# Security Policy 0pt (SIAX Core Platform: Data OS) is proprietary software operated by SIAX Technology AB. This document explains how to report a suspected security vulnerability. ## Reporting a vulnerability Do not open a public GitHub issue for a suspected security problem. Email: security@siax.io (fallback: simon@siax.io) Include, if possible: - A description of the issue and the impact you believe it has. - Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept request/response. - The route, endpoint, or component affected. - Whether the issue is already publicly known or exploited. ## Response expectations - Acknowledgement: within 2 business days. - Initial triage and severity assessment: within 5 business days. - Remediation timeline: communicated after triage, based on severity. Confirmed high/critical issues are prioritized ahead of other work. We will keep you informed of progress until the report is resolved and, where appropriate, credit you in internal release notes (no public bug bounty program exists at this time). ## Scope In scope: - The 0pt application and its API routes at 0pt.app. - The 0pt engine/orchestrator services in this repository. - Infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD configuration in this repository. Out of scope: - Third-party services and dependencies not maintained in this repository (report those to the respective vendor). - Denial-of-service testing, spam, or social engineering against SIAX staff or customers. - Automated scanning that generates excessive load against production systems without prior coordination. Note: `github.com/sax3l/0pt` (this checkout's `origin`) and `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea) are two diverged remotes that share part of this codebase's history — see README "Known issues" for what's known and what isn't about the relationship between them. Which one is deployed to 0pt.app is currently unconfirmed; if your finding is remote-specific, say which remote/branch you tested against. ## Known, already-tracked gaps The following are **not** news to us — they are open, named gaps as of this pass, not secrets, and reporting them again mainly helps confirm priority rather than surfacing something new: - **No authentication or tenant-isolation system exists in this repo yet.** The only gate in front of any route is a `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` dev-login scaffold (`app/api/auth/login/route.ts`) — there is no session-to-tenant binding. `app/api/orders/route.ts`'s `GET` handler carries the literal comment `// GET /api/orders — list (org scoping added with auth).`, confirming this directly. As a consequence, the P0 data-platform routes under `/api/0pt/*` (`lakehouse/mappings`, `sources/rate-policies`, `sources/[sourceId]/query`) and `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` accept `tenant_id`/ `project_id` **from the client-supplied request body or query string** rather than from a server-bound session — a violation of this platform's own tenant-isolation rule (tenant_id must never be trusted from client input). This is an open, prioritized gap pending real auth (Phase 3, `docs/09-build-plan.md`), not an intentional design. Do not treat this repo as tenant-isolated until that lands. - Beyond that specific item, other authentication gaps on internal API routes may still exist and are tracked internally pending an intentional, reviewed fix; reporting any you find is still welcome and helps confirm priority. ## Disclosure Please give us a reasonable opportunity to investigate and remediate an issue before any public disclosure. We aim to coordinate disclosure timing with reporters wherever possible.