Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
40 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
40 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* P014: lib/db.ts's `getSql()` used to hardcode `ssl: "require"`
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* unconditionally. That is correct for every REAL deployment target this
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* app has (Vercel Postgres, managed Postgres) but made ANY plain,
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* non-TLS Postgres -- compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container, or a
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* throwaway restore-drill target -- silently unreachable through this
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* function, contradicting compose.dev.yaml's own doc comment and its
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* "UNVERIFIED... not smoke-tested" caveat. Found and fixed while executing
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* P014's real restore drill (see docs/runbook/backup-restore.md).
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
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import { sslMode } from "@/lib/db";
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describe("sslMode", () => {
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const saved = process.env.DATABASE_SSL;
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afterEach(() => {
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if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.DATABASE_SSL;
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else process.env.DATABASE_SSL = saved;
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});
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beforeEach(() => {
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delete process.env.DATABASE_SSL;
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});
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it("defaults to \"require\" when DATABASE_SSL is unset -- unchanged behavior for every real deployment", () => {
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expect(sslMode()).toBe("require");
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});
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for (const value of ["false", "FALSE", "disable", "off", "0", " false "]) {
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it(`treats DATABASE_SSL=${JSON.stringify(value)} as an explicit opt-out (false)`, () => {
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process.env.DATABASE_SSL = value;
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expect(sslMode()).toBe(false);
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});
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}
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it("an unrecognized value falls back to the safe default (\"require\"), not an accidental opt-out", () => {
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process.env.DATABASE_SSL = "yes-please";
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expect(sslMode()).toBe("require");
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});
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});
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