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Commits
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80b87c55fc |
fix(skatteverket): treat AGI kvittens gateway refusals as errors and name the connector operator (#2234)
* fix(skatteverket): treat AGI kvittens gateway refusals as errors and name the connector operator The AGI kvittens cron bucketed ACCESS_DENIED as apigw_config with a warn-once suppression because the APIGW client was known to lack the AGI hantera subscription in Utvecklarportalen (#963). With that subscription being put in place (#2226), a gateway refusal is a regression and belongs in the ordinary error path, so the bucket, its "known configuration gap" comment and the apigwConfig response field are gone. The connector-mode gateway-refusal message said "kontakta supporten"; hosted is now itself a Connect installation for the canary companies, so the message names the connector operator by host instead. Refs #2226 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159Mi1sTAHfUDZkSysntYz2 * fix(skatteverket): keep the ACCESS_DENIED code in the kvittens cron body Skeptic finding on PR #2234: the generic error path ran the gateway refusal through getErrorMessage, whose Swedish keyword heuristic misses the gateway wording and collapsed it into "Något gick fel". Echo the machine-readable code instead, as the expired_token and grant_revoked rows already do; the full guidance stays in the error log. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159Mi1sTAHfUDZkSysntYz2 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d900fea1a8 |
feat(connect): Skatteverket data calls through the connector with a per-company canary (#2209)
CONNECT_SKV_CANARY_COMPANIES mirrors the bank canary: the listed companies' user-token Skatteverket calls (skattekonto, moms, AGI) go through the connector's data proxy while this installation still has its own credentials and keeps refreshing the tokens on its own OAuth client. Callers without a company id (OAuth start, token exchange, environment reporting) keep the plain rule: own credentials win. This is how hosted moves its Skatteverket traffic to Connect a few companies at a time before dropping its own keys. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> |
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08b1119c7d |
feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2) (#2103)
* feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2) In connector mode (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY set, no own SKV credentials) the Skatteverket extension now routes through the hosted connector stack (#1757) instead of calling Skatteverket directly: - skvRequestWithAuth routes to the data proxy: base URL maps to a service segment (moms/skattekonto/agd-inlamning/agd-period), the user's SKV Bearer moves to X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization, the connector key authenticates the proxy, and the gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret are omitted (the proxy adds Arcim's). Connector-layer 4xx bodies (code CONNECTOR_*) are classified before the SKV-shaped 401/403 sniffing so a broker refusal surfaces operator guidance (check GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY), never APIGW/BankID guidance for knobs the instance does not have. - OAuth: /authorize starts the consent via the broker's authorize-url (persisting its redirect_uri + connector_state), the hosted SKV callback bounces the code back to the instance, and exchangeCodeForTokens / refreshAccessToken exchange through the broker's /oauth/token, unwrapping its { data } envelope. Tokens still rest encrypted on the instance; client_id/client_secret never exist there. - Broker refresh 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED maps to SESSION_EXPIRED (terminal; reconnect fixes); broker 502 stays a raw error so a transient SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner (#1155). - getSkatteverketEnvironment() reports 'prod' in connector mode: the upstream env is hosted's, and the instance's unset defaults would show a false Testmiljo badge on real filings. - System (CCG/ombud) auth is deliberately not brokered: hosted-only, stays direct. Hosted and own-credentials self-hosts are byte-identical: every branch gates on skatteverketConnectorMode(), which is null whenever own SKV credentials exist or no connector key is set. Direct-path tests pin that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS * fix(connect): classify SKV dead-refresh-token dialects broker-side; forward diagnostic headers; connector-aware gateway guidance Skeptic refutation on PR #2103 (found independently by the correctness and compliance skeptics): the broker's /oauth/token catch-all collapsed SKV's terminal dead-refresh-token dialects (404 id_not_found, 400 invalid_grant, "Refresh Token status is expired": the dominant refresh outcome, per-flow tokens live 65 minutes) into the generic 502 CONNECTOR_SKV_TOKEN_FAILED, so a connector instance could never classify ordinary session expiry: raw English 500s instead of the reconnect flow, staged filing operations consumed as non-recoverable, crons retrying raw forever. - Broker /oauth/token: re-codes those dialects as 401 CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD, refresh grant only (invalid_grant on the code exchange means an expired one-shot code and keeps the generic 502). The classifier (isSkvDeadRefreshTokenError) uses the same regex set the extension's direct path classifies with. - Instance dead-token classifier maps CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD to SESSION_EXPIRED alongside 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED; the generic 502 stays a raw error so a transient SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner. - Data proxy: forwards WWW-Authenticate and x-skv-*/x-amzn-*/x-api-* response headers (the instance's MISSING_SCOPE classification reads them; body-less gateway rejections carry no other signal). - Instance gateway-refusal guidance is connector-aware: a self-host has no SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID and no Utvecklarportalen access, so connector mode points at /api/connector/status and support instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS * fix(connect): reject redirects on the instance's broker OAuth requests CodeRabbit inline finding (CWE-200): the connector-mode authorize-url and token requests followed redirects by default, so a 307/308 would resend the connector key (and code/refresh token) to the redirect target. redirect 'error', matching the broker's own postToken rule; the token response must only ever come from the broker endpoint itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |