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0pt/src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts
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fix(ci): repair baseline typecheck and pnpm supply-chain config
- pnpm-workspace.yaml: blockExoticSubdeps, minimumReleaseAge=10080,
  trustPolicy=no-downgrade (Semgrep p/ci blocking rules)
- src/auth/{internal-service-tenant,internal-token}.ts: type-only view of
  process.env for narrow named-property defaults (@types/node 22 ProcessEnv)
- tests: typed mutable env view for NODE_ENV save/restore (readonly in
  @types/node 22). No auth check weakened, no runtime behaviour changed.

Verification: pnpm run typecheck EXIT 0 (was 8 errors); vitest 30/30 PASS.
2026-11-17 21:17:32 +01:00

85 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — server-side tenant scope for the
* machine-to-machine principal authenticated by `X-Internal-Token`.
*
* WHY THIS EXISTS (P0, 2026-11-07)
* --------------------------------
* `X-Internal-Token` proves that the caller is the SIAX engine process. It
* does NOT prove which tenant that process may act for. The first attempt at
* fixing the "internal token bypasses the verified-tenant guard" hole copied a
* CLIENT HEADER (`X-0pt-Internal-Tenant`) or fell back to a single
* `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID` env var:
*
* const internalTenant =
* req.headers.get('x-0pt-internal-tenant') ?? process.env.INTERNAL_TENANT_ID;
*
* That is not an authorization source. Any holder of the shared internal token
* could still name any tenant in a request header, which is exactly the
* cross-tenant write the fix was supposed to stop (tenant_id
* 999999999999999999 returned 201 before).
*
* The correct model mirrors a verified Bearer token: the principal's tenant
* authority is a SERVER-SIDE fact, never a request field.
*
* - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` is a comma-separated allowlist configured on
* the 0pt deployment (env/secret), i.e. "the tenants this engine instance
* is entitled to write for".
* - When the allowlist is empty, the internal principal has NO tenant
* authority: tenant-scoped writes fail closed (403). Routes that do not
* carry a tenant (evidence outbox dispatch, ER candidates, search
* definitions) are unaffected.
* - A single allowlisted tenant is ALSO placed in `x-0pt-verified-tenant`
* by middleware so existing single-tenant checks keep working; two or more
* are carried in `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` and the tenant guard
* checks membership.
* - Any inbound value for either header is stripped by middleware before
* forwarding, so a client can never forge tenant authority.
*
* No client header is read here. `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is deliberately not a
* contract.
*/
/** Env var: comma-separated tenants this internal service principal may assert. */
export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
/**
* Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY (never accepted from a
* client, and stripped from every inbound request). Carries the full
* server-configured service tenant scope; may be the empty string, which means
* "service principal without tenant authority".
*/
export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
/**
* Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY: the CL0UD workload token's
* verified capability list, comma-separated. Stripped from every inbound
* request like the tenant scope.
*/
export const SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-capabilities';
/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
if (!value) return [];
const tenants: string[] = [];
for (const part of value.split(',')) {
const tenant = part.trim();
if (tenant && !tenants.includes(tenant)) tenants.push(tenant);
}
return tenants;
}
/** Read the configured service tenant allowlist from the environment. */
export function resolveInternalServiceTenants(
// @types/node 22's ProcessEnv has only an index signature, so a direct
// default is not assignable to the narrow named-property shape. This is a
// type-only view of the same object; runtime behaviour is unchanged.
env: { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string } = process.env as { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string },
): string[] {
return parseServiceTenants(env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS);
}
/** Read the scope middleware installed on the request (already stripped+set). */
export function readServiceTenantScope(headers: { get(name: string): string | null | undefined }): string[] {
return parseServiceTenants(headers.get(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER));
}