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0pt/lib/db.ts
T
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5 dc6aaa0e10
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fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.

Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.

Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.

Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.

82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00

43 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript

import postgres from "postgres";
// Lazy, env-guarded Postgres client. Works with Vercel Postgres (POSTGRES_URL)
// or any DATABASE_URL. Returns null when no DB is configured so the app still
// builds/runs (with in-memory fallback) before storage is provisioned.
let _sql: ReturnType<typeof postgres> | null = null;
export function dbUrl(): string | undefined {
return process.env.DATABASE_URL || process.env.POSTGRES_URL || process.env.POSTGRES_PRISMA_URL;
}
export function hasDb(): boolean {
return Boolean(dbUrl());
}
/**
* P014 fix: `ssl` used to be hardcoded to `"require"` unconditionally. That
* is the right default for every REAL deployment target this app has
* (Vercel Postgres, managed Postgres providers), but it made `compose.dev.yaml`'s
* local Postgres container -- which speaks plain, non-TLS Postgres -- and
* ANY other throwaway/local Postgres (e.g. a restore-drill target) silently
* unreachable via this function, contradicting that file's own doc comment
* ("local-only Postgres for developers who want real persistence") and its
* own "UNVERIFIED... not smoke-tested end to end" caveat -- this is
* precisely why it was never smoke-tested: it could not have worked.
* `DATABASE_SSL` is opt-in-to-disable ONLY; absence (the default, matching
* every existing deployment's actual env) keeps the exact prior behavior.
*/
export function sslMode(): "require" | false {
const raw = process.env.DATABASE_SSL?.trim().toLowerCase();
if (raw === "false" || raw === "disable" || raw === "off" || raw === "0") return false;
return "require";
}
export function getSql() {
const url = dbUrl();
if (!url) return null;
if (!_sql) {
_sql = postgres(url, { prepare: false, idle_timeout: 20, max: 5, ssl: sslMode() });
}
return _sql;
}