feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387)
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit (reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt; self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars. Fixes #362 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review finding on PR #1387. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings - signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null - heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization - sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is never accepted on the userId fallback alone - drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen readers are not interrupted every second Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
parent
f55bfc478b
commit
1c9d378df8
+191
-1
@@ -5,6 +5,24 @@ import { apiPathSkipsMfaGate } from '@/lib/auth/api-mfa-gate'
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import { DEFAULT_LOCALE, LOCALE_COOKIE, isLocale } from '@/i18n/config'
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import { userHasPassword } from '@/lib/auth/has-password'
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import { safeReturnTo } from '@/lib/auth/safe-return-to'
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import {
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apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout,
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createSessionTimeoutState,
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evaluateSessionTimeout,
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getSessionTimeoutConfig,
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sessionStateMatchesUser,
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sessionTimeoutClearCookieOptions,
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sessionTimeoutCookieOptions,
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signSessionTimeoutState,
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verifySessionTimeoutState,
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} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout'
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import {
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isSessionAuthMethod,
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SESSION_AUTH_METHOD_HINT_COOKIE,
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SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
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type SessionAuthMethod,
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type SessionTimeoutReason,
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} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout-shared'
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export async function updateSession(request: NextRequest) {
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let supabaseResponse = NextResponse.next({
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@@ -62,6 +80,72 @@ export async function updateSession(request: NextRequest) {
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}
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}
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const timeoutConfig = getSessionTimeoutConfig()
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const hasAuthorizationHeader = request.headers.get('authorization') !== null
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if (!user) {
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clearSessionTimeoutCookies(request, supabaseResponse)
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} else if (
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timeoutConfig.enabled &&
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!apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout(pathname, hasAuthorizationHeader)
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) {
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const encodedState = request.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
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const sessionId = await getSupabaseSessionId(supabase)
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const verifiedState = await verifySessionTimeoutState(encodedState)
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if (encodedState && !verifiedState) {
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await signOutTimedOutSession(supabase)
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return sessionTimeoutResponse(
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request,
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supabaseResponse,
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'absolute',
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'password',
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)
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}
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if (
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!verifiedState ||
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!sessionStateMatchesUser(verifiedState, user.id, sessionId)
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) {
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const hintedMethod = request.cookies.get(
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SESSION_AUTH_METHOD_HINT_COOKIE,
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)?.value
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const method = isSessionAuthMethod(hintedMethod)
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? hintedMethod
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: 'password'
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: user.id,
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sessionId,
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method,
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})
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const signedState = await signSessionTimeoutState(state)
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if (signedState) {
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request.cookies.set(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE, signedState)
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supabaseResponse.cookies.set(
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SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
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signedState,
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sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(),
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)
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clearAuthMethodHint(request, supabaseResponse)
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}
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} else {
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const timeoutReason = evaluateSessionTimeout(
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verifiedState,
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timeoutConfig,
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)
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if (timeoutReason) {
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await signOutTimedOutSession(supabase)
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return sessionTimeoutResponse(
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request,
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supabaseResponse,
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timeoutReason,
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verifiedState.method,
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)
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}
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}
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}
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// ── API routes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// API routes authenticate themselves (requireAuth, API-key Bearer, cron
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// secret, webhook signatures). Middleware runs on them for ONE reason: to
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@@ -78,7 +162,7 @@ export async function updateSession(request: NextRequest) {
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if (pathname.startsWith('/api')) {
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const skipMfaGate = apiPathSkipsMfaGate(
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pathname,
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request.headers.get('authorization') !== null,
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hasAuthorizationHeader,
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)
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if (!skipMfaGate && user && shouldEnforceMfa(user)) {
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const { data: aal } =
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@@ -300,6 +384,112 @@ export async function updateSession(request: NextRequest) {
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return supabaseResponse
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}
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async function getSupabaseSessionId(
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supabase: ReturnType<typeof createServerClient>,
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): Promise<string | null> {
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if (typeof supabase.auth.getClaims !== 'function') return null
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try {
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const { data } = await supabase.auth.getClaims()
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return typeof data?.claims?.session_id === 'string'
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? data.claims.session_id
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: null
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} catch (error) {
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console.warn('[middleware] could not resolve Supabase session id', error)
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return null
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}
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}
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async function signOutTimedOutSession(
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supabase: ReturnType<typeof createServerClient>,
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): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await supabase.auth.signOut({ scope: 'local' })
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} catch (error) {
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console.warn('[middleware] timed-out session revocation failed', error)
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}
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}
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function clearAuthMethodHint(
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request: NextRequest,
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response: NextResponse,
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): void {
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if (!request.cookies.has(SESSION_AUTH_METHOD_HINT_COOKIE)) return
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request.cookies.delete(SESSION_AUTH_METHOD_HINT_COOKIE)
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response.cookies.set(SESSION_AUTH_METHOD_HINT_COOKIE, '', {
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path: '/',
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maxAge: 0,
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sameSite: 'lax',
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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})
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}
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function clearSessionTimeoutCookies(
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request: NextRequest,
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response: NextResponse,
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): void {
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if (request.cookies.has(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)) {
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request.cookies.delete(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)
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response.cookies.set(
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SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
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'',
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sessionTimeoutClearCookieOptions(),
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)
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}
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clearAuthMethodHint(request, response)
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}
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function copyResponseCookies(from: NextResponse, to: NextResponse): void {
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for (const cookie of from.cookies.getAll()) {
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to.cookies.set(cookie)
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}
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}
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function sessionTimeoutResponse(
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request: NextRequest,
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authResponse: NextResponse,
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reason: SessionTimeoutReason,
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method: SessionAuthMethod,
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): NextResponse {
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clearSessionTimeoutCookies(request, authResponse)
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if (request.nextUrl.pathname.startsWith('/api')) {
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const response = NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: {
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code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED',
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message: reason === 'idle'
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? 'Sessionen har upphört på grund av inaktivitet.'
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: 'Sessionen har upphört av säkerhetsskäl.',
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message_en: reason === 'idle'
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? 'The session expired due to inactivity.'
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: 'The session expired for security reasons.',
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reason,
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},
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},
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{ status: 401 },
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)
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response.headers.set('X-Session-Timeout-Reason', reason)
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response.headers.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
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copyResponseCookies(authResponse, response)
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return response
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}
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const url = new URL('/login', request.url)
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url.searchParams.set('reason', reason)
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url.searchParams.set('method', method)
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const destination = safeReturnTo(
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request.nextUrl.pathname + request.nextUrl.search,
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'/',
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)
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if (destination !== '/') url.searchParams.set('next', destination)
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(url)
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response.headers.set('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
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copyResponseCookies(authResponse, response)
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return response
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}
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/**
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* Which query parameter each auth page reads its post-auth destination from.
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* /login reads `next` (app/(auth)/login/page.tsx), the MFA pages read
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