Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5
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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
49 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { assertTenantMatchesVerified, VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
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function req(headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/0pt/sources", { headers });
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}
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describe("assertTenantMatchesVerified", () => {
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it("returns 403 when the client-supplied tenant_id disagrees with the verified header", () => {
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({ [VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER]: "t_a" }), "t_b");
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expect(res).not.toBeNull();
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expect(res!.status).toBe(403);
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});
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it("the 403 body names both the requested and verified tenant, without leaking which is 'right'", async () => {
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({ [VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER]: "t_a" }), "t_b");
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const body = await res!.json();
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expect(body.error).toBe("OPT_ACCESS_DENIED");
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expect(body.details).toEqual({ requested_tenant: "t_b", verified_tenant: "t_a" });
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});
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it("returns null (proceed) when the tenant matches", () => {
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({ [VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER]: "t_a" }), "t_a");
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expect(res).toBeNull();
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});
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it("returns null (proceed) when no verified-tenant header is present (local-dev escape hatch)", () => {
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({}), "t_b");
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expect(res).toBeNull();
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});
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it("returns null when tenantId itself is missing/empty (handlers 400 on that separately)", () => {
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({ [VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER]: "t_a" }), null);
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expect(res).toBeNull();
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});
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it("a spoofed verified-tenant header cannot be used to APPROVE a mismatched request -- only middleware.ts ever sets this header for real", () => {
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// This is a documentation-by-test of the trust boundary: the guard trusts
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// whatever is in the header, which is exactly why every route sits behind
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// middleware.ts (matcher /api/0pt/:path*) that overwrites it with the
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// real verified value -- a caller hitting the route directly, outside
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// Next's routing, cannot reach the handler without going through
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// middleware first in a real deployment.
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const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(req({ [VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER]: "t_attacker" }), "t_attacker");
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expect(res).toBeNull(); // matches -- proves the guard is a pure equality check, no extra magic
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});
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});
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