fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jakob Wennberg
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5.1
Jakob Wennberg
Claude Fable 5.1
Jakob Wennberg
parent
6e8d76a9cb
commit
18cbc4c30a
@@ -757,3 +757,201 @@ describe('truncateIp: privacy-preserving IP logging', () => {
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// Suppress unused-import warning: we re-export to keep the type chain visible.
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void mockStoreIdempotency
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describe('withApiV1: read-only role gate (viewer)', () => {
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// The v1 surface runs as the service role, so RLS never sees the viewer.
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// This wrapper is the only place the read-only role is enforced for API
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// keys; the DB triggers that block viewer writes apply to cookie sessions.
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function viewerKey(scopes: string[]) {
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mockValidate.mockResolvedValue({
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userId: 'user-viewer',
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companyId: 'company-1',
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scopes,
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mode: 'live',
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})
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mockServiceClient.mockReturnValue(makeSupabaseStub({ company_id: 'company-1', role: 'viewer' }))
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}
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it('refuses a viewer key on POST journal-entries with 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY before the handler runs', async () => {
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viewerKey(['bookkeeping:write'])
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const handlerSpy = vi.fn(async (_req: Request, ctx: { requestId: string }) =>
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ok({ id: 'je-1' }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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// No requireScope override: the real catalogue entry for the route is what
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// classifies the request ('POST .../journal-entries' -> bookkeeping:write).
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'journal-entries.create',
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handlerSpy,
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/journal-entries', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x', 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ description: 'x', lines: [] }),
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(403)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.error.code).toBe('FORBIDDEN')
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expect(body.error.details.code).toBe('ROLE_READ_ONLY')
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expect(body.error.details.role).toBe('viewer')
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expect(body.error.details.required_scope).toBe('bookkeeping:write')
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// Swedish user-facing message from the registry entry.
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expect(body.error.message).toBe('Du har inte behörighet att utföra denna åtgärd.')
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expect(body.error.request_id).toMatch(/^req_/)
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expect(handlerSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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// Refused before the seat gate: no extra read for a refused write.
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expect(getMultiUserStateMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it('refuses a viewer even when the write is a dry-run (nothing to simulate for a read-only role)', async () => {
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viewerKey(['invoices:write'])
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const handlerSpy = vi.fn(async (_req: Request, ctx: { requestId: string }) =>
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ok({ ok: true }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'invoices.create',
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handlerSpy,
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{ requireScope: 'invoices:write' },
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/invoices?dry_run=true', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' },
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(403)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.error.details.code).toBe('ROLE_READ_ONLY')
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expect(handlerSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it('refuses a viewer on a GET whose scope is an elevated grant (webhooks:manage)', async () => {
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viewerKey(['webhooks:manage'])
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const handlerSpy = vi.fn(async (_req: Request, ctx: { requestId: string }) =>
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ok({ webhooks: [] }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'webhooks.list',
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handlerSpy,
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{ requireScope: 'webhooks:manage' },
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/webhooks', {
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' },
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(403)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.error.details.code).toBe('ROLE_READ_ONLY')
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expect(body.error.details.required_scope).toBe('webhooks:manage')
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expect(handlerSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it('leaves a viewer GET on a :read scope untouched (200, seat gate still consulted)', async () => {
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viewerKey(['reports:read'])
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'journal-entries.list',
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async (_req, ctx) => ok({ entries: [], companyId: ctx.companyId }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/journal-entries', {
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' },
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(200)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.data.companyId).toBe('company-1')
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// A viewer is a non-owner: the dormant-seat logic still runs for reads.
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expect(getMultiUserStateMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
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})
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it('still applies the seat gate to a viewer read in a frozen company', async () => {
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viewerKey(['reports:read'])
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getMultiUserStateMock.mockResolvedValue({ state: 'frozen', graceEndsAt: null })
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'journal-entries.list',
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async (_req, ctx) => ok({ entries: [] }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/journal-entries', {
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' },
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(403)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.error.details.capability).toBe('multi_user')
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expect(body.error.details.code).toBeUndefined()
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})
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it.each(['member', 'admin', 'owner'])('lets a %s key through the role gate on POST journal-entries', async (role) => {
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mockValidate.mockResolvedValue({
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userId: 'user-1',
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companyId: 'company-1',
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scopes: ['bookkeeping:write'],
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mode: 'live',
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})
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mockServiceClient.mockReturnValue(makeSupabaseStub({ company_id: 'company-1', role }))
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const handlerSpy = vi.fn(async (_req: Request, ctx: { requestId: string }) =>
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NextResponse.json({ data: { id: 'je-1', requestId: ctx.requestId } }, { status: 201 }),
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)
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'journal-entries.create',
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handlerSpy,
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/journal-entries', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x', 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ description: 'x', lines: [] }),
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(201)
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expect(handlerSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
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})
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it('keeps the non-member answer unchanged: 404, no role information leaks', async () => {
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mockValidate.mockResolvedValue({
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userId: 'user-outsider',
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companyId: 'company-2',
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scopes: ['bookkeeping:write'],
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mode: 'live',
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})
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mockServiceClient.mockReturnValue(makeSupabaseStub(null))
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const handler = withApiV1<{ params: Promise<{ companyId: string }> }>(
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'journal-entries.create',
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async (_req, ctx) => ok({ ok: true }, { requestId: ctx.requestId }),
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)
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const res = await handler(
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makeRequest('https://x.test/api/v1/companies/company-1/journal-entries', {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer gnubok_sk_x' },
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}),
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companyParams('company-1'),
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)
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expect(res.status).toBe(404)
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const body = await res.json()
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expect(body.error.code).toBe('NOT_FOUND')
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expect(body.error.details.role).toBeUndefined()
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})
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})
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@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
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* the token when one is supplied.
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* 4. When the URL contains `companyId`, verifies the API key's user has
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* access to that company via `company_members`. Multi-company keys are
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* supported transparently: the URL is the source of truth.
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* supported transparently: the URL is the source of truth. A `viewer`
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* (read-only) membership is refused for every write: mutating method
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* or non-`:read` scope (FORBIDDEN, details.code ROLE_READ_ONLY).
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* 5. Resolves the dry-run flag (`?dry_run=true` query OR `X-Dry-Run` header).
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* 6. Resolves `Idempotency-Key` (header) and replays cached responses. The
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* dry-run flag is part of the cache identity and dry-run responses are
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@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ import {
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extractBearerToken,
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hasScope,
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RATE_LIMIT_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS,
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scopeKind,
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validateApiKey,
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} from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
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import { runWithActor } from '@/lib/bookkeeping/actor-context-node'
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@@ -78,6 +81,13 @@ const DRY_RUN_HEADER = 'X-Dry-Run'
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// idempotency replay, requireIdempotencyKey enforcement), and omitting PUT
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// would let test keys write through PUT routes for real.
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const REQUIRES_IDEMPOTENCY = new Set(['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'])
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// RFC 9110 safe methods. The read-only role gate treats EVERYTHING else as a
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// write: a superset of REQUIRES_IDEMPOTENCY, so an exotic method can never
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// slip a viewer past the gate. Deliberately separate from REQUIRES_IDEMPOTENCY,
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// whose semantics (replay, dry-run forcing) must not widen as a side effect.
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const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS'])
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/** The read-only company role (see `CompanyRole` in `@/types`). */
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const READ_ONLY_ROLE = 'viewer'
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export interface ApiV1Context {
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/** Stable id for this HTTP request: appears in logs, error envelope, X-Request-Id. */
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@@ -414,14 +424,54 @@ export function withApiV1<P extends DynamicParams = { params: Promise<Record<str
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})
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}
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const membershipRole = (membership as { role?: string }).role
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// Read-only role gate. Cookie routes enforce the viewer role through
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// withRouteContext({ requireWrite }) and the DB enforces it through
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// RLS + triggers for cookie sessions, but this surface runs as the
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// service role: nothing below this line would stop a viewer's key from
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// posting. A request is a write when EITHER its method is unsafe
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// (catches action verbs whatever their scope) OR its scope is an
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// elevated grant (catches reads-by-method that still manage tenant
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// state, e.g. GET /webhooks on webhooks:manage). Dry-run and test
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// keys are refused too: a viewer has no write to simulate.
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//
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// Placed AFTER the membership 404 so a non-member sees exactly what it
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// saw before (no new company-existence signal), and BEFORE the seat
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// gate so a refused write costs no extra read.
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if (
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membershipRole === READ_ONLY_ROLE &&
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(!SAFE_METHODS.has(request.method) || scopeKind(requiredScope) === 'write')
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) {
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userLog.warn('read-only membership refused write request', {
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companyId,
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method: request.method,
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requiredScope,
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...forensic,
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})
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return await v1ErrorResponseFromCode('FORBIDDEN', userLog, {
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requestId,
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status: 403,
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reason: 'role_read_only',
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details: {
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code: 'ROLE_READ_ONLY',
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companyId,
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role: READ_ONLY_ROLE,
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required_scope: requiredScope,
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message:
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'This company membership is read-only (viewer): write requests are refused. Ask a company owner or admin to change the role.',
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},
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})
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}
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// Multi-user seat gate: the API-key surface is a chokepoint like the
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// cookie routes and MCP. A non-owner membership in a frozen company
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// (multi_user lapsed past its 20-day grace) is refused here so an old
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// key cannot keep working the books after the freeze. Owners pass
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// without the extra read; the service client sees team-scoped grants.
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if ((membership as { role?: string }).role !== 'owner') {
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if (membershipRole !== 'owner') {
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const access = await getMultiUserState(supabase, companyId)
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if (isMembershipDormant((membership as { role: string }).role, access.state)) {
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if (isMembershipDormant(membershipRole as string, access.state)) {
|
||||
userLog.warn('multi-user seat gate refused frozen membership', { companyId, ...forensic })
|
||||
return await v1ErrorResponseFromCode('FORBIDDEN', userLog, {
|
||||
requestId,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user