Files
0pt/tests/auth/internal-token.test.ts
T
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5 dc6aaa0e10
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fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill
Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.

Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.

Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.

Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.

82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00

54 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { verifyInternalServiceToken, INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER } from "@/src/auth/internal-token";
function headers(map: Record<string, string> = {}): { get(name: string): string | null } {
const lower = new Map(Object.entries(map).map(([k, v]) => [k.toLowerCase(), v]));
return { get: (name: string) => lower.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null };
}
describe("verifyInternalServiceToken", () => {
it("accepts a header that matches the configured INTERNAL_TOKEN exactly", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ [INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER]: "s3cr3t" }), {
INTERNAL_TOKEN: "s3cr3t",
});
expect(ok).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects a mismatched token", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ [INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER]: "wrong" }), {
INTERNAL_TOKEN: "s3cr3t",
});
expect(ok).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects a missing header even when INTERNAL_TOKEN is configured", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({}), { INTERNAL_TOKEN: "s3cr3t" });
expect(ok).toBe(false);
});
it("FAILS CLOSED: an unset INTERNAL_TOKEN never authenticates, even against an empty header value", () => {
// Regression guard: quality_bridge.py sends `os.getenv("INTERNAL_TOKEN", "")`
// -- if the edge's own INTERNAL_TOKEN were also unset, a naive `provided
// === expected` comparison of two empty strings would wrongly authenticate.
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ [INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER]: "" }), { INTERNAL_TOKEN: undefined });
expect(ok).toBe(false);
});
it("FAILS CLOSED: an unset INTERNAL_TOKEN never authenticates even a non-empty header", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ [INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER]: "anything" }), {
INTERNAL_TOKEN: undefined,
});
expect(ok).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects a whitespace-only configured token (trimmed to empty)", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ [INTERNAL_TOKEN_HEADER]: " " }), { INTERNAL_TOKEN: " " });
expect(ok).toBe(false);
});
it("is case-sensitive on the header name lookup contract but tolerant of header-name casing via the HeaderLookup adapter", () => {
const ok = verifyInternalServiceToken(headers({ "X-Internal-Token": "s3cr3t" }), { INTERNAL_TOKEN: "s3cr3t" });
expect(ok).toBe(true);
});
});