fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215)

* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership

The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no
company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise,
while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and
retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could
hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production.

Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already
carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from
COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then
revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised
statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that
are not repeated.

userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a
NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile
rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side

The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain
base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was
minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned
a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post
the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's
consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger.

State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row,
consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and
expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing.
provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client.
provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up.

Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status
oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before
the scoped check ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A)

The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were
documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a
member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept
direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank
statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in
20260416120000; this bucket was left behind.

Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the
uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and
reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which
drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining
legacy prefix objects.

The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid
the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a
uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix
qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail
the whole query instead of filtering the row out.

deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored
pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to
erase.

The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry
run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and
SHA-256 identical before repointing the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events

This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no
downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify
company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and
was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key
falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went
straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user
had been removed from the company kept reading.

Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members
with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead
of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return
a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error
strings with the canonical envelope.

Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is
gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every
other v1 read endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds

A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced
fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and
had become the top application consumer of production database time:
measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds
of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at
7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on
the booking path.

PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a
correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops
Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole
journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side
instead turns that into two indexed round trips.

Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent
entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove
a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at
PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling.

Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query
stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the
truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The
accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead,
since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows.

commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the
read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at

Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh
next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column,
which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor
timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never
applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped
on the newest rows indefinitely.

The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap;
the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with
an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly.
ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change
sort semantics on the route that currently works.

Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every
business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and
date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had
them.

The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters,
because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug
is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard
iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash

The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query
string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow
documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same
Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and
wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a
write that never happened.

dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional
boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write,
and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail
the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call
sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent
cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review

The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so
was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and
re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to
5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0.

Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so
an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still
finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH
would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was
rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the
full tree.

The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that
package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift
went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the
lockfile, never workflow files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json

vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were
byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent
recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up
idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of
daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily.

Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the
whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into
the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its
extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were
already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which
settles the intent.

documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession:
the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is
capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the
integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention.

webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day
on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since
the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line
place to change that.

A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list,
and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they
are named rather than silently rotting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink

There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel
retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven
code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry
captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug
fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email.

This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a
no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an
adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined
by next.config.ts.

Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger
and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application
data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink
calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry
personnummer and financial data.

verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without
touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated
without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The
threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing
the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible.

The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code
actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client
side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not
forwarded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces

Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with
one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven
to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open
decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md.

Structural roots closed:
- resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking
  1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING
- ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document,
  not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed
- sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the
  exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed
- tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed
  CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all
  four baselines now empty
- three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import,
  ungated-extension-route

Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap),
RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag
resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent
polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure
and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/
Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites
with isSwedishUserMessage extended.

Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice,
recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep
work and are verified green together.

13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge.
20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new
DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres).

Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0
errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version

origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping
our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase
apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices

A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and
~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass:

- replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for
  service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid()
  (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a
  Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo
- bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of
  writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns
- credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no
  cross-tenant figures in exception text
- link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end
- personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE
- same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book
  realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse
- receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts
- period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap
- documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout
  reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source
  sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping
- invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression),
  duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran
- match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat)
- refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window)
- KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint
- personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools
- worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths
- MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit
  on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk
- observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted
  stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True,
  cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings
  call removed)

Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers
are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests

* fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215

pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role
GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the
invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() =
'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the
shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a
fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher
migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text,
reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use
public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved.

Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form
instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column,
and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt
failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's
staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit
path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and
gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no
longer renders as already filed.

Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern
(all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215

- restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the
  NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version
  never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch
- replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap
  warning texts and update the pinned test expectations
- drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment
- strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests

renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s
default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mattsson
2026-07-27 03:34:56 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent a43a8b03cf
commit f24b26a139
536 changed files with 68921 additions and 4851 deletions
+709 -23
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,13 @@
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
import { bulkBookMatchedInboxItems, categorizeMatchedTransaction } from '@/lib/transactions/categorize-core'
import { getVatRules, getAvailableVatRates } from '@/lib/invoices/vat-rules'
import { fetchExchangeRate, convertToSEK } from '@/lib/currency/riksbanken'
import { getVatRules, getPermittedVatRates } from '@/lib/invoices/vat-rules'
import { fetchExchangeRate } from '@/lib/currency/riksbanken'
import {
resolveSupplierInvoiceExchangeRate,
supplierInvoiceSekAmounts,
} from '@/lib/currency/supplier-invoice-rate'
import { roundOre } from '@/lib/money'
import { validateVatNumber } from '@/lib/vat/vies-client'
import { normalizeVatRateToDecimal } from '@/lib/vat/supplier-invoice-line-checks'
import {
@@ -99,6 +104,23 @@ import { CreateAccountParamsSchema, UpdateAccountParamsSchema } from '@/lib/pend
import { SetVoucherNoteParamsSchema } from '@/lib/pending-operations/schemas/voucher-note'
import { UpdateCompanySettingsParamsSchema } from '@/lib/pending-operations/schemas/company-settings'
import { UpdateCustomerParamsSchema } from '@/lib/pending-operations/schemas/customer'
import {
CreateRecurringScheduleParamsSchema,
UpdateRecurringScheduleParamsSchema,
} from '@/lib/pending-operations/schemas/recurring-schedule'
import {
computeInitialRunDate,
computeNextRunDate,
getStockholmDateHour,
} from '@/lib/invoices/recurring-schedule-service'
import { UpdateInvoiceParamsSchema } from '@/lib/pending-operations/schemas/update-invoice'
import {
buildInvoiceWriteData,
type InvoiceWriteInput,
type InvoiceWriteItemInput,
} from '@/lib/invoices/build-invoice-write'
import { isEditableInvoiceDraft } from '@/lib/invoices/is-editable-draft'
import { replaceInvoiceItems } from '@/lib/invoices/replace-invoice-items'
import { BulkBookInboxSchema } from '@/lib/api/schemas'
import { ensureArticleNumber } from '@/lib/articles/ensure-article-number'
import { isValidRevenueAccount } from '@/lib/articles/validate-revenue-account'
@@ -118,6 +140,7 @@ import type {
PendingOperation,
CompanySettings,
InvoiceItem,
InvoiceDocumentType,
AccountingMethod,
CreditNote,
CreateJournalEntryLineInput,
@@ -428,7 +451,7 @@ async function commitUpdateCompanySettings(
.from('company_settings')
.update(validated.changes)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.select('bank_name, clearing_number, account_number, bankgiro, plusgiro, swish, iban, bic, default_our_reference')
.select('bank_name, clearing_number, account_number, bankgiro, plusgiro, swish, iban, bic, default_our_reference, email, phone, website, invoice_email_texts')
.single()
if (error) {
@@ -450,6 +473,296 @@ async function commitUpdateCompanySettings(
iban: data.iban ?? null,
bic: data.bic ?? null,
contact_person: data.default_our_reference ?? null,
email: data.email ?? null,
phone: data.phone ?? null,
website: data.website ?? null,
invoice_email_texts: data.invoice_email_texts ?? null,
},
}
}
async function commitCreateRecurringSchedule(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
userId: string,
companyId: string,
params: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<ExecutorResult> {
// Re-validate at the commit boundary with the shared schema so a tampered
// pending_operations row is rejected with the same rules the staging tool
// and the cookie-session POST route enforce.
let validated
try {
validated = CreateRecurringScheduleParamsSchema.parse(params)
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {
const issue = err.issues[0]
return {
error: `Invalid ${issue?.path?.join('.') ?? 'params'}: ${issue?.message ?? 'validation failed'}`,
status: 400,
}
}
throw err
}
const { data: customer, error: customerError } = await supabase
.from('customers')
.select('id, email')
.eq('id', validated.customer_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (customerError) return { error: customerError.message, status: 500 }
if (!customer) return { error: 'Customer not found', status: 404 }
// auto_send without a customer email would silently degrade to a monthly
// draft + warning at cron time. Reject at commit exactly like the route.
if (validated.auto_send && !customer.email) {
return {
error: 'Customer has no email address: automatic sending requires one',
status: 400,
}
}
const nextRunDate = computeInitialRunDate(
new Date(),
validated.day_of_month,
validated.start_date,
)
const { data: schedule, error: insertError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedules')
.insert({
company_id: companyId,
user_id: userId,
customer_id: validated.customer_id,
name: validated.name,
day_of_month: validated.day_of_month,
send_hour: validated.send_hour,
payment_terms_days: validated.payment_terms_days,
currency: validated.currency,
your_reference: validated.your_reference ?? null,
our_reference: validated.our_reference ?? null,
notes: validated.notes ?? null,
auto_send: validated.auto_send,
next_run_date: nextRunDate,
status: 'active',
})
.select()
.single()
if (insertError || !schedule) {
return { error: insertError?.message ?? 'Failed to insert recurring schedule', status: 500 }
}
const itemRows = validated.items.map((item, idx) => ({
schedule_id: schedule.id,
sort_order: idx,
description: item.description,
quantity: item.quantity,
unit: item.unit,
unit_price: item.unit_price,
vat_rate: item.vat_rate ?? null,
}))
const { error: itemsError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedule_items')
.insert(itemRows)
if (itemsError) {
// Roll back the parent so a half-created schedule doesn't ship: an
// item-less schedule makes every cron run throw "schedule has no items"
// and silently skip billing dates.
await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedules')
.delete()
.eq('id', schedule.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
return { error: itemsError.message, status: 500 }
}
return {
data: {
recurring_schedule_id: schedule.id,
name: validated.name,
customer_id: validated.customer_id,
day_of_month: validated.day_of_month,
send_hour: validated.send_hour,
currency: validated.currency,
auto_send: validated.auto_send,
status: 'active',
next_run_date: nextRunDate,
item_count: itemRows.length,
},
}
}
async function commitUpdateRecurringSchedule(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
params: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<ExecutorResult> {
let validated
try {
validated = UpdateRecurringScheduleParamsSchema.parse(params)
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {
const issue = err.issues[0]
return {
error: `Invalid ${issue?.path?.join('.') ?? 'params'}: ${issue?.message ?? 'validation failed'}`,
status: 400,
}
}
throw err
}
const { schedule_id: scheduleId, changes } = validated
const { items, ...fieldChanges } = changes
const { data: existing, error: existingError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedules')
.select('id, status, auto_send, customer_id, day_of_month, next_run_date')
.eq('id', scheduleId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (existingError) return { error: existingError.message, status: 500 }
if (!existing) return { error: 'Recurring schedule not found', status: 404 }
// Turning auto_send on (or moving the schedule to another customer) needs
// the target customer checked: email when auto_send is effectively on
// (mirrors the PATCH route), and company membership always (this executor
// runs on a service-role client with no RLS, so a cross-tenant customer_id
// would otherwise pass the FK).
if (changes.customer_id !== undefined || changes.auto_send === true) {
const effectiveAutoSend = changes.auto_send ?? existing.auto_send
const { data: customer, error: customerError } = await supabase
.from('customers')
.select('id, email')
.eq('id', changes.customer_id ?? existing.customer_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (customerError) return { error: customerError.message, status: 500 }
if (!customer) return { error: 'Customer not found', status: 404 }
if (effectiveAutoSend && !customer.email) {
return {
error: 'Customer has no email address: automatic sending requires one',
status: 400,
}
}
}
const updateRow: Record<string, unknown> = {}
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(fieldChanges)) {
if (v !== undefined) updateRow[k] = v
}
// Recompute next_run_date when the schedule is reactivated from a stale
// date or its day-of-month changed: mirror of the PATCH route. Always the
// next STRICTLY-future occurrence, never today, so an approval cannot
// trigger a same-hour surprise send. Editing other fields leaves
// next_run_date alone so an unrelated edit never skips an imminent send.
if (changes.status === 'active' || changes.day_of_month !== undefined) {
const reactivating = changes.status === 'active'
const dayChanged =
changes.day_of_month !== undefined && changes.day_of_month !== existing.day_of_month
const effectiveDay = changes.day_of_month ?? existing.day_of_month
const { date: todayStockholm } = getStockholmDateHour(new Date())
const stockholmToday = new Date(`${todayStockholm}T00:00:00Z`)
const staleOnReactivate = reactivating && existing.next_run_date <= todayStockholm
if (staleOnReactivate || dayChanged) {
const rolled = computeInitialRunDate(stockholmToday, effectiveDay)
updateRow.next_run_date =
rolled === todayStockholm
? computeNextRunDate(stockholmToday, effectiveDay)
: rolled
}
// A conscious reactivation invalidates any lingering warning.
if (reactivating) {
updateRow.last_run_warning = null
}
}
if (Object.keys(updateRow).length > 0) {
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedules')
.update(updateRow)
.eq('id', scheduleId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (updateError) return { error: updateError.message, status: 500 }
}
let itemsReplaced = false
if (items) {
// Provided = replace all; omitted = keep existing (the schema contract).
// Snapshot first so a failed insert can restore the previous lines: an
// item-less schedule makes every cron run throw "schedule has no items"
// and silently skip billing dates.
const { data: previousItems } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedule_items')
.select('sort_order, description, quantity, unit, unit_price, vat_rate')
.eq('schedule_id', scheduleId)
await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedule_items')
.delete()
.eq('schedule_id', scheduleId)
const itemRows = items.map((item, idx) => ({
schedule_id: scheduleId,
sort_order: idx,
description: item.description,
quantity: item.quantity,
unit: item.unit,
unit_price: item.unit_price,
vat_rate: item.vat_rate ?? null,
}))
const { error: itemsError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedule_items')
.insert(itemRows)
if (itemsError) {
// Restore the snapshot so the schedule stays valid for the cron.
if (previousItems && previousItems.length > 0) {
const restoreRows = previousItems.map((row) => ({
schedule_id: scheduleId,
sort_order: row.sort_order,
description: row.description,
quantity: row.quantity,
unit: row.unit,
unit_price: row.unit_price,
vat_rate: row.vat_rate,
}))
const { error: restoreError } = await supabase
.from('recurring_invoice_schedule_items')
.insert(restoreRows)
if (restoreError) {
log.error(
'failed to restore schedule items after failed replace: schedule may be left empty',
restoreError,
{ scheduleId },
)
}
}
return { error: itemsError.message, status: 500 }
}
itemsReplaced = true
}
return {
data: {
recurring_schedule_id: scheduleId,
status: changes.status ?? existing.status,
updated_fields: Object.keys(updateRow),
items_replaced: itemsReplaced,
...(itemsReplaced && items ? { item_count: items.length } : {}),
...(updateRow.next_run_date !== undefined
? { next_run_date: updateRow.next_run_date }
: {}),
},
}
}
@@ -990,6 +1303,65 @@ async function commitCreateTransaction(
return { error: 'ledger_account must be a BAS 19xx cash account', status: 400 }
}
// A foreign-currency row must carry its SEK translation from the moment it
// lands. The categorization path resolves a line amount through the LENIENT
// resolveSekAmount() (lib/bookkeeping/currency-utils.ts), which falls back to
// the RAW foreign number when amount_sek and exchange_rate are both empty. A
// staged 1500 USD row therefore debited 1500 kr while buildCurrencyMetadata()
// stamped the same line `currency: USD, amount_in_currency: 1500`: one line
// asserting two different amounts. Nothing catches it, because every leg is
// scaled by the same wrong factor so the verifikation still balances and no
// trigger fires. Under ML 8 kap 21-23 § the beskattningsunderlag must be
// translated at a published kurs, so the understatement lands straight in
// rutorna 05/10 or 48 of the momsdeklaration.
//
// Rate is fetched for the row's OWN date (not "today"), with the supabase
// client passed so `exchange_rates` acts as the read-through cache and as the
// last-cached-observation fallback when Riksbanken 429s. Identical call shape
// to lib/transactions/ingest.ts, which is the reference for this path.
//
// Resolved BEFORE ensureManualCashAccount below so a refusal leaves no
// half-created kassakonto behind (same ordering rationale as the arrival
// number in app/api/supplier-invoices/route.ts).
let amountSek: number | null = null
let exchangeRate: number | null = null
let exchangeRateDate: string | null = null
if (currency !== 'SEK') {
const rateDate = new Date(date)
let rateInfo: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fetchExchangeRate>> = null
if (!Number.isNaN(rateDate.getTime())) {
try {
rateInfo = await fetchExchangeRate(currency, rateDate, supabase)
} catch {
// fetchExchangeRate swallows its own network errors and reports null; a
// throw can only come from a mock or a future refactor. Treat it as
// "no rate", never as a reason to invent one.
rateInfo = null
}
}
if (!rateInfo || !Number.isFinite(rateInfo.rate) || rateInfo.rate <= 0) {
// Refuse rather than insert with NULL. ingest.ts may store NULL because
// it is a bulk bank feed where one unreachable rate must not abort the
// batch, and its rows stay repairable via
// /api/transactions/[id]/refresh-exchange-rate. Here there is exactly one
// row, the approver is present, and storing NULL only relocates the
// failure to the categorization step, which does NOT refuse: it silently
// books 1:1. So the commit boundary is the last place the contradiction
// can still be surfaced to a human.
return {
error:
`Transaktionen är i ${currency} men ingen växelkurs kunde hämtas för ${date}. ` +
`Utan kurs skulle raden bokföras som om 1 ${currency} = 1 SEK. ` +
'Försök igen när kursen finns publicerad, eller registrera beloppet i kronor.',
status: 400,
}
}
exchangeRate = rateInfo.rate
exchangeRateDate = rateInfo.date ?? null
amountSek = roundOre(amount * exchangeRate)
}
// Bind the row to a manual kassakonto when a ledger account is given, so
// reconciliation and voucher matching resolve the real account instead of
// falling back to 1930 (issue #1016). Find-or-create; the row's currency
@@ -1011,6 +1383,11 @@ async function commitCreateTransaction(
description: description.trim(),
amount,
currency,
// NULL for a SEK row: the column means "SEK translation of a foreign
// amount", and amount already IS kronor. Mirrors ingest.ts.
amount_sek: amountSek,
exchange_rate: exchangeRate,
exchange_rate_date: exchangeRateDate,
import_source: 'mcp',
})
.select('id')
@@ -1060,8 +1437,14 @@ async function commitCreateInvoice(
}
const vatRules = getVatRules(customer.customer_type, customer.vat_number_validated)
const availableRates = getAvailableVatRates(customer.customer_type, customer.vat_number_validated)
const allowedRates = new Set(availableRates.map((r) => r.rate))
// Gate on the PERMITTED set, not the picker default, exactly like
// buildInvoiceWriteData: the ML 6 kap. supplies taxed where they are performed
// (hotel/restaurang 12%, persontransport and event admission 6%,
// fastighetstjänst and korttidsuthyrning 25%) carry Swedish VAT even to a
// foreign business customer. The default is still 0% (vatRules.rate is the
// fallback below), so a Swedish rate only lands here when staged explicitly.
const permittedRates = getPermittedVatRates(customer.customer_type, customer.vat_number_validated)
const allowedRates = new Set(permittedRates.map((r) => r.rate))
// VAT registration gate (mirrors app/api/invoices/route.ts). A
// non-momsregistrerad company books no output VAT: force every line to 0%
@@ -1100,24 +1483,66 @@ async function commitCreateInvoice(
const total = subtotal + vatAmount
const currency = ((params.currency as string) || 'SEK') as Currency
const invoiceDate = (params.invoice_date as string) || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
// Sales-side twin of the supplier-invoice currency policy
// (lib/currency/supplier-invoice-rate.ts). Three defects lived here:
//
// 1. `fetchExchangeRate(currency)` passed NO date, so a back-dated invoice
// was translated at TODAY'S kurs. ML 8 kap 21-23 § anchors the
// beskattningsunderlag on the taxable event, and the registration
// verifikat is posted on invoice_date, so the money and the verifikat
// must be anchored on the same day. The staged params carry no
// delivery_date, so invoice_date IS that event here (the web path,
// lib/invoices/build-invoice-write.ts, prefers delivery_date when the
// form supplied one).
// 2. No supabase client, so the shared `exchange_rates` cache was neither
// read nor used as the last-cached-observation fallback when Riksbanken
// rate-limits. One transient 429 left the invoice permanently unconverted.
// 3. A null result fell through in silence and stored exchange_rate = NULL,
// which resolveSekAmount() then books 1:1: 1000 EUR posts 1000 kr to 3001
// and 250 kr to 2611 instead of 11 500 and 2 875, understating ruta 05
// and ruta 10 by the whole FX difference.
let exchangeRate: number | null = null
let exchangeRateDate: string | null = null
let subtotalSek: number | null = null
let vatAmountSek: number | null = null
let totalSek: number | null = null
// Multiplier to SEK. 1 for a SEK invoice, so the *_sek columns equal their
// invoice-currency counterparts instead of staying NULL: an ordinary Swedish
// invoice legitimately has no exchange_rate, and the old
// `if (currency !== 'SEK')` guard therefore left total_sek NULL on every one
// of them. Same fix, same reason, as supplierInvoiceSekAmounts().
let sekRate = 1
if (currency !== 'SEK') {
const rateData = await fetchExchangeRate(currency)
if (rateData) {
exchangeRate = rateData.rate
exchangeRateDate = rateData.date
subtotalSek = convertToSEK(subtotal, exchangeRate)
vatAmountSek = convertToSEK(vatAmount, exchangeRate)
totalSek = convertToSEK(total, exchangeRate)
const rateDate = new Date(invoiceDate)
let rateData: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fetchExchangeRate>> = null
if (!Number.isNaN(rateDate.getTime())) {
try {
rateData = await fetchExchangeRate(currency, rateDate, supabase)
} catch {
rateData = null
}
}
if (!rateData || !Number.isFinite(rateData.rate) || rateData.rate <= 0) {
// Refuse at the approval boundary. Storing NULL only relocates the
// failure: createInvoiceJournalEntry() already refuses such an invoice
// with INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING, by which point the invoice row (and its
// F-series number, once sent) exists and the approver has moved on.
return {
error:
getErrorEntry('INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING')?.message_sv ??
'Fakturan är i utländsk valuta men saknar växelkurs. Ange fakturans växelkurs innan den bokförs.',
status: 400,
}
}
exchangeRate = rateData.rate
exchangeRateDate = rateData.date ?? null
sekRate = rateData.rate
}
const subtotalSek = roundOre(subtotal * sekRate)
const vatAmountSek = roundOre(vatAmount * sekRate)
const totalSek = roundOre(total * sekRate)
const uniqueRates = new Set(billableItems.map((item) => item.vat_rate ?? vatRules.rate))
const isMixedRate = uniqueRates.size > 1
@@ -1141,7 +1566,7 @@ async function commitCreateInvoice(
company_id: companyId,
customer_id: customerId,
invoice_number: null,
invoice_date: (params.invoice_date as string) || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0],
invoice_date: invoiceDate,
due_date: (params.due_date as string) || null,
currency,
exchange_rate: exchangeRate,
@@ -1233,6 +1658,194 @@ async function commitCreateInvoice(
return { data: { invoice_id: invoice.id, invoice_number: invoice.invoice_number } }
}
/**
* Commit a staged update_invoice: rewrite a DRAFT invoice in place (header
* fields and/or a FULL REPLACE of its line items).
*
* Staging is not a lock: the invoice can be sent, paid, or credited between
* staging and approval, so the shared editable-draft predicate
* (isEditableInvoiceDraft) is re-checked HERE, and the row update carries a
* .eq('status','draft') guard so a concurrent send turns into a 0-row update
* instead of rewriting a now-issued invoice.
*
* Totals and VAT are recomputed by buildInvoiceWriteData: the exact builder
* the cookie PATCH route (app/api/invoices/[id]) and the v1 REST routes use,
* so VAT gating, accrual guards, ROT/RUT compute, and currency conversion
* cannot drift. When the staged changes carry no items, the existing rows are
* fed back through the builder so a header-only edit (e.g. a new invoice_date
* on a foreign-currency draft) still recomputes the SEK legs consistently.
*/
async function commitUpdateInvoice(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
params: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<ExecutorResult> {
// Re-validate staged params at the commit boundary (defense in depth: a
// hand-crafted pending_operations row must not reach the write below).
let validated
try {
validated = UpdateInvoiceParamsSchema.parse(params)
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {
const issue = err.issues[0]
return {
error: `Invalid ${issue?.path?.join('.') ?? 'params'}: ${issue?.message ?? 'validation failed'}`,
status: 400,
}
}
throw err
}
const { invoice_id: invoiceId, changes } = validated
const { data: existing, error: fetchError } = await supabase
.from('invoices')
.select(
'id, status, invoice_number, journal_entry_id, is_self_billed, credited_invoice_id, customer_id, document_type, invoice_date, due_date, delivery_date, currency, your_reference, our_reference, notes, payment_link_url, payment_link_auto, ore_rounding, default_dimensions, deduction_personnummer_encrypted, deduction_personnummer_last4',
)
.eq('id', invoiceId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (fetchError) return { error: fetchError.message, status: 500 }
if (!existing) return { error: 'Invoice not found: it may have been deleted.', status: 404 }
if (!isEditableInvoiceDraft(existing)) {
return {
error: `Fakturan är inte längre ett redigerbart utkast (status: ${existing.status}). Skickade eller bokförda fakturor rättas med kreditfaktura.`,
status: 409,
}
}
// The customer is structural on a draft edit (never changed here): resolve
// the EXISTING customer for VAT rules.
const { data: customer, error: customerError } = await supabase
.from('customers')
.select('*')
.eq('id', existing.customer_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (customerError || !customer) {
return { error: 'Customer not found: they may have been deleted.', status: 404 }
}
// Effective line set: FULL REPLACE when staged, otherwise the current rows
// fed back through the builder unchanged.
let itemsInput: InvoiceWriteItemInput[]
if (changes.items) {
itemsInput = changes.items as InvoiceWriteItemInput[]
} else {
const { data: itemRows, error: itemsFetchError } = await supabase
.from('invoice_items')
.select(
'line_type, description, quantity, unit, unit_price, vat_rate, article_id, revenue_account, deduction_type, labor_hours, work_type, housing_designation, apartment_number, brf_org_number, accrual_period_start, accrual_period_end, accrual_balance_account, dimensions',
)
.eq('invoice_id', invoiceId)
.order('sort_order', { ascending: true })
if (itemsFetchError) return { error: itemsFetchError.message, status: 500 }
itemsInput = (itemRows ?? []) as InvoiceWriteItemInput[]
}
if (itemsInput.length === 0) {
return { error: 'Fakturan saknar rader: minst en rad krävs.', status: 400 }
}
// ROT/RUT claim info lives per line, not on the header: derive the
// invoice-level inputs the builder's presence checks expect from the first
// deduction line (per-line values win in the item mapping regardless).
const firstDeduction = itemsInput.find((item) => item.deduction_type)
const input: InvoiceWriteInput = {
customer_id: existing.customer_id,
invoice_date: changes.invoice_date ?? existing.invoice_date,
due_date: changes.due_date ?? existing.due_date,
delivery_date:
changes.delivery_date !== undefined ? changes.delivery_date : existing.delivery_date,
currency: existing.currency as Currency,
your_reference: changes.your_reference ?? existing.your_reference ?? undefined,
our_reference: changes.our_reference ?? existing.our_reference ?? undefined,
notes: changes.notes ?? existing.notes ?? undefined,
// Not editable through this operation: fed back so the builder echoes the
// stored values instead of clearing them.
payment_link_url: existing.payment_link_url ?? undefined,
payment_link_auto: existing.payment_link_auto ?? undefined,
ore_rounding: existing.ore_rounding ?? undefined,
deduction_housing_designation: firstDeduction?.housing_designation ?? undefined,
deduction_apartment_number: firstDeduction?.apartment_number ?? undefined,
deduction_brf_org_number: firstDeduction?.brf_org_number ?? undefined,
default_dimensions:
changes.default_dimensions ??
((existing.default_dimensions as Record<string, string> | null) ?? {}),
items: itemsInput,
}
const build = await buildInvoiceWriteData({
supabase,
companyId,
customer: customer as Customer,
documentType: (existing.document_type || 'invoice') as InvoiceDocumentType,
input,
// The stored personnummer exists only as ciphertext: an edit that carries
// deduction lines but no plaintext keeps the stored value.
existingPersonnummer: existing.deduction_personnummer_encrypted
? {
encrypted: existing.deduction_personnummer_encrypted,
last4: existing.deduction_personnummer_last4 ?? null,
}
: null,
})
if (!build.ok) {
if ('dbError' in build) {
const message = (build.dbError as { message?: string } | null)?.message
return { error: message ?? 'Database error', status: 500 }
}
const entry = getErrorEntry(build.code)
return {
error: entry?.message_sv ?? build.code,
status: entry?.httpStatus ?? 400,
data: build.details as Record<string, unknown> | undefined,
}
}
// invoice_number and status are intentionally NOT in build.invoiceFields:
// editing never (re)allocates a number nor changes lifecycle state.
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('invoices')
.update({ ...build.invoiceFields, updated_at: new Date().toISOString() })
.eq('id', invoiceId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('status', 'draft')
.select('id')
if (updateError) return { error: updateError.message, status: 500 }
if (!updated || updated.length === 0) {
return {
error: 'Fakturan är inte längre ett utkast: den har skickats eller bokförts efter att ändringen förbereddes.',
status: 409,
}
}
const replaced = await replaceInvoiceItems(supabase, invoiceId, build.items)
if (!replaced.ok) {
return {
error: `Fakturaraderna kunde inte skrivas om (${replaced.stage}): ${replaced.error.message}`,
status: 500,
}
}
return {
data: {
invoice_id: invoiceId,
invoice_number: existing.invoice_number ?? null,
subtotal: build.invoiceFields.subtotal,
vat_amount: build.invoiceFields.vat_amount,
total: build.invoiceFields.total,
item_count: build.items.length,
items_replaced: Boolean(changes.items),
},
}
}
async function commitMarkInvoicePaid(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
userId: string,
@@ -1273,7 +1886,16 @@ async function commitMarkInvoicePaid(
try {
candidates = await findDuplicatePaymentCandidatesForInvoice(supabase, {
companyId,
invoice: { invoice_number: invoice.invoice_number, customer_name: customerName },
invoice: {
invoice_number: invoice.invoice_number,
customer_name: customerName,
currency: invoice.currency ?? null,
total: invoice.total ?? null,
total_sek: invoice.total_sek ?? null,
exchange_rate: invoice.exchange_rate ?? null,
},
// remaining_amount is stored in the invoice currency; the lookup
// converts it before banding kronor bank rows.
paymentAmount: remainingAmount,
paymentDate,
})
@@ -1305,7 +1927,14 @@ async function commitMarkInvoicePaid(
(invoice as { remaining_amount?: number }).remaining_amount ?? invoice.total
const dismissed = await findDuplicatePaymentCandidatesForInvoice(supabase, {
companyId,
invoice: { invoice_number: invoice.invoice_number, customer_name: customerName },
invoice: {
invoice_number: invoice.invoice_number,
customer_name: customerName,
currency: invoice.currency ?? null,
total: invoice.total ?? null,
total_sek: invoice.total_sek ?? null,
exchange_rate: invoice.exchange_rate ?? null,
},
paymentAmount: remainingAmount,
paymentDate,
})
@@ -2682,6 +3311,40 @@ async function commitCreateSupplierInvoiceFromInbox(
if (supplierErr || !supplier) return { error: 'Supplier not found', status: 404 }
// Fourth and last supplier-invoice write path to adopt the shared resolver
// (POST /api/supplier-invoices, POST /api/v1/.../supplier-invoices and the
// inbox convert route went first). It took `params.exchange_rate` verbatim
// with no fetch, so an inbox conversion whose staging-time lookup failed
// (the MCP tool stages `exchange_rate: null` + `exchange_rate_source:
// 'lookup_failed'` in that case) persisted a foreign invoice with
// exchange_rate = NULL. createSupplierInvoiceRegistrationEntry then refuses
// it with SI_FX_RATE_MISSING further down, after the ankomstnummer has
// already been burnt, and a NULL rate that does reach a lenient reader
// understates the fiktiv moms on 2614/2645, i.e. rutorna 20-24 + 30-32.
//
// Sharing the resolver is what keeps the four paths in agreement: the
// currency policy, the SEK arithmetic and the refusal are defined once. A
// caller-supplied positive rate is still trusted verbatim, which is what
// makes the approved preview number the number written; only a missing rate
// triggers the Riksbanken fetch, anchored on invoice_date with the supabase
// client passed so `exchange_rates` serves as the read-through cache.
//
// Resolved BEFORE get_next_arrival_number so a refusal never burns an
// ankomstnummer: same ordering as app/api/supplier-invoices/route.ts.
const fx = await resolveSupplierInvoiceExchangeRate(supabase, {
currency,
invoiceDate,
suppliedRate: exchangeRate,
})
if (!fx.ok) {
return {
error:
getErrorEntry('SI_FX_RATE_MISSING')?.message_sv ??
'Leverantörsfakturan är i utländsk valuta men saknar växelkurs. Ange fakturans växelkurs innan den bokförs.',
status: 400,
}
}
const { data: arrivalNum, error: arrivalErr } = await supabase
.rpc('get_next_arrival_number', { p_company_id: companyId })
@@ -2693,9 +3356,20 @@ async function commitCreateSupplierInvoiceFromInbox(
const subtotalRounded = Math.round(subtotal * 100) / 100
const vatAmountRounded = Math.round(vatAmount * 100) / 100
const totalRounded = Math.round(total * 100) / 100
const subtotalSek = exchangeRate ? Math.round(subtotal * exchangeRate * 100) / 100 : null
const vatAmountSek = exchangeRate ? Math.round(vatAmount * exchangeRate * 100) / 100 : null
const totalSek = exchangeRate ? Math.round(total * exchangeRate * 100) / 100 : null
// Fed the already-rounded figures so a SEK invoice (rate 1) gets
// total_sek === total to the öre instead of the two roundings disagreeing on
// an exact-half value. The old `exchangeRate ? … : null` guard left all three
// SEK columns NULL on every ordinary Swedish invoice, which is what blanked
// the SEK-reporting readers (the KPI "Största leverantörer" panel among them).
const {
subtotal_sek: subtotalSek,
vat_amount_sek: vatAmountSek,
total_sek: totalSek,
} = supplierInvoiceSekAmounts(fx.rate, {
subtotal: subtotalRounded,
vatAmount: vatAmountRounded,
total: totalRounded,
})
const { data: invoice, error: invoiceErr } = await supabase
.from('supplier_invoices')
@@ -2708,8 +3382,11 @@ async function commitCreateSupplierInvoiceFromInbox(
invoice_date: invoiceDate,
due_date: dueDate,
status: 'registered',
currency,
exchange_rate: exchangeRate,
currency: fx.rate.currency,
exchange_rate: fx.rate.exchangeRate,
// Which day's kurs the SEK amounts were translated at: the audit trail
// that makes them verifiable under BFL 5 kap.
exchange_rate_date: fx.rate.exchangeRateDate,
vat_treatment: vatTreatment,
reverse_charge: reverseCharge,
paid_with_private_funds: false,
@@ -4648,6 +5325,15 @@ async function commitPendingOperationInner(
case 'update_customer':
result = await commitUpdateCustomer(supabase, companyId, pendingOp.params)
break
case 'update_invoice':
result = await commitUpdateInvoice(supabase, companyId, pendingOp.params)
break
case 'create_recurring_schedule':
result = await commitCreateRecurringSchedule(supabase, userId, companyId, pendingOp.params)
break
case 'update_recurring_schedule':
result = await commitUpdateRecurringSchedule(supabase, companyId, pendingOp.params)
break
case 'update_company_settings':
result = await commitUpdateCompanySettings(supabase, companyId, pendingOp.params)
break