fix(restore): återställ default branch-filer som raderades av docs-publiceringen (7e33543)
Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
name: Bug report
|
||||
description: Report something that is broken or behaving incorrectly
|
||||
labels: ["bug"]
|
||||
body:
|
||||
- type: markdown
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
value: |
|
||||
Thanks for taking the time to report a bug.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not report security vulnerabilities here.** Use our [security policy](https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted/security/policy) instead.
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: what-happened
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: What happened?
|
||||
description: A clear description of the bug.
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: steps
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Steps to reproduce
|
||||
placeholder: |
|
||||
1. Go to ...
|
||||
2. Click ...
|
||||
3. See error
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: expected
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Expected behavior
|
||||
description: What you expected to happen instead.
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: dropdown
|
||||
id: deployment
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Deployment
|
||||
options:
|
||||
- Hosted (app.gnubok.se)
|
||||
- Self-hosted (Docker)
|
||||
- Local development
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: input
|
||||
id: environment
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Browser and OS
|
||||
placeholder: "e.g. Chrome 138 on macOS 15"
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: logs
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Relevant logs or screenshots
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Paste any error messages or attach screenshots.
|
||||
Remember to redact personal data, organization numbers, and financial details before posting.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
blank_issues_enabled: false
|
||||
contact_links:
|
||||
- name: Documentation
|
||||
url: https://docs.gnubok.se
|
||||
about: User guides and API reference.
|
||||
- name: Security vulnerability
|
||||
url: https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted/security/policy
|
||||
about: Report security issues privately, never in a public issue.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
name: Feature request
|
||||
description: Suggest a new feature or improvement
|
||||
labels: ["enhancement"]
|
||||
body:
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: problem
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: What problem does this solve?
|
||||
description: Describe the problem or friction you are running into, not just the solution.
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: solution
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Proposed solution
|
||||
description: What would you like to see happen?
|
||||
validations:
|
||||
required: true
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: alternatives
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Alternatives considered
|
||||
description: Other approaches you have considered, or how you work around this today.
|
||||
- type: textarea
|
||||
id: context
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
label: Additional context
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Anything else that helps us understand the request. For accounting features, a reference
|
||||
to the relevant Swedish rule or an example from another tool (e.g. Fortnox) is very helpful.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# What and why
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- What does this PR change, and why? Link related issues with "Closes #123". -->
|
||||
|
||||
## Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Title follows [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) (`feat:`, `fix:`, `refactor:`, `test:`, `docs:`)
|
||||
- [ ] `npm run lint`, `npm test`, and `npm run build` pass locally
|
||||
- [ ] New or changed logic in `lib/` or `app/api/` has tests
|
||||
- [ ] New or changed UI strings exist in both `messages/sv.json` and `messages/en.json`
|
||||
- [ ] Migrations (if any) are new files in `supabase/migrations/`; no edits to already-shipped migrations
|
||||
- [ ] Core builds with zero extensions enabled (no imports from `@/extensions/` in core code)
|
||||
- [ ] Commits are signed off (`git commit -s`, see [DCO](../DCO))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
name: Set up core toolchain
|
||||
description: >-
|
||||
Node, dependencies, and a zero-extension registry: the prologue every
|
||||
core-build job needs before it can lint, build, or test. The caller must check
|
||||
the repository out first, because a local composite action cannot be resolved
|
||||
until the workspace containing it exists.
|
||||
|
||||
runs:
|
||||
using: composite
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
|
||||
# Restore-only, deliberately never `save`. A cache written from a
|
||||
# pull_request run is scoped to that PR's ref, so no other run can ever read
|
||||
# it: PR-side saves are pure quota burn. Fourteen dead 284 MB copies (4 GB,
|
||||
# 40% of the repo quota) accumulated in a single day the last time a naive
|
||||
# `cache: npm` was left on, which is why test-pg-real.yml still runs
|
||||
# uncached. The entries read here are written on main by ci-cache.yml, and
|
||||
# default-branch entries are restorable from every PR.
|
||||
- name: Restore npm cache
|
||||
uses: actions/cache/restore@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: ~/.npm
|
||||
key: npm-${{ runner.os }}-node20-${{ hashFiles('package-lock.json') }}
|
||||
restore-keys: |
|
||||
npm-${{ runner.os }}-node20-
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install dependencies
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: npm ci
|
||||
|
||||
# CI builds core with zero extensions enabled: that property is the entire
|
||||
# reason this workflow exists, so every job that compiles or runs code needs
|
||||
# the registry regenerated from an empty config first.
|
||||
- name: Reset extensions config
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: echo '{"extensions":[]}' > extensions.config.json
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Generate extension registry
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
run: npm run setup:extensions
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
||||
# Security-updates-only posture: open-pull-requests-limit: 0 disables scheduled
|
||||
# version-bump PRs while keeping Dependabot security PRs, and `ignore` applies
|
||||
# to both kinds.
|
||||
version: 2
|
||||
updates:
|
||||
- package-ecosystem: "npm"
|
||||
directory: "/"
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
interval: "weekly"
|
||||
open-pull-requests-limit: 0
|
||||
cooldown:
|
||||
default-days: 7
|
||||
ignore:
|
||||
# @anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk 0.30.0+ broke invoice OCR and the assistant in
|
||||
# prod (empty Bedrock streams, 2026-07 outage; see DECISIONS.md). The
|
||||
# dependency is pinned to 0.29.1 in package.json; a bump must be a
|
||||
# deliberate, verified change, never an automated PR.
|
||||
- dependency-name: "@anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk"
|
||||
versions: [">=0.30.0"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
||||
name: CI cache warm
|
||||
|
||||
# The save half of the npm cache that .github/actions/setup-core restores.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It has to live in its own main-branch workflow. GitHub scopes a cache entry to
|
||||
# the ref that wrote it, with one exception: entries written on the default
|
||||
# branch are readable from every branch and PR. core-build.yml runs on
|
||||
# pull_request only, so anything it saved would be readable by exactly one PR
|
||||
# and dead the moment that PR merged. That is not hypothetical here: a naive
|
||||
# `cache: npm` on the pg-real workflow once put fourteen 284 MB copies (4 GB,
|
||||
# 40% of the repo quota) on disk in a day, none of them ever restorable.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# So: main saves, PRs restore-only. Keyed on the lockfile hash, so this runs
|
||||
# only when dependencies actually move and each entry is read many times before
|
||||
# it is replaced.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
paths:
|
||||
- package-lock.json
|
||||
- package.json
|
||||
workflow_dispatch: {}
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: ci-cache
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
warm:
|
||||
name: Warm npm cache
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
|
||||
# Populates ~/.npm. `npm ci` deletes node_modules first, so this measures
|
||||
# a cold install the same way a PR job will.
|
||||
- run: npm ci
|
||||
|
||||
# A no-op when the key already exists, which is the intent: one entry per
|
||||
# lockfile state, not one per push.
|
||||
- name: Save npm cache
|
||||
uses: actions/cache/save@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: ~/.npm
|
||||
key: npm-${{ runner.os }}-node20-${{ hashFiles('package-lock.json') }}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
name: CodeQL
|
||||
|
||||
# Semantic code scanning. The repo already had `security-events: write` and
|
||||
# uploaded Trivy SARIF, but Trivy only reports known CVEs in dependencies and
|
||||
# base images: nothing analysed the application's own code. For a multi-tenant
|
||||
# accounting SaaS holding personnummer, bank data and money, that was the gap.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Two languages:
|
||||
# javascript-typescript - the app itself (injection, path traversal, unsafe
|
||||
# deserialization, missing authorization checks, hardcoded credentials).
|
||||
# actions - GitHub's own workflow analysis. It overlaps zizmor.yml without
|
||||
# replacing it: CodeQL follows dataflow into composite actions, zizmor knows
|
||||
# Actions-specific misconfigurations CodeQL has no notion of. Two cheap
|
||||
# scanners with different blind spots beat one.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The default query suite is used deliberately. `security-extended` finds more
|
||||
# but roughly doubles the runtime, and this already runs on every PR; revisit
|
||||
# once the default suite's findings are triaged.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
# Weekly. CodeQL ships new queries continuously, so an unchanged repo can
|
||||
# still acquire findings.
|
||||
- cron: '19 3 * * 1'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch: {}
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: codeql-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
analyze:
|
||||
name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 30
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
# Required to upload the analysis results.
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
# Required by the `actions` language pack to read workflow metadata.
|
||||
actions: read
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
# A failure in one language should not hide the other's results.
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
language: [javascript-typescript, actions]
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Initialize CodeQL
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/init@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
|
||||
|
||||
# No build step. javascript-typescript and actions are both interpreted
|
||||
# languages to CodeQL, extracted straight from source, so `npm ci` and
|
||||
# `next build` would add minutes and change nothing about the database.
|
||||
- name: Perform CodeQL analysis
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
||||
name: "compliance: review (advisory)"
|
||||
|
||||
# Lightweight LLM-only review on every PR. ~90s, no Docker scanners.
|
||||
# Posts a sticky comment with reasoned findings across all 5 frameworks.
|
||||
# The nightly compliance-swarm.yml (mode: audit) provides the deeper
|
||||
# scanner-backed coverage.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
pull-requests: write
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: compliance-review-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
review:
|
||||
name: Compliance review (advisory)
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 5
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: erp-mafia/compliancemaxx@248cebcf90867fa813a8c0a2bc66cca70a56db3a # v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
base: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
|
||||
fail-on-findings: false # advisory while bedding in
|
||||
env:
|
||||
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
|
||||
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
|
||||
AWS_REGION: eu-north-1
|
||||
# Pin the review model explicitly. compliancemaxx falls back to
|
||||
# `eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6` when this is unset
|
||||
# (packages/cli/src/llm/bedrock.ts), so leaving it out silently kept
|
||||
# this workflow a generation behind the rest of the repo after the
|
||||
# Sonnet 5 migration (#1218). Keep in sync with
|
||||
# swedish-compliance-review.yml and lib/agent/composer/client.ts.
|
||||
COMPLIANCE_BEDROCK_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
name: "compliance: full swarm"
|
||||
|
||||
# Full hybrid audit: deterministic scanners + LLM-driven deep_audit checks
|
||||
# (RoPA drift, AGPL §13 evaluation, IDOR/access-control reasoning, ISMS clause
|
||||
# review, change-management bypass detection).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Triggers:
|
||||
# - Nightly cron at 02:00 UTC
|
||||
# - workflow_dispatch (run anytime)
|
||||
# - PRs labeled `compliance:full-audit`
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
reason:
|
||||
description: 'Why are you running this manually?'
|
||||
required: false
|
||||
default: ''
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [labeled]
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
pull-requests: write
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: compliance-swarm-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: false
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
swarm:
|
||||
name: Full hybrid audit
|
||||
if: |
|
||||
github.event_name != 'pull_request'
|
||||
|| github.event.label.name == 'compliance:full-audit'
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 60
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: erp-mafia/compliancemaxx@248cebcf90867fa813a8c0a2bc66cca70a56db3a # v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
mode: audit # v2 name; was `swarm` in v1
|
||||
llm-provider: bedrock
|
||||
fail-on-findings: false # observational while bedding in
|
||||
env:
|
||||
AWS_REGION: eu-north-1
|
||||
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
|
||||
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
|
||||
# Pin the audit model explicitly rather than leaving this commented
|
||||
# out. compliancemaxx defaults to `eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6`
|
||||
# when it is unset (packages/cli/src/llm/bedrock.ts), which quietly
|
||||
# kept the nightly audit a generation behind after #1218. Keep in
|
||||
# sync with compliance-pr.yml and lib/agent/composer/client.ts.
|
||||
COMPLIANCE_BEDROCK_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
|
||||
name: Core Build (no extensions)
|
||||
|
||||
# Split out of a single serial job that took 7m43s wall-clock: npm ci 24s, lint
|
||||
# ratchet 1m29s, build 2m00s, unit tests 3m31s, ratchets ~10s. None of those
|
||||
# stages needed the previous one's output, so they were serial only by
|
||||
# accident. Running them as independent jobs (and sharding the 897-file unit
|
||||
# suite four ways) puts the critical path on `build` at roughly 2m30s.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The prologue each job needs is in .github/actions/setup-core.
|
||||
|
||||
on: [pull_request]
|
||||
|
||||
# Six concurrent jobs per push makes stale runs far more expensive than they
|
||||
# were when this was one job, and a superseded push has nothing worth finishing.
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: core-build-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
checks:
|
||||
name: Checks
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens
|
||||
# what a compromised dependency in the build could reach.
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify skill bodies are in sync with the seed migration
|
||||
# Fails if a .claude/skills/**/SKILL.md changed without regenerating the
|
||||
# seed migration (npm run skills:generate). Keeps prod skill content from
|
||||
# silently drifting out of sync. No DB needed: reads files + manifest.
|
||||
run: npm run skills:check
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify taxonomy registry is in sync with the element lists
|
||||
# Fails if dev_docs/bokslut/taxonomi/** changed without regenerating
|
||||
# lib/bokslut/ixbrl/taxonomy/generated/ (npm run taxonomy:generate).
|
||||
# The iXBRL generator emits facts strictly from the generated registry,
|
||||
# so drift here means filings tagged against a stale concept set.
|
||||
run: npm run taxonomy:check
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify the accounted-api agent skill is in sync with the registry
|
||||
# Fails if a v1 endpoint / registry schema / overlay changed without
|
||||
# regenerating skills/accounted-api (npm run apiskill:generate). The
|
||||
# skill is the installable API reference for external coding agents;
|
||||
# drift here means agents integrate against stale endpoint contracts.
|
||||
run: npm run apiskill:check
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Lint ratchet (no new ESLint errors)
|
||||
# `npm run lint` was never wired into CI, so ~60 legacy errors
|
||||
# accumulated. This ratchet (sibling of check:guards) fails only when
|
||||
# a PR ADDS an error beyond scripts/checks/eslint-baseline.json; the
|
||||
# baseline ratchets down as legacy errors get fixed.
|
||||
run: npm run check:lint
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Typecheck ratchet (no new TypeScript errors)
|
||||
# `npm test` does not typecheck: vitest transpiles and discards types,
|
||||
# so a type error passes all 18 000 tests and only surfaces in the
|
||||
# build. That happened twice on 2026-08-27. This also covers __tests__
|
||||
# files, which the Next.js build never compiles, so it is not merely a
|
||||
# faster copy of the build job.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Baselined per FILE in scripts/checks/typecheck-baseline.json (539
|
||||
# legacy errors across 83 files, all in test files) and ratchets down.
|
||||
# Per-file rather than per-error-code on purpose: a code-keyed budget
|
||||
# would let a real regression hide behind a legacy fix elsewhere.
|
||||
run: npm run check:types
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Antipattern ratchet (no new MFA-bypassing routes / naive öre-rounding)
|
||||
# Fails only if a PR ADDS a route that hand-rolls supabase.auth.getUser()
|
||||
# instead of the MFA-enforcing guard, or a new Math.round(x*100)/100.
|
||||
# Baseline lives in scripts/checks/antipatterns-baseline.json and ratchets
|
||||
# down as the A1 (route auth) and D1 (rounding) migrations land.
|
||||
run: npm run check:guards
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Validate konteringspaket catalogue
|
||||
# The system booking templates are data files under packs/ rather than
|
||||
# rows frozen inside a migration. This gate is what makes that safe: it
|
||||
# checks the schema, that every BAS account actually exists in the 2026
|
||||
# chart, and that each pack BALANCES when applied through the real
|
||||
# applyTemplate(). PR #1321 shipped seeded reference data that
|
||||
# contradicted the engine; that class of bug is structurally valid and
|
||||
# only a semantic check catches it.
|
||||
run: npm run validate:packs
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Validate community registry
|
||||
# registry/ is the public source of truth for gnubok.se/community/registry
|
||||
# and takes entries by PR from outside the team. The gate checks the
|
||||
# frontmatter the website build consumes, and rejects JSX/import/export
|
||||
# in entry bodies: the site renders bodies through MDX, which would
|
||||
# execute those at build time.
|
||||
run: npm run validate:registry
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Check no core imports from extensions
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
VIOLATIONS=$(grep -r "from '@/extensions/" lib/ app/api/ components/ --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" \
|
||||
| grep -v "app/api/extensions/" \
|
||||
| grep -v "components/extensions/" \
|
||||
| grep -v "lib/extensions/_generated/" \
|
||||
| grep -v "lib/extensions/loader.ts" || true)
|
||||
if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
|
||||
echo "ERROR: Core code imports from @/extensions/:"
|
||||
echo "$VIOLATIONS"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
build:
|
||||
name: Build (zero extensions)
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens
|
||||
# what a compromised dependency in the build could reach.
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core
|
||||
- run: npm run build
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# The Next.js build worker OOMs on the runner's default Node heap
|
||||
# since 2026-08-19 (bundle growth crossed the default old-space
|
||||
# ceiling; the first branch containing the whole day's merges was the
|
||||
# first to hit it). Public-repo runners have 16 GB, give the build 8.
|
||||
NODE_OPTIONS: --max-old-space-size=8192
|
||||
|
||||
test:
|
||||
# 897 unit test files (11,341 tests) take 3m31s in one process. Measured
|
||||
# locally, four shards split them 225/224/224/224 with the slowest at 64s,
|
||||
# which puts this comfortably under the build job so it stops being the
|
||||
# critical path. Vitest hard-errors when the shard count exceeds the
|
||||
# resolved file count, which is nowhere near a concern at this size.
|
||||
name: Unit tests (${{ matrix.shard }}/4)
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
# One shard failing should not hide failures in the other three: a red PR
|
||||
# is more useful when it lists every broken test, not just the first.
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
shard: [1, 2, 3, 4]
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens
|
||||
# what a compromised dependency in the build could reach.
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core
|
||||
# Via env rather than interpolated straight into the shell body: the value
|
||||
# is a static matrix integer and harmless, but keeping every `run:` free of
|
||||
# ${{ }} is the rule that makes the template-injection audit meaningful.
|
||||
- run: npm test -- --shard="$SHARD/4"
|
||||
env:
|
||||
SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }}
|
||||
|
||||
core-build:
|
||||
# One stable check name covering all six jobs above, so the PR checks list
|
||||
# (and any future required-status-check rule) has a single thing to read
|
||||
# rather than a shard-numbered matrix. `needs` alone would not be enough:
|
||||
# a needed job that is skipped or cancelled does not fail its dependents,
|
||||
# so the results are asserted explicitly.
|
||||
name: Core Build
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
needs: [checks, build, test]
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Assert every core job succeeded
|
||||
env:
|
||||
CHECKS: ${{ needs.checks.result }}
|
||||
BUILD: ${{ needs.build.result }}
|
||||
TEST: ${{ needs.test.result }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
echo "checks=$CHECKS build=$BUILD test=$TEST"
|
||||
failed=0
|
||||
for r in "$CHECKS" "$BUILD" "$TEST"; do
|
||||
[ "$r" = "success" ] || failed=1
|
||||
done
|
||||
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::One or more core-build jobs did not succeed"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||
name: Scheduled Image Vulnerability Scan
|
||||
|
||||
# The build pipeline (docker-publish.yml) builds and publishes the image but
|
||||
# does NOT fail on CVEs: it stays green so deploys are deterministic. This
|
||||
# workflow is the actual vulnerability gate: it re-scans the published `latest`
|
||||
# image and fails (notifying repo admins) plus raises a Security-tab alert on a
|
||||
# fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVE, prompting a dependency or base-image bump.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It fires on three triggers:
|
||||
# 1. workflow_run: the moment "Build and Push Docker Image" completes, so a
|
||||
# freshly published image is gated within the scan's own duration (minutes)
|
||||
# rather than waiting up to 24h for the cron. This is what shrinks the
|
||||
# vulnerable-image exposure window after every publish.
|
||||
# 2. schedule (daily): catches CVEs newly disclosed against an already-
|
||||
# published image even when nothing was republished.
|
||||
# 3. workflow_dispatch: run on demand from the Actions tab after a patch to
|
||||
# confirm clean.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Severity gate policy (both jobs): only fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs may fail a
|
||||
# run; LOW/MEDIUM findings must never turn a run red. Every sarif-format Trivy
|
||||
# step MUST keep `limit-severities-for-sarif: true`, otherwise trivy-action
|
||||
# unsets TRIVY_SEVERITY for SARIF output and the gate silently widens to all
|
||||
# severities (that exact misconfiguration shipped once; see the scan step).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The `sca` job is the dependency-level counterpart of the image scan: a daily
|
||||
# Trivy filesystem scan of the npm lockfile. It exists because Dependabot was
|
||||
# deliberately removed (PR #1084) and two HIGH Next.js CVEs then sat
|
||||
# undetected until a manual check; this job is the automated SCA alerting
|
||||
# that replaces it.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NOTE: GitHub only runs `schedule` and `workflow_run` triggers from the default
|
||||
# branch, so both start firing once this is merged to main.
|
||||
on:
|
||||
workflow_run:
|
||||
workflows: ['Build and Push Docker Image']
|
||||
types: [completed]
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
# 06:17 UTC daily: off the hour to dodge cron congestion on GitHub.
|
||||
- cron: '17 6 * * *'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch: {}
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
REGISTRY: ghcr.io
|
||||
IMAGE_NAME: erp-mafia/gnubok
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
scan:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
# workflow_run fires even when the publish FAILED: there's no new image to
|
||||
# gate in that case, so skip. schedule/workflow_dispatch carry no
|
||||
# workflow_run payload, so the `!= 'workflow_run'` arm lets them through.
|
||||
if: >-
|
||||
github.event_name != 'workflow_run' ||
|
||||
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
# Pull the published image from GHCR.
|
||||
packages: read
|
||||
# SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab.
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Log in to GHCR
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
|
||||
username: ${{ github.actor }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Scan published image with Trivy
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:latest
|
||||
# Block on fixable CRITICAL/HIGH: the same policy the build pipeline
|
||||
# used to enforce inline. It is safe to block here: a red scheduled
|
||||
# run is a "go patch" notification, not a blocked deploy. ignore-unfixed
|
||||
# keeps it actionable (only CVEs we can resolve by rebuilding fail).
|
||||
severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
|
||||
exit-code: '1'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
format: sarif
|
||||
output: trivy-results.sarif
|
||||
# Without this, trivy-action unsets TRIVY_SEVERITY when format is
|
||||
# sarif (entrypoint.sh: "Building SARIF report with all severities"),
|
||||
# silently discarding the CRITICAL,HIGH filter above. The exit code
|
||||
# then fires on any fixable CVE down to LOW, which is not the policy
|
||||
# documented here and turns routine low-severity noise into a red run.
|
||||
limit-severities-for-sarif: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab
|
||||
# if: always() so findings still reach the Security tab even though the
|
||||
# scan step above failed the run. Same category as docker-publish.yml so
|
||||
# the two analyses share one alert set instead of duplicating.
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif
|
||||
category: trivy
|
||||
|
||||
sca:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
# The lockfile does not change when an image is published, so the
|
||||
# workflow_run trigger is irrelevant here: run on the daily schedule and
|
||||
# on manual dispatch only.
|
||||
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_run'
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
# SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab.
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Scan npm lockfile with Trivy
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Filesystem scan: picks up package-lock.json and reports known CVEs
|
||||
# in the resolved dependency tree, including transitive pins. Same
|
||||
# gate policy as the image scan above: fail only on fixable
|
||||
# CRITICAL/HIGH, and keep limit-severities-for-sarif set (see the
|
||||
# header comment for why dropping it silently widens the gate).
|
||||
scan-type: fs
|
||||
scan-ref: .
|
||||
scanners: vuln
|
||||
severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
|
||||
exit-code: '1'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
format: sarif
|
||||
output: trivy-sca.sarif
|
||||
limit-severities-for-sarif: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload Trivy SCA results to GitHub Security tab
|
||||
# if: always() so findings reach the Security tab even when the scan
|
||||
# step failed the run. Distinct category from the image scan so
|
||||
# dependency alerts and image alerts stay separately traceable.
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
sarif_file: trivy-sca.sarif
|
||||
category: trivy-sca
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
|
||||
name: Build and Push Docker Image
|
||||
|
||||
# Builds each platform on its own native runner, then stitches the two into one
|
||||
# manifest list.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This was a single amd64 job emulating arm64 through QEMU and took ~31 minutes:
|
||||
# QEMU translates every Arm instruction into x86, so the arm64 half ran several
|
||||
# times slower than the amd64 half it shared a runner with. GitHub's free
|
||||
# `ubuntu-24.04-arm` runners (public repos) remove the emulation entirely, and
|
||||
# the two halves now run concurrently on their own hardware.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The cost is a second job. A native single-platform build cannot produce a
|
||||
# multi-platform manifest by itself, so each build pushes an untagged,
|
||||
# digest-addressed image and `merge` composes the tag list from those digests
|
||||
# with `imagetools create`. Tagging, signing, and scanning all belong to `merge`,
|
||||
# because the digest consumers actually resolve is the manifest list's, not
|
||||
# either platform's.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# workflow_dispatch is deliberate: it makes this runnable from a branch before
|
||||
# merge. On a non-default branch the is_default_branch guard below disables the
|
||||
# `latest` tag, so a dispatch run publishes only the immutable commit-sha tag and
|
||||
# cannot move what production pulls.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
tags: ['v*.*.*']
|
||||
workflow_dispatch: {}
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
REGISTRY: ghcr.io
|
||||
IMAGE_NAME: erp-mafia/gnubok
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
name: Build ${{ matrix.platform }}
|
||||
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
# Publishing one architecture and silently dropping the other is worse
|
||||
# than publishing neither: the merge below needs both digests.
|
||||
fail-fast: true
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
include:
|
||||
- platform: linux/amd64
|
||||
arch: amd64
|
||||
runner: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
- platform: linux/arm64
|
||||
arch: arm64
|
||||
runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
packages: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# The build pushes to GHCR via docker/login-action, never over git, so
|
||||
# the git credential is dead weight inside a Docker build context.
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Log in to GHCR
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
|
||||
username: ${{ github.actor }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
# Labels only. Tags are applied once, to the manifest list, in `merge`.
|
||||
- name: Extract metadata
|
||||
id: meta
|
||||
uses: docker/metadata-action@dc802804100637a589fabce1cb79ff13a1411302 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4
|
||||
|
||||
# No setup-qemu-action. That was the whole point: each runner now builds
|
||||
# its own architecture natively.
|
||||
- name: Build and push by digest
|
||||
id: build
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@53b7df96c91f9c12dcc8a07bcb9ccacbed38856a # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
|
||||
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
|
||||
build-args: |
|
||||
EXTENSIONS_PRESET=self-hosted
|
||||
# SBOM (software bill of materials) + SLSA provenance are attached as
|
||||
# OCI attestations, queryable via `docker buildx imagetools inspect`.
|
||||
provenance: mode=max
|
||||
sbom: true
|
||||
# push-by-digest publishes without a tag; `merge` collects the digests
|
||||
# and builds the tag list from them. name-canonical records the
|
||||
# repository name in the config so the merged manifest resolves.
|
||||
outputs: type=image,name=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true
|
||||
# Layer cache lives in GHCR, not the GitHub Actions cache. Two
|
||||
# platforms x mode=max is ~7 GB, which alone ate 70% of the repo's
|
||||
# 10 GB Actions cache quota and, because buildx refreshes every blob's
|
||||
# access time on each run, never aged out under LRU: it starved the
|
||||
# other workflows' caches instead. GHCR storage is free for public
|
||||
# repos and off that quota. mode=max is kept deliberately: mode=min
|
||||
# would drop the deps/builder stages and make every push redo
|
||||
# `npm ci` + `next build`.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The cache tag is now per-architecture. Each runner builds a single
|
||||
# platform, so a shared tag would leave the two jobs racing to
|
||||
# overwrite a cache manifest describing layers the other cannot use.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# A stable cache tag is safe here: this workflow runs only on main,
|
||||
# on v*.*.* tags (cut from main), and on manual dispatch, so there is
|
||||
# no untrusted ref that could poison the layers.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# image-manifest=true,oci-mediatypes=true is required by GHCR, which
|
||||
# rejects buildkit's default cache manifest media type.
|
||||
cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:buildcache-${{ matrix.arch }}
|
||||
cache-to: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:buildcache-${{ matrix.arch }},mode=max,image-manifest=true,oci-mediatypes=true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify NEXT_PUBLIC_* sentinels survived the build
|
||||
# The image is generic: it is built with sentinel values
|
||||
# (__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__) that docker-entrypoint.sh seds into
|
||||
# .next at container start. That only works if the sentinel is still IN
|
||||
# the build output. Writing `process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_X === 'true'` in
|
||||
# source lets the minifier fold the comparison and delete the branch,
|
||||
# erasing the sentinel: the flag is then permanently false and no
|
||||
# operator setting can change it. That shipped once and left every
|
||||
# Docker self-host running with the entitlement paywall live, invisibly,
|
||||
# because dev and the Vercel build both have real env values and never
|
||||
# reproduce it.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This runs in the per-platform build, not in `merge`, for two reasons.
|
||||
# It is the only place each architecture is actually checked: `docker
|
||||
# run` against the manifest list resolves the runner's own platform, so
|
||||
# a merge-job check would silently exempt arm64. And it lands BEFORE any
|
||||
# tag exists, so a folded sentinel fails the matrix (fail-fast) and
|
||||
# `merge` never runs: `latest` cannot move onto a build whose flags can
|
||||
# no longer be configured. The digest image pushed above stays untagged
|
||||
# and unreferenced.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# check:guards catches the source pattern on every PR; this is the
|
||||
# end-to-end proof against the built artifact, which is the only place
|
||||
# the failure is observable.
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}"
|
||||
MISSING=""
|
||||
for VAR in NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA; do
|
||||
if docker run --rm --entrypoint sh "$IMAGE" -c \
|
||||
"grep -rq '__${VAR}__' /opt/gnubok-template/.next"; then
|
||||
echo "ok: __${VAR}__ present in build output"
|
||||
else
|
||||
MISSING="${MISSING} ${VAR}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
if [ -n "$MISSING" ]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::Sentinel(s) missing from the build output:${MISSING}."
|
||||
echo "::error::Read these flags via lib/env/public-flags (flagEnabled/isSelfHosted)."
|
||||
echo "::error::An in-place comparison is constant-folded away, leaving the flag stuck off."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Digests reach `merge` as artifact filenames: the file content is
|
||||
# irrelevant, only the name carries information.
|
||||
- name: Export digest
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
mkdir -p /tmp/digests
|
||||
touch "/tmp/digests/${DIGEST#sha256:}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload digest
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: digests-${{ matrix.arch }}
|
||||
path: /tmp/digests/*
|
||||
# A silently empty artifact would surface later as an imagetools
|
||||
# invocation with no source digests, which is a much worse error.
|
||||
if-no-files-found: error
|
||||
retention-days: 1
|
||||
|
||||
merge:
|
||||
name: Merge, sign and scan
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
needs: build
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
packages: write
|
||||
# OIDC token used by cosign keyless signing.
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
# SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab from the Trivy scan.
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Download digests
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: /tmp/digests
|
||||
pattern: digests-*
|
||||
merge-multiple: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Log in to GHCR
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
|
||||
username: ${{ github.actor }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Extract metadata
|
||||
id: meta
|
||||
uses: docker/metadata-action@dc802804100637a589fabce1cb79ff13a1411302 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}
|
||||
# On main: push `latest` + commit-sha tags.
|
||||
# On v*.*.* tags: push semver tags (1.2.3, 1.2, 1) for production pinning.
|
||||
# A workflow_dispatch run from a branch gets the sha tag only, because
|
||||
# is_default_branch gates `latest`.
|
||||
tags: |
|
||||
type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
|
||||
type=sha,prefix=
|
||||
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
|
||||
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
|
||||
type=semver,pattern={{major}}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create and push manifest list
|
||||
working-directory: /tmp/digests
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
docker buildx imagetools create \
|
||||
$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \
|
||||
$(printf "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@sha256:%s " *)
|
||||
|
||||
# Cosign and Trivy must address the manifest list, not either platform's
|
||||
# image: the list digest is what `docker pull` resolves for consumers, so
|
||||
# it is the thing worth signing and the thing worth scanning.
|
||||
- name: Resolve manifest list digest
|
||||
id: manifest
|
||||
env:
|
||||
VERSION: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
DIGEST=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect \
|
||||
"${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION}" \
|
||||
--format '{{json .Manifest}}' | jq -r '.digest')
|
||||
echo "Resolved ${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION} -> ${DIGEST}"
|
||||
echo "digest=${DIGEST}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Verify both platforms are present
|
||||
# A merge that quietly produced a single-arch manifest would ship a
|
||||
# broken image to every arm64 self-hoster, and nothing downstream checks
|
||||
# architecture. Assert it here while the digest is still in hand.
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
PLATFORMS=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect \
|
||||
"${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}" --raw \
|
||||
| jq -r '[.manifests[]
|
||||
| select(.platform != null)
|
||||
| select(.platform.os != "unknown")
|
||||
| "\(.platform.os)/\(.platform.architecture)"]
|
||||
| sort | unique | join(",")')
|
||||
echo "Manifest platforms: ${PLATFORMS}"
|
||||
[ "$PLATFORMS" = "linux/amd64,linux/arm64" ] || {
|
||||
echo "::error::Expected linux/amd64,linux/arm64 but got ${PLATFORMS}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install cosign
|
||||
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 # v4.1.2
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Sign the image (keyless OIDC)
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
cosign sign --yes "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Scan image with Trivy (report-only)
|
||||
id: trivy
|
||||
# Decoupled from the publish gate on purpose: this pipeline must stay
|
||||
# green so builds are deterministic. The image is already pushed and
|
||||
# signed above, so failing here would only redden the run: it would not
|
||||
# unship a vulnerable image. exit-code:0 + continue-on-error keep CVEs
|
||||
# (and even a Trivy/DB outage) from failing the build; findings still
|
||||
# flow to the Security tab below. The real blocking gate is
|
||||
# docker-image-scan.yml, which re-scans the published image and fails
|
||||
# (notifying admins) on a fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVE. It runs on a
|
||||
# workflow_run trigger the moment THIS workflow completes (so the gap
|
||||
# between publish and the blocking scan is the scan's own duration
|
||||
# (minutes), not a 24h cron window) plus a daily cron as a safety net.
|
||||
# Accepted residual risk: an image is live for that short scan window
|
||||
# before the gate fires; see docs/SELF-HOSTING.md / the risk register.
|
||||
continue-on-error: true
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}@${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }}
|
||||
severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
|
||||
exit-code: '0'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
format: sarif
|
||||
output: trivy-results.sarif
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab
|
||||
# if: always(), evidence must reach the Security tab regardless of the
|
||||
# scan step's exit status. With the previous `outcome == 'success'` guard,
|
||||
# a Trivy/DB outage that errored the scan would silently drop findings.
|
||||
# Kept non-fatal (continue-on-error) so a missing SARIF or a Security-tab
|
||||
# hiccup can't redden an otherwise-good publish.
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
continue-on-error: true
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif
|
||||
category: trivy
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
|
||||
name: Publish MCP bridges to npm
|
||||
|
||||
# Publishes the two stdio-to-HTTP MCP bridges, packages/accounted-mcp and
|
||||
# packages/gnubok-mcp, to the public npm registry.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The trigger is a version bump, not a git tag: a push to main that touches a
|
||||
# packages/*/package.json runs one job per package, and each job publishes only
|
||||
# if the version in its package.json is not already on the registry. A package
|
||||
# whose version did not change is skipped, so a merge that bumps one bridge
|
||||
# never republishes the other, and re-running a finished workflow is a no-op.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Auth is the repository secret NPM_TOKEN, an npm granular access token with
|
||||
# publish rights on both packages. A run without the secret fails at its first
|
||||
# step with a message naming it, rather than inside `npm publish` with an opaque
|
||||
# ENEEDAUTH. A token rather than OIDC trusted publishing because accounted-mcp
|
||||
# has never been published, and npm cannot bind a trusted publisher to a package
|
||||
# that does not exist yet.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --provenance attaches a Sigstore attestation that ties the tarball to this
|
||||
# workflow run and commit; id-token: write exists for that. The registry rejects
|
||||
# the attestation unless package.json `repository.url` matches this repository,
|
||||
# which is why both package.jsons point at erp-mafia/accounted.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# workflow_dispatch runs the same job on demand, optionally for one package (the
|
||||
# other package's job is skipped by the Select step), and with dry_run to
|
||||
# exercise the version gate and `npm publish --dry-run` without touching the
|
||||
# registry. Dispatching from a branch is the way to test this file
|
||||
# before merging it.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
paths:
|
||||
- 'packages/*/package.json'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
package:
|
||||
description: Package to publish
|
||||
type: choice
|
||||
options: [all, accounted-mcp, gnubok-mcp]
|
||||
default: all
|
||||
dry_run:
|
||||
description: Pack and validate only, do not publish
|
||||
type: boolean
|
||||
default: false
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
# A dispatch overlapping a push could race to publish the same version; the
|
||||
# loser would only fail with a confusing E403. Queue instead of cancelling.
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: npm-publish
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: false
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
publish:
|
||||
name: Publish ${{ matrix.package }}
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 10
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
# OIDC token for the --provenance attestation.
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
# The packages are independent: a failure in one must not cancel the other.
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
# Static on purpose: both packages always get a job. On push the
|
||||
# version gate skips the one that did not change; on dispatch the
|
||||
# Select step skips the one that was not requested. A matrix built
|
||||
# from the dispatch input would put workflow input text into an
|
||||
# expression, which is the shape injection scanners flag.
|
||||
package: [accounted-mcp, gnubok-mcp]
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }}
|
||||
PACKAGE_DIR: packages/${{ matrix.package }}
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Select package
|
||||
id: select
|
||||
env:
|
||||
REQUESTED: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && 'all' || inputs.package }}
|
||||
PACKAGE: ${{ matrix.package }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
if [ "$REQUESTED" = "all" ] || [ "$REQUESTED" = "$PACKAGE" ]; then
|
||||
echo "run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Skipping $PACKAGE: dispatch requested $REQUESTED."
|
||||
echo "run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Require the NPM_TOKEN secret
|
||||
# Before checkout, so a missing secret is the first line of the log.
|
||||
# Only the presence of the secret is checked here; the token itself is
|
||||
# exposed to the publish step alone.
|
||||
if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true'
|
||||
env:
|
||||
NPM_TOKEN_SET: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN != '' }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Dry run: NPM_TOKEN is not required."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$NPM_TOKEN_SET" != "true" ]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::Repository secret NPM_TOKEN is not set. Create an npm granular access token with read and write access to accounted-mcp and gnubok-mcp (see the Releasing section in packages/*/README.md) and add it under Settings > Secrets and variables > Actions as NPM_TOKEN."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "NPM_TOKEN is set."
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Nothing here pushes over git; the only credential this job needs is
|
||||
# the npm token, and that never touches the checkout.
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 22
|
||||
# Writes an .npmrc that reads the auth token from NODE_AUTH_TOKEN.
|
||||
registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Compare package.json version with the registry
|
||||
id: gate
|
||||
if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true'
|
||||
working-directory: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
NAME=$(node -p "require('./package.json').name")
|
||||
VERSION=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")
|
||||
|
||||
# `npm view` exits 1 with an E404 body when the package has never
|
||||
# been published. That is the first-release case and counts as
|
||||
# "nothing on the registry". Any other failure (network, registry
|
||||
# outage, bad token) is an error: assuming "not published" there
|
||||
# would only move the failure into `npm publish`.
|
||||
set +e
|
||||
VIEW=$(npm view "$NAME" versions --json 2>&1)
|
||||
STATUS=$?
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
if [ "$STATUS" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q 'E404' <<< "$VIEW"; then
|
||||
echo "$NAME has never been published (E404): $VERSION would be its first release."
|
||||
VIEW='[]'
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "::error::npm view $NAME failed (exit $STATUS)."
|
||||
echo "$VIEW"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# `npm view <name> versions --json` prints a bare string, not a
|
||||
# one-element array, when exactly one version exists.
|
||||
ON_REGISTRY=$(VIEW="$VIEW" VERSION="$VERSION" node -e '
|
||||
const raw = JSON.parse(process.env.VIEW);
|
||||
const list = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw];
|
||||
console.error("Versions on registry: " + (list.length ? list.join(", ") : "(none)"));
|
||||
process.stdout.write(list.includes(process.env.VERSION) ? "yes" : "no");
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$ON_REGISTRY" = "yes" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Skipping: $NAME@$VERSION is already on the registry."
|
||||
echo "publish=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: already on the registry, skipped" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Publishing: $NAME@$VERSION is not on the registry."
|
||||
echo "publish=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "name=$NAME" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "version=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Publish to npm
|
||||
if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' && steps.gate.outputs.publish == 'true'
|
||||
working-directory: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }}
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# The only step that sees the token.
|
||||
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
|
||||
NAME: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.name }}
|
||||
VERSION: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.version }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
|
||||
# --dry-run packs and validates but never contacts the registry, so
|
||||
# it also runs without a token.
|
||||
npm publish --dry-run --access public
|
||||
echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: dry run, not published" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
npm publish --provenance --access public
|
||||
echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: published, https://www.npmjs.com/package/$NAME/v/$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
|
||||
name: PR Agent
|
||||
|
||||
# AI pull-request review (PR-Agent, the original open-source reviewer: repo id
|
||||
# 662766482, same repo the qodo-ai/Codium-ai names redirect to). Replaces the
|
||||
# Greptile bot that went silent after #682.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Supply-chain hardening:
|
||||
# * Pinned to an immutable commit SHA (v0.36.0), NOT a movable tag, because the
|
||||
# repo now sits under a recently-created, unverified org (The-PR-Agent).
|
||||
# * Runs on a DEDICATED, minimal IAM key (bedrock:InvokeModel only) supplied via
|
||||
# PR_AGENT_AWS_* secrets: never the app's general AWS credentials. A leaked
|
||||
# PR-Agent key can do nothing but invoke the one Bedrock model.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Scope: ONLY /review runs automatically. /describe and /improve are disabled so
|
||||
# the bot never overwrites hand-written PR descriptions. Users can still invoke
|
||||
# any command interactively by commenting e.g. "/describe" or "/improve" on a PR.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [opened, reopened, ready_for_review, synchronize]
|
||||
issue_comment:
|
||||
types: [created, edited]
|
||||
|
||||
# One run per PR *per event type*; a new push (pull_request:synchronize) cancels
|
||||
# a superseded review. The event_name suffix is critical: without it, the
|
||||
# pull_request and issue_comment triggers share a group, so a bot comment
|
||||
# (Vercel/Supabase/compliance preview bots fire within ~2s of opening a PR)
|
||||
# queues an issue_comment run that cancel-in-progress kills the real review with,
|
||||
# before the job-level `if: sender.type != 'Bot'` ever gets to skip it. Keeping the
|
||||
# groups separate lets comment runs cancel only each other (all skipped, harmless)
|
||||
# and never the open/push review.
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: pr-agent-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}-${{ github.event_name }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
pull-requests: write
|
||||
issues: write
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
pr_agent:
|
||||
# Skip bot-authored events (vercel/supabase/etc.) to avoid feedback loops.
|
||||
if: ${{ github.event.sender.type != 'Bot' }}
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
name: The PR Agent
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: The PR Agent
|
||||
# Pinned to the v0.36.0 commit SHA (immutable): do not switch to @v0.36.0.
|
||||
uses: The-PR-Agent/pr-agent@8e4d32e5497defd43c023a404f73560c62728961 # v0.39.0
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── DEDICATED Bedrock IAM key (bedrock:InvokeModel only): NOT the
|
||||
# app's AWS_* secrets. litellm reads AWS_REGION_NAME; AWS_REGION is
|
||||
# set too for safety. Create these three repo/org secrets:
|
||||
# PR_AGENT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, PR_AGENT_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,
|
||||
# PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION (an EU region, e.g. eu-west-1).
|
||||
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
|
||||
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
|
||||
AWS_REGION_NAME: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION }}
|
||||
AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION }}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Model: Claude Sonnet 5 via the EU Bedrock inference profile. The
|
||||
# strong and weak slots both point at it: this account has no larger
|
||||
# model enabled, so a second id would only be the same model under
|
||||
# another name. custom_model_max_tokens is required because this id
|
||||
# is not in PR-Agent's built-in map.
|
||||
CONFIG.MODEL: "bedrock/eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5"
|
||||
CONFIG.MODEL_WEAK: "bedrock/eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5"
|
||||
# Emptied explicitly. This block previously said it set no fallback
|
||||
# list, but "unset" is not "none": PR-Agent's own default is
|
||||
# ["gpt-5.6-terra"], visible in the resolved config it logs on every
|
||||
# run. Only AWS credentials reach this container, so that fallback
|
||||
# could never have authenticated, but a silent third-party model in
|
||||
# the path of every PR diff should be absent by intent, not by a
|
||||
# missing key.
|
||||
CONFIG.FALLBACK_MODELS: "[]"
|
||||
CONFIG.CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS: "1000000"
|
||||
# Input window PR-Agent prunes the diff to fit. Default (~32k) truncated
|
||||
# large PRs; raise it so the whole diff is reviewed (Sonnet 5 = 1M ctx).
|
||||
# 64000 was tuned against Sonnet 4.6's tokenizer. Sonnet 5 tokenizes the
|
||||
# same text into roughly 30% more tokens, so that budget silently held
|
||||
# ~30% less real diff after #1218; 96000 restores parity with headroom.
|
||||
CONFIG.MAX_MODEL_TOKENS: "96000"
|
||||
LITELLM.DROP_PARAMS: "true"
|
||||
|
||||
# ── pr_actions = which GitHub PR *event actions* trigger the bot
|
||||
# (NOT a command list). Default omits 'synchronize', so pushes are
|
||||
# skipped; we add it so every push is reviewed too.
|
||||
GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.PR_ACTIONS: '["opened", "reopened", "ready_for_review", "review_requested", "synchronize"]'
|
||||
# ── Which commands actually run on a handled event. Only review:
|
||||
# describe/improve off so the bot never rewrites the PR body or
|
||||
# pushes code suggestions.
|
||||
GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_REVIEW: "true"
|
||||
GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_DESCRIBE: "false"
|
||||
GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_IMPROVE: "false"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
name: Compliance diff
|
||||
|
||||
# Stage 1 of the fork-safe compliance review (see swedish-compliance-review.yml).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This runs on the untrusted PR head, but is SAFE because it has NO secrets and
|
||||
# only a read-only token: it computes the diff and uploads it as an artifact.
|
||||
# It never runs project code (no `npm install`, no `node`): only git plumbing,
|
||||
# which does not execute repository hooks. The privileged half (model call +
|
||||
# comment) lives in stage 2, which never checks out fork code.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
prepare:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
- name: Compute diff vs base
|
||||
# Pass GitHub context via env, never interpolate ${{ }} into the shell
|
||||
# body: expression substitution happens before bash parses the script,
|
||||
# so a value with shell metacharacters would be a code-execution sink.
|
||||
env:
|
||||
BASE_REF: ${{ github.base_ref }}
|
||||
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
# Full fetch (not --depth=1): the PR branch may be behind base, and a
|
||||
# shallow base can leave merge-base with no reachable common ancestor.
|
||||
# checkout above uses fetch-depth: 0, so HEAD already has full history.
|
||||
git fetch origin "$BASE_REF"
|
||||
MERGE_BASE=$(git merge-base "origin/$BASE_REF" HEAD)
|
||||
git diff "$MERGE_BASE" HEAD > diff.patch
|
||||
git diff --name-only "$MERGE_BASE" HEAD > files.txt
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$PR_NUMBER" > pr-number.txt
|
||||
- name: Upload diff artifact
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: compliance-input
|
||||
path: |
|
||||
diff.patch
|
||||
files.txt
|
||||
pr-number.txt
|
||||
retention-days: 1
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
|
||||
name: Swedish Accounting Compliance Review
|
||||
|
||||
# Stage 2 of the fork-safe compliance review (stage 1 is swedish-compliance-diff.yml).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SECURITY: this is the privileged half: it has the AWS Bedrock secrets and a
|
||||
# write token. It is triggered by `workflow_run` (NOT pull_request_target) and
|
||||
# checks out ONLY the base repo, so it never executes fork PR code. The untrusted
|
||||
# input (the PR diff) arrives as a downloaded artifact and is fed to the model
|
||||
# as DATA: never run. This is the pattern GitHub recommends instead of
|
||||
# `pull_request_target` + checking out the PR head.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
workflow_run:
|
||||
# Must match the `name:` field in swedish-compliance-diff.yml exactly.
|
||||
# A rename there silently stops this trigger from firing on all subsequent PRs.
|
||||
workflows: ["Compliance diff"]
|
||||
types: [completed]
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
actions: read # required to download the artifact from the triggering run
|
||||
pull-requests: write # required to post the review comment
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
review:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 10
|
||||
# Only act on PR-triggered diffs that actually produced an artifact.
|
||||
if: >
|
||||
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request' &&
|
||||
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
# Base repo only: the TRUSTED copy of the script and .claude/skills/.
|
||||
# persist-credentials: false, no later step needs git push creds, so don't
|
||||
# leave the token in .git/config for the steps that handle untrusted input.
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
- name: Download diff artifact
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: compliance-input
|
||||
# Unpacked OUTSIDE the checkout, not into the workspace root.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This artifact is built from a fork's PR head, so its contents are
|
||||
# attacker-influenced. Extracted over the workspace, an entry named
|
||||
# `scripts/swedish-compliance-review.mjs` would overwrite the trusted
|
||||
# script this job is about to run, with the AWS secrets and a write
|
||||
# token already in scope. Stage 1 only ever writes three fixed
|
||||
# filenames, and its workflow definition comes from the base repo even
|
||||
# for fork PRs, so that is not reachable today: this keeps it
|
||||
# unreachable if stage 1 ever grows a filename derived from PR
|
||||
# content. Flagged by CodeQL as actions/artifact-poisoning.
|
||||
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input
|
||||
run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
|
||||
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
- name: Resolve PR number
|
||||
id: pr
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
NUM=$(cat "$RUNNER_TEMP/compliance-input/pr-number.txt")
|
||||
# Guard: pr-number.txt must be a plain integer (artifact is untrusted input).
|
||||
if ! [[ "$NUM" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Refusing to continue: pr-number.txt is not a number" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "number=$NUM" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
- name: Install Anthropic Bedrock SDK
|
||||
# Installed ONE DIRECTORY ABOVE the checkout on purpose. Running this
|
||||
# inside the repo makes npm re-resolve the whole dependency tree from
|
||||
# package.json (--no-package-lock throws away the pinned resolutions),
|
||||
# and that re-resolution dies on an unrelated floating peer conflict
|
||||
# (@hookform/resolvers -> valibot), which silently killed this review on
|
||||
# every PR. Out of tree npm resolves this one package and nothing else,
|
||||
# so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the compliance gate down
|
||||
# again. Node still finds it: ESM bare specifiers walk up the parent
|
||||
# directories' node_modules. NODE_PATH is not an alternative here, the
|
||||
# ESM loader ignores it (CommonJS only).
|
||||
# Version tracks the exact package.json pin: 0.32.0 broke Bedrock
|
||||
# streaming in prod (DECISIONS.md 2026-07-08) and check:guards enforces
|
||||
# 0.29.1 repo-wide, so this job must not be the one place running an
|
||||
# unvetted build. Pinned exact + --ignore-scripts because this is the
|
||||
# privileged job (write token in env): no floating @latest, and no
|
||||
# dependency lifecycle scripts may execute here.
|
||||
run: npm install --prefix "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.." --no-save --no-package-lock --ignore-scripts @anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk@0.29.1
|
||||
- name: Run compliance review
|
||||
env:
|
||||
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
|
||||
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
|
||||
AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.AWS_REGION || 'eu-north-1' }}
|
||||
REVIEW_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5
|
||||
# Two-stage mode: read the diff from the artifact instead of git-diffing.
|
||||
DIFF_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input/diff.patch
|
||||
FILES_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input/files.txt
|
||||
run: node scripts/swedish-compliance-review.mjs
|
||||
- name: Assert review produced output
|
||||
# This job once produced no compliance signal for 10 consecutive PR
|
||||
# runs (the in-tree npm install died on an unrelated peer conflict, see
|
||||
# the install step above) and nobody noticed: workflow_run-triggered
|
||||
# jobs do not appear on the PR checks list, so a red or silently empty
|
||||
# run is invisible from the PR. Fail loudly whenever the review script
|
||||
# finishes without writing a non-empty review.md, so "no output" can
|
||||
# never again pass as a green run.
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
if [ ! -s review.md ]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::Compliance review produced no output (review.md missing or empty)"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
- name: Find previous compliance comment
|
||||
uses: peter-evans/find-comment@b30e6a3c0ed37e7c023ccd3f1db5c6c0b0c23aad # v4.0.0
|
||||
id: find-comment
|
||||
with:
|
||||
issue-number: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }}
|
||||
comment-author: 'github-actions[bot]'
|
||||
body-includes: '<!-- swedish-compliance-review-bot -->'
|
||||
- name: Post or update PR comment
|
||||
uses: peter-evans/create-or-update-comment@e8674b075228eee787fea43ef493e45ece1004c9 # v5
|
||||
with:
|
||||
issue-number: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }}
|
||||
comment-id: ${{ steps.find-comment.outputs.comment-id }}
|
||||
body-path: review.md
|
||||
edit-mode: replace
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
|
||||
name: pg-real tests
|
||||
|
||||
on: [pull_request]
|
||||
|
||||
# Neither job writes anything back: they read the repo, stand up a throwaway
|
||||
# Postgres, and run tests. Without this block both inherit the repository's
|
||||
# default token permissions, which are broader than that.
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: pg-real-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
coverage-gate:
|
||||
# Enforces the database.md rule: a migration touching a trigger/RPC/RLS/
|
||||
# DEFERRABLE must come with a *.pg.test.ts change. Previously instruction-
|
||||
# only. Escape hatch: `-- pg-test: covered-by <path>` / `-- pg-test: skip
|
||||
# (<reason>)` comments inside the migration.
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Full history so the merge-base with the PR base branch exists.
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
- name: Require pg-real coverage for trigger/RPC/RLS migrations
|
||||
env:
|
||||
PG_GATE_BASE: origin/${{ github.base_ref }}
|
||||
run: node scripts/check-pg-test-coverage.mjs
|
||||
|
||||
# Proves that an EXISTING database survives the PR's migrations, which the
|
||||
# pg-real job below cannot: it applies every migration to an empty database,
|
||||
# so a NOT NULL, a CHECK, a unique index or a backfill passes trivially
|
||||
# against zero rows and can still fail (or silently corrupt) on production.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Shape: schema at the merge-base -> seed real rows -> apply ONLY the new
|
||||
# migrations -> assert the rows are intact. A PR that adds no migration skips
|
||||
# straight past the apply step and costs one cheap no-op run.
|
||||
pg-upgrade:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060
|
||||
env:
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- 5432:5432
|
||||
options: >-
|
||||
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres"
|
||||
--health-interval 5s
|
||||
--health-timeout 5s
|
||||
--health-retries 20
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres
|
||||
PGPASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Full history so the merge-base with the PR base branch exists.
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install psql client
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Identify the migrations this PR adds
|
||||
id: newmig
|
||||
env:
|
||||
BASE_REF: origin/${{ github.base_ref }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
MERGE_BASE=$(git merge-base "$BASE_REF" HEAD)
|
||||
echo "merge_base=$MERGE_BASE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "Merge base: $MERGE_BASE"
|
||||
|
||||
# Migrations present at HEAD but not at the merge base. Uses the git
|
||||
# tree, not the filesystem, so a rebase or a merge commit cannot make
|
||||
# an already-shipped migration look new.
|
||||
git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD -- supabase/migrations \
|
||||
| grep '\.sql$' | sort > /tmp/head-migrations.txt
|
||||
git ls-tree -r --name-only "$MERGE_BASE" -- supabase/migrations \
|
||||
| grep '\.sql$' | sort > /tmp/base-migrations.txt
|
||||
comm -23 /tmp/head-migrations.txt /tmp/base-migrations.txt > /tmp/new-migrations.txt
|
||||
|
||||
COUNT=$(wc -l < /tmp/new-migrations.txt | tr -d ' ')
|
||||
echo "count=$COUNT" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
echo "New migrations ($COUNT):"
|
||||
cat /tmp/new-migrations.txt
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Bootstrap storage schema
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0'
|
||||
run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Apply the schema as it stands at the merge base
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0'
|
||||
env:
|
||||
MERGE_BASE: ${{ steps.newmig.outputs.merge_base }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
# Read each migration out of the merge-base tree rather than the
|
||||
# working tree: a PR that EDITS a shipped migration (forbidden, but
|
||||
# this job must not be the thing that hides it) still gets the
|
||||
# original applied here, so the edit shows up as a failure below.
|
||||
while read -r f; do
|
||||
echo "Applying (base) $f"
|
||||
git show "$MERGE_BASE:$f" | psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q
|
||||
done < /tmp/base-migrations.txt
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Seed a real company with posted verifikat
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0'
|
||||
run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/upgrade/seed.sql
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Apply ONLY the new migrations, against existing data
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
while read -r f; do
|
||||
echo "Applying (new) $f"
|
||||
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f"
|
||||
done < /tmp/new-migrations.txt
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Assert the existing data survived
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0'
|
||||
run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f tests/pg/upgrade/assert.sql
|
||||
|
||||
- name: No migrations in this PR
|
||||
if: steps.newmig.outputs.count == '0'
|
||||
run: echo "This PR adds no migration; nothing to upgrade-test."
|
||||
|
||||
pg-real:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
# Supabase image ships the auth schema, auth.uid(), and the extensions
|
||||
# (uuid-ossp, pg_cron, btree_gist, vector) this repo's migrations need.
|
||||
# Plain postgres:15 would require manual bootstrap SQL.
|
||||
image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060
|
||||
env:
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- 5432:5432
|
||||
options: >-
|
||||
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres"
|
||||
--health-interval 5s
|
||||
--health-timeout 5s
|
||||
--health-retries 20
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres
|
||||
PGPASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
# Deliberately no `cache: npm` here. This workflow runs on pull_request
|
||||
# only, so the cache is never written on main, and GitHub scopes caches
|
||||
# by ref: every PR uploaded its own 284 MB copy under an identical key
|
||||
# that no other PR could ever restore. Fourteen dead copies (4 GB, 40% of
|
||||
# the repo quota) accumulated in a single day. If this is ever worth
|
||||
# caching again, it has to be actions/cache/save on main plus
|
||||
# actions/cache/restore here, which is the only shape that gets hits.
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
|
||||
- run: npm ci
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install psql client
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Bootstrap storage schema
|
||||
# The supabase/postgres image ships a partial storage schema; the rest
|
||||
# is provisioned by the storage-api service at runtime, which we do
|
||||
# not run in CI. This aligns the schema with what migrations expect.
|
||||
run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Apply migrations
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
shopt -s nullglob
|
||||
files=(supabase/migrations/*.sql)
|
||||
if [ ${#files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "No migration files found"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
for f in "${files[@]}"; do
|
||||
echo "Applying $f"
|
||||
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f"
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
- run: npm run test:pg
|
||||
|
||||
tool-pg:
|
||||
# MCP tools driven through a REAL supabase-js client against a REAL
|
||||
# PostgREST. This is NOT a duplicate of the pg-real job: that one holds a
|
||||
# `pg` Pool and writes SQL, which cannot see the half of a tool that
|
||||
# PostgREST resolves (the .select() column strings, the resource embeds,
|
||||
# the or=(...) grammar). Before this job, all 100 files in
|
||||
# extensions/general/mcp-server/__tests__ faked supabase and nothing in CI
|
||||
# exercised that surface.
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060
|
||||
env:
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- 5432:5432
|
||||
options: >-
|
||||
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres"
|
||||
--health-interval 5s
|
||||
--health-timeout 5s
|
||||
--health-retries 20
|
||||
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres
|
||||
TOOL_PG_DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres
|
||||
TOOL_PG_REST_URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000
|
||||
PGPASSWORD: postgres
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 20
|
||||
|
||||
- run: npm ci
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install psql client
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Bootstrap storage schema
|
||||
run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Default privileges for the supabase roles
|
||||
# Without these PostgREST answers every request with 42501, because the
|
||||
# grants have to exist before the migrations create ~400 tables.
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c "
|
||||
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON TABLES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON ROUTINES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON SEQUENCES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Apply migrations
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
shopt -s nullglob
|
||||
files=(supabase/migrations/*.sql)
|
||||
if [ ${#files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then echo "No migration files found"; exit 1; fi
|
||||
for f in "${files[@]}"; do
|
||||
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f"
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Grant on everything the migrations created
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c "
|
||||
GRANT ALL ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
GRANT ALL ON ALL ROUTINES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
GRANT ALL ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role;
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Start PostgREST
|
||||
# Deliberately `docker run --network host` rather than a service
|
||||
# container. Service containers on a non-containerized job are reachable
|
||||
# from the runner on localhost, but NOT from each other by name, and
|
||||
# PostgREST has to reach Postgres. Host networking sidesteps that.
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
docker run -d --name postgrest --network host \
|
||||
-e PGRST_DB_URI="postgres://postgres:postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/postgres" \
|
||||
-e PGRST_DB_SCHEMAS=public \
|
||||
-e PGRST_DB_ANON_ROLE=anon \
|
||||
-e PGRST_JWT_SECRET="super-secret-jwt-token-with-at-least-32-characters-long" \
|
||||
-e PGRST_DB_MAX_ROWS=100000 \
|
||||
-e PGRST_SERVER_PORT=3000 \
|
||||
postgrest/postgrest:v12.2.3
|
||||
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
|
||||
if curl -sf -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:3000/" ; then break; fi
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
done
|
||||
curl -sf -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:3000/" || (docker logs postgrest && exit 1)
|
||||
|
||||
- run: npm run test:tools
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
name: Workflow audit (zizmor)
|
||||
|
||||
# Static analysis for the workflows themselves. Every other scanner in this repo
|
||||
# looks at application code or container contents; nothing looked at CI, which is
|
||||
# where the credentials live.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The motivating incident is concrete: in March 2026 attackers exploited a
|
||||
# pull_request_target misconfiguration in aquasecurity/trivy-action (an action
|
||||
# this repo uses in three places) to exfiltrate org and repo secrets, then used
|
||||
# them to backdoor LiteLLM on PyPI. zizmor's dangerous-triggers and
|
||||
# unpinned-uses audits cover exactly that class.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Installed from PyPI at a pinned version rather than via zizmorcore/zizmor-action:
|
||||
# a workflow whose job is to check the supply chain should not widen it.
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main]
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
# Weekly, off the hour to dodge cron congestion on GitHub. New audits ship
|
||||
# regularly, so a repo that stopped changing can still start failing here.
|
||||
- cron: '41 5 * * 1'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch: {}
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: zizmor-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
audit:
|
||||
name: Audit workflows
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 10
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
# SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab.
|
||||
security-events: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
# pipx is preinstalled on GitHub's ubuntu runners. Exact pin, because an
|
||||
# unpinned install here would be the same mistake this workflow exists to
|
||||
# catch.
|
||||
- name: Install zizmor
|
||||
run: pipx install zizmor==1.28.0
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Audit workflows (SARIF)
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# Lets zizmor run its online audits (resolving `uses:` refs against
|
||||
# the forge) instead of falling back to offline-only checks.
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
# zizmor suppresses its findings-based exit codes under --format=sarif,
|
||||
# so this step reports and never gates. The gate is the separate step
|
||||
# below, which is why the audit is run twice.
|
||||
run: zizmor --format=sarif . > zizmor.sarif
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload zizmor results to GitHub Security tab
|
||||
# if: always() so findings still reach the Security tab when the gate
|
||||
# below fails the run. Distinct category from the Trivy uploads so
|
||||
# workflow findings stay separately traceable.
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
sarif_file: zizmor.sarif
|
||||
category: zizmor
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Gate on high-severity, high-confidence findings
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
# Deliberately narrower than the SARIF report above. Everything zizmor
|
||||
# finds is visible in the Security tab; only findings it is confident are
|
||||
# high severity block a merge. Tighten by lowering --min-severity once
|
||||
# the backlog is clear.
|
||||
run: zizmor --min-severity=high --min-confidence=high --format=plain .
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
# zizmor configuration. See .github/workflows/zizmor.yml for why this repo
|
||||
# audits its own CI.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Suppressions here are reviewed exceptions, not a backlog. Anything added needs
|
||||
# a reason that says why the generic rule does not apply, so the Security tab
|
||||
# stays worth reading.
|
||||
|
||||
rules:
|
||||
dangerous-triggers:
|
||||
ignore:
|
||||
# zizmor's position is that `workflow_run` is almost always used
|
||||
# insecurely, and it is right in general: the usual mistake is triggering
|
||||
# on a fork's build and then checking out that fork's code with secrets in
|
||||
# scope. Both uses below are the opposite pattern, and both are the
|
||||
# documented fix for the trigger they replaced.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Stage 2 of the fork-safe compliance review. It holds the AWS secrets and
|
||||
# a write token, and it checks out ONLY the base repo: fork code never
|
||||
# executes here. The untrusted PR diff arrives as a downloaded artifact
|
||||
# and is passed to the model as data. This is precisely what GitHub
|
||||
# recommends instead of `pull_request_target` + checking out the PR head,
|
||||
# which is what this workflow used to be.
|
||||
- swedish-compliance-review.yml
|
||||
# Re-scans an image that has already been published to GHCR. It checks out
|
||||
# no source at all and only fires on `conclusion == 'success'` of a
|
||||
# workflow that itself runs only on main and release tags, so there is no
|
||||
# untrusted input and no fork ref in reach. The trigger exists to shrink
|
||||
# the window between publishing an image and gating it from up to 24h
|
||||
# (the cron) down to the scan's own duration.
|
||||
- docker-image-scan.yml
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user