fix(documents): record archive integrity checks in their own ledger so the nightly control advances again (#2108)
The 03:00 WORM verification cron stamped last_integrity_check_at on document_attachments. enforce_period_lock_documents() fires on any UPDATE of a row whose journal entry sits in a closed or locked period, without checking whether the entry link actually changed, so a read-only integrity stamp was rejected. The queue orders last_integrity_check_at ASC NULLS FIRST, so the rejected rows re-sorted to the head every night and the batch became permanently 200/200 blocked. Both call sites discarded the update error, so nothing logged and nothing alerted. Prod state: 34 557 current-version documents, 24 083 never checked, last successful stamp 2026-08-31 03:00, nightly successes already decayed to single digits. Migration 017's enforcement triggers are legally required and never-touch, so this does not narrow the trigger. The verification outcome moves to its own document_integrity_checks table and the cron stops writing document_attachments altogether, which takes the trigger off the write path. The legacy column stays in place. Failures are now counted, logged and reported in the route's summary: the silence is why this went unnoticed for weeks. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1427,6 +1427,7 @@ One line per decision: `[YYYY-MM-DD] <decision>: <why>`. Appended by agents and
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[2026-09-01] multi_user skeptic fixes: Stripe cancel EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it (grace anchor; other grants still deleted per freeze-and-retain); app-side state checks go RPC-first via SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state (capability_grants RLS hides team rows from non-team users, byrå clients would misread as frozen); byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant via backfill + teams trigger (WL-10 assumption made real; partner billing is out-of-band); PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has no multi_user rows: gated fallback would freeze all non-owners); /api/v1 got the same dormancy gate as MCP. RLS-level enforcement and the mid-session API fallback write-back window stay v2 follow-ups (documented, same class as pre-existing stale-preference fallback).
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[2026-09-01] Declined CodeRabbit's UpgradeNote suggestion (PR #1758 follow-up) to append the self-host connector sentence to children instead of replacing them: every caller's children is hosted subscription copy ("... kräver ett abonnemang"), so appending would show subscription wording on a self-host, the exact thing the branch exists to avoid; the "CSV/SIE import stays free" text it cited is a code comment in BankSyncNowButton, not children. Replace-on-self-host stays; a dedicated selfHosted children prop can come when a caller actually needs per-panel reassurance there.
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[2026-09-01] getConnectorConfig() rebuilds baseUrl as origin + path (userinfo/query/fragment stripped, warn-logged without the raw value): /api/connector/status echoes baseUrl to the operator and the sync/proxy URLs get paths appended, so nothing secret-shaped pasted into GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL may survive; the stripped parts were never meaningful in a base URL. The status route is also Cache-Control: no-store (key prefix + wiring layout out of shared browser caches).
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[2026-09-01] WORM integrity check moved to a new document_integrity_checks table instead of narrowing enforce_period_lock_documents(). CLAUDE.md declares migration 017's enforcement triggers legally required and never-touch, and the nightly stamp does not need to write document_attachments at all. Trades one extra table for leaving the BFL enforcement surface untouched.
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[2026-09-01] processing_history PII: the sender address and mail subject are dropped outright from RateLimitedDropped and AttachmentsTruncated rather than hashed, and the strip ships in the same commit as, and ahead of, the migration registering those event types. Registering first would start persisting PII into an append-only table the archive's erasure path excludes.
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[2026-09-01] White-label backend guard inverted from an allowlist of protected hosts to an assertion that any customer-facing production host is served by the production Supabase project. This reverses the earlier explicit-allowlist decision: that model failed open for improveone.accounted.se, which was serving a byra login page wired to the staging project with no alert, because it was never added to the list.
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[2026-09-01] Anon-callable SECURITY DEFINER writes: the guard shape `IF auth.uid() IS NOT NULL AND NOT EXISTS (membership)` is unsafe on its own. The anon JWT carries no `sub` claim, so auth.uid() is NULL for role anon too and the guard short-circuits into the trusted branch. It is defense in depth behind a REVOKE FROM PUBLIC, anon, never a substitute for one. Every new SECURITY DEFINER function ships with that REVOKE; tests/pg/definer-function-grants.pg.test.ts enforces it from a sweep rather than a hand list, because hand-listing is exactly how three guarded numbering RPCs were wrongly declared safe.
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