fix(security): resolve the CodeQL backlog, three fixes and three documented false positives (#1225)

Triage of all 9 CodeQL alerts surfaced on main by #1223. None were introduced by that PR.

Fixed: the compliance-review artifact now unpacks to runner.temp instead of over the trusted checkout (actions/artifact-poisoning, critical); MCP LIKE patterns escape backslash first, which was a real correctness bug returning wrong rows for any search containing a backslash (js/incomplete-sanitization, 2 sites); and the mcp-oauth consent form action is HTML-escaped (js/reflected-xss, not exploitable because WHATWG URL already percent-encodes " < >, but & is not in that encode set).

Dismissed as false positives with reasoning recorded at each site and in DECISIONS.md: sie-export escapeQuotes, where doubling backslashes would violate SIE 4B, corrupt files in conformant readers and skew #KSUMMA under BFL 7-year retention; hashApiKey, where SHA-256 is correct for a 256-bit CSPRNG token and changing it would invalidate every live gnubok_sk_ key; and the DuplicateBookingDialog href, which is a DB UUID behind a literal path prefix.

Regression tests cover both behavioural fixes, including the escape ordering.
This commit is contained in:
Jakob Wennberg
2026-07-27 14:02:25 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4702a63cff
commit 7dde8cac82
8 changed files with 161 additions and 7 deletions
+17
View File
@@ -378,6 +378,23 @@ export function generateApiKey(mode: ApiKeyMode = 'live'): { key: string; hash:
return { key, hash, prefix }
}
/**
* SHA-256, deliberately, and NOT a slow KDF like bcrypt/argon2.
*
* CodeQL flags this as js/insufficient-password-hash. That rule exists for
* user-chosen passwords, which are low-entropy and brute-forceable, so the
* defence is to make each guess expensive. This input is not a password: keys
* come from generateApiKey as 32 CSPRNG bytes (`gnubok_sk_<base64url>`), and no
* work factor moves the needle on a 256-bit random secret.
*
* A slow KDF would also be actively worse here: this runs on the hot path of
* every MCP request, where the hash is the primary-key lookup used to find the
* row, so per-request cost is real latency for zero security gain.
*
* Do NOT "fix" this by changing the algorithm. The hash IS the stored
* credential, so a different function invalidates every live `gnubok_sk_` key,
* breaking existing MCP connections with no migration path.
*/
export function hashApiKey(key: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
}