fix(auth): secure white-label invite and reset links (#1680)

This commit is contained in:
Mattsson
2026-08-18 23:17:26 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3ec76d39db
commit dfa7097f3a
9 changed files with 362 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import {
buildPasswordResetRedirectTo,
getCanonicalAppOrigin,
resolveRequestAppOrigin,
resolveTrustedAppOrigin,
} from '../trusted-app-origin'
const ORIGINAL_APP_URL = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
const ORIGINAL_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
describe('trusted application origins', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = 'https://app.accounted.test'
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
})
afterEach(() => {
if (ORIGINAL_APP_URL === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = ORIGINAL_APP_URL
if (ORIGINAL_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS === undefined) {
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
} else {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = ORIGINAL_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
}
})
it('uses an exact registered white-label host over HTTPS', () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = 'portal.brand.test, books.partner.test'
expect(resolveTrustedAppOrigin('https://portal.brand.test')).toBe(
'https://portal.brand.test',
)
expect(resolveTrustedAppOrigin('PORTAL.BRAND.TEST.')).toBe(
'https://portal.brand.test',
)
})
it('rejects spoofed, credential, wildcard, and non-default-port hosts', () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = 'portal.brand.test,*.wildcard.test'
for (const candidate of [
'https://portal.brand.test.attacker.test',
'https://portal.brand.test@attacker.test',
'https://child.wildcard.test',
'https://portal.brand.test:444',
]) {
expect(resolveTrustedAppOrigin(candidate), candidate).toBe(
'https://app.accounted.test',
)
}
})
it('falls back to the canonical origin when the request host is not registered', () => {
expect(resolveTrustedAppOrigin('https://unregistered.test')).toBe(
'https://app.accounted.test',
)
expect(resolveTrustedAppOrigin(null)).toBe('https://app.accounted.test')
})
it('normalises the canonical URL to its origin and has a local safe fallback', () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = 'https://app.accounted.test/base?ignored=yes'
expect(getCanonicalAppOrigin()).toBe('https://app.accounted.test')
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = 'javascript:alert(1)'
expect(getCanonicalAppOrigin()).toBe('http://localhost:3000')
})
it('validates the request URL and ignores a spoofed forwarded host', () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = 'portal.brand.test'
const trusted = new Request('https://portal.brand.test/api/company/members/invite', {
headers: { 'x-forwarded-host': 'attacker.test' },
})
const spoofed = new Request('https://attacker.test/api/company/members/invite', {
headers: { 'x-forwarded-host': 'portal.brand.test' },
})
expect(resolveRequestAppOrigin(trusted)).toBe('https://portal.brand.test')
expect(resolveRequestAppOrigin(spoofed)).toBe('https://app.accounted.test')
})
})
describe('password reset callback', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = 'https://app.accounted.test'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = 'portal.brand.test'
})
afterEach(() => {
if (ORIGINAL_APP_URL === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = ORIGINAL_APP_URL
if (ORIGINAL_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS === undefined) {
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
} else {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS = ORIGINAL_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS
}
})
it('keeps a registered brand callback on the brand domain', () => {
expect(buildPasswordResetRedirectTo('https://portal.brand.test')).toBe(
'https://portal.brand.test/auth/callback?next=/reset-password',
)
})
it('uses the allowlisted canonical callback for an unknown browser origin', () => {
expect(buildPasswordResetRedirectTo('https://attacker.test')).toBe(
'https://app.accounted.test/auth/callback?next=/reset-password',
)
})
})