feat(transactions): split-payment allocator — 1 tx → N invoices (#603)

* fix(category-mapping): use leaf BAS accounts instead of group codes

3900, 5800, 6200 are BAS gruppkonton (header codes) and shouldn't carry
postings. Switched the default mappings to the matching leaf accounts:

  - income_other:     3900 -> 3999 (Övriga rörelseintäkter)
  - expense_travel:   5800 -> 5890 (Övriga resekostnader)
  - expense_telecom:  6200 -> 6230 (Datakommunikation)

The fallback for income_other inside getCategoryAccountMapping was also
hardcoded to '3900'; updated to '3999' for consistency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(transactions): split-payment allocator — 1 tx → N invoices

Closes one of the two flows that motivated PR #602's foundation:
allocating a single bank transaction across multiple customer OR
multiple supplier invoices, with one combined verifikat
(samlingsverifikation per BFL 5 kap 6§ st 3).

## Backend (Phase 3a)

- **PL/pgSQL RPC** match_batch_allocate (~400 lines): locks the tx +
  each target invoice with SELECT … FOR UPDATE in id order, validates
  status/currency/remaining/direction before any write, builds the
  combined verifikat via commit_journal_entry (atomically assigns
  voucher_number + flips draft→posted), inserts N rows in
  invoice_payments or supplier_invoice_payments pointing at the same
  JE, advances paid_amount/remaining_amount/status per invoice. Returns
  { ok, journal_entry_id, voucher_number, allocations: [...] } on
  success or { ok: false, code, details } on guard failure. Mixed
  customer+supplier kinds are rejected (v1 scope).

- **Endpoint** POST /api/transactions/[id]/match-batch — thin wrapper
  around the RPC. Validates body via MatchBatchSchema (zod
  discriminatedUnion + superRefine to catch mixed-kinds at the schema
  layer). On RPC success, emits one invoice.match_confirmed or
  supplier_invoice.match_confirmed event per allocation so existing
  subscribers (reminders, automations, processing-history) keep
  working. Maps the structured RPC error envelope to
  errorResponseFromCode.

- **16 new BATCH_* error codes** (sv+en): BATCH_TX_NOT_FOUND,
  BATCH_TX_ALREADY_BOOKED, BATCH_OVERSHOOT, BATCH_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_TX,
  BATCH_MIXED_KINDS_UNSUPPORTED, BATCH_DIRECTION_MISMATCH,
  BATCH_CURRENCY_MISMATCH, BATCH_PERIOD_LOCKED, BATCH_RPC_FAILED, etc.

## UI (Phase 5a)

- **MatchAllocationDialog** (components/transactions/) — direction-
  aware (positive tx → customer invoices, negative → supplier). Search
  + selectable list of open invoices. Per-row amount input with default
  = min(invoice.remaining, tx_remaining_budget). Live tally with
  green-check balanced state, red overshoot warning, gray leftover
  note. Confirm button disabled on overshoot. POSTs to /match-batch
  and on 200 triggers the same exit animation as single-tx match.

- **Inbox row** gains a second outline icon button (Split icon) next
  to the existing 1:1 match button, gated by the same
  showInvoiceMatchButton predicate. Tooltip explains the direction-
  aware split. Opens MatchAllocationDialog.

- **i18n** strings under tx_match_allocation namespace in sv.json
  and en.json (32 keys each).

## Tests

- tests/pg/match-batch-allocate.pg.test.ts — 5 pg-real tests covering
  combined verifikat shape, overshoot guard, already-booked tx,
  direction mismatch, mixed-kinds rejection.
- app/api/transactions/[id]/match-batch/__tests__/route.test.ts — 5
  unit tests covering schema validation, mixed-kinds, happy path,
  structured-error mapping, raw-error → BATCH_RPC_FAILED.

63 unit tests pass across the touched paths. The RPC migration was
already applied to remote in an earlier Phase 3a session (idempotent
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION; the next replay is a no-op).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(match-batch): PR #603 review round 1 + CI fixes

Closes both CI failures and the three real review findings.

## CI fixes

- **pg-real failure**: the RPC declared
  `v_journal_entry_id uuid := uuid_generate_v4()` which fails in the CI
  Postgres image (uuid-ossp extension is off). Switched to
  `gen_random_uuid()` — the codebase standard already used by
  supplier_invoices, invoice_inbox, etc.
- **core-only failure**: my earlier BAS leaf-account commit
  (3900→3999, 5800→5890, 6200→6230) didn't update the matching
  `lib/bookkeeping/__tests__/category-mapping.test.ts` expectations,
  and `getDefaultAccountForCategory`'s fallback for `income_*` was
  still hardcoded to '3900'. Updated both.

## Review findings (greptile)

- **P1 deadlock-stable locking** (`match_batch_allocate.sql:11`): the
  validation `FOR UPDATE` loop ran in caller-supplied array order. Two
  concurrent calls with overlapping invoice sets in opposite orders
  could deadlock and one would abort with `BATCH_RPC_FAILED`. Now
  all three loops (validate, build lines, advance invoices) iterate
  via `SELECT … FROM jsonb_array_elements(…) ORDER BY
  COALESCE(invoice_id, supplier_invoice_id)`, giving a stable global
  lock order regardless of how the caller ordered the JSON array.

- **P1 duplicate-allocation detection** (`match_batch_allocate.sql:163`):
  the same invoice_id listed twice would pass the per-row overshoot
  guard (both iterations read the original `remaining_amount`) and
  the write loop would insert two `invoice_payments` rows for the
  same invoice. Added a `v_seen_ids text[]` check in the validation
  loop and a new `BATCH_DUPLICATE_ALLOCATION` error code (sv + en).
  The dialog already prevents this UI-side via `if (prev[candidate.id]
  return prev` — the RPC guard is the defense-in-depth layer.

- **P2 zod `.positive()`** (`schemas.ts:544`): allocation amount was
  `nonNegativeAmount` (allowing 0), passing schema validation only to
  be rejected by the RPC with `BATCH_INVALID_AMOUNT`. Now
  `z.number().positive(…)` so 0-amount entries fail at the schema
  layer with a per-field path, cleaner 400.

- **P2 strict `> 0` direction check** (`MatchAllocationDialog.tsx:82`):
  used `amount >= 0` to pick customer-side, but a zero-amount tx would
  load customer candidates only to hit `BATCH_TX_ZERO_AMOUNT` at
  submit time after the user has filled in allocations. Switched to
  `> 0` so 0-amount tx never reaches the dialog at all (it's rejected
  by the RPC immediately).

The fourth Greptile comment (the schema P2 about amount validation)
overlaps with the third; addressed in the same edit.

## Verification

- 112 unit tests pass across touched paths
- ESLint clean
- New pg-real test `tests/pg/match-batch-allocate.pg.test.ts` covers
  the dedupe scenario (same supplier invoice listed twice with summing
  amounts that individually pass per-row overshoot)
- RPC patch applied to remote via Supabase MCP

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(match-batch): PR #603 review round 2 — compliance hardening

Addresses the actionable findings from compliance-swarm and
Swedish-accounting-compliance reviews. Six small RPC changes + two
TS-side guards, all bundled in one follow-up migration.

## Security

- **(GDPR Art.5(1)(f) / ISO A.8.2) Caller verification**: SECURITY
  DEFINER bypasses RLS, and the prior RPC accepted any
  (p_user_id, p_company_id) pair from the route. Now the function
  rejects with new `BATCH_UNAUTHORIZED` (sv+en, HTTP 403) if
  `auth.uid()` is not a member of `p_company_id`. Pattern lifted from
  `harden_invoice_number_rpcs` (#20260510140000).
- **(OWASP V4.2) Allocation cap**: `MatchBatchSchema.allocations` now
  carries `.max(100)` to prevent DoS via unbounded FOR UPDATE locks.

## Swedish accounting correctness

- **source_type per direction**: was hardcoded to `'invoice_paid'` for
  both customer + supplier batches, mis-routing behandlingshistorik
  filters. Customer batches keep `'invoice_paid'`, supplier batches now
  write `'supplier_invoice_paid'`.
- **Fiscal-period determinism**: `LIMIT 1` on the period lookup was
  non-deterministic on overlap (e.g. corrected broken year). Added
  `ORDER BY period_start DESC` so the most recent matching period
  wins.
- **Tolerance harmonisation**: cross-allocation sum used `+0.01`
  tolerance while per-row used `+0.005`. Both now `+0.005` so a
  multi-row batch can't drift ~0.01 SEK while each row passes
  individually.
- **`transactions.category` no longer overwritten**: was forced to
  `'income_services'` (→ BAS 3001 at 25% VAT) for any customer batch,
  misrepresenting reduced-rate / export / EU-service invoices. The
  category is only meaningful 1:1 with a single invoice; batches now
  leave it as-is, mirroring the supplier-side `ELSE category` branch.

## Tests

- `tests/pg/match-batch-allocate.pg.test.ts` now wraps every RPC call
  in `withUserContext(userId)` so `auth.uid()` resolves to the seeded
  owner. Without this the new membership check would have failed all
  existing tests.
- New pg-real test: `rejects with BATCH_UNAUTHORIZED when caller is
  not a member of the company` — outsider user gets explicit refusal.
- New happy-path assertion: `source_type = 'supplier_invoice_paid'`
  on the combined verifikat for supplier batches.

15 unit tests pass on the touched paths. RPC patch applied to remote
via Supabase MCP. Out-of-scope mcp-server changes still parked locally.

Skipped findings (documented in PR comment thread):
  - V8.2.1 ownership pre-check at route layer (RPC enforces it)
  - V4.5 / Art.5(1)(b) narrower API response and event payload —
    typed contracts require the full shapes
  - V2.4 rate-limiting — system-level, applies to all match endpoints
  - A.8.28 client-side RLS reliance — documented architectural choice
  - Direction pre-check at API layer (RPC catches with cleaner code)
  - V16 + Art.32 + Art.5(1)(b) low-severity logging nits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jakob Wennberg
2026-05-29 13:45:41 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.7
parent 7bcd46d503
commit 7eb8715417
15 changed files with 2844 additions and 12 deletions
+462
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import {
insertAuthUser,
insertCompany,
insertCompanyMember,
insertFiscalPeriod,
} from '@/tests/pg/fixtures'
import { getPool, withUserContext } from '@/tests/pg/setup'
/**
* Covers 20260529120100_match_batch_allocate:
* - 1 bank tx → N supplier invoices: builds ONE combined verifikat with
* N × Dr 2440 + 1 × Cr 1930, inserts N supplier_invoice_payments rows
* all pointing at the same JE.
* - Per-invoice paid_amount/remaining_amount/status advance correctly.
* - Overshoot guard returns BATCH_OVERSHOOT cleanly (no partial state).
* - Already-booked tx rejection.
* - Direction mismatch rejection.
* - Mixed customer + supplier kinds rejection.
*
* These tests bypass RLS by writing through the superuser pool — they
* exercise the RPC logic + DB constraints, not the policy layer.
*/
async function insertSupplier(params: {
userId: string
companyId: string
name?: string
}): Promise<string> {
const id = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.suppliers
(id, user_id, company_id, name, supplier_type, country, default_payment_terms, default_currency)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'swedish_business', 'SE', 30, 'SEK')`,
[id, params.userId, params.companyId, params.name ?? 'Leverantör AB'],
)
return id
}
async function insertSupplierInvoice(params: {
userId: string
companyId: string
supplierId: string
total: number
status?: string
invoiceDate?: string
dueDate?: string
}): Promise<string> {
const id = randomUUID()
// Arrival numbers are generated per-company by get_next_arrival_number,
// but for an isolated test we can hardcode a unique value via current time
// millis modulo a wide range. The unique constraint allows that.
const arrivalNumber = (Date.now() % 1_000_000_000) + Math.floor(Math.random() * 10_000)
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.supplier_invoices
(id, user_id, company_id, supplier_id, arrival_number, supplier_invoice_number,
invoice_date, due_date, received_date, status, currency,
subtotal, vat_amount, total, paid_amount, remaining_amount,
vat_treatment, reverse_charge, is_credit_note)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $7, $9, 'SEK',
$10, 0, $10, 0, $10, 'standard_25', false, false)`,
[
id,
params.userId,
params.companyId,
params.supplierId,
arrivalNumber,
`LF-${arrivalNumber}`,
params.invoiceDate ?? '2026-06-01',
params.dueDate ?? '2026-07-01',
params.status ?? 'approved',
params.total,
],
)
return id
}
async function insertTransaction(params: {
userId: string
companyId: string
amount: number
date?: string
currency?: string
}): Promise<string> {
const id = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.transactions
(id, user_id, company_id, date, description, amount, currency, category)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, 'uncategorized')`,
[
id,
params.userId,
params.companyId,
params.date ?? '2026-06-05',
'Bank transfer',
params.amount,
params.currency ?? 'SEK',
],
)
return id
}
async function seedTenant(opts: { isClosed?: boolean } = {}) {
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
const companyId = await insertCompany({ createdBy: userId })
await insertCompanyMember({ companyId, userId, role: 'owner' })
const fiscalPeriodId = await insertFiscalPeriod({
userId,
companyId,
periodStart: '2026-01-01',
periodEnd: '2026-12-31',
isClosed: opts.isClosed,
})
return { userId, companyId, fiscalPeriodId }
}
interface RpcResult {
ok: boolean
code?: string
details?: Record<string, unknown>
journal_entry_id?: string
voucher_number?: number
allocations?: Array<{
kind: string
supplier_invoice_id?: string
invoice_id?: string
payment_id: string
status: string
paid_amount: number
remaining_amount: number
amount: number
}>
total_allocated?: number
leftover?: number
}
describe('match_batch_allocate', () => {
it('builds a single combined verifikat for 1 tx → 3 supplier invoices', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si1 = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 2000,
})
const si2 = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 3000,
})
const si3 = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1500,
})
const txId = await insertTransaction({
userId, companyId, amount: -6500, date: '2026-06-05',
})
const allocations = [
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si1, amount: 2000 },
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si2, amount: 3000 },
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si3, amount: 1500 },
]
// withUserContext sets request.jwt.claim.sub so the RPC's auth.uid()
// membership check (PR #603 round 2) resolves the seeded owner.
// ALL assertions about post-RPC state must run inside this block since
// it rolls back at the end.
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[txId, JSON.stringify(allocations), userId, companyId],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(true)
expect(result.journal_entry_id).toBeTruthy()
expect(result.voucher_number).toBeGreaterThan(0)
expect(result.total_allocated).toBe(6500)
expect(result.leftover).toBe(0)
expect(result.allocations).toHaveLength(3)
// Verify one verifikat with N+1 lines (3 × Dr 2440 + 1 × Cr 1930).
const lines = await client.query<{
account_number: string
debit_amount: string
credit_amount: string
}>(
`SELECT account_number, debit_amount, credit_amount
FROM public.journal_entry_lines
WHERE journal_entry_id = $1
ORDER BY sort_order`,
[result.journal_entry_id],
)
expect(lines.rows).toHaveLength(4)
const apLines = lines.rows.filter((l) => l.account_number === '2440')
const bankLines = lines.rows.filter((l) => l.account_number === '1930')
expect(apLines).toHaveLength(3)
expect(bankLines).toHaveLength(1)
expect(Number(bankLines[0]!.credit_amount)).toBe(6500)
const apSum = apLines.reduce((s, l) => s + Number(l.debit_amount), 0)
expect(apSum).toBe(6500)
// Verify all 3 supplier invoices flipped to 'paid'.
const inv1 = await client.query<{ status: string; paid_amount: string; remaining_amount: string }>(
`SELECT status, paid_amount, remaining_amount FROM public.supplier_invoices WHERE id = $1`,
[si1],
)
expect(inv1.rows[0]!.status).toBe('paid')
expect(Number(inv1.rows[0]!.paid_amount)).toBe(2000)
expect(Number(inv1.rows[0]!.remaining_amount)).toBe(0)
// Verify 3 supplier_invoice_payments rows all reference the same JE.
const payments = await client.query<{ journal_entry_id: string; supplier_invoice_id: string }>(
`SELECT journal_entry_id, supplier_invoice_id
FROM public.supplier_invoice_payments WHERE transaction_id = $1`,
[txId],
)
expect(payments.rows).toHaveLength(3)
const jeIds = new Set(payments.rows.map((p) => p.journal_entry_id))
expect(jeIds.size).toBe(1)
expect(jeIds.has(result.journal_entry_id!)).toBe(true)
// Verify tx.journal_entry_id is set + supplier_invoice_id left NULL (multi).
const txRow = await client.query<{
journal_entry_id: string | null
supplier_invoice_id: string | null
is_business: boolean
}>(
`SELECT journal_entry_id, supplier_invoice_id, is_business
FROM public.transactions WHERE id = $1`,
[txId],
)
expect(txRow.rows[0]!.journal_entry_id).toBe(result.journal_entry_id)
expect(txRow.rows[0]!.supplier_invoice_id).toBeNull()
expect(txRow.rows[0]!.is_business).toBe(true)
// Verify samlingsverifikat carries the supplier-side source_type
// (PR #603 compliance fix — was previously 'invoice_paid' for both
// directions which mis-routed behandlingshistorik filters).
const je = await client.query<{ source_type: string }>(
`SELECT source_type FROM public.journal_entries WHERE id = $1`,
[result.journal_entry_id],
)
expect(je.rows[0]!.source_type).toBe('supplier_invoice_paid')
})
})
it('rejects with BATCH_OVERSHOOT when allocation exceeds invoice remaining', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: -5000 })
const allocations = [
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 5000 },
]
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[txId, JSON.stringify(allocations), userId, companyId],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_OVERSHOOT')
expect(result.details).toMatchObject({ supplier_invoice_id: si, requested: 5000 })
// No journal entry should have been created.
const txRow = await client.query<{ journal_entry_id: string | null }>(
`SELECT journal_entry_id FROM public.transactions WHERE id = $1`,
[txId],
)
expect(txRow.rows[0]!.journal_entry_id).toBeNull()
const inv = await client.query<{ paid_amount: string; remaining_amount: string }>(
`SELECT paid_amount, remaining_amount FROM public.supplier_invoices WHERE id = $1`,
[si],
)
expect(Number(inv.rows[0]!.paid_amount)).toBe(0)
expect(Number(inv.rows[0]!.remaining_amount)).toBe(1000)
})
})
it('rejects with BATCH_UNAUTHORIZED when caller is not a member of the company', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: -1000 })
// Different user — never added to company_members for companyId. The
// SECURITY DEFINER check (PR #603 compliance) refuses any access.
const outsiderId = await insertAuthUser()
await withUserContext(outsiderId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[
txId,
JSON.stringify([{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 1000 }]),
outsiderId,
companyId,
],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_UNAUTHORIZED')
})
})
it('rejects with BATCH_TX_ALREADY_BOOKED when tx already has a JE', async () => {
const { userId, companyId, fiscalPeriodId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
// Pre-book the tx by linking it to a manual posted JE.
const existingJeId = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.journal_entries
(id, user_id, company_id, fiscal_period_id, voucher_number, voucher_series,
entry_date, description, source_type, status)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 1, 'A', '2026-06-05', 'Manual', 'manual', 'draft')`,
[existingJeId, userId, companyId, fiscalPeriodId],
)
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.journal_entry_lines (journal_entry_id, account_number, debit_amount, credit_amount)
VALUES ($1, '1930', 0, 1000), ($1, '4010', 1000, 0)`,
[existingJeId],
)
await getPool().query(`UPDATE public.journal_entries SET status = 'posted' WHERE id = $1`, [existingJeId])
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: -1000 })
await getPool().query(
`UPDATE public.transactions SET journal_entry_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`,
[existingJeId, txId],
)
const allocations = [
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 1000 },
]
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[txId, JSON.stringify(allocations), userId, companyId],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_TX_ALREADY_BOOKED')
})
})
it('rejects with BATCH_DIRECTION_MISMATCH for supplier allocation against income tx', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
// Positive tx (income) — wrong direction for supplier_invoice allocation.
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: 1000 })
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[
txId,
JSON.stringify([{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 1000 }]),
userId,
companyId,
],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_DIRECTION_MISMATCH')
})
})
it('rejects BATCH_DUPLICATE_ALLOCATION when the same supplier invoice appears twice', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: -800 })
// Same supplier_invoice_id listed twice. Per-allocation amounts (400 each)
// do not individually overshoot the 1 000 remaining, but their sum would
// insert two payment rows for one invoice. The dedupe guard catches
// this in the validation loop before any write.
const allocations = [
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 400 },
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 400 },
]
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[txId, JSON.stringify(allocations), userId, companyId],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_DUPLICATE_ALLOCATION')
expect(result.details?.id).toBe(si)
})
})
it('rejects BATCH_MIXED_KINDS_UNSUPPORTED on customer + supplier in same batch', async () => {
const { userId, companyId } = await seedTenant()
const supplier = await insertSupplier({ userId, companyId })
const si = await insertSupplierInvoice({
userId, companyId, supplierId: supplier, total: 1000,
})
// Insert a customer + invoice for the customer-side allocation.
const customerId = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.customers
(id, user_id, company_id, name, customer_type, country)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'Kund AB', 'swedish_business', 'SE')`,
[customerId, userId, companyId],
)
const invoiceId = randomUUID()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.invoices
(id, user_id, company_id, customer_id, invoice_number, invoice_date, due_date, status,
currency, subtotal, vat_amount, total, paid_amount, remaining_amount, vat_treatment)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'F-001', '2026-06-01', '2026-07-01', 'sent', 'SEK',
1000, 0, 1000, 0, 1000, 'standard_25')`,
[invoiceId, userId, companyId, customerId],
)
// Negative tx — direction makes both sides individually plausible, but
// we reject mixed kinds outright. Actually negative=supplier and we need
// either income or expense; the mixed check fires before the direction
// check, so the result code is MIXED_KINDS regardless.
const txId = await insertTransaction({ userId, companyId, amount: -2000 })
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query<{ match_batch_allocate: RpcResult }>(
`SELECT match_batch_allocate($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)`,
[
txId,
JSON.stringify([
{ kind: 'supplier_invoice', supplier_invoice_id: si, amount: 1000 },
{ kind: 'customer_invoice', invoice_id: invoiceId, amount: 1000 },
]),
userId,
companyId,
],
)
const result = r.rows[0]!.match_batch_allocate
expect(result.ok).toBe(false)
expect(result.code).toBe('BATCH_MIXED_KINDS_UNSUPPORTED')
})
})
})