perf(layout): dashboard layout in two waves, nav flags as one RPC, local JWT verification (#1946)
The dashboard layout runs on every hard load, hard refresh, company switch and the 16 router.refresh() sites, and loading.tsx cannot paint until it resolves. It cost ~20 network calls in 4 sequential waves: a third getUser() round trip to Supabase Auth (after the proxy's and the route guard's), the company resolution, then 16 reads including four limit-1 probes whose only job is to decide whether to render the Webshop and Körjournal nav rows, and an entitlements read that itself ran two waves. - lib/auth/claims.ts: claimsPinned/userFromClaims extracted from require-auth.ts (unchanged) so the dashboard request context shares the exact pinning + mapping. getDashboardAuthContext verifies the JWT locally and falls back to getUser() only when claims are missing, unpinned or unverifiable: the proxy already performed the per-request revocation check before the layout runs (same semantics approved for routes on 2026-07-23). - Wave 1 (user-keyed, parallel with the company resolution): team membership, profile, user preferences and the memberships join, which now also supplies the active company's row and role, so the separate companies and company_members reads are gone. - Wave 2 (company-keyed): settings, agent profile, the switcher's settings names, entitlements in ONE wave (getCompanyEntitlements takes the team_id the join already carries and runs the grants read alongside config + subscription), and get_dashboard_nav_flags(). - supabase/migrations/20260826120000_get_dashboard_nav_flags.sql: SECURITY INVOKER, STABLE, EXECUTE for authenticated only; RLS applies inside. lib/dashboard/nav-flags.ts wraps it with the pre-RPC four-probe fallback on PGRST202/42883/42501 (self-hosted not yet migrated, deploy ordering) and degrades to hidden rows on any other error. - tests/pg/dashboard-nav-flags-rpc.pg.test.ts (6): fresh company, active vs pending WooCommerce, active Shopify, mileage trips, RLS for a member of another company, EXECUTE grants. Unit tests for the wrapper (RPC row, single-object payload, each fallback code, other errors) and for the entitlements teamId option. ~20 calls / 4 waves -> ~12 calls / 2 waves, 0 auth network calls. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Jakob Wennberg
Claude Fable 5
parent
1a41119682
commit
4ac7b45c8a
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import type { JwtPayload, User } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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/**
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* Local JWT claims to a User: shared by the API route guard (require-auth),
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* the dashboard request context and, once adopted, the auth proxy.
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*
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* getClaims() verifies signature and expiry locally against the cached JWKS
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* (asymmetric signing keys; HS256 projects fall back to a server call inside
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* getClaims itself). These helpers add the pinning and the User mapping.
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*/
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/**
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* Defense-in-depth pinning on top of getClaims' signature/expiry verification:
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* the token must come from THIS project's auth server (iss) and be an
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* end-user access token (aud 'authenticated'; anonymous sign-ins share it).
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* A mismatch is not treated as unauthenticated: callers fall back to the
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* server-side getUser() check, which is authoritative.
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*/
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export function claimsPinned(claims: JwtPayload): boolean {
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const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL?.replace(/\/+$/, '')
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// Without a configured URL (unit tests) there is nothing to pin against.
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const issOk = !supabaseUrl || claims.iss === `${supabaseUrl}/auth/v1`
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const aud = claims.aud
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const audOk = Array.isArray(aud) ? aud.includes('authenticated') : aud === 'authenticated'
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return issOk && audOk
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}
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/**
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* Maps verified JWT claims onto the User subset server code actually consumes
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* (id, email, is_anonymous, app_metadata, user_metadata, role, phone).
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*
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* Server-only fields (identities, factors, created_at timestamps) are absent
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* from the token and verified unused by any route (2026-07-23 audit);
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* created_at is set to '' only to satisfy the type.
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*/
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export function userFromClaims(claims: JwtPayload): User {
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return {
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id: claims.sub,
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aud: Array.isArray(claims.aud) ? (claims.aud[0] ?? 'authenticated') : (claims.aud ?? 'authenticated'),
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role: claims.role,
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email: claims.email,
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phone: claims.phone,
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app_metadata: claims.app_metadata ?? {},
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user_metadata: claims.user_metadata ?? {},
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is_anonymous: claims.is_anonymous ?? false,
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created_at: '',
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}
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}
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@@ -1,49 +1,15 @@
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import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { shouldEnforceMfa } from './mfa'
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import type { User, SupabaseClient, JwtPayload } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import type { User, SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { claimsPinned, userFromClaims } from './claims'
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type AuthResult =
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| { user: User; supabase: SupabaseClient; error: null }
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| { user: null; supabase: SupabaseClient; error: NextResponse }
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/**
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* Maps verified JWT claims onto the User subset routes actually consume
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* (id, email, is_anonymous, app_metadata, user_metadata, role, phone).
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*
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* Server-only fields (identities, factors, created_at timestamps) are absent
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* from the token and verified unused by any route (2026-07-23 audit);
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* created_at is set to '' only to satisfy the type.
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*/
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/**
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* Defense-in-depth pinning on top of getClaims' signature/expiry verification:
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* the token must come from THIS project's auth server (iss) and be an
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* end-user access token (aud 'authenticated'; anonymous sign-ins share it).
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* A mismatch is not treated as unauthenticated: we fall back to the
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* server-side getUser() check, which is authoritative.
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*/
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function claimsPinned(claims: JwtPayload): boolean {
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const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL?.replace(/\/+$/, '')
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// Without a configured URL (unit tests) there is nothing to pin against.
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const issOk = !supabaseUrl || claims.iss === `${supabaseUrl}/auth/v1`
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const aud = claims.aud
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const audOk = Array.isArray(aud) ? aud.includes('authenticated') : aud === 'authenticated'
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return issOk && audOk
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}
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function userFromClaims(claims: JwtPayload): User {
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return {
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id: claims.sub,
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aud: Array.isArray(claims.aud) ? (claims.aud[0] ?? 'authenticated') : (claims.aud ?? 'authenticated'),
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role: claims.role,
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email: claims.email,
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phone: claims.phone,
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app_metadata: claims.app_metadata ?? {},
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user_metadata: claims.user_metadata ?? {},
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is_anonymous: claims.is_anonymous ?? false,
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created_at: '',
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}
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}
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// claimsPinned / userFromClaims live in ./claims so the dashboard request
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// context (and later the auth proxy) share the exact same pinning + mapping.
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/**
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* Auth + MFA guard for API routes.
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