies match the trimmed set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
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16164ea14c |
Fix/mcp fixes and bugs (#518)
* feat(voucher): add create voucher and correct entry previews; update commit methods * feat: add support for pending operations in API key scopes and OAuth client management - Introduced new API key scopes for reading and approving pending operations. - Updated the scope groups to include pending operations. - Added new tools for listing and managing pending operations. - Implemented OAuth client registration and revocation endpoints. - Created a UI panel for managing OAuth clients, including registration and revocation. - Added tests for pending operations tools and OAuth allowlist functionality. - Implemented a database migration for OAuth client registrations with appropriate policies and constraints. * feat: Implement OAuth client registration rate limiting and enhance security measures - Added IP-based rate limiting to the OAuth client registration endpoint to prevent enumeration attacks. - Introduced a service-role client for allowlist lookups, ensuring trust boundaries are maintained. - Updated error responses to be uniform across different types of redirect URI validation failures. - Enhanced tests to reflect changes in OAuth scope handling, ensuring fallback to read-only scopes when no scopes are provided. - Improved handling of high-risk pending operations, requiring explicit confirmation for approvals. - Added audit logging for OAuth client revocations and pending operation approvals/rejections to maintain a security audit trail. - Refactored API key scope management to include default read-only scopes for OAuth-issued keys and added segregation-of-duties checks. |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.7
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db592d922d |
feat(api): v1 REST API foundation — auth wrapper, scopes, registry, smoke endpoints (#450)
* feat(api): v1 REST API foundation — auth wrapper, scopes, registry, smoke endpoints Lay the substrate for the public REST API at /api/v1/*: Bearer-auth wrapper that reuses the existing api_keys + idempotency machinery, an extended scope catalogue (companies, events, webhooks, operations, documents, compliance), v1 response envelopes (data + meta with request_id, api_version, audit block, cursor pagination), an error envelope with recovery_hint / docs_url / valid_alternatives derived from the existing structured-error registry, and a Zod schema registry that generates the OpenAPI 3.1 spec with x-action-risk / x-idempotent / x-reversible / x-dry-run-supported extensions. Ships discovery routes (/llms.txt, /.well-known/skills/index.json) and three smoke endpoints (GET /api/v1/health, /api/v1/companies, /api/v1/openapi.json) so the wrapper is exercised end-to-end. Includes the api_keys.mode (test|live) migration and 41 unit tests covering auth, scope, company-membership, idempotency replay, dry-run, pagination, response shape, and scope resolution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): harden v1 foundation — cursor validation, security headers, forensic logs Address compliance-swarm findings on PR #450: - OWASP V2.3: decodeDefaultCursor now validates the cursor's ts as ISO 8601 and id as UUID. A crafted cursor previously could inject untyped strings into a query's .gt(field, value); PostgREST would have rejected them, but validating here keeps the failure mode predictable (stale cursor → reset) rather than 400-ing. - OWASP V3.4: public discovery routes (llms.txt, .well-known/skills, openapi.json) now stamp X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy, X-Frame-Options: DENY. New lib/api/v1/security-headers.ts helper. - OWASP V16: security event logs (missing token, validation failure, insufficient scope, company-membership deny) now include source IP (x-forwarded-for / x-real-ip) and User-Agent for forensic correlation. - OWASP V8.2.1 / ISO A.8.3: GET /api/v1/companies emits a warn log when the PostgREST archived_at filter unexpectedly returns a row with a null company join, surfacing silent data-integrity regressions instead of hiding them behind the existing pickCompany() === null filter. Pushing back on (not changed): - GDPR Art.32 cursor HMAC signing — cursors only paginate within a user's own user_id scope; cross-tenant probe surface doesn't exist yet. - GDPR Art.25 org_number in list — Bolagsverket public-record data, removing forces N+1 fetches to make the response useful. - SOC 2 CC6.3 service-role bypasses RLS — defense-in-depth IS the design; the wrapper's company_members membership check is the technical control. - ISO A.8.12 public OpenAPI spec — intentional, mirrors Stripe/Twilio. 5 new pagination tests cover the cursor validators. 46/46 v1 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): detect Supabase duplicate-signup obfuscation on register Supabase obfuscates duplicate signups to prevent user enumeration: when an email already belongs to a confirmed account, signUp returns data.user with identities: [] and no error, and sends no email. Without detecting this case we showed the "check your email" screen to the user, who then waited for a mail that never arrived. Detect the empty-identities response and surface it via duplicateEmail state so the UI can branch on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): second-pass hardening — CSP, IP truncation, cursor scope comment Address the second compliance-swarm sweep on PR #450: - OWASP V3.2: PUBLIC_SECURITY_HEADERS now includes Content-Security-Policy default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'. Free win for JSON/text-only public routes (no script, style, image, or form contexts). - GDPR Art.5(1)(f): truncate IPs before logging — IPv4 to /24, IPv6 to /48. Preserves diagnostic value (ASN, abuse-pattern correlation, city-level geolocation) while eliminating point-of-presence identification. Standard pattern used by Google Analytics anonymize_ip. Exported truncateIp() so other surfaces can adopt it. - OWASP V8.2.1: explicit comment in GET /api/v1/companies documenting that the cursor's joined_at is applied AFTER user_id filter, so a tampered cursor can only reorder rows the caller already owns. Cursors deliberately unsigned; trade-off documented. Pushing back on second-pass findings (not changed): - ISO A.8.12 / SOC 2 CC6.3 health/llms.txt/skills exposing service name + API version + MCP URL — these are intentional disclosures for a public 3rd-party developer API; hiding them is theatre. - GDPR Art.32 logging granted scopes on INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE — diagnostic value during incident response outweighs the theoretical privilege-profile leak; an attacker who already breached the log store has bigger problems. - OWASP V2.2 route-level Zod for cursor — decodeDefaultCursor already validates strictly; route-level Zod is stylistic. - GDPR Art.25(2) org_number/entity_type in list — Bolagsverket-public data; entity_type materially affects which API calls make sense. - ISO A.8.15 x-forwarded-for trusted-proxy CIDR — overkill behind Vercel's edge which rewrites the leftmost value. 50/50 v1 tests pass (4 new for truncateIp). Build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): third-pass hardening — Host header injection, anon client, HSTS Address the third compliance-swarm sweep on PR #450: - SOC 2 CC6.1 (3× high): llms.txt, openapi.json, and .well-known/skills built URLs from the inbound Host header. A spoofed Host could poison agent discovery with attacker-controlled endpoints. New lib/api/v1/base-url.ts centralises canonical base-URL derivation via NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL (already a required env var per CLAUDE.md). - ISO A.8.2 / A.8.5 (2× high): the wrapper's public-scope code path now uses an anon-key Supabase client (RLS-respecting) instead of the service-role client. A future accidental DB call from a public handler is constrained to anon-accessible rows. Least-privilege at the infrastructure layer. - OWASP V3.2 (medium): PUBLIC_SECURITY_HEADERS now includes Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains. - GDPR Art.5(1)(f) (medium): truncateIp now logs a warn when a non-empty x-forwarded-for / x-real-ip payload fails to parse, surfacing spoofed or unexpected proxy values to security monitoring instead of silently dropping them. The raw value is never logged. - CC2.3 (low): llms.txt now links the SECURITY.md disclosure policy with the security@arcim.io reporting address so agents have a clear responsible-disclosure path. Pushing back on third-pass findings (not changed): - Cursor HMAC signing — user_id filter is the authorisation boundary; cursor scope is bounded to within-user rows. Documented in code. - org_number in companies list — Bolagsverket public data; the swarm's "could be enskild firma personnummer" framing isn't accurate (enskild firma org_number IS the personnummer, but it's already in the public Bolagsverket business register). - Health endpoint information disclosure — intentional for a public developer API; matches Stripe/Twilio convention. - llms.txt / skills index MCP URL disclosure — that's the file's purpose. - Cache-Control public on discovery routes — content is by definition public; getCanonicalBaseUrl() removes the previous spoof concern. - Duplicate-email screen — user's own input; out of scope for this PR. 50/50 v1 tests pass; @supabase/supabase-js#createClient mocked so the public-path tests don't need real env vars. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): widen validateApiKey result assertions to include mode field The core-only CI job failed on two pre-existing api-keys.test.ts assertions that used strict toEqual matching against the old (userId, companyId, scopes) shape. The wrapper migration in this PR widened that shape with mode, apiKeyId, and apiKeyName. Update both existing assertions to match the current shape and add a third test that exercises the mode='test' path. 3027/3027 vitest tests now pass locally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): fourth-pass hardening — env guards, IP range check, headers on wrapped routes Address the fourth compliance-swarm sweep on PR #450: - ISO A.5.17 / SOC 2 CC6.1 (high): createAnonClient now fails closed with an explicit Error if NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL or _ANON_KEY are missing, surfacing misconfiguration on the first request instead of throwing deeper in the handler with no context. - GDPR Art.5(1)(f): truncateIp now rejects IPv4 with out-of-range octets (>255). '999.999.999.999' now returns undefined instead of a pseudo-IP that would pollute abuse-pattern analysis. Edge octets (0, 255) still accepted. 2 new tests. - OWASP V3.2 / V3.3: the wrapper's stampHeaders step now applies the full security header set to every wrapped v1 response (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame, Referrer-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options) PLUS X-Robots-Tag: noai, noimageai so authenticated payloads are excluded from AI training sets. Public discovery routes (llms.txt, skills index, openapi.json) deliberately omit X-Robots-Tag — being AI-discoverable is the whole point of those surfaces. - New WRAPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS export separates the two contexts. Pushing back on: - SOC 2 CC6.1 medium "API key prefix in public docs aids brute force" — inverted logic. Every public API publishes its key prefix specifically so secret scanners (GitHub Advanced Security, GitLeaks) can detect leaks. Stripe (sk_live_), GitHub (ghp_), OpenAI (sk-) all do this. - SOC 2 CC6.3 medium "formal risk register for unsigned cursors" — org -level documentation, outside this PR. Code-comment already documents the trade-off. - SOC 2 CC2.3 low "llms.txt hardcodes security@arcim.io" — same address as SECURITY.md; no drift risk. Flagged separately (not changed): the register-page duplicate-email detection in this branch defeats Supabase's user-enumeration obfuscation (GDPR Art.5(1)(c) × 2, ISO A.8.11). Substantive product decision: UX (no infinite-wait for non-existent accounts) vs security (no enumeration). GitHub and Stripe Atlas pick UX; some pick security. Owner's call. 3029/3029 vitest tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): address Greptile review on PR #450 - P1 (companies/route.ts): keyset pagination was missing its tiebreaker. The cursor encoded (joined_at, id) but the filter only applied .gt('joined_at', ts) — same-joined_at rows on a page boundary could be skipped or duplicated. Also the encoded id was companies.id while the sort was on company_members, mismatched. Fixed: select + sort + encode on company_members.id, apply compound joined_at.gt.{ts} OR (joined_at.eq.{ts} AND id.gt.{cursor_id}) via .or(). Side benefit — eliminates the broken-cursor-on-null-join case (#2) because company_members.id is always present, no null guard needed. - P2 (registry.ts): ZodUnion branch had a dead ternary (['x','y','z','w'].length > 0 ? undefined : 'object') that always yielded undefined. Removed; emit { oneOf: [...] } without top-level type (correct JSON Schema for a union). - P2 (with-api-v1.ts): public-endpoint path was short-circuiting before Bearer-token validation, contradicting the JSDoc and PR description. Now opportunistically validates a supplied token for rate-limit attribution + key tracking; missing/invalid token silently falls back to anon (the route is public by definition, so we don't 401). Two new tests cover both branches. 3031/3031 vitest tests pass; build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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c03582b5c7 |
Fix/percistent mcp connection (#392)
* feat(oauth): add support for refresh tokens in OAuth flow and update database schema * feat(prompts): add MCP prompts and corresponding functionality for prompt retrieval * feat(auth): enhance error handling for refresh token operations and validation |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.6
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5d66dd6bfc |
feat: MCP server, API keys, OAuth, and KPI dashboard (#72)
* fix: prevent Chrome auto-translate from crashing React during onboarding
Chrome auto-translate modifies DOM text nodes when it detects a Swedish
page (lang="sv") in a browser set to English. React does not expect
external DOM mutations and throws, crashing the entire component tree
into global-error.tsx on every step transition.
Add translate="no" and <meta name="google" content="notranslate"> to
suppress browser translation. Also fix timezone-unsafe date parsing in
fiscal period validation (new Date("YYYY-MM-DD") + getDate() returns
local-timezone values, shifting dates by -1 day in Western timezones).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add notranslate meta tag to global-error.tsx for consistency
Per review feedback — global-error.tsx renders its own <html> document,
so it needs the same <meta name="google" content="notranslate"> tag as
layout.tsx to fully suppress Chrome translation on error pages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add MCP server extension with OAuth, API keys, and KPI dashboard
Let users do bookkeeping through Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or any
MCP-compatible client. "Show my uncategorized transactions." "Book that
as office supplies." "Invoice Acme for 15,000 kr."
MCP server (extension):
- 10 tools: transactions, categorization, customers, invoices,
trial balance, VAT report, KPI report, income statement
- JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol (no SDK dependency, works in serverless)
- Tool annotations, pagination, input validation per MCP best practices
- Same engine as web UI (VAT rules, exchange rates, event emission)
API key infrastructure (core):
- api_keys table with RLS, rate limiting (100 RPM), scopes column
- Atomic rate limit via DB RPC (validate_and_increment_api_key)
- Key management API routes + settings UI panel
OAuth 2.1 for Claude Desktop connectors:
- .well-known/oauth-protected-resource + oauth-authorization-server
- Authorization endpoint with consent page
- Token endpoint with PKCE verification
- Stateless encrypted auth codes (AES-256-GCM, no DB storage)
- Dynamic client registration
KPI dashboard:
- /nyckeltal page with hero cards, operational grid, trend chart
- GET /api/reports/kpi endpoint
- Gross margin, cash position, expense ratio, avg payment days,
VAT liability, revenue/expense trend
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address OAuth security vulnerabilities from code review
Critical fixes:
- Auth code replay: Track used codes in oauth_used_codes table with
unique constraint. Codes are single-use per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.
- Open redirect: Validate redirect_uri against hardcoded allowlist
of known Claude callback URLs + localhost for dev.
P1 fixes:
- Move API key creation from /authorize to /token endpoint. Keys are
only created after PKCE verification, preventing orphaned keys on
abandoned OAuth flows.
- Add ensureInitialized() to MCP server so event handlers load and
transaction.categorized events reach extensions.
P2 fixes:
- Remove 'plain' from PKCE methods — only S256 is advertised and
accepted.
- Fix extension count in sectors test (10 → 11 for mcp-server).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove duplicate ensureInitialized() that caused circular import
The extension router (ext/[...path]/route.ts) already calls
ensureInitialized() before dispatching to handlers. The duplicate
call in server.ts created a circular import that Turbopack couldn't
resolve, breaking the Vercel build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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