/** * Regression tests for the anonymous-access finding on `/api/orders` (GET) * and `/api/admin/metrics` (GET): a live compliance audit confirmed both * responded HTTP 200 with zero authentication (the order queue + financial * pipeline aggregates were readable by anyone). Both are outside * middleware.ts's matcher (`/api/0pt/:path*` only), so each handler now * calls `requireRouteAuth` (src/auth/require-route-auth.ts -> the same * fail-closed `resolveAuthContext`/Zitadel verifier `/api/0pt/*` relies on) * directly. * * No DATABASE_URL is set in this test env, so lib/orders-store.ts falls back * to its in-memory store -- these tests only exercise the auth gate, not * order persistence. */ import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'; import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'; import { GET as ordersGET } from '@/app/api/orders/route'; import { GET as orderGET } from '@/app/api/orders/[id]/route'; import { GET as adminMetricsGET } from '@/app/api/admin/metrics/route'; import { POST as depositPOST } from '@/app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route'; function req(url: string, headers: Record = {}): NextRequest { return new NextRequest(new URL(url, 'http://localhost'), { headers }); } describe('anonymous-access regression: /api/orders (GET) and /api/admin/metrics (GET)', () => { const saved = { auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE, node: process.env.NODE_ENV }; beforeEach(() => { // Default posture: AUTH_ENFORCE unset => enforced (fail-closed), matching // production and matching how resolveAuthContext's own tests run. delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; }); afterEach(() => { if (saved.auth === undefined) delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; else process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = saved.auth; if (saved.node === undefined) delete process.env.NODE_ENV; else process.env.NODE_ENV = saved.node; }); it('REGRESSION: GET /api/orders 401s with no Authorization header (was: 200 + full order list)', async () => { const res = await ordersGET(req('/api/orders')); expect(res.status).toBe(401); const body = await res.json(); expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED'); }); it('GET /api/orders 401s on an invalid/unparseable bearer token', async () => { const res = await ordersGET(req('/api/orders', { authorization: 'Bearer not.a.real.jwt' })); expect(res.status).toBe(401); }); it('GET /api/orders/{id} rejects anonymous and spoofed-tenant reads before loading an order', async () => { const params = { params: Promise.resolve({ id: 'order-unknown' }) }; expect((await orderGET(req('/api/orders/order-unknown'), params)).status).toBe(401); expect((await orderGET(req('/api/orders/order-unknown', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 'tenant_attacker', }), params)).status).toBe(401); }); it('deposit checkout rejects anonymous callers before checking Stripe credentials or order id', async () => { const request = req('/api/payments/order-unknown/deposit'); const result = await depositPOST(request, { params: Promise.resolve({ order_id: 'order-unknown' }) }); expect(result.status).toBe(401); }); it('REGRESSION: GET /api/admin/metrics 401s with no Authorization header (was: 200 + financial aggregates)', async () => { const res = await adminMetricsGET(req('/api/admin/metrics')); expect(res.status).toBe(401); const body = await res.json(); expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED'); }); it('a bare X-Tenant-Id header alone (no bearer token) does not grant access to either route', async () => { // Guards against a shortcut implementation that trusts a client-supplied // tenant/verified header instead of re-verifying the token. const ordersRes = await ordersGET(req('/api/orders', { 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_attacker' })); expect(ordersRes.status).toBe(401); const metricsRes = await adminMetricsGET(req('/api/admin/metrics', { 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_attacker' })); expect(metricsRes.status).toBe(401); }); it('a spoofed x-0pt-verified-tenant header alone does not grant access (never trusted directly)', async () => { // These routes sit outside middleware.ts's matcher, so nothing strips or // overwrites this header before the handler sees it -- proving the // handler re-verifies via the real JWT check rather than trusting it. const res = await ordersGET(req('/api/orders', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 'tenant_attacker' })); expect(res.status).toBe(401); }); it('AUTH_ENFORCE=false cannot mint/read payable orders without a verified buyer', async () => { process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false'; const ordersRes = await ordersGET(req('/api/orders')); expect(ordersRes.status).toBe(401); const metricsRes = await adminMetricsGET(req('/api/admin/metrics')); expect(metricsRes.status).toBe(200); }); });