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Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading
tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against
the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a
shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected
routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass
(documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows
when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads
(rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone.
Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now
honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres +
in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual
delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real
concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case.
Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly
invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own
compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating)
block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the
plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production
bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge
(X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never
checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any
environment enforcing auth.
Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres
containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way:
sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was
never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require",
making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev
container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies
cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts +
content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts,
SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back
correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding.
82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS +
55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
76 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* P014 regression test: before this pass, POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run
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* -- the ONE route the Python engine's quality_bridge.py actually calls,
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* using X-Internal-Token, never a Bearer token -- was rejected 401 by
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* middleware.ts in any environment enforcing auth (the default), because
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* middleware required a verified Zitadel Bearer token unconditionally on
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* every /api/0pt/* path. See src/auth/internal-token.ts's doc comment for
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* the full story. Neither existing test suite caught it: the TS bridge test
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* calls the route's POST function directly (bypassing middleware.ts
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* entirely) and the Python test mocks the HTTP layer.
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*
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* This test exercises the actual `middleware` function, not the route
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* handler, so it proves the fix at the layer where the bug lived.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
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import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
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function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
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}
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describe('middleware.ts: internal-token path for /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', () => {
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const saved = { auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE, internal: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN, node: process.env.NODE_ENV };
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beforeEach(() => {
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delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
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process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(saved)) {
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const envKey = k === 'auth' ? 'AUTH_ENFORCE' : k === 'internal' ? 'INTERNAL_TOKEN' : 'NODE_ENV';
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if (v === undefined) delete process.env[envKey];
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else process.env[envKey] = v;
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}
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});
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it('REGRESSION: a valid X-Internal-Token lets the engine through with NO Bearer token (was: 401)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(
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req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
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);
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// NextResponse.next() carries no body/status override -- it is not an
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// error JSON response the way a rejection is.
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('an invalid X-Internal-Token still falls through to the ordinary Bearer requirement (401, not a bypass)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong-secret' }));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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const body = await res.json();
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expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED');
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});
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it('a valid X-Internal-Token on a DIFFERENT /api/0pt/* route does NOT bypass auth (not a blanket exemption)', async () => {
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/sources', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('no INTERNAL_TOKEN configured on the edge -- the internal-token path never activates, even with the right-looking header', async () => {
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delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
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const res = await middleware(
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req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('a real Bearer-authenticated caller can still reach bridge-run directly (not internal-token-only)', async () => {
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// No X-Internal-Token at all, no Authorization header either -> falls to
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// the normal Bearer requirement -> 401, proving this path is additive,
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// not a replacement for the existing Zitadel flow.
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const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run'));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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});
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