From 04dad01309ffd5155650909bfe5ab302874d2009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SIAX Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:15:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] chore(ci): ta bort GitHub Actions-duplicat (SEC-25) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Gitea Actions (.gitea/workflows) är kanoniskt CI i SIAX. Kvarvarande .github-filer (mallar, dependabot) behålls. --- .github/workflows/ci-cache.yml | 54 --- .github/workflows/codeql.yml | 71 ---- .github/workflows/compliance-pr.yml | 44 --- .github/workflows/compliance-swarm.yml | 61 ---- .github/workflows/core-build.yml | 184 ---------- .github/workflows/docker-image-scan.yml | 142 -------- .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml | 320 ------------------ .github/workflows/npm-publish.yml | 194 ----------- .github/workflows/pr-agent.yml | 97 ------ .github/workflows/swedish-compliance-diff.yml | 51 --- .../workflows/swedish-compliance-review.yml | 126 ------- .github/workflows/test-pg-real.yml | 299 ---------------- .github/workflows/zizmor.yml | 81 ----- 13 files changed, 1724 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/ci-cache.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/codeql.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/compliance-pr.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/compliance-swarm.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/core-build.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/docker-image-scan.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/npm-publish.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/pr-agent.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/swedish-compliance-diff.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/swedish-compliance-review.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/test-pg-real.yml delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/zizmor.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-cache.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-cache.yml deleted file mode 100644 index a4720dfc..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/ci-cache.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -name: CI cache warm - -# The save half of the npm cache that .github/actions/setup-core restores. -# -# It has to live in its own main-branch workflow. GitHub scopes a cache entry to -# the ref that wrote it, with one exception: entries written on the default -# branch are readable from every branch and PR. core-build.yml runs on -# pull_request only, so anything it saved would be readable by exactly one PR -# and dead the moment that PR merged. That is not hypothetical here: a naive -# `cache: npm` on the pg-real workflow once put fourteen 284 MB copies (4 GB, -# 40% of the repo quota) on disk in a day, none of them ever restorable. -# -# So: main saves, PRs restore-only. Keyed on the lockfile hash, so this runs -# only when dependencies actually move and each entry is read many times before -# it is replaced. - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - paths: - - package-lock.json - - package.json - workflow_dispatch: {} - -concurrency: - group: ci-cache - cancel-in-progress: true - -permissions: - contents: read - -jobs: - warm: - name: Warm npm cache - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - with: - node-version: 20 - - # Populates ~/.npm. `npm ci` deletes node_modules first, so this measures - # a cold install the same way a PR job will. - - run: npm ci - - # A no-op when the key already exists, which is the intent: one entry per - # lockfile state, not one per push. - - name: Save npm cache - uses: actions/cache/save@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4 - with: - path: ~/.npm - key: npm-${{ runner.os }}-node20-${{ hashFiles('package-lock.json') }} diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 57d25d9a..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -name: CodeQL - -# Semantic code scanning. The repo already had `security-events: write` and -# uploaded Trivy SARIF, but Trivy only reports known CVEs in dependencies and -# base images: nothing analysed the application's own code. For a multi-tenant -# accounting SaaS holding personnummer, bank data and money, that was the gap. -# -# Two languages: -# javascript-typescript - the app itself (injection, path traversal, unsafe -# deserialization, missing authorization checks, hardcoded credentials). -# actions - GitHub's own workflow analysis. It overlaps zizmor.yml without -# replacing it: CodeQL follows dataflow into composite actions, zizmor knows -# Actions-specific misconfigurations CodeQL has no notion of. Two cheap -# scanners with different blind spots beat one. -# -# The default query suite is used deliberately. `security-extended` finds more -# but roughly doubles the runtime, and this already runs on every PR; revisit -# once the default suite's findings are triaged. - -on: - pull_request: - branches: [main] - push: - branches: [main] - schedule: - # Weekly. CodeQL ships new queries continuously, so an unchanged repo can - # still acquire findings. - - cron: '19 3 * * 1' - workflow_dispatch: {} - -permissions: - contents: read - -concurrency: - group: codeql-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -jobs: - analyze: - name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }}) - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 30 - permissions: - contents: read - # Required to upload the analysis results. - security-events: write - # Required by the `actions` language pack to read workflow metadata. - actions: read - strategy: - # A failure in one language should not hide the other's results. - fail-fast: false - matrix: - language: [javascript-typescript, actions] - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Initialize CodeQL - uses: github/codeql-action/init@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - languages: ${{ matrix.language }} - - # No build step. javascript-typescript and actions are both interpreted - # languages to CodeQL, extracted straight from source, so `npm ci` and - # `next build` would add minutes and change nothing about the database. - - name: Perform CodeQL analysis - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - category: /language:${{ matrix.language }} diff --git a/.github/workflows/compliance-pr.yml b/.github/workflows/compliance-pr.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1085b4c7..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/compliance-pr.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -name: "compliance: review (advisory)" - -# Lightweight LLM-only review on every PR. ~90s, no Docker scanners. -# Posts a sticky comment with reasoned findings across all 5 frameworks. -# The nightly compliance-swarm.yml (mode: audit) provides the deeper -# scanner-backed coverage. - -on: - pull_request: - types: [opened, synchronize, reopened] - -permissions: - contents: read - pull-requests: write - -concurrency: - group: compliance-review-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -jobs: - review: - name: Compliance review (advisory) - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 5 - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - fetch-depth: 0 - - - uses: erp-mafia/compliancemaxx@248cebcf90867fa813a8c0a2bc66cca70a56db3a # v2 - with: - base: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} - fail-on-findings: false # advisory while bedding in - env: - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }} - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }} - AWS_REGION: eu-north-1 - # Pin the review model explicitly. compliancemaxx falls back to - # `eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6` when this is unset - # (packages/cli/src/llm/bedrock.ts), so leaving it out silently kept - # this workflow a generation behind the rest of the repo after the - # Sonnet 5 migration (#1218). Keep in sync with - # swedish-compliance-review.yml and lib/agent/composer/client.ts. - COMPLIANCE_BEDROCK_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5 diff --git a/.github/workflows/compliance-swarm.yml b/.github/workflows/compliance-swarm.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c879de0a..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/compliance-swarm.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -name: "compliance: full swarm" - -# Full hybrid audit: deterministic scanners + LLM-driven deep_audit checks -# (RoPA drift, AGPL §13 evaluation, IDOR/access-control reasoning, ISMS clause -# review, change-management bypass detection). -# -# Triggers: -# - Nightly cron at 02:00 UTC -# - workflow_dispatch (run anytime) -# - PRs labeled `compliance:full-audit` - -on: - schedule: - - cron: '0 2 * * *' - workflow_dispatch: - inputs: - reason: - description: 'Why are you running this manually?' - required: false - default: '' - pull_request: - types: [labeled] - -permissions: - contents: read - pull-requests: write - security-events: write - -concurrency: - group: compliance-swarm-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: false - -jobs: - swarm: - name: Full hybrid audit - if: | - github.event_name != 'pull_request' - || github.event.label.name == 'compliance:full-audit' - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 60 - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - fetch-depth: 0 - - - uses: erp-mafia/compliancemaxx@248cebcf90867fa813a8c0a2bc66cca70a56db3a # v2 - with: - mode: audit # v2 name; was `swarm` in v1 - llm-provider: bedrock - fail-on-findings: false # observational while bedding in - env: - AWS_REGION: eu-north-1 - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }} - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }} - # Pin the audit model explicitly rather than leaving this commented - # out. compliancemaxx defaults to `eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6` - # when it is unset (packages/cli/src/llm/bedrock.ts), which quietly - # kept the nightly audit a generation behind after #1218. Keep in - # sync with compliance-pr.yml and lib/agent/composer/client.ts. - COMPLIANCE_BEDROCK_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5 diff --git a/.github/workflows/core-build.yml b/.github/workflows/core-build.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 29b60217..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/core-build.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ -name: Core Build (no extensions) - -# Split out of a single serial job that took 7m43s wall-clock: npm ci 24s, lint -# ratchet 1m29s, build 2m00s, unit tests 3m31s, ratchets ~10s. None of those -# stages needed the previous one's output, so they were serial only by -# accident. Running them as independent jobs (and sharding the 897-file unit -# suite four ways) puts the critical path on `build` at roughly 2m30s. -# -# The prologue each job needs is in .github/actions/setup-core. - -on: [pull_request] - -# Six concurrent jobs per push makes stale runs far more expensive than they -# were when this was one job, and a superseded push has nothing worth finishing. -concurrency: - group: core-build-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -permissions: - contents: read - -jobs: - checks: - name: Checks - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens - # what a compromised dependency in the build could reach. - persist-credentials: false - - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core - - - name: Verify skill bodies are in sync with the seed migration - # Fails if a .claude/skills/**/SKILL.md changed without regenerating the - # seed migration (npm run skills:generate). Keeps prod skill content from - # silently drifting out of sync. No DB needed: reads files + manifest. - run: npm run skills:check - - - name: Verify taxonomy registry is in sync with the element lists - # Fails if dev_docs/bokslut/taxonomi/** changed without regenerating - # lib/bokslut/ixbrl/taxonomy/generated/ (npm run taxonomy:generate). - # The iXBRL generator emits facts strictly from the generated registry, - # so drift here means filings tagged against a stale concept set. - run: npm run taxonomy:check - - - name: Verify the accounted-api agent skill is in sync with the registry - # Fails if a v1 endpoint / registry schema / overlay changed without - # regenerating skills/accounted-api (npm run apiskill:generate). The - # skill is the installable API reference for external coding agents; - # drift here means agents integrate against stale endpoint contracts. - run: npm run apiskill:check - - - name: Lint ratchet (no new ESLint errors) - # `npm run lint` was never wired into CI, so ~60 legacy errors - # accumulated. This ratchet (sibling of check:guards) fails only when - # a PR ADDS an error beyond scripts/checks/eslint-baseline.json; the - # baseline ratchets down as legacy errors get fixed. - run: npm run check:lint - - - name: Typecheck ratchet (no new TypeScript errors) - # `npm test` does not typecheck: vitest transpiles and discards types, - # so a type error passes all 18 000 tests and only surfaces in the - # build. That happened twice on 2026-08-27. This also covers __tests__ - # files, which the Next.js build never compiles, so it is not merely a - # faster copy of the build job. - # - # Baselined per FILE in scripts/checks/typecheck-baseline.json (539 - # legacy errors across 83 files, all in test files) and ratchets down. - # Per-file rather than per-error-code on purpose: a code-keyed budget - # would let a real regression hide behind a legacy fix elsewhere. - run: npm run check:types - - - name: Antipattern ratchet (no new MFA-bypassing routes / naive öre-rounding) - # Fails only if a PR ADDS a route that hand-rolls supabase.auth.getUser() - # instead of the MFA-enforcing guard, or a new Math.round(x*100)/100. - # Baseline lives in scripts/checks/antipatterns-baseline.json and ratchets - # down as the A1 (route auth) and D1 (rounding) migrations land. - run: npm run check:guards - - - name: Validate konteringspaket catalogue - # The system booking templates are data files under packs/ rather than - # rows frozen inside a migration. This gate is what makes that safe: it - # checks the schema, that every BAS account actually exists in the 2026 - # chart, and that each pack BALANCES when applied through the real - # applyTemplate(). PR #1321 shipped seeded reference data that - # contradicted the engine; that class of bug is structurally valid and - # only a semantic check catches it. - run: npm run validate:packs - - - name: Validate community registry - # registry/ is the public source of truth for gnubok.se/community/registry - # and takes entries by PR from outside the team. The gate checks the - # frontmatter the website build consumes, and rejects JSX/import/export - # in entry bodies: the site renders bodies through MDX, which would - # execute those at build time. - run: npm run validate:registry - - - name: Check no core imports from extensions - run: | - VIOLATIONS=$(grep -r "from '@/extensions/" lib/ app/api/ components/ --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" \ - | grep -v "app/api/extensions/" \ - | grep -v "components/extensions/" \ - | grep -v "lib/extensions/_generated/" \ - | grep -v "lib/extensions/loader.ts" || true) - if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then - echo "ERROR: Core code imports from @/extensions/:" - echo "$VIOLATIONS" - exit 1 - fi - - build: - name: Build (zero extensions) - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens - # what a compromised dependency in the build could reach. - persist-credentials: false - - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core - - run: npm run build - env: - # The Next.js build worker OOMs on the runner's default Node heap - # since 2026-08-19 (bundle growth crossed the default old-space - # ceiling; the first branch containing the whole day's merges was the - # first to hit it). Public-repo runners have 16 GB, give the build 8. - NODE_OPTIONS: --max-old-space-size=8192 - - test: - # 897 unit test files (11,341 tests) take 3m31s in one process. Measured - # locally, four shards split them 225/224/224/224 with the slowest at 64s, - # which puts this comfortably under the build job so it stops being the - # critical path. Vitest hard-errors when the shard count exceeds the - # resolved file count, which is nowhere near a concern at this size. - name: Unit tests (${{ matrix.shard }}/4) - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - strategy: - # One shard failing should not hide failures in the other three: a red PR - # is more useful when it lists every broken test, not just the first. - fail-fast: false - matrix: - shard: [1, 2, 3, 4] - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # Nothing here pushes, so leaving the token in .git/config only widens - # what a compromised dependency in the build could reach. - persist-credentials: false - - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-core - # Via env rather than interpolated straight into the shell body: the value - # is a static matrix integer and harmless, but keeping every `run:` free of - # ${{ }} is the rule that makes the template-injection audit meaningful. - - run: npm test -- --shard="$SHARD/4" - env: - SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }} - - core-build: - # One stable check name covering all six jobs above, so the PR checks list - # (and any future required-status-check rule) has a single thing to read - # rather than a shard-numbered matrix. `needs` alone would not be enough: - # a needed job that is skipped or cancelled does not fail its dependents, - # so the results are asserted explicitly. - name: Core Build - if: always() - needs: [checks, build, test] - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Assert every core job succeeded - env: - CHECKS: ${{ needs.checks.result }} - BUILD: ${{ needs.build.result }} - TEST: ${{ needs.test.result }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - echo "checks=$CHECKS build=$BUILD test=$TEST" - failed=0 - for r in "$CHECKS" "$BUILD" "$TEST"; do - [ "$r" = "success" ] || failed=1 - done - if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then - echo "::error::One or more core-build jobs did not succeed" - exit 1 - fi diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker-image-scan.yml b/.github/workflows/docker-image-scan.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 50cbe772..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/docker-image-scan.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -name: Scheduled Image Vulnerability Scan - -# The build pipeline (docker-publish.yml) builds and publishes the image but -# does NOT fail on CVEs: it stays green so deploys are deterministic. This -# workflow is the actual vulnerability gate: it re-scans the published `latest` -# image and fails (notifying repo admins) plus raises a Security-tab alert on a -# fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVE, prompting a dependency or base-image bump. -# -# It fires on three triggers: -# 1. workflow_run: the moment "Build and Push Docker Image" completes, so a -# freshly published image is gated within the scan's own duration (minutes) -# rather than waiting up to 24h for the cron. This is what shrinks the -# vulnerable-image exposure window after every publish. -# 2. schedule (daily): catches CVEs newly disclosed against an already- -# published image even when nothing was republished. -# 3. workflow_dispatch: run on demand from the Actions tab after a patch to -# confirm clean. -# -# Severity gate policy (both jobs): only fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs may fail a -# run; LOW/MEDIUM findings must never turn a run red. Every sarif-format Trivy -# step MUST keep `limit-severities-for-sarif: true`, otherwise trivy-action -# unsets TRIVY_SEVERITY for SARIF output and the gate silently widens to all -# severities (that exact misconfiguration shipped once; see the scan step). -# -# The `sca` job is the dependency-level counterpart of the image scan: a daily -# Trivy filesystem scan of the npm lockfile. It exists because Dependabot was -# deliberately removed (PR #1084) and two HIGH Next.js CVEs then sat -# undetected until a manual check; this job is the automated SCA alerting -# that replaces it. -# -# NOTE: GitHub only runs `schedule` and `workflow_run` triggers from the default -# branch, so both start firing once this is merged to main. -on: - workflow_run: - workflows: ['Build and Push Docker Image'] - types: [completed] - schedule: - # 06:17 UTC daily: off the hour to dodge cron congestion on GitHub. - - cron: '17 6 * * *' - workflow_dispatch: {} - -env: - REGISTRY: ghcr.io - IMAGE_NAME: erp-mafia/gnubok - -jobs: - scan: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - # workflow_run fires even when the publish FAILED: there's no new image to - # gate in that case, so skip. schedule/workflow_dispatch carry no - # workflow_run payload, so the `!= 'workflow_run'` arm lets them through. - if: >- - github.event_name != 'workflow_run' || - github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' - permissions: - contents: read - # Pull the published image from GHCR. - packages: read - # SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab. - security-events: write - - steps: - - name: Log in to GHCR - uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4 - with: - registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} - username: ${{ github.actor }} - password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - - name: Scan published image with Trivy - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0 - with: - image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:latest - # Block on fixable CRITICAL/HIGH: the same policy the build pipeline - # used to enforce inline. It is safe to block here: a red scheduled - # run is a "go patch" notification, not a blocked deploy. ignore-unfixed - # keeps it actionable (only CVEs we can resolve by rebuilding fail). - severity: CRITICAL,HIGH - exit-code: '1' - ignore-unfixed: true - format: sarif - output: trivy-results.sarif - # Without this, trivy-action unsets TRIVY_SEVERITY when format is - # sarif (entrypoint.sh: "Building SARIF report with all severities"), - # silently discarding the CRITICAL,HIGH filter above. The exit code - # then fires on any fixable CVE down to LOW, which is not the policy - # documented here and turns routine low-severity noise into a red run. - limit-severities-for-sarif: true - - - name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab - # if: always() so findings still reach the Security tab even though the - # scan step above failed the run. Same category as docker-publish.yml so - # the two analyses share one alert set instead of duplicating. - if: always() - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif - category: trivy - - sca: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - # The lockfile does not change when an image is published, so the - # workflow_run trigger is irrelevant here: run on the daily schedule and - # on manual dispatch only. - if: github.event_name != 'workflow_run' - permissions: - contents: read - # SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab. - security-events: write - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Scan npm lockfile with Trivy - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0 - with: - # Filesystem scan: picks up package-lock.json and reports known CVEs - # in the resolved dependency tree, including transitive pins. Same - # gate policy as the image scan above: fail only on fixable - # CRITICAL/HIGH, and keep limit-severities-for-sarif set (see the - # header comment for why dropping it silently widens the gate). - scan-type: fs - scan-ref: . - scanners: vuln - severity: CRITICAL,HIGH - exit-code: '1' - ignore-unfixed: true - format: sarif - output: trivy-sca.sarif - limit-severities-for-sarif: true - - - name: Upload Trivy SCA results to GitHub Security tab - # if: always() so findings reach the Security tab even when the scan - # step failed the run. Distinct category from the image scan so - # dependency alerts and image alerts stay separately traceable. - if: always() - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - sarif_file: trivy-sca.sarif - category: trivy-sca diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml b/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0a145eeb..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,320 +0,0 @@ -name: Build and Push Docker Image - -# Builds each platform on its own native runner, then stitches the two into one -# manifest list. -# -# This was a single amd64 job emulating arm64 through QEMU and took ~31 minutes: -# QEMU translates every Arm instruction into x86, so the arm64 half ran several -# times slower than the amd64 half it shared a runner with. GitHub's free -# `ubuntu-24.04-arm` runners (public repos) remove the emulation entirely, and -# the two halves now run concurrently on their own hardware. -# -# The cost is a second job. A native single-platform build cannot produce a -# multi-platform manifest by itself, so each build pushes an untagged, -# digest-addressed image and `merge` composes the tag list from those digests -# with `imagetools create`. Tagging, signing, and scanning all belong to `merge`, -# because the digest consumers actually resolve is the manifest list's, not -# either platform's. -# -# workflow_dispatch is deliberate: it makes this runnable from a branch before -# merge. On a non-default branch the is_default_branch guard below disables the -# `latest` tag, so a dispatch run publishes only the immutable commit-sha tag and -# cannot move what production pulls. - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - tags: ['v*.*.*'] - workflow_dispatch: {} - -env: - REGISTRY: ghcr.io - IMAGE_NAME: erp-mafia/gnubok - -jobs: - build: - name: Build ${{ matrix.platform }} - runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }} - strategy: - # Publishing one architecture and silently dropping the other is worse - # than publishing neither: the merge below needs both digests. - fail-fast: true - matrix: - include: - - platform: linux/amd64 - arch: amd64 - runner: ubuntu-latest - - platform: linux/arm64 - arch: arm64 - runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm - permissions: - contents: read - packages: write - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # The build pushes to GHCR via docker/login-action, never over git, so - # the git credential is dead weight inside a Docker build context. - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Log in to GHCR - uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4 - with: - registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} - username: ${{ github.actor }} - password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - # Labels only. Tags are applied once, to the manifest list, in `merge`. - - name: Extract metadata - id: meta - uses: docker/metadata-action@dc802804100637a589fabce1cb79ff13a1411302 # v6 - with: - images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} - - - name: Set up Docker Buildx - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4 - - # No setup-qemu-action. That was the whole point: each runner now builds - # its own architecture natively. - - name: Build and push by digest - id: build - uses: docker/build-push-action@53b7df96c91f9c12dcc8a07bcb9ccacbed38856a # v7 - with: - context: . - platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }} - labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} - build-args: | - EXTENSIONS_PRESET=self-hosted - # SBOM (software bill of materials) + SLSA provenance are attached as - # OCI attestations, queryable via `docker buildx imagetools inspect`. - provenance: mode=max - sbom: true - # push-by-digest publishes without a tag; `merge` collects the digests - # and builds the tag list from them. name-canonical records the - # repository name in the config so the merged manifest resolves. - outputs: type=image,name=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true - # Layer cache lives in GHCR, not the GitHub Actions cache. Two - # platforms x mode=max is ~7 GB, which alone ate 70% of the repo's - # 10 GB Actions cache quota and, because buildx refreshes every blob's - # access time on each run, never aged out under LRU: it starved the - # other workflows' caches instead. GHCR storage is free for public - # repos and off that quota. mode=max is kept deliberately: mode=min - # would drop the deps/builder stages and make every push redo - # `npm ci` + `next build`. - # - # The cache tag is now per-architecture. Each runner builds a single - # platform, so a shared tag would leave the two jobs racing to - # overwrite a cache manifest describing layers the other cannot use. - # - # A stable cache tag is safe here: this workflow runs only on main, - # on v*.*.* tags (cut from main), and on manual dispatch, so there is - # no untrusted ref that could poison the layers. - # - # image-manifest=true,oci-mediatypes=true is required by GHCR, which - # rejects buildkit's default cache manifest media type. - cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:buildcache-${{ matrix.arch }} - cache-to: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:buildcache-${{ matrix.arch }},mode=max,image-manifest=true,oci-mediatypes=true - - - name: Verify NEXT_PUBLIC_* sentinels survived the build - # The image is generic: it is built with sentinel values - # (__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__) that docker-entrypoint.sh seds into - # .next at container start. That only works if the sentinel is still IN - # the build output. Writing `process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_X === 'true'` in - # source lets the minifier fold the comparison and delete the branch, - # erasing the sentinel: the flag is then permanently false and no - # operator setting can change it. That shipped once and left every - # Docker self-host running with the entitlement paywall live, invisibly, - # because dev and the Vercel build both have real env values and never - # reproduce it. - # - # This runs in the per-platform build, not in `merge`, for two reasons. - # It is the only place each architecture is actually checked: `docker - # run` against the manifest list resolves the runner's own platform, so - # a merge-job check would silently exempt arm64. And it lands BEFORE any - # tag exists, so a folded sentinel fails the matrix (fail-fast) and - # `merge` never runs: `latest` cannot move onto a build whose flags can - # no longer be configured. The digest image pushed above stays untagged - # and unreferenced. - # - # check:guards catches the source pattern on every PR; this is the - # end-to-end proof against the built artifact, which is the only place - # the failure is observable. - env: - DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}" - MISSING="" - for VAR in NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA; do - if docker run --rm --entrypoint sh "$IMAGE" -c \ - "grep -rq '__${VAR}__' /opt/gnubok-template/.next"; then - echo "ok: __${VAR}__ present in build output" - else - MISSING="${MISSING} ${VAR}" - fi - done - if [ -n "$MISSING" ]; then - echo "::error::Sentinel(s) missing from the build output:${MISSING}." - echo "::error::Read these flags via lib/env/public-flags (flagEnabled/isSelfHosted)." - echo "::error::An in-place comparison is constant-folded away, leaving the flag stuck off." - exit 1 - fi - - # Digests reach `merge` as artifact filenames: the file content is - # irrelevant, only the name carries information. - - name: Export digest - env: - DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - mkdir -p /tmp/digests - touch "/tmp/digests/${DIGEST#sha256:}" - - - name: Upload digest - uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7 - with: - name: digests-${{ matrix.arch }} - path: /tmp/digests/* - # A silently empty artifact would surface later as an imagetools - # invocation with no source digests, which is a much worse error. - if-no-files-found: error - retention-days: 1 - - merge: - name: Merge, sign and scan - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - needs: build - permissions: - contents: read - packages: write - # OIDC token used by cosign keyless signing. - id-token: write - # SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab from the Trivy scan. - security-events: write - - steps: - - name: Download digests - uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8 - with: - path: /tmp/digests - pattern: digests-* - merge-multiple: true - - - name: Log in to GHCR - uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4 - with: - registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} - username: ${{ github.actor }} - password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - - name: Set up Docker Buildx - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4 - - - name: Extract metadata - id: meta - uses: docker/metadata-action@dc802804100637a589fabce1cb79ff13a1411302 # v6 - with: - images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} - # On main: push `latest` + commit-sha tags. - # On v*.*.* tags: push semver tags (1.2.3, 1.2, 1) for production pinning. - # A workflow_dispatch run from a branch gets the sha tag only, because - # is_default_branch gates `latest`. - tags: | - type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}} - type=sha,prefix= - type=semver,pattern={{version}} - type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} - type=semver,pattern={{major}} - - - name: Create and push manifest list - working-directory: /tmp/digests - run: | - set -euo pipefail - docker buildx imagetools create \ - $(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON") \ - $(printf "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@sha256:%s " *) - - # Cosign and Trivy must address the manifest list, not either platform's - # image: the list digest is what `docker pull` resolves for consumers, so - # it is the thing worth signing and the thing worth scanning. - - name: Resolve manifest list digest - id: manifest - env: - VERSION: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - DIGEST=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect \ - "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION}" \ - --format '{{json .Manifest}}' | jq -r '.digest') - echo "Resolved ${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION} -> ${DIGEST}" - echo "digest=${DIGEST}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - - - name: Verify both platforms are present - # A merge that quietly produced a single-arch manifest would ship a - # broken image to every arm64 self-hoster, and nothing downstream checks - # architecture. Assert it here while the digest is still in hand. - env: - DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - PLATFORMS=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect \ - "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}" --raw \ - | jq -r '[.manifests[] - | select(.platform != null) - | select(.platform.os != "unknown") - | "\(.platform.os)/\(.platform.architecture)"] - | sort | unique | join(",")') - echo "Manifest platforms: ${PLATFORMS}" - [ "$PLATFORMS" = "linux/amd64,linux/arm64" ] || { - echo "::error::Expected linux/amd64,linux/arm64 but got ${PLATFORMS}" - exit 1 - } - - - name: Install cosign - uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 # v4.1.2 - - - name: Sign the image (keyless OIDC) - env: - DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - cosign sign --yes "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@${DIGEST}" - - - name: Scan image with Trivy (report-only) - id: trivy - # Decoupled from the publish gate on purpose: this pipeline must stay - # green so builds are deterministic. The image is already pushed and - # signed above, so failing here would only redden the run: it would not - # unship a vulnerable image. exit-code:0 + continue-on-error keep CVEs - # (and even a Trivy/DB outage) from failing the build; findings still - # flow to the Security tab below. The real blocking gate is - # docker-image-scan.yml, which re-scans the published image and fails - # (notifying admins) on a fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVE. It runs on a - # workflow_run trigger the moment THIS workflow completes (so the gap - # between publish and the blocking scan is the scan's own duration - # (minutes), not a 24h cron window) plus a daily cron as a safety net. - # Accepted residual risk: an image is live for that short scan window - # before the gate fires; see docs/SELF-HOSTING.md / the risk register. - continue-on-error: true - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0 - with: - image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}@${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }} - severity: CRITICAL,HIGH - exit-code: '0' - ignore-unfixed: true - format: sarif - output: trivy-results.sarif - - - name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab - # if: always(), evidence must reach the Security tab regardless of the - # scan step's exit status. With the previous `outcome == 'success'` guard, - # a Trivy/DB outage that errored the scan would silently drop findings. - # Kept non-fatal (continue-on-error) so a missing SARIF or a Security-tab - # hiccup can't redden an otherwise-good publish. - if: always() - continue-on-error: true - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif - category: trivy diff --git a/.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml b/.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 89a0fc76..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,194 +0,0 @@ -name: Publish MCP bridges to npm - -# Publishes the two stdio-to-HTTP MCP bridges, packages/accounted-mcp and -# packages/gnubok-mcp, to the public npm registry. -# -# The trigger is a version bump, not a git tag: a push to main that touches a -# packages/*/package.json runs one job per package, and each job publishes only -# if the version in its package.json is not already on the registry. A package -# whose version did not change is skipped, so a merge that bumps one bridge -# never republishes the other, and re-running a finished workflow is a no-op. -# -# Auth is the repository secret NPM_TOKEN, an npm granular access token with -# publish rights on both packages. A run without the secret fails at its first -# step with a message naming it, rather than inside `npm publish` with an opaque -# ENEEDAUTH. A token rather than OIDC trusted publishing because accounted-mcp -# has never been published, and npm cannot bind a trusted publisher to a package -# that does not exist yet. -# -# --provenance attaches a Sigstore attestation that ties the tarball to this -# workflow run and commit; id-token: write exists for that. The registry rejects -# the attestation unless package.json `repository.url` matches this repository, -# which is why both package.jsons point at erp-mafia/accounted. -# -# workflow_dispatch runs the same job on demand, optionally for one package (the -# other package's job is skipped by the Select step), and with dry_run to -# exercise the version gate and `npm publish --dry-run` without touching the -# registry. Dispatching from a branch is the way to test this file -# before merging it. - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - paths: - - 'packages/*/package.json' - workflow_dispatch: - inputs: - package: - description: Package to publish - type: choice - options: [all, accounted-mcp, gnubok-mcp] - default: all - dry_run: - description: Pack and validate only, do not publish - type: boolean - default: false - -permissions: - contents: read - -# A dispatch overlapping a push could race to publish the same version; the -# loser would only fail with a confusing E403. Queue instead of cancelling. -concurrency: - group: npm-publish - cancel-in-progress: false - -jobs: - publish: - name: Publish ${{ matrix.package }} - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 10 - permissions: - contents: read - # OIDC token for the --provenance attestation. - id-token: write - strategy: - # The packages are independent: a failure in one must not cancel the other. - fail-fast: false - matrix: - # Static on purpose: both packages always get a job. On push the - # version gate skips the one that did not change; on dispatch the - # Select step skips the one that was not requested. A matrix built - # from the dispatch input would put workflow input text into an - # expression, which is the shape injection scanners flag. - package: [accounted-mcp, gnubok-mcp] - env: - DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }} - PACKAGE_DIR: packages/${{ matrix.package }} - - steps: - - name: Select package - id: select - env: - REQUESTED: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && 'all' || inputs.package }} - PACKAGE: ${{ matrix.package }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - if [ "$REQUESTED" = "all" ] || [ "$REQUESTED" = "$PACKAGE" ]; then - echo "run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - else - echo "Skipping $PACKAGE: dispatch requested $REQUESTED." - echo "run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - fi - - - name: Require the NPM_TOKEN secret - # Before checkout, so a missing secret is the first line of the log. - # Only the presence of the secret is checked here; the token itself is - # exposed to the publish step alone. - if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' - env: - NPM_TOKEN_SET: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN != '' }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then - echo "Dry run: NPM_TOKEN is not required." - exit 0 - fi - if [ "$NPM_TOKEN_SET" != "true" ]; then - echo "::error::Repository secret NPM_TOKEN is not set. Create an npm granular access token with read and write access to accounted-mcp and gnubok-mcp (see the Releasing section in packages/*/README.md) and add it under Settings > Secrets and variables > Actions as NPM_TOKEN." - exit 1 - fi - echo "NPM_TOKEN is set." - - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' - with: - # Nothing here pushes over git; the only credential this job needs is - # the npm token, and that never touches the checkout. - persist-credentials: false - - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' - with: - node-version: 22 - # Writes an .npmrc that reads the auth token from NODE_AUTH_TOKEN. - registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org - - - name: Compare package.json version with the registry - id: gate - if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' - working-directory: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - NAME=$(node -p "require('./package.json').name") - VERSION=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version") - - # `npm view` exits 1 with an E404 body when the package has never - # been published. That is the first-release case and counts as - # "nothing on the registry". Any other failure (network, registry - # outage, bad token) is an error: assuming "not published" there - # would only move the failure into `npm publish`. - set +e - VIEW=$(npm view "$NAME" versions --json 2>&1) - STATUS=$? - set -e - if [ "$STATUS" -ne 0 ]; then - if grep -q 'E404' <<< "$VIEW"; then - echo "$NAME has never been published (E404): $VERSION would be its first release." - VIEW='[]' - else - echo "::error::npm view $NAME failed (exit $STATUS)." - echo "$VIEW" - exit 1 - fi - fi - - # `npm view versions --json` prints a bare string, not a - # one-element array, when exactly one version exists. - ON_REGISTRY=$(VIEW="$VIEW" VERSION="$VERSION" node -e ' - const raw = JSON.parse(process.env.VIEW); - const list = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw]; - console.error("Versions on registry: " + (list.length ? list.join(", ") : "(none)")); - process.stdout.write(list.includes(process.env.VERSION) ? "yes" : "no"); - ') - - if [ "$ON_REGISTRY" = "yes" ]; then - echo "Skipping: $NAME@$VERSION is already on the registry." - echo "publish=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: already on the registry, skipped" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" - else - echo "Publishing: $NAME@$VERSION is not on the registry." - echo "publish=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - fi - echo "name=$NAME" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - echo "version=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - - - name: Publish to npm - if: steps.select.outputs.run == 'true' && steps.gate.outputs.publish == 'true' - working-directory: ${{ env.PACKAGE_DIR }} - env: - # The only step that sees the token. - NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }} - NAME: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.name }} - VERSION: ${{ steps.gate.outputs.version }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then - # --dry-run packs and validates but never contacts the registry, so - # it also runs without a token. - npm publish --dry-run --access public - echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: dry run, not published" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" - exit 0 - fi - npm publish --provenance --access public - echo "- \`$NAME@$VERSION\`: published, https://www.npmjs.com/package/$NAME/v/$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" diff --git a/.github/workflows/pr-agent.yml b/.github/workflows/pr-agent.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1624d603..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/pr-agent.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -name: PR Agent - -# AI pull-request review (PR-Agent, the original open-source reviewer: repo id -# 662766482, same repo the qodo-ai/Codium-ai names redirect to). Replaces the -# Greptile bot that went silent after #682. -# -# Supply-chain hardening: -# * Pinned to an immutable commit SHA (v0.36.0), NOT a movable tag, because the -# repo now sits under a recently-created, unverified org (The-PR-Agent). -# * Runs on a DEDICATED, minimal IAM key (bedrock:InvokeModel only) supplied via -# PR_AGENT_AWS_* secrets: never the app's general AWS credentials. A leaked -# PR-Agent key can do nothing but invoke the one Bedrock model. -# -# Scope: ONLY /review runs automatically. /describe and /improve are disabled so -# the bot never overwrites hand-written PR descriptions. Users can still invoke -# any command interactively by commenting e.g. "/describe" or "/improve" on a PR. - -on: - pull_request: - types: [opened, reopened, ready_for_review, synchronize] - issue_comment: - types: [created, edited] - -# One run per PR *per event type*; a new push (pull_request:synchronize) cancels -# a superseded review. The event_name suffix is critical: without it, the -# pull_request and issue_comment triggers share a group, so a bot comment -# (Vercel/Supabase/compliance preview bots fire within ~2s of opening a PR) -# queues an issue_comment run that cancel-in-progress kills the real review with, -# before the job-level `if: sender.type != 'Bot'` ever gets to skip it. Keeping the -# groups separate lets comment runs cancel only each other (all skipped, harmless) -# and never the open/push review. -concurrency: - group: pr-agent-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}-${{ github.event_name }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -permissions: - contents: read - pull-requests: write - issues: write - -jobs: - pr_agent: - # Skip bot-authored events (vercel/supabase/etc.) to avoid feedback loops. - if: ${{ github.event.sender.type != 'Bot' }} - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - name: The PR Agent - steps: - - name: The PR Agent - # Pinned to the v0.36.0 commit SHA (immutable): do not switch to @v0.36.0. - uses: The-PR-Agent/pr-agent@8e4d32e5497defd43c023a404f73560c62728961 # v0.39.0 - env: - GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - # ── DEDICATED Bedrock IAM key (bedrock:InvokeModel only): NOT the - # app's AWS_* secrets. litellm reads AWS_REGION_NAME; AWS_REGION is - # set too for safety. Create these three repo/org secrets: - # PR_AGENT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, PR_AGENT_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, - # PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION (an EU region, e.g. eu-west-1). - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }} - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }} - AWS_REGION_NAME: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION }} - AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.PR_AGENT_AWS_REGION }} - - # ── Model: Claude Sonnet 5 via the EU Bedrock inference profile. The - # strong and weak slots both point at it: this account has no larger - # model enabled, so a second id would only be the same model under - # another name. custom_model_max_tokens is required because this id - # is not in PR-Agent's built-in map. - CONFIG.MODEL: "bedrock/eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5" - CONFIG.MODEL_WEAK: "bedrock/eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5" - # Emptied explicitly. This block previously said it set no fallback - # list, but "unset" is not "none": PR-Agent's own default is - # ["gpt-5.6-terra"], visible in the resolved config it logs on every - # run. Only AWS credentials reach this container, so that fallback - # could never have authenticated, but a silent third-party model in - # the path of every PR diff should be absent by intent, not by a - # missing key. - CONFIG.FALLBACK_MODELS: "[]" - CONFIG.CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS: "1000000" - # Input window PR-Agent prunes the diff to fit. Default (~32k) truncated - # large PRs; raise it so the whole diff is reviewed (Sonnet 5 = 1M ctx). - # 64000 was tuned against Sonnet 4.6's tokenizer. Sonnet 5 tokenizes the - # same text into roughly 30% more tokens, so that budget silently held - # ~30% less real diff after #1218; 96000 restores parity with headroom. - CONFIG.MAX_MODEL_TOKENS: "96000" - LITELLM.DROP_PARAMS: "true" - - # ── pr_actions = which GitHub PR *event actions* trigger the bot - # (NOT a command list). Default omits 'synchronize', so pushes are - # skipped; we add it so every push is reviewed too. - GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.PR_ACTIONS: '["opened", "reopened", "ready_for_review", "review_requested", "synchronize"]' - # ── Which commands actually run on a handled event. Only review: - # describe/improve off so the bot never rewrites the PR body or - # pushes code suggestions. - GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_REVIEW: "true" - GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_DESCRIBE: "false" - GITHUB_ACTION_CONFIG.AUTO_IMPROVE: "false" diff --git a/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-diff.yml b/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-diff.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8ab51c22..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-diff.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -name: Compliance diff - -# Stage 1 of the fork-safe compliance review (see swedish-compliance-review.yml). -# -# This runs on the untrusted PR head, but is SAFE because it has NO secrets and -# only a read-only token: it computes the diff and uploads it as an artifact. -# It never runs project code (no `npm install`, no `node`): only git plumbing, -# which does not execute repository hooks. The privileged half (model call + -# comment) lives in stage 2, which never checks out fork code. - -on: - pull_request: - types: [opened, synchronize, reopened] - -permissions: - contents: read - -jobs: - prepare: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} - fetch-depth: 0 - - name: Compute diff vs base - # Pass GitHub context via env, never interpolate ${{ }} into the shell - # body: expression substitution happens before bash parses the script, - # so a value with shell metacharacters would be a code-execution sink. - env: - BASE_REF: ${{ github.base_ref }} - PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - # Full fetch (not --depth=1): the PR branch may be behind base, and a - # shallow base can leave merge-base with no reachable common ancestor. - # checkout above uses fetch-depth: 0, so HEAD already has full history. - git fetch origin "$BASE_REF" - MERGE_BASE=$(git merge-base "origin/$BASE_REF" HEAD) - git diff "$MERGE_BASE" HEAD > diff.patch - git diff --name-only "$MERGE_BASE" HEAD > files.txt - printf '%s\n' "$PR_NUMBER" > pr-number.txt - - name: Upload diff artifact - uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7 - with: - name: compliance-input - path: | - diff.patch - files.txt - pr-number.txt - retention-days: 1 diff --git a/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-review.yml b/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-review.yml deleted file mode 100644 index def828f7..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/swedish-compliance-review.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -name: Swedish Accounting Compliance Review - -# Stage 2 of the fork-safe compliance review (stage 1 is swedish-compliance-diff.yml). -# -# SECURITY: this is the privileged half: it has the AWS Bedrock secrets and a -# write token. It is triggered by `workflow_run` (NOT pull_request_target) and -# checks out ONLY the base repo, so it never executes fork PR code. The untrusted -# input (the PR diff) arrives as a downloaded artifact and is fed to the model -# as DATA: never run. This is the pattern GitHub recommends instead of -# `pull_request_target` + checking out the PR head. - -on: - workflow_run: - # Must match the `name:` field in swedish-compliance-diff.yml exactly. - # A rename there silently stops this trigger from firing on all subsequent PRs. - workflows: ["Compliance diff"] - types: [completed] - -permissions: - contents: read - actions: read # required to download the artifact from the triggering run - pull-requests: write # required to post the review comment - -jobs: - review: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 10 - # Only act on PR-triggered diffs that actually produced an artifact. - if: > - github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request' && - github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' - steps: - # Base repo only: the TRUSTED copy of the script and .claude/skills/. - # persist-credentials: false, no later step needs git push creds, so don't - # leave the token in .git/config for the steps that handle untrusted input. - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - with: - node-version: 20 - - name: Download diff artifact - uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8 - with: - name: compliance-input - # Unpacked OUTSIDE the checkout, not into the workspace root. - # - # This artifact is built from a fork's PR head, so its contents are - # attacker-influenced. Extracted over the workspace, an entry named - # `scripts/swedish-compliance-review.mjs` would overwrite the trusted - # script this job is about to run, with the AWS secrets and a write - # token already in scope. Stage 1 only ever writes three fixed - # filenames, and its workflow definition comes from the base repo even - # for fork PRs, so that is not reachable today: this keeps it - # unreachable if stage 1 ever grows a filename derived from PR - # content. Flagged by CodeQL as actions/artifact-poisoning. - path: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input - run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }} - github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - name: Resolve PR number - id: pr - run: | - set -euo pipefail - NUM=$(cat "$RUNNER_TEMP/compliance-input/pr-number.txt") - # Guard: pr-number.txt must be a plain integer (artifact is untrusted input). - if ! [[ "$NUM" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then - echo "Refusing to continue: pr-number.txt is not a number" >&2 - exit 1 - fi - echo "number=$NUM" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - - name: Install Anthropic Bedrock SDK - # Installed ONE DIRECTORY ABOVE the checkout on purpose. Running this - # inside the repo makes npm re-resolve the whole dependency tree from - # package.json (--no-package-lock throws away the pinned resolutions), - # and that re-resolution dies on an unrelated floating peer conflict - # (@hookform/resolvers -> valibot), which silently killed this review on - # every PR. Out of tree npm resolves this one package and nothing else, - # so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the compliance gate down - # again. Node still finds it: ESM bare specifiers walk up the parent - # directories' node_modules. NODE_PATH is not an alternative here, the - # ESM loader ignores it (CommonJS only). - # Version tracks the exact package.json pin: 0.32.0 broke Bedrock - # streaming in prod (DECISIONS.md 2026-07-08) and check:guards enforces - # 0.29.1 repo-wide, so this job must not be the one place running an - # unvetted build. Pinned exact + --ignore-scripts because this is the - # privileged job (write token in env): no floating @latest, and no - # dependency lifecycle scripts may execute here. - run: npm install --prefix "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.." --no-save --no-package-lock --ignore-scripts @anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk@0.29.1 - - name: Run compliance review - env: - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }} - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }} - AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.AWS_REGION || 'eu-north-1' }} - REVIEW_MODEL: eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5 - # Two-stage mode: read the diff from the artifact instead of git-diffing. - DIFF_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input/diff.patch - FILES_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/compliance-input/files.txt - run: node scripts/swedish-compliance-review.mjs - - name: Assert review produced output - # This job once produced no compliance signal for 10 consecutive PR - # runs (the in-tree npm install died on an unrelated peer conflict, see - # the install step above) and nobody noticed: workflow_run-triggered - # jobs do not appear on the PR checks list, so a red or silently empty - # run is invisible from the PR. Fail loudly whenever the review script - # finishes without writing a non-empty review.md, so "no output" can - # never again pass as a green run. - run: | - set -euo pipefail - if [ ! -s review.md ]; then - echo "::error::Compliance review produced no output (review.md missing or empty)" - exit 1 - fi - - name: Find previous compliance comment - uses: peter-evans/find-comment@b30e6a3c0ed37e7c023ccd3f1db5c6c0b0c23aad # v4.0.0 - id: find-comment - with: - issue-number: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }} - comment-author: 'github-actions[bot]' - body-includes: '' - - name: Post or update PR comment - uses: peter-evans/create-or-update-comment@e8674b075228eee787fea43ef493e45ece1004c9 # v5 - with: - issue-number: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }} - comment-id: ${{ steps.find-comment.outputs.comment-id }} - body-path: review.md - edit-mode: replace diff --git a/.github/workflows/test-pg-real.yml b/.github/workflows/test-pg-real.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d119bab4..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/test-pg-real.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,299 +0,0 @@ -name: pg-real tests - -on: [pull_request] - -# Neither job writes anything back: they read the repo, stand up a throwaway -# Postgres, and run tests. Without this block both inherit the repository's -# default token permissions, which are broader than that. -permissions: - contents: read - -concurrency: - group: pg-real-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -jobs: - coverage-gate: - # Enforces the database.md rule: a migration touching a trigger/RPC/RLS/ - # DEFERRABLE must come with a *.pg.test.ts change. Previously instruction- - # only. Escape hatch: `-- pg-test: covered-by ` / `-- pg-test: skip - # ()` comments inside the migration. - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # Full history so the merge-base with the PR base branch exists. - fetch-depth: 0 - persist-credentials: false - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - with: - node-version: 20 - - name: Require pg-real coverage for trigger/RPC/RLS migrations - env: - PG_GATE_BASE: origin/${{ github.base_ref }} - run: node scripts/check-pg-test-coverage.mjs - - # Proves that an EXISTING database survives the PR's migrations, which the - # pg-real job below cannot: it applies every migration to an empty database, - # so a NOT NULL, a CHECK, a unique index or a backfill passes trivially - # against zero rows and can still fail (or silently corrupt) on production. - # - # Shape: schema at the merge-base -> seed real rows -> apply ONLY the new - # migrations -> assert the rows are intact. A PR that adds no migration skips - # straight past the apply step and costs one cheap no-op run. - pg-upgrade: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - - services: - postgres: - image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060 - env: - POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres - ports: - - 5432:5432 - options: >- - --health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres" - --health-interval 5s - --health-timeout 5s - --health-retries 20 - - env: - DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres - PGPASSWORD: postgres - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - # Full history so the merge-base with the PR base branch exists. - fetch-depth: 0 - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Install psql client - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client - - - name: Identify the migrations this PR adds - id: newmig - env: - BASE_REF: origin/${{ github.base_ref }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - MERGE_BASE=$(git merge-base "$BASE_REF" HEAD) - echo "merge_base=$MERGE_BASE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - echo "Merge base: $MERGE_BASE" - - # Migrations present at HEAD but not at the merge base. Uses the git - # tree, not the filesystem, so a rebase or a merge commit cannot make - # an already-shipped migration look new. - git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD -- supabase/migrations \ - | grep '\.sql$' | sort > /tmp/head-migrations.txt - git ls-tree -r --name-only "$MERGE_BASE" -- supabase/migrations \ - | grep '\.sql$' | sort > /tmp/base-migrations.txt - comm -23 /tmp/head-migrations.txt /tmp/base-migrations.txt > /tmp/new-migrations.txt - - COUNT=$(wc -l < /tmp/new-migrations.txt | tr -d ' ') - echo "count=$COUNT" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - echo "New migrations ($COUNT):" - cat /tmp/new-migrations.txt - - - name: Bootstrap storage schema - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0' - run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql - - - name: Apply the schema as it stands at the merge base - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0' - env: - MERGE_BASE: ${{ steps.newmig.outputs.merge_base }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - # Read each migration out of the merge-base tree rather than the - # working tree: a PR that EDITS a shipped migration (forbidden, but - # this job must not be the thing that hides it) still gets the - # original applied here, so the edit shows up as a failure below. - while read -r f; do - echo "Applying (base) $f" - git show "$MERGE_BASE:$f" | psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q - done < /tmp/base-migrations.txt - - - name: Seed a real company with posted verifikat - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0' - run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/upgrade/seed.sql - - - name: Apply ONLY the new migrations, against existing data - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0' - run: | - set -euo pipefail - while read -r f; do - echo "Applying (new) $f" - psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f" - done < /tmp/new-migrations.txt - - - name: Assert the existing data survived - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count != '0' - run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f tests/pg/upgrade/assert.sql - - - name: No migrations in this PR - if: steps.newmig.outputs.count == '0' - run: echo "This PR adds no migration; nothing to upgrade-test." - - pg-real: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - - services: - postgres: - # Supabase image ships the auth schema, auth.uid(), and the extensions - # (uuid-ossp, pg_cron, btree_gist, vector) this repo's migrations need. - # Plain postgres:15 would require manual bootstrap SQL. - image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060 - env: - POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres - ports: - - 5432:5432 - options: >- - --health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres" - --health-interval 5s - --health-timeout 5s - --health-retries 20 - - env: - DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres - PGPASSWORD: postgres - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - # Deliberately no `cache: npm` here. This workflow runs on pull_request - # only, so the cache is never written on main, and GitHub scopes caches - # by ref: every PR uploaded its own 284 MB copy under an identical key - # that no other PR could ever restore. Fourteen dead copies (4 GB, 40% of - # the repo quota) accumulated in a single day. If this is ever worth - # caching again, it has to be actions/cache/save on main plus - # actions/cache/restore here, which is the only shape that gets hits. - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - with: - node-version: 20 - - - run: npm ci - - - name: Install psql client - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client - - - name: Bootstrap storage schema - # The supabase/postgres image ships a partial storage schema; the rest - # is provisioned by the storage-api service at runtime, which we do - # not run in CI. This aligns the schema with what migrations expect. - run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql - - - name: Apply migrations - run: | - set -euo pipefail - shopt -s nullglob - files=(supabase/migrations/*.sql) - if [ ${#files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then - echo "No migration files found" - exit 1 - fi - for f in "${files[@]}"; do - echo "Applying $f" - psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f" - done - - - run: npm run test:pg - - tool-pg: - # MCP tools driven through a REAL supabase-js client against a REAL - # PostgREST. This is NOT a duplicate of the pg-real job: that one holds a - # `pg` Pool and writes SQL, which cannot see the half of a tool that - # PostgREST resolves (the .select() column strings, the resource embeds, - # the or=(...) grammar). Before this job, all 100 files in - # extensions/general/mcp-server/__tests__ faked supabase and nothing in CI - # exercised that surface. - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - - services: - postgres: - image: supabase/postgres:15.8.1.060 - env: - POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres - ports: - - 5432:5432 - options: >- - --health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres" - --health-interval 5s - --health-timeout 5s - --health-retries 20 - - env: - DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres - TOOL_PG_DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres - TOOL_PG_REST_URL: http://127.0.0.1:3000 - PGPASSWORD: postgres - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6 - with: - node-version: 20 - - - run: npm ci - - - name: Install psql client - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends postgresql-client - - - name: Bootstrap storage schema - run: psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f tests/pg/bootstrap.sql - - - name: Default privileges for the supabase roles - # Without these PostgREST answers every request with 42501, because the - # grants have to exist before the migrations create ~400 tables. - run: | - psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c " - GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON TABLES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON ROUTINES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public GRANT ALL ON SEQUENCES TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - " - - - name: Apply migrations - run: | - set -euo pipefail - shopt -s nullglob - files=(supabase/migrations/*.sql) - if [ ${#files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then echo "No migration files found"; exit 1; fi - for f in "${files[@]}"; do - psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f" - done - - - name: Grant on everything the migrations created - run: | - psql "$DATABASE_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c " - GRANT ALL ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - GRANT ALL ON ALL ROUTINES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - GRANT ALL ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO postgres, anon, authenticated, service_role; - " - - - name: Start PostgREST - # Deliberately `docker run --network host` rather than a service - # container. Service containers on a non-containerized job are reachable - # from the runner on localhost, but NOT from each other by name, and - # PostgREST has to reach Postgres. Host networking sidesteps that. - run: | - docker run -d --name postgrest --network host \ - -e PGRST_DB_URI="postgres://postgres:postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/postgres" \ - -e PGRST_DB_SCHEMAS=public \ - -e PGRST_DB_ANON_ROLE=anon \ - -e PGRST_JWT_SECRET="super-secret-jwt-token-with-at-least-32-characters-long" \ - -e PGRST_DB_MAX_ROWS=100000 \ - -e PGRST_SERVER_PORT=3000 \ - postgrest/postgrest:v12.2.3 - for _ in $(seq 1 60); do - if curl -sf -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:3000/" ; then break; fi - sleep 1 - done - curl -sf -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:3000/" || (docker logs postgrest && exit 1) - - - run: npm run test:tools diff --git a/.github/workflows/zizmor.yml b/.github/workflows/zizmor.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4b1c1821..00000000 --- a/.github/workflows/zizmor.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Workflow audit (zizmor) - -# Static analysis for the workflows themselves. Every other scanner in this repo -# looks at application code or container contents; nothing looked at CI, which is -# where the credentials live. -# -# The motivating incident is concrete: in March 2026 attackers exploited a -# pull_request_target misconfiguration in aquasecurity/trivy-action (an action -# this repo uses in three places) to exfiltrate org and repo secrets, then used -# them to backdoor LiteLLM on PyPI. zizmor's dangerous-triggers and -# unpinned-uses audits cover exactly that class. -# -# Installed from PyPI at a pinned version rather than via zizmorcore/zizmor-action: -# a workflow whose job is to check the supply chain should not widen it. - -on: - pull_request: - push: - branches: [main] - schedule: - # Weekly, off the hour to dodge cron congestion on GitHub. New audits ship - # regularly, so a repo that stopped changing can still start failing here. - - cron: '41 5 * * 1' - workflow_dispatch: {} - -permissions: - contents: read - -concurrency: - group: zizmor-${{ github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - -jobs: - audit: - name: Audit workflows - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 10 - permissions: - contents: read - # SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab. - security-events: write - - steps: - - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7 - with: - persist-credentials: false - - # pipx is preinstalled on GitHub's ubuntu runners. Exact pin, because an - # unpinned install here would be the same mistake this workflow exists to - # catch. - - name: Install zizmor - run: pipx install zizmor==1.28.0 - - - name: Audit workflows (SARIF) - env: - # Lets zizmor run its online audits (resolving `uses:` refs against - # the forge) instead of falling back to offline-only checks. - GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - # zizmor suppresses its findings-based exit codes under --format=sarif, - # so this step reports and never gates. The gate is the separate step - # below, which is why the audit is run twice. - run: zizmor --format=sarif . > zizmor.sarif - - - name: Upload zizmor results to GitHub Security tab - # if: always() so findings still reach the Security tab when the gate - # below fails the run. Distinct category from the Trivy uploads so - # workflow findings stay separately traceable. - if: always() - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4 - with: - sarif_file: zizmor.sarif - category: zizmor - - - name: Gate on high-severity, high-confidence findings - env: - GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - # Deliberately narrower than the SARIF report above. Everything zizmor - # finds is visible in the Security tab; only findings it is confident are - # high severity block a merge. Tighten by lowering --min-severity once - # the backlog is clear. - run: zizmor --min-severity=high --min-confidence=high --format=plain .