Merge pull request 'fix(manifest): provenRestore=true (restore-drill 2026-09-29)' (#493) from fix/prod-restore-2026-09-29 into main

tests/siax-access/idempotency.test.ts hade fyra @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
vilket fick quality-jobbet att exita 1 (133 testfiler gröna men lint röd) och
därmed blockerade alla PR:er. Använder exporterade IdempotencyStore<unknown,
{x:number}>; eslint rent, 7/7 tester gröna.

.env.example

@@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ DEV_LOGIN_KEY=
 # Shared token for internal/service-to-service calls; sent as X-Internal-Token
 # on every engineFetch() call (lib/engine.ts).
 INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me-internal-token
+# Tenant authority for the internal-token principal. Comma-separated allowlist
+# of tenants this deployment's engine is entitled to write for, e.g.
+# "379976258701823235". This is the ONLY source of tenant authority for
+# X-Internal-Token: a request header may never name a tenant. Empty/unset means
+# the service principal has no tenant authority and tenant-scoped writes
+# (canonical facts, quality bridge runs) are denied with 403. Exactly ONE
+# tenant is supported: the shared token identifies one service process, not a
+# set of principals. A multi-tenant list is refused (401) until a verified
+# workload-identity binding exists.
+INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS=
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Zitadel / OIDC Bearer verification (Wave 2 hardening) -- wired in code today

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
-      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.io)
+      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.dev)
         env:
-          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.io
+          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.dev
           SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -309,3 +309,22 @@ jobs:
           trap 'docker rm -f "$cid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
           docker cp . "$cid":/usr/src
           docker start -a "$cid"
+
+  design-conformance:
+    name: Component conformance (blocking)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '22'
+      - name: Checkout canonical siax-standard (SSOT)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          repository: admin/siax-standard
+          token: ${{ secrets.SIAX_CI_TOKEN }}
+          path: siax-standard-ssot
+      - name: Component conformance (blocking)
+        run: |
+          node --input-type=module -e "import('./siax-standard-ssot/packages/doctor/src/commands/component-conformance.mjs').then(m=>{process.exit(m.run(['--repo', process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE, '--allow-path-prefix', 'siax-standard-ssot/', '--fail-on=block']))})"

.siax/component-allowlist.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"allow":[{"pathPrefix":"components/states.tsx","reason":"0pt:s varumärkta EmptyState med DataArtifact-grid, EN/SV-copy och CTA; domänkomposition, KEEP_LOCAL enligt COMPONENT_STANDARD §2."},{"pathPrefix":"components/theme-provider.tsx","reason":"Tunn next-themes-adapter för App Router; ingen egen temaimplementation."},{"pathPrefix":"components/ui/toaster.tsx","reason":"Legacy lokal toast-state (shadcn); migration till @siax/ui kräver samtidig state-migrering. KEEP_LOCAL med backlog."}]}

app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route.ts
+ * ====================================
+ * POST — canonical structured-observation write (entities/facts/relations).
+ * GET  — tenant-scoped read for consumers (products, agents, L0RE projection).
+ *
+ * 0pt owns observed facts; L0RE owns epistemic propositions/projections and
+ * consumes this API. Tenant is always cross-checked against the verified
+ * principal (assertTenantMatchesVerified), never trusted from the body alone.
+ */
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { canonicalWriteSchema, parseBody } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas";
+import { canonicalFactService } from "@/src/services/canonical-fact-registry";
+import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
+
+export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = parseBody(canonicalWriteSchema, await request.json());
+    if (!parsed.ok) return NextResponse.json(parsed.body, { status: parsed.status });
+    const body = parsed.data;
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
+    if (guard) return guard;
+    const result = await canonicalFactService.write(body);
+    return NextResponse.json(result, { status: 201 });
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    return siaxErrorResponse(error);
+  }
+}
+
+export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  try {
+    const { searchParams } = new URL(request.url);
+    const tenantId = searchParams.get("tenant_id");
+    if (!tenantId) return NextResponse.json({ error: "tenant_id is required" }, { status: 400 });
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, tenantId);
+    if (guard) return guard;
+    const limitRaw = searchParams.get("limit");
+    const facts = await canonicalFactService.query({
+      tenant_id: tenantId,
+      entity_id: searchParams.get("entity_id") ?? undefined,
+      entity_type: searchParams.get("entity_type") ?? undefined,
+      identity_namespace: searchParams.get("identity_namespace") ?? undefined,
+      identity_value: searchParams.get("identity_value") ?? undefined,
+      predicate: searchParams.get("predicate") ?? undefined,
+      limit: limitRaw ? Number(limitRaw) : undefined,
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ facts });
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    return siaxErrorResponse(error);
+  }
+}

app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { parseBody, qualityBridgeRunSchema } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas"
 import { qualityService } from "@/src/services/quality";
 import { ensureBaselineRules } from "@/src/quality/quality-bridge";
 import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
 
 export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
   try {
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
       return NextResponse.json(__parsed.body, { status: __parsed.status });
     }
     const body = __parsed.data;
+    // Tenant-scoped write (auto-provisions baseline rules + stores a run):
+    // the internal service principal must stay inside its server-configured
+    // tenant allowlist, never a tenant named by the caller.
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
+    if (guard) return guard;
 
     await ensureBaselineRules(qualityService, {
       tenant_id: body.tenant_id,

app/portal/dokument/page.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 'use client';
 
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react';
+import { FileDropzone } from '@siax/ui/components/file-dropzone';
 import { useT } from '@/components/locale-provider';
 import { PortalShell } from '@/components/portal-shell';
 
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
   const [uploadNote, setUploadNote] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [uploading, setUploading] = useState(false);
   const [unknownOutcome, setUnknownOutcome] = useState<unknown | null>(null);
-  const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
   // One idempotency key per selected file: a retry (double click, network
   // error, reload-and-pick-the-same-file) returns the SAME document instead of
   // creating a duplicate. Picking a different file resets it.
@@ -277,34 +277,16 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
             />
           </label>
 
-          <div
+          <FileDropzone
-            role="button"
+            className="mt-4"
-            tabIndex={0}
+            label={t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}
-            onClick={() => inputRef.current?.click()}
+            hint={file ? file.name : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
-            onKeyDown={(event) => {
+            disabled={uploading}
-              if (event.key === 'Enter' || event.key === ' ') {
+            onFiles={(files) => {
-                event.preventDefault();
+              uploadKey.current = null;
-                inputRef.current?.click();
+              setFile(files[0] ?? null);
-              }
             }}
-            className="mt-4 flex cursor-pointer flex-col items-center justify-center border border-dashed border-border px-6 py-10 text-center focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-ring"
+          />
-          >
-            <span className={label}>{t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}</span>
-            <span className="mt-3 text-[15px]">
-              {file
-                ? file.name
-                : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
-            </span>
-            <input
-              ref={inputRef}
-              type="file"
-              className="hidden"
-              onChange={(event) => {
-                uploadKey.current = null;
-                setFile(event.target.files?.[0] ?? null);
-              }}
-            />
-          </div>
 
           <button
             type="button"

docs/runbook/legacy-instances-20261107.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Legacy instance audit — 0pt (server5) and L0RE (server5) — 2026-11-07
+
+Canonical runtimes: **0pt on server6** (Coolify app `shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g`,
+`0pt.app`) and **L0RE on server9** (`l0re.siax.io`). This document records the
+older instances on server5 and their disposition. It is not production
+documentation for either product.
+
+## 1. 0pt legacy (server5)
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Containers | `0pt-api` (`0pt-api:c46ebbf`, created 2026-11-05), `0pt-web` (`:18080`) |
+| Database | `0pt-pg`, user/db `opt`, 11 MB |
+| Exposure | `0pt-web` only on `100.124.7.55:18080`; no DNS record, no reverse proxy |
+| Consumers | none found (`/etc/siax`, `/opt/siax`, site0 and L0RE deploy configs) |
+| Unique data | 32 canonical facts (30 GLEIF web observations + `body_type` YDL405 + `passmark.find_prime_numbers.v10`) |
+
+**Data reconciliation:** all 32 facts were exported and re-imported through the
+canonical API (`POST /api/0pt/canonical/facts`) into the server6 deployment.
+Replay returned `duplicates: 32`, so the import is idempotent. Production now
+holds 34 facts (32 migrated + 2 verification observations) and 4 entities.
+
+**Backup:** `server5:/var/backups/0pt-legacy/opt_legacy_20261107.dump.zst`
+(custom format, 32 KB) + offsite `server11:/home/backup/0pt/`.
+
+**Action taken:** `docker update --restart=no` + `docker stop` for `0pt-api` and
+`0pt-web`. `0pt-pg` left running for forensics/rollback. `0pt.app` verified 200
+after the stop (served by server6).
+
+**Full removal (requires owner decision):** snapshot/destroy `0pt-pg` volume
+after the retention window, remove the legacy compose project, revoke the old
+`INTERNAL_TOKEN` if it was ever stored on server5.
+
+## 2. L0RE orphan (server5)
+
+Documented separately in `admin/l0re` PR #485
+(`docs/runbook/l0re-orphan-decommission-20261107.md`): API stopped with
+`restart=no`, dump + restore proof (8 propositions/62 assertions), no unique
+legitimate data (pilot facts already re-projected to production). `l0re-pg` and
+`l0re-opensearch` remain for forensics.
+
+## 3. Single-runtime rule
+
+One primary runtime per logical service. A container image of a product running
+outside its registered Coolify app is a finding, not a fallback. Both server5
+instances were reachable only from the host, which is why the split survived
+until this audit.

middleware.ts

@@ -4,12 +4,16 @@
  * Customer calls use verified Zitadel bearer identity and receive immutable
  * x-0pt-verified-* headers. Explicit machine routes may instead use the
  * shared X-Internal-Token convention; mutation handlers verify it again for
- * defence in depth.
+ * defence in depth. The canonical-fact write is one such explicit machine route.
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
 import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
 import { SESSION_COOKIE, verifySession } from '@/lib/auth';
 import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token';
+import {
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
 
 assertAuthConfigSafe();
 
@@ -26,19 +30,77 @@ const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
 /** Routes that may be reached with a service token instead of end-user bearer auth. */
 const INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [
   /^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/,
+  // Acquisition engine -> 0pt canonical observation write (machine-to-machine,
+  // same X-Internal-Token class as the quality bridge; not a blanket bypass).
+  /^\/api\/0pt\/canonical\/facts$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/evidence-outbox\/dispatch$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/er\/candidates$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/search\/definitions$/,
 ];
 
 let _authDiagCount = 0;
+let internalScopeWarned = false;
+
+/**
+ * Headers that only middleware may set. Anything a client sends under these
+ * names is a forgery attempt and is removed before forwarding — including on
+ * the internal-token path, which previously passed the original header map
+ * through unchanged.
+ */
+const VERIFIED_HEADERS = [
+  'x-0pt-verified-tenant',
+  'x-0pt-verified-sub',
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+] as const;
+
+function stripVerifiedHeaders(req: NextRequest): Headers {
+  const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+  for (const name of VERIFIED_HEADERS) forwarded.delete(name);
+  return forwarded;
+}
 
 export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
   const path = req.nextUrl.pathname;
   if (EXEMPT_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(path))) return NextResponse.next();
 
   if (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
-    return NextResponse.next();
+    // P0 tenant isolation (2026-11-07): X-Internal-Token proves the service —
+    // not a tenant. Tenant authority is SERVER CONFIG (INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS),
+    // never a client header: an inbound `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is ignored and
+    // stripped. With no configured tenants the principal has no tenant
+    // authority and tenant-scoped writes fail closed with 403.
+    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+    const tenants = resolveInternalServiceTenants();
+    if (tenants.length > 1) {
+      // The shared X-Internal-Token identifies ONE service process, not a set
+      // of independently authenticated principals. A multi-tenant allowlist
+      // would let any holder of that shared token choose between all listed
+      // tenants, which is exactly the client-controlled authority this guard
+      // exists to remove. Multi-tenant service access requires a verified
+      // workload-identity binding (CL0UD delegation contract); until that
+      // exists, an ambiguous configuration fails closed.
+      console.error(
+        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS lists more than one tenant: refusing the internal request until workload-identity binding exists',
+      );
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error: 'OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED',
+          message:
+            'internal service tenant scope is ambiguous: configure exactly one tenant until a verified workload-identity binding exists',
+        },
+        { status: 401 },
+      );
+    }
+    forwarded.set(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER, tenants.join(','));
+    if (tenants.length === 1) {
+      forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', tenants[0]);
+    } else if (tenants.length === 0 && !internalScopeWarned) {
+      internalScopeWarned = true;
+      console.warn(
+        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS is unset: the internal service principal has no tenant authority; tenant-scoped writes will be denied',
+      );
+    }
+    return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
   if (_authDiagCount < 5) {
@@ -62,7 +124,7 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
       typeof session.exp === 'number' &&
       session.exp > Date.now()
     ) {
-      const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+      const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', session.sub);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', session.tenantId);
       return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
@@ -83,11 +145,13 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
 
   const principal = decision.ctx.principal;
   if (principal) {
-    const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', principal.sub);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', principal.tenantId);
     return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
-  return NextResponse.next();
+  // No verified principal (explicit AUTH_ENFORCE=false development mode).
+  // Never forward a client-named verified header, even in dev.
+  return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: stripVerifiedHeaders(req) } });
 }

packages/siax-access/src/idempotency.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access idempotency primitives — the universal SIAX contract for any
+ * operation that must either happen exactly once or replay its receipt.
+ *
+ * This package is derived from the pattern proven in 0pt's durable upload
+ * attempts (prepare -> claim -> dispatch -> store receipt -> replay), then
+ * generalized so DOC0, N0D and future products can adopt the identical shape
+ * instead of re-implementing it.
+ *
+ * Rules encoded here:
+ *   1. An operation identity binds EVERY result-affecting input (tenant,
+ *      project, actor, payload version). A changed payload under the same key
+ *      is a CONFLICT, never a replay of someone else's receipt.
+ *   2. One claimant per key: returning `false` from `start` means another
+ *      caller owns the dispatch, and only the stored receipt (or bounded
+ *      observation) may be answered.
+ *   3. A stored receipt is replayed verbatim; the caller never invents one.
+ *   4. Commit boundaries: NEVER write a network command before the claim is
+ *      durably persisted, and never lose the claim after the command may have
+ *      committed.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+
+/** Stable JSON canonicalization (sorted array stays sorted; v-prefix bumped on contract change). */
+export function operationFingerprint(parts: readonly unknown[], version = "siax-idempotency-v1"): string {
+  return createHash("sha256")
+    .update(JSON.stringify([version, ...parts]))
+    .digest("hex");
+}
+
+export interface OperationIdentity {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  /** Client-generated, transport-level key (<=256 visible ASCII). */
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  /** Supply result-affecting inputs; the helper adds the scope fields itself. */
+  payload: readonly unknown[];
+}
+
+export function operationIdentity(operation: OperationIdentity): {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  fingerprint: string;
+} {
+  if (
+    !operation ||
+    ![operation.tenantId, operation.projectId, operation.actorId, operation.idempotencyKey].every(
+      (value) => typeof value === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+-]{0,255}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !Array.isArray(operation.payload)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid idempotent operation identity");
+  }
+  void operation.payload;
+  return {
+    tenantId: operation.tenantId,
+    projectId: operation.projectId,
+    actorId: operation.actorId,
+    idempotencyKey: operation.idempotencyKey,
+    fingerprint: operationFingerprint([
+      operation.tenantId,
+      operation.projectId,
+      operation.actorId,
+      ...operation.payload,
+    ]),
+  };
+}
+
+export type OperationOutcome<R> =
+  | { kind: "claimed"; execute: () => Promise<R> }
+  | { kind: "replayed"; receipt: R }
+  | { kind: "conflict"; expected?: string };
+
+/** Structural contract for an attempt store. Matched by Postgres adapters per product. */
+export interface IdempotencyStore<Identity, Receipt> {
+  /** Returns true when this caller won the right to dispatch; false = reuse replay path. */
+  start(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Persist after a verified downstream commit. Must never be called before. */
+  save(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string, receipt: Receipt): Promise<void>;
+  /** Load a stored receipt for replay (exact fingerprint match). */
+  receipt(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<Receipt | undefined>;
+}
+
+export type IdempotentStoreItemIdentity<I> = {
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+};
+
+export async function runIdempotentOperation<I, R>(input: {
+  store: IdempotencyStore<I, R>;
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+  /** Must be safe to call exactly once; a second call is never attempted here. */
+  dispatch: () => Promise<R>;
+}): Promise<OperationOutcome<R>> {
+  if (typeof input.dispatch !== "function") throw new Error("Dispatch is required");
+  try {
+    const won = await input.store.start(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+    if (!won) {
+      const stored = await input.store.receipt(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+      return stored !== undefined
+        ? { kind: "replayed", receipt: stored }
+        : { kind: "replayed", receipt: undefined as unknown as R };
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    return { kind: "conflict", expected: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "store_unavailable" };
+  }
+  const receipt = await input.dispatch();
+  try {
+    await input.store.save(input.identity, input.fingerprint, receipt);
+  } catch {
+    /* The downstream commit is real; a journal-write failure must not turn a
+       real receipt into an error. The next retry replays via the stored receipt
+       if the save ever succeeds before a downstream resend. */
+  }
+  return { kind: "claimed", execute: async () => receipt };
+}

packages/siax-access/src/index.ts

@@ -1,235 +1,2 @@
-/**
+export * from './relationships';
- * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
+export * from './idempotency';
- *
- * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
- * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
- * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
- * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
- *
- *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
- *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
- *   N0D      — job submission scope
- *   any app  — tenant/project membership
- *
- * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
- * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
- * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
- * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
- * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
- * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
- */
-
-export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
-export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-}
-
-const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
-const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
-const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
-
-export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
-  baseUrl: string;
-  storeId: string;
-  modelId: string;
-  serviceToken: string;
-  timeoutMs?: number;
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
-  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
-  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
- * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
- * the caller so it can fail closed.
- */
-export class OpenFgaRelationships {
-  private readonly baseUrl: string;
-  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
-  private readonly storeId: string;
-  private readonly modelId: string;
-  private readonly serviceToken: string;
-  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
-
-  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
-    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
-    const loopbackTest =
-      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
-      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
-      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
-      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
-    if (
-      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
-      url.username ||
-      url.password ||
-      url.search ||
-      url.hash ||
-      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
-      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
-      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
-      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
-      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
-      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
-        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
-    ) {
-      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
-    }
-    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
-    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
-    this.storeId = options.storeId;
-    this.modelId = options.modelId;
-    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
-    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
-   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
-   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
-   */
-  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
-    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
-    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
-    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
-    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
-    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
-  }
-
-  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
-  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
-    if (
-      ![user, relation, object].every(
-        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
-      )
-    ) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    try {
-      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: {
-          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
-          'content-type': 'application/json',
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
-          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
-          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
-        }),
-        redirect: 'error',
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
-      });
-      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
-      const reader = response.body.getReader();
-      try {
-        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-        let total = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-          const part = await reader.read();
-          if (part.done) break;
-          total += part.value.byteLength;
-          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
-            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-            return 'unavailable';
-          }
-          chunks.push(part.value);
-        }
-        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
-          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
-        );
-        if (
-          !result ||
-          typeof result !== 'object' ||
-          Array.isArray(result) ||
-          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
-        ) {
-          return 'unavailable';
-        }
-        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
-      } finally {
-        reader.releaseLock();
-      }
-    } catch {
-      return 'unavailable';
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
- * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
- */
-export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
-  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
-  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
-  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
-  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
-} as const;
-
-export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
-  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
-  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
-  /**
-   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
-   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
-   */
-  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
-}
-
-/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
-export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
-  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
-  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
-): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (!options.relationships) return false;
-  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
-  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
-  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
-    try {
-      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
- * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
- */
-export function openFgaFromEnv(
-  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
-): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
-  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
-  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
-  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
-  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
-  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
-  try {
-    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
-      baseUrl,
-      storeId,
-      modelId,
-      serviceToken,
-      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
-    });
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}

packages/siax-access/src/relationships.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
+ *
+ * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
+ * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
+ * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
+ * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
+ *
+ *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
+ *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
+ *   N0D      — job submission scope
+ *   any app  — tenant/project membership
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
+ * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
+ * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
+ * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
+ * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
+ * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
+ */
+
+export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
+export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+}
+
+const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
+const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
+const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
+
+export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  storeId: string;
+  modelId: string;
+  serviceToken: string;
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
+  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
+ * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
+ * the caller so it can fail closed.
+ */
+export class OpenFgaRelationships {
+  private readonly baseUrl: string;
+  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
+  private readonly storeId: string;
+  private readonly modelId: string;
+  private readonly serviceToken: string;
+  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
+
+  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
+    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    const loopbackTest =
+      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
+      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
+      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
+      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
+    if (
+      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
+      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
+      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
+      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
+      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
+      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
+      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
+    ) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
+    }
+    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
+    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    this.storeId = options.storeId;
+    this.modelId = options.modelId;
+    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
+    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
+   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
+   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
+   */
+  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
+    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
+    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
+    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
+    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
+    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
+  }
+
+  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
+  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
+    if (
+      ![user, relation, object].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
+      )
+    ) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    try {
+      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
+          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
+          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
+        }),
+        redirect: 'error',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
+      });
+      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
+      const reader = response.body.getReader();
+      try {
+        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+        let total = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+          const part = await reader.read();
+          if (part.done) break;
+          total += part.value.byteLength;
+          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
+            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+            return 'unavailable';
+          }
+          chunks.push(part.value);
+        }
+        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
+          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
+        );
+        if (
+          !result ||
+          typeof result !== 'object' ||
+          Array.isArray(result) ||
+          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
+        ) {
+          return 'unavailable';
+        }
+        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
+      } finally {
+        reader.releaseLock();
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return 'unavailable';
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
+ * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
+ */
+export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
+  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
+  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
+  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
+  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
+} as const;
+
+export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
+  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
+  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
+  /**
+   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
+   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
+   */
+  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
+}
+
+/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
+export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
+  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
+  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!options.relationships) return false;
+  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
+  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
+  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
+    try {
+      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
+ * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
+ */
+export function openFgaFromEnv(
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
+): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
+  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
+  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
+  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
+  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
+  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
+  try {
+    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
+      baseUrl,
+      storeId,
+      modelId,
+      serviceToken,
+      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}

siax.repo.v3.json

@@ -89,7 +89,16 @@
     "0pt.source_registry_list",
     "0pt.order_create",
     "0pt.order_payment",
-    "0pt.write_iceberg_table"
+    "0pt.write_iceberg_table",
+    "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+    "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+    "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+    "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+    "0pt.structure.normalize_value"
   ],
   "surfaces": [
     "api",

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.extract_document.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.extract_document",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.extract_document (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.extract_document."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.get_lineage.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.get_provenance",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.get_lineage (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.get_provenance."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.normalize_value.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.normalize_value",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.normalize_value (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.normalize_value."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_checks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.checks",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_checks (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.checks."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_list_runs.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.list_runs",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_list_runs (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.list_runs."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_reports.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.reports",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_reports (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.reports."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_run.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.run",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_run (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.run."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.resolve_entities.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.resolve_entities",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.resolve_entities (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.resolve_entities."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.route_parsing.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.route_parsing",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.route_parsing (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.route_parsing."
+}

siax/design-conformance.json

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "role": "consumer",
+  "canonicalOwner": "sax3l/DES1GN",
+  "sourceRoots": [
+    "app",
+    "components"
+  ],
+  "packagePolicy": {
+    "namespace": "@siax",
+    "registry": "https://git.siax.io/api/packages/sax3l/npm/",
+    "forbidMutableSpecs": true,
+    "forbidInternalImports": true,
+    "requiredPackages": [
+      "@siax/config",
+      "@siax/tokens",
+      "@siax/ui"
+    ]
+  },
+  "tokenPolicy": "canonical-plus-domain-extensions",
+  "fontPolicy": "canonical-self-hosted",
+  "geometryPolicy": "canonical",
+  "elevationPolicy": "canonical-only",
+  "guard": {
+    "required": true,
+    "sourceRootAware": true,
+    "negativeFixtures": false,
+    "command": "siax-doctor design --repo . --fail-on=block"
+  },
+  "liveArtifactIdentity": {
+    "required": false,
+    "separateFromApiArtifact": true
+  },
+  "exceptions": [
+    {
+      "rule": "internal-siax-import",
+      "path": "app/globals.css",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/aspect-ratio.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/avatar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/carousel.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/collapsible.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/drawer.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/form.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/label.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/pagination.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/progress.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/resizable.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/scroll-area.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/separator.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sonner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/spinner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/table.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toaster.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/empty.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    }
+  ]
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "artifact-digest",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "docker image inspect RepoDigests (real registry digest)",
+  "proofRef": "docker://server6 image shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g:13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "tool": "docker"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "deploy-log",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "Coolify deployment record (application_deployment_queues, status=finished)",
+  "proofRef": "coolify://server6/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g finished 2026-11-04 05:42:18",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "running-digest",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "docker inspect (running container image digest)",
+  "proofRef": "docker://server6 container/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g-20261104T093337 image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "sbom",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T09:29:06Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "syft (estate-kampanj issue #76, skannad vid deployad commit)",
+  "proofRef": "siax/sbom/sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "tool": "syft",
+  "sbomFormat": "cyclonedx-json"
+}

siax/signing/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # 0pt — cosign-signeringskedjan (2026-09-29)
 
-Prod-imagen git.cloud.siax.io/sax3l/0pt:prod-8b5e23aa9b (sha256:889753b7e5a9db3e1c870eeb38f450cb0f20498e1025edb28153233e0b06f46d) är cosign-signerad
+Prod-imagen git.cloud.siax.io/sax3l/0pt:prod-ef84832cdb (sha256:a8e2ebc09bafe1f0d198f72bda700f9b826ac80c7a72f0d21879d851c30dbb1d) är cosign-signerad
 med nyckelparet vars pubkey ligger här. Privata nyckeln raderad efter signering.

siax/signing/cosign.pub

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEiPRG9iG1pjIW548KoIduQPD/B3Yb
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE6Cdqn5WinLh2POoCPzroqb2Tz0Jw
-tg5hPmy7o4feVQsdDnW38VtemVBQ4I+goytV9X4XkrFiweKmfqEMhGyPgg==
+W+vJqjfc1+UybkeU9NZkamkDgCWunNHSn4gGmAyrZpZ8wQqxK35cBhwNeA==
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

siax/source-bundles/sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 {
   "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.source-bundle.schema.json",
   "id": "sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0PT",
+  "repo": "0pt",
   "commitSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
   "branch": "main",
   "buildId": "coolify:0pt",
-  "producedAt": "2026-11-04T01:26:48Z"
+  "producedAt": "2026-11-04T01:26:48Z",
+  "artifactId": "shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
 }

sql/022_canonical_facts.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+-- 022_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
+--
+-- 0pt owns normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source said, when, from which
+-- artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections; it
+-- must consume these rows through this API/contract, never by writing here.
+--
+-- Conflict preservation is structural: the unique key includes source_ref and
+-- observed_at, so two sources disagreeing about the same predicate are two
+-- rows, never an overwrite. `status` records observed/supported/disputed/
+-- retracted; reconciliation is a separate, explicit decision.
+--
+-- Tenant isolation: RLS is FORCEd and keyed on a transaction-local GUC that
+-- only trusted server code sets (same pattern as 019_document_credit_rls.sql).
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_entities (
+  entity_id          UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  entity_type        TEXT NOT NULL,            -- company|person|web_page|product|...
+  identity_namespace TEXT NOT NULL,            -- url|orgnr|lei|gtin|...
+  identity_value     TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  updated_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_entities_tenant_type
+  ON opt_canonical_entities (tenant_id, entity_type);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_facts (
+  fact_id            UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  entity_id          UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  predicate          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- e.g. web.title, product.price
+  value_json         JSONB NOT NULL,
+  value_type         TEXT NOT NULL,            -- string|number|boolean|date|json
+  value_unit         TEXT,
+  source_ref         TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source_record_id   TEXT,
+  st0re_artifact_id  TEXT,
+  aud0_evidence_ref  TEXT,
+  run_ref            TEXT,
+  extractor_version  TEXT NOT NULL,
+  observed_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+  valid_from         TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  valid_to           TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  confidence         NUMERIC CHECK (confidence BETWEEN 0 AND 1),
+  quality_status     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'unvalidated',  -- passed|warned|failed|unvalidated
+  schema_version     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '0pt.canonical_fact/v1',
+  status             TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'observed'
+                     CHECK (status IN ('observed','supported','disputed','retracted')),
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, source_ref, observed_at)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_facts_entity
+  ON opt_canonical_facts (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_facts_predicate
+  ON opt_canonical_facts (tenant_id, predicate, observed_at DESC);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_relations (
+  relation_id        UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  subject_id         UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  predicate          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- LINKS_TO|SOLD_BY|USES_SOFTWARE|...
+  object_id          UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  attributes_json    JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  source_ref         TEXT NOT NULL,
+  st0re_artifact_id  TEXT,
+  aud0_evidence_ref  TEXT,
+  run_ref            TEXT,
+  extractor_version  TEXT NOT NULL,
+  observed_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+  valid_from         TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  valid_to           TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  confidence         NUMERIC CHECK (confidence BETWEEN 0 AND 1),
+  schema_version     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '0pt.canonical_relation/v1',
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, source_ref, observed_at)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_subject
+  ON opt_canonical_relations (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_object
+  ON opt_canonical_relations (tenant_id, object_id, predicate);
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));

sql/023_canonical_grants.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- 023_canonical_grants.sql — app-role privileges for 022 canonical tables.
+--
+-- Tables created by a manual psql migration are owned by the migrating role
+-- (0pt_edge); the running application connects as 0pt_app. Existing 0pt tables
+-- carry explicit grants rather than default ACLs, so the canonical tables need
+-- the same treatment. RLS still applies to 0pt_app (FORCE is on); this only
+-- grants the statement privileges, not row visibility.
+--
+-- Idempotent and role-guarded: no-op in environments without the app role.
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '0pt_app') THEN
+    GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
+      ON opt_canonical_entities, opt_canonical_facts, opt_canonical_relations
+      TO "0pt_app";
+  END IF;
+END
+$$;

src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/**
+ * `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — server-side tenant scope for the
+ * machine-to-machine principal authenticated by `X-Internal-Token`.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS (P0, 2026-11-07)
+ * --------------------------------
+ * `X-Internal-Token` proves that the caller is the SIAX engine process. It
+ * does NOT prove which tenant that process may act for. The first attempt at
+ * fixing the "internal token bypasses the verified-tenant guard" hole copied a
+ * CLIENT HEADER (`X-0pt-Internal-Tenant`) or fell back to a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID` env var:
+ *
+ *     const internalTenant =
+ *       req.headers.get('x-0pt-internal-tenant') ?? process.env.INTERNAL_TENANT_ID;
+ *
+ * That is not an authorization source. Any holder of the shared internal token
+ * could still name any tenant in a request header, which is exactly the
+ * cross-tenant write the fix was supposed to stop (tenant_id
+ * 999999999999999999 returned 201 before).
+ *
+ * The correct model mirrors a verified Bearer token: the principal's tenant
+ * authority is a SERVER-SIDE fact, never a request field.
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` is a comma-separated allowlist configured on
+ *     the 0pt deployment (env/secret), i.e. "the tenants this engine instance
+ *     is entitled to write for".
+ *   - When the allowlist is empty, the internal principal has NO tenant
+ *     authority: tenant-scoped writes fail closed (403). Routes that do not
+ *     carry a tenant (evidence outbox dispatch, ER candidates, search
+ *     definitions) are unaffected.
+ *   - A single allowlisted tenant is ALSO placed in `x-0pt-verified-tenant`
+ *     by middleware so existing single-tenant checks keep working; two or more
+ *     are carried in `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` and the tenant guard
+ *     checks membership.
+ *   - Any inbound value for either header is stripped by middleware before
+ *     forwarding, so a client can never forge tenant authority.
+ *
+ * No client header is read here. `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is deliberately not a
+ * contract.
+ */
+
+/** Env var: comma-separated tenants this internal service principal may assert. */
+export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
+
+/**
+ * Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY (never accepted from a
+ * client, and stripped from every inbound request). Carries the full
+ * server-configured service tenant scope; may be the empty string, which means
+ * "service principal without tenant authority".
+ */
+export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
+
+/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
+export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
+  if (!value) return [];
+  const tenants: string[] = [];
+  for (const part of value.split(',')) {
+    const tenant = part.trim();
+    if (tenant && !tenants.includes(tenant)) tenants.push(tenant);
+  }
+  return tenants;
+}
+
+/** Read the configured service tenant allowlist from the environment. */
+export function resolveInternalServiceTenants(
+  env: { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string } = process.env,
+): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS);
+}
+
+/** Read the scope middleware installed on the request (already stripped+set). */
+export function readServiceTenantScope(headers: { get(name: string): string | null | undefined }): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(headers.get(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER));
+}

src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ export interface Doc0UploadReceipt {
 /** The POST may have committed even if its response could not be verified. */
 export class Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError extends Error {
   constructor() {
-    super('DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key');
+    super(
+      'DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key',
+    );
     this.name = 'Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError';
   }
 }
@@ -60,6 +62,44 @@ export type Doc0Inspection =
  * Internal contract only: callers must retain this identity before dispatch,
  * authorize its scope, and keep the same input bytes/metadata until dispatch.
  */
+/**
+ * One upload identity per operation — not per file.
+ *
+ * "Identical file, different instruction" is a DIFFERENT operation, so the
+ * fingerprint must cover every result-affecting input. DOC0's fingerprint
+ * accepts arbitrary string tuples; we version the domain explicitly.
+ *
+ * Boundary kept: this code stays the 0pt-owned fingerprint of an internal
+ * interface; the SHA-256 of the bytes remains the same regardless, and DOC0
+ * still receives the same `x-idempotency-key` (it owns its own idempotency).
+ */
+export function bindOperationToUploadIdentity(
+  input: Doc0UploadInput,
+  operation: {
+    instruction: string;
+    fields: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; type: string; required?: boolean }>;
+    modelId: string;
+    dataClass: string;
+    format: 'json' | 'csv';
+  },
+): Doc0UploadInput {
+  const payloadVersion = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(
+      JSON.stringify([
+        '0pt-structure-operation-v1',
+        operation.instruction.length,
+        operation.instruction,
+        operation.fields.map((f) => [f.name, f.type, f.required === true]),
+        operation.modelId,
+        operation.dataClass,
+        operation.format,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex')
+    .slice(0, 16);
+  return { ...input, filename: `${input.filename}#${payloadVersion}` };
+}
+
 export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   sourceSha256: string;
   sourceSizeBytes: number;
@@ -68,13 +108,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   wireMimeType: string;
 } {
   if (
-    ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey, input.filename, input.mimeType]
+    ![
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+      input.tenantId,
-    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
+      input.projectId,
-      .every((value) => /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value)) ||
+      input.actorId,
-    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(input.classification) ||
+      input.requestId,
-    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) || input.bytes.byteLength === 0
+      input.idempotencyKey,
-  ) throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
+      input.filename,
+      input.mimeType,
+    ].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every((value) =>
+      /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(
+      input.classification,
+    ) ||
+    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) ||
+    input.bytes.byteLength === 0
+  )
+    throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
   const wireMimeType = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
   if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/.test(wireMimeType)) {
     throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload MIME type');
@@ -83,10 +135,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   const wireFilename = `source.${extension}`;
   const sourceSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(input.bytes).digest('hex');
   const sourceSizeBytes = input.bytes.byteLength;
-  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
+  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256')
-    'doc0-upload-v1', input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, sourceSha256,
+    .update(
-    sourceSizeBytes, wireFilename, wireMimeType, input.filename, 'unknown', input.classification, [], null,
+      JSON.stringify([
-  ])).digest('hex');
+        'doc0-upload-v1',
+        input.tenantId,
+        input.projectId,
+        input.actorId,
+        sourceSha256,
+        sourceSizeBytes,
+        wireFilename,
+        wireMimeType,
+        input.filename,
+        'unknown',
+        input.classification,
+        [],
+        null,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex');
   return { sourceSha256, sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint, wireFilename, wireMimeType };
 }
 
@@ -109,7 +176,9 @@ async function readBoundedJson(response: Response): Promise<unknown> {
       parts.push(chunk.value);
     }
     return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(parts))) as unknown;
-  } finally { reader.releaseLock(); }
+  } finally {
+    reader.releaseLock();
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -131,16 +200,28 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
     },
   ) {
     let url: URL;
-    try { url = new URL(options.baseUrl); }
+    try {
-    catch { throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required'); }
+      url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required');
+    }
     if (
-      url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash ||
+      url.protocol !== 'https:' ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
       !options.serviceToken.trim() ||
       !Number.isSafeInteger(options.maxBytes) ||
       options.maxBytes <= 0 ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 1_000 || options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) ||
+          options.timeoutMs < 1_000 ||
+          options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
     ) {
-      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required');
+      throw new Error(
+        'A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required',
+      );
     }
     // Keep the validated values even if the caller later changes its options object.
     this.options = { ...options };
@@ -167,7 +248,11 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         classification: input.classification,
       }),
     );
-    body.set('file', new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }), identity.wireFilename);
+    body.set(
+      'file',
+      new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }),
+      identity.wireFilename,
+    );
     let response: Response;
     try {
       response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/documents`, {
@@ -183,11 +268,16 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         body,
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
       });
-    } catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     // Even a non-2xx response does not prove the write did not commit.
     let decoded: unknown;
-    try { decoded = await readBoundedJson(response); }
+    try {
-    catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+      decoded = await readBoundedJson(response);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     const data = decoded as {
       document?: {
         documentId?: unknown;
@@ -239,33 +329,63 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
    * is complete. No automatic retry, settlement or customer route is wired.
    */
   async inspect(input: Doc0InspectionInput): Promise<Doc0Inspection> {
-    if (![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
+    if (
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+      ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every(
-      input.projectId.length > 256 || input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim(),
-      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
+      ) ||
-      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) || input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0) {
+      input.projectId.length > 256 ||
+      input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) ||
+      input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0
+    ) {
       throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 inspection input');
     }
     let result: unknown;
     try {
       const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/upload-intents/inspect`, {
-        method: 'POST', redirect: 'error', cache: 'no-store', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
+        method: 'POST',
-        headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`, 'content-type': 'application/json',
+        redirect: 'error',
-          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId, 'x-actor-id': input.actorId, 'x-request-id': input.requestId, 'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey },
+        cache: 'no-store',
-        body: JSON.stringify({ projectId: input.projectId, sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
-          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint }),
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId,
+          'x-actor-id': input.actorId,
+          'x-request-id': input.requestId,
+          'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey,
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          projectId: input.projectId,
+          sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
+          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes,
+          requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint,
+        }),
       });
       result = await readBoundedJson(response);
-    } catch { throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError(); }
+    } catch {
-    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result)) throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    }
+    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result))
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
     const record = result as Record<string, unknown>;
-    if (typeof record.status === 'string' && ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
+    if (
-      Object.keys(record).length === 1) {
+      typeof record.status === 'string' &&
+      ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 1
+    ) {
       return { status: record.status as 'not_found' | 'in_progress' | 'reconciliation_required' };
     }
-    if (record.status === 'completed_recorded' && Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
+    if (
-      typeof record.documentId === 'string' && record.documentId.trim() &&
+      record.status === 'completed_recorded' &&
-      typeof record.versionId === 'string' && record.versionId.trim()) {
+      Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
+      typeof record.documentId === 'string' &&
+      record.documentId.trim() &&
+      typeof record.versionId === 'string' &&
+      record.versionId.trim()
+    ) {
       return { status: 'completed_recorded', documentId: record.documentId, versionId: record.versionId };
     }
     throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();

src/http/tenant-guard.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
  * authz hole without changing every route's request contract).
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
+import { readServiceTenantScope } from "@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant";
 
 export const VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
 
@@ -52,6 +53,26 @@ export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
   tenantId: string | null | undefined,
 ): NextResponse | null {
   const verified = request.headers.get(VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER);
+  // Internal service principal: tenant authority is the SERVER-CONFIGURED
+  // allowlist middleware installed (never a client header). The scope header is
+  // present even when the allowlist is empty, which means "no tenant
+  // authority" -> fail closed. Routes that do not take a tenant never call
+  // this guard, so evidence dispatch / ER / search definitions keep working.
+  if (request.headers.get("x-0pt-verified-service-tenants") !== null) {
+    if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
+    const scope = readServiceTenantScope(request.headers);
+    if (!scope.includes(tenantId)) {
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error: "OPT_ACCESS_DENIED",
+          message: "tenant_id is outside the internal service principal's configured tenant scope",
+          details: { requested_tenant: tenantId, service_tenant_scope: scope },
+        },
+        { status: 403 },
+      );
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
   if (!verified) return null;
   if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
   if (tenantId !== verified) {

src/repositories/canonical-fact-repository.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/**
+ * src/repositories/canonical-fact-repository.ts
+ * =============================================
+ * Storage seam for 0pt canonical entities/facts/relations (sql/022).
+ * Same split as source-repository.ts: one interface, an in-memory
+ * implementation (dev/test) and a Postgres implementation (production),
+ * chosen once via resolveStoreMode.
+ *
+ * Tenant isolation is enforced by the service + route AND by RLS in Postgres
+ * (transaction-local GUC `app.opt_canonical_tenant_id`, same pattern as
+ * 019_document_credit_rls.sql). The in-memory backend scopes by tenant_id in
+ * every read/write.
+ */
+import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
+import { resolveStoreMode } from "../platform/dependency-mode";
+import type {
+  CanonicalEntity,
+  CanonicalEntityInput,
+  CanonicalFact,
+  CanonicalFactInput,
+  CanonicalQuery,
+  CanonicalRelationInput,
+} from "../types/canonical-facts";
+import { getRepositorySql, repositoryDatabaseUrl, type RepositorySql } from "./db";
+
+export interface CanonicalFactRepository {
+  upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]>;
+  insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }>;
+  insertRelations(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalRelationInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }>;
+  queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]>;
+}
+
+/** PostgreSQL timestamptz arrives as Date; the API contract is RFC3339/ISO-8601. */
+function iso(value: unknown): string {
+  return value instanceof Date ? value.toISOString() : String(value);
+}
+
+export function entityKey(e: CanonicalEntityInput): string {
+  return `${e.entity_type}\u0000${e.identity_namespace}\u0000${e.identity_value}`;
+}
+
+export function createCanonicalFactRepository(databaseUrl?: string): CanonicalFactRepository {
+  const mode = resolveStoreMode("0pt.canonical_facts", databaseUrl ?? repositoryDatabaseUrl());
+  if (mode.mode === "postgres") {
+    return new PostgresCanonicalFactRepository(getRepositorySql(mode.url));
+  }
+  return new InMemoryCanonicalFactRepository();
+}
+
+// ── in-memory (dev/test) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+class InMemoryCanonicalFactRepository implements CanonicalFactRepository {
+  private entities = new Map<string, CanonicalEntity>();
+  private facts = new Map<string, CanonicalFact>();
+
+  async upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]> {
+    const now = new Date().toISOString();
+    return inputs.map((input) => {
+      const key = `${tenantId}\u0000${entityKey(input)}`;
+      const existing = this.entities.get(key);
+      if (existing) return existing;
+      const entity: CanonicalEntity = {
+        ...input,
+        entity_id: randomUUID(),
+        tenant_id: tenantId,
+        created_at: now,
+        updated_at: now,
+      };
+      this.entities.set(key, entity);
+      return entity;
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    let inserted = 0;
+    let duplicates = 0;
+    for (const input of inputs) {
+      const entityId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.entity));
+      if (!entityId) continue;
+      const key = `${tenantId}\u0000${entityId}\u0000${input.predicate}\u0000${input.source_ref}\u0000${input.observed_at}`;
+      if (this.facts.has(key)) {
+        duplicates += 1;
+        continue;
+      }
+      this.facts.set(key, {
+        ...input,
+        fact_id: randomUUID(),
+        tenant_id: tenantId,
+        entity_id: entityId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      inserted += 1;
+    }
+    return { inserted, duplicates };
+  }
+
+  async insertRelations(): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    // Relations are not persisted in the in-memory backend beyond validation;
+    // tests assert the write path through facts + counts.
+    return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+  }
+
+  async queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    const limit = query.limit ?? 100;
+    return [...this.facts.values()]
+      .filter((f) => f.tenant_id === query.tenant_id)
+      .filter((f) => (query.entity_id ? f.entity_id === query.entity_id : true))
+      .filter((f) => (query.predicate ? f.predicate === query.predicate : true))
+      .slice(0, limit);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── postgres (production) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+class PostgresCanonicalFactRepository implements CanonicalFactRepository {
+  constructor(private readonly sql: RepositorySql) {}
+
+  private async tx<T>(tenantId: string, fn: (tx: RepositorySql) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+    return this.sql.begin(async (tx) => {
+      await tx`SELECT set_config('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', ${tenantId}, true)`;
+      return fn(tx as unknown as RepositorySql);
+    }) as Promise<T>;
+  }
+
+  async upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return [];
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      const out: CanonicalEntity[] = [];
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_entities (entity_id, tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+          VALUES (${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${input.entity_type}, ${input.identity_namespace}, ${input.identity_value})
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+          DO UPDATE SET updated_at = now()
+          RETURNING entity_id, tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value, created_at, updated_at`;
+        const r = rows[0];
+        out.push({
+          entity_id: r.entity_id, tenant_id: r.tenant_id, entity_type: r.entity_type,
+          identity_namespace: r.identity_namespace, identity_value: r.identity_value,
+          created_at: String(r.created_at), updated_at: String(r.updated_at),
+        });
+      }
+      return out;
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      let inserted = 0;
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const entityId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.entity));
+        if (!entityId) continue;
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_facts (
+            fact_id, tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, value_json, value_type, value_unit,
+            source_ref, source_record_id, st0re_artifact_id, aud0_evidence_ref, run_ref,
+            extractor_version, observed_at, valid_from, valid_to, confidence, quality_status, status
+          ) VALUES (
+            ${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${entityId}, ${input.predicate}, ${JSON.stringify(input.value)}::jsonb,
+            ${input.value_type ?? "json"}, ${input.value_unit ?? null}, ${input.source_ref},
+            ${input.source_record_id ?? null}, ${input.st0re_artifact_id ?? null},
+            ${input.aud0_evidence_ref ?? null}, ${input.run_ref ?? null}, ${input.extractor_version},
+            ${input.observed_at}, ${input.valid_from ?? null}, ${input.valid_to ?? null},
+            ${input.confidence ?? null}, ${input.quality_status ?? "unvalidated"}, ${input.status ?? "observed"}
+          )
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, source_ref, observed_at) DO NOTHING
+          RETURNING fact_id`;
+        if (rows.length > 0) inserted += 1;
+      }
+      return { inserted, duplicates: inputs.length - inserted };
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertRelations(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalRelationInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      let inserted = 0;
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const subjectId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.subject));
+        const objectId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.object));
+        if (!subjectId || !objectId) continue;
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_relations (
+            relation_id, tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, attributes_json,
+            source_ref, st0re_artifact_id, aud0_evidence_ref, run_ref, extractor_version,
+            observed_at, valid_from, valid_to, confidence
+          ) VALUES (
+            ${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${subjectId}, ${input.predicate}, ${objectId},
+            ${JSON.stringify(input.attributes ?? {})}::jsonb, ${input.source_ref},
+            ${input.st0re_artifact_id ?? null}, ${input.aud0_evidence_ref ?? null},
+            ${input.run_ref ?? null}, ${input.extractor_version}, ${input.observed_at},
+            ${input.valid_from ?? null}, ${input.valid_to ?? null}, ${input.confidence ?? null}
+          )
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, source_ref, observed_at) DO NOTHING
+          RETURNING relation_id`;
+        if (rows.length > 0) inserted += 1;
+      }
+      return { inserted, duplicates: inputs.length - inserted };
+    });
+  }
+
+  async queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    const limit = query.limit ?? 100;
+    return this.tx(query.tenant_id, async (tx) => {
+      const rows = await tx`
+        SELECT f.*, e.entity_type, e.identity_namespace, e.identity_value
+        FROM opt_canonical_facts f
+        JOIN opt_canonical_entities e ON e.entity_id = f.entity_id
+        WHERE f.tenant_id = ${query.tenant_id}
+          ${query.entity_id ? tx`AND f.entity_id = ${query.entity_id}` : tx``}
+          ${query.predicate ? tx`AND f.predicate = ${query.predicate}` : tx``}
+          ${query.entity_type ? tx`AND e.entity_type = ${query.entity_type}` : tx``}
+          ${query.identity_namespace ? tx`AND e.identity_namespace = ${query.identity_namespace}` : tx``}
+          ${query.identity_value ? tx`AND e.identity_value = ${query.identity_value}` : tx``}
+        ORDER BY f.observed_at DESC
+        LIMIT ${limit}`;
+      return rows.map((r) => ({
+        fact_id: r.fact_id, tenant_id: r.tenant_id, entity_id: r.entity_id,
+        entity: { entity_type: r.entity_type, identity_namespace: r.identity_namespace, identity_value: r.identity_value },
+        predicate: r.predicate, value: r.value_json, value_type: r.value_type,
+        value_unit: r.value_unit ?? undefined, source_ref: r.source_ref,
+        source_record_id: r.source_record_id ?? undefined,
+        st0re_artifact_id: r.st0re_artifact_id ?? undefined,
+        aud0_evidence_ref: r.aud0_evidence_ref ?? undefined, run_ref: r.run_ref ?? undefined,
+        extractor_version: r.extractor_version, observed_at: iso(r.observed_at),
+        valid_from: r.valid_from ? iso(r.valid_from) : undefined,
+        valid_to: r.valid_to ? iso(r.valid_to) : undefined,
+        confidence: r.confidence === null ? undefined : Number(r.confidence),
+        quality_status: r.quality_status, status: r.status, created_at: iso(r.created_at),
+      })) as CanonicalFact[];
+    });
+  }
+}

src/services/canonical-fact-registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/** Shared singleton for the canonical-fact routes (same pattern as source-registry.ts). */
+import { CanonicalFactService } from "./canonical-fact-service";
+
+export const canonicalFactService = new CanonicalFactService();

src/services/canonical-fact-service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/**
+ * src/services/canonical-fact-service.ts
+ * ======================================
+ * 0pt's canonical structured-observation write/read surface (sql/022).
+ *
+ * Ownership boundary: 0pt stores normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source
+ * said, when, from which artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions and
+ * projections and must consume these rows through this API. Nothing here
+ * overwrites an earlier observation: the unique key includes source_ref +
+ * observed_at, so conflicting sources are preserved as separate rows.
+ *
+ * Idempotency: identical re-writes hit ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING and are
+ * reported as `duplicates`, never duplicated.
+ */
+import { createAud0Client, type Aud0Client } from "../clients/aud0-client";
+import { SiaxError } from "../platform/errors";
+import {
+  createCanonicalFactRepository,
+  entityKey,
+  type CanonicalFactRepository,
+} from "../repositories/canonical-fact-repository";
+import type {
+  CanonicalEntity,
+  CanonicalEntityInput,
+  CanonicalFact,
+  CanonicalFactInput,
+  CanonicalQuery,
+  CanonicalRelationInput,
+  CanonicalWriteRequest,
+  CanonicalWriteResult,
+  FactValueType,
+} from "../types/canonical-facts";
+
+const FACT_VALUE_TYPES: FactValueType[] = ["string", "number", "boolean", "date", "json"];
+
+function inferValueType(value: unknown): FactValueType {
+  if (typeof value === "string") return "string";
+  if (typeof value === "number") return "number";
+  if (typeof value === "boolean") return "boolean";
+  return "json";
+}
+
+function assertEntity(entity: CanonicalEntityInput, label: string): void {
+  if (!entity || !entity.entity_type || !entity.identity_namespace || !entity.identity_value) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `${label} requires entity_type, identity_namespace and identity_value`);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertFact(fact: CanonicalFactInput, index: number): void {
+  assertEntity(fact.entity, `facts[${index}].entity`);
+  if (!fact.predicate) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].predicate is required`);
+  if (!fact.source_ref) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].source_ref is required`);
+  if (!fact.extractor_version) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].extractor_version is required`);
+  if (!fact.observed_at || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(fact.observed_at))) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].observed_at must be an ISO timestamp`);
+  }
+  if (fact.value === undefined) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].value is required`);
+  if (fact.value_type && !FACT_VALUE_TYPES.includes(fact.value_type)) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].value_type is invalid`);
+  }
+  if (fact.confidence !== undefined && (fact.confidence < 0 || fact.confidence > 1)) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].confidence must be between 0 and 1`);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertRelation(relation: CanonicalRelationInput, index: number): void {
+  assertEntity(relation.subject, `relations[${index}].subject`);
+  assertEntity(relation.object, `relations[${index}].object`);
+  if (!relation.predicate) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].predicate is required`);
+  if (!relation.source_ref) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].source_ref is required`);
+  if (!relation.extractor_version) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].extractor_version is required`);
+  if (!relation.observed_at || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(relation.observed_at))) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].observed_at must be an ISO timestamp`);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalFactServiceOptions {
+  repository?: CanonicalFactRepository;
+  aud0BaseUrl?: string;
+  databaseUrl?: string;
+}
+
+export class CanonicalFactService {
+  private readonly repo: CanonicalFactRepository;
+  private readonly aud0: Aud0Client;
+
+  constructor(opts?: CanonicalFactServiceOptions) {
+    this.repo = opts?.repository ?? createCanonicalFactRepository(opts?.databaseUrl);
+    this.aud0 = createAud0Client(opts?.aud0BaseUrl);
+  }
+
+  async write(input: CanonicalWriteRequest): Promise<CanonicalWriteResult> {
+    if (!input.tenant_id) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "tenant_id is required");
+    const facts = input.facts ?? [];
+    const relations = input.relations ?? [];
+    const explicit = input.entities ?? [];
+    if (facts.length === 0 && relations.length === 0 && explicit.length === 0) {
+      throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "at least one entity, fact or relation is required");
+    }
+    facts.forEach(assertFact);
+    relations.forEach(assertRelation);
+
+    // Unique entity inputs from explicit + facts + relations.
+    const unique = new Map<string, CanonicalEntityInput>();
+    for (const e of [...explicit, ...facts.map((f) => f.entity), ...relations.flatMap((r) => [r.subject, r.object])]) {
+      assertEntity(e, "entity");
+      unique.set(entityKey(e), e);
+    }
+    const entities: CanonicalEntity[] = await this.repo.upsertEntities(input.tenant_id, [...unique.values()]);
+    const entityIds = new Map(entities.map((e) => [entityKey(e), e.entity_id]));
+
+    const normalizedFacts = facts.map((f) => ({ ...f, value_type: f.value_type ?? inferValueType(f.value) }));
+    const factResult = await this.repo.insertFacts(input.tenant_id, normalizedFacts, entityIds);
+    const relationResult = await this.repo.insertRelations(input.tenant_id, relations, entityIds);
+
+    // AUD0: counts and provenance refs only, never fact values (PII discipline).
+    try {
+      await this.aud0.ingestEvent({
+        event_id: `evt_0pt_canonical_facts_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+        event_type: "0pt.canonical_facts_written",
+        tenant_id: input.tenant_id,
+        project_id: input.project_id ?? input.tenant_id,
+        actor_id: "0pt",
+        app_id: "0pt",
+        capability_id: "0pt.canonical_fact_write",
+        resource_type: "canonical_facts",
+        resource_id: input.tenant_id,
+        risk_level: "L2",
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        payload: {
+          entities: entities.length,
+          facts_inserted: factResult.inserted,
+          facts_duplicates: factResult.duplicates,
+          relations_inserted: relationResult.inserted,
+          relations_duplicates: relationResult.duplicates,
+          source_refs: [...new Set([...facts.map((f) => f.source_ref), ...relations.map((r) => r.source_ref)])],
+          run_refs: [...new Set([...facts.map((f) => f.run_ref), ...relations.map((r) => r.run_ref)].filter(Boolean))],
+        },
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // AUD0 outage must not lose the canonical write; the caller sees counts.
+    }
+
+    return {
+      entities,
+      facts: normalizedFacts.map((f) => ({
+        fact_id: "",
+        entity_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(f.entity)) ?? "",
+        predicate: f.predicate,
+      })),
+      relations: relations.map((r) => ({
+        relation_id: "",
+        subject_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(r.subject)) ?? "",
+        predicate: r.predicate,
+        object_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(r.object)) ?? "",
+      })),
+      duplicates: factResult.duplicates + relationResult.duplicates,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async query(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    if (!query.tenant_id) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "tenant_id is required");
+    return this.repo.queryFacts({ ...query, limit: Math.min(query.limit ?? 100, 500) });
+  }
+}

src/types/canonical-facts.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * src/types/canonical-facts.ts — 0pt canonical structured observations.
+ *
+ * 0pt owns OBSERVED facts (source said X at time T, from artifact A). L0RE
+ * owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections derived from these.
+ * This contract is the single write path into the canonical observation store;
+ * downstream products consume it through the same API instead of their own DB.
+ */
+
+export interface CanonicalEntityInput {
+  entity_type: string;
+  identity_namespace: string;
+  identity_value: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalEntity extends CanonicalEntityInput {
+  entity_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+  updated_at: string;
+}
+
+export type FactValueType = "string" | "number" | "boolean" | "date" | "json";
+export type QualityStatus = "passed" | "warned" | "failed" | "unvalidated";
+export type FactStatus = "observed" | "supported" | "disputed" | "retracted";
+
+export interface CanonicalFactInput {
+  entity: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  predicate: string;
+  value: unknown;
+  value_type?: FactValueType;
+  value_unit?: string;
+  source_ref: string;
+  source_record_id?: string;
+  st0re_artifact_id?: string;
+  aud0_evidence_ref?: string;
+  run_ref?: string;
+  extractor_version: string;
+  observed_at: string;
+  valid_from?: string;
+  valid_to?: string;
+  confidence?: number;
+  quality_status?: QualityStatus;
+  status?: FactStatus;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalRelationInput {
+  subject: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  predicate: string;
+  object: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  attributes?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  source_ref: string;
+  st0re_artifact_id?: string;
+  aud0_evidence_ref?: string;
+  run_ref?: string;
+  extractor_version: string;
+  observed_at: string;
+  valid_from?: string;
+  valid_to?: string;
+  confidence?: number;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalFact extends CanonicalFactInput {
+  fact_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  entity_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalRelation extends CanonicalRelationInput {
+  relation_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  subject_id: string;
+  object_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalWriteRequest {
+  tenant_id: string;
+  project_id?: string;
+  entities?: CanonicalEntityInput[];
+  facts?: CanonicalFactInput[];
+  relations?: CanonicalRelationInput[];
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalWriteResult {
+  entities: CanonicalEntity[];
+  facts: { fact_id: string; entity_id: string; predicate: string }[];
+  relations: { relation_id: string; subject_id: string; predicate: string; object_id: string }[];
+  /** Identical re-inserts skipped by the unique key (idempotent replay). */
+  duplicates: number;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalQuery {
+  tenant_id: string;
+  entity_id?: string;
+  entity_type?: string;
+  identity_namespace?: string;
+  identity_value?: string;
+  predicate?: string;
+  limit?: number;
+}

src/validation/0pt-schemas.ts

@@ -263,3 +263,63 @@ export const activateSourceSchema = z.object({
   tenant_id: z.string().min(1),
   actor_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
 });
+
+/** POST /api/0pt/canonical/facts — canonical structured observation write (sql/022). */
+const canonicalEntityInputSchema = z.object({
+  entity_type: z.string().min(1),
+  identity_namespace: z.string().min(1),
+  identity_value: z.string().min(1),
+});
+
+const canonicalValueSchema = z.union([
+  z.string(),
+  z.number(),
+  z.boolean(),
+  z.null(),
+  z.array(z.unknown()),
+  jsonObject,
+]);
+
+export const canonicalFactInputSchema = z.object({
+  entity: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  predicate: z.string().min(1),
+  value: canonicalValueSchema,
+  value_type: z.enum(['string', 'number', 'boolean', 'date', 'json']).optional(),
+  value_unit: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  source_ref: z.string().min(1),
+  source_record_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  st0re_artifact_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  aud0_evidence_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  run_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  extractor_version: z.string().min(1),
+  observed_at: z.string().min(1),
+  valid_from: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  valid_to: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).optional(),
+  quality_status: z.enum(['passed', 'warned', 'failed', 'unvalidated']).optional(),
+  status: z.enum(['observed', 'supported', 'disputed', 'retracted']).optional(),
+});
+
+export const canonicalRelationInputSchema = z.object({
+  subject: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  predicate: z.string().min(1),
+  object: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  attributes: jsonObject.optional(),
+  source_ref: z.string().min(1),
+  st0re_artifact_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  aud0_evidence_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  run_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  extractor_version: z.string().min(1),
+  observed_at: z.string().min(1),
+  valid_from: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  valid_to: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).optional(),
+});
+
+export const canonicalWriteSchema = z.object({
+  tenant_id: z.string().min(1),
+  project_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  entities: z.array(canonicalEntityInputSchema).optional(),
+  facts: z.array(canonicalFactInputSchema).optional(),
+  relations: z.array(canonicalRelationInputSchema).optional(),
+});

tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/**
+ * P0 regression (2026-11-07): tenant authority for the machine-to-machine
+ * (`X-Internal-Token`) principal is SERVER CONFIGURATION, never a client
+ * header.
+ *
+ * The first attempt at this fix read `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` (or a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID`) and copied it into `x-0pt-verified-tenant`. Any holder
+ * of the shared internal token could then still name any tenant, so the
+ * original cross-tenant write (tenant_id 999999999999999999 -> 201) remained
+ * possible through a different header. These tests pin the corrected model:
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` (server env) is the only source of tenant
+ *     authority for the service principal.
+ *   - No configured scope => tenant-scoped writes are denied (fail closed).
+ *   - Client-supplied `x-0pt-internal-tenant`, `x-0pt-verified-tenant` and
+ *     `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` are ignored and stripped.
+ *   - Bearer/session principals are unchanged.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
+import {
+  parseServiceTenants,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from '@/src/http/tenant-guard';
+import { POST as canonicalPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route';
+import { POST as bridgePOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route';
+import { POST as evidenceDispatchPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch/route';
+
+const INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
+const SCOPED_ROUTE = '/api/0pt/canonical/facts';
+
+function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
+}
+
+/** Headers middleware forwarded to the route handler (Next stores them here). */
+function forwarded(res: { headers: { get(name: string): string | null } }, name: string): string | null {
+  return res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${name.toLowerCase()}`);
+}
+
+function guardRequest(headers: Record<string, string>): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers },
+  });
+}
+
+describe('parseServiceTenants / resolveInternalServiceTenants', () => {
+  it('splits, trims and de-duplicates the allowlist', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(' t_a , t_b ,, t_a ')).toEqual(['t_a', 't_b']);
+  });
+
+  it('an unset/empty allowlist means no tenant authority', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(undefined)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseServiceTenants('')).toEqual([]);
+    expect(resolveInternalServiceTenants({})).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('middleware: internal-token tenant authority comes from server config', () => {
+  const saved = {
+    auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE,
+    token: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+    tenants: process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS,
+    node: process.env.NODE_ENV,
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    delete process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    const values: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
+      AUTH_ENFORCE: saved.auth,
+      INTERNAL_TOKEN: saved.token,
+      INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS: saved.tenants,
+      NODE_ENV: saved.node,
+    };
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
+      else process.env[key] = value;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('single allowlisted tenant is installed as the verified tenant', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('REFUSES an ambiguous multi-tenant allowlist (no workload-identity binding yet)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a,t_b';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    expect(body.message).toContain('ambiguous');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a single allowlist entry is still forwarded as the service scope', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('with no configured scope the service principal has no tenant authority (empty scope header)', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('IGNORES a client-supplied X-0pt-Internal-Tenant (not an authority source)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-internal-tenant': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('STRIPS a forged x-0pt-verified-tenant and forged scope header', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-sub': 'user_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-sub')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('strips forged verified headers on the unauthenticated development path too', async () => {
+    process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false';
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/documents/capture', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim' }));
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('an invalid internal token still falls through to 401', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong' }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('assertTenantMatchesVerified: service scope is enforced fail-closed', () => {
+  it('no service scope header behaves exactly as before (Bearer verified tenant)', () => {
+    const same = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_a',
+    );
+    expect(same).toBeNull();
+    const cross = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(cross?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows a tenant inside the configured service scope', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a,t_b' }),
+      't_b',
+    );
+    expect(res).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES a tenant outside the configured service scope (403)', async () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+    const body = await res!.json();
+    expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_ACCESS_DENIED');
+    expect(body.details.service_tenant_scope).toEqual(['t_a']);
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES every tenant when the configured scope is empty (fail closed, even if a verified tenant was also set)', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({
+        [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': '999999999999999999',
+      }),
+      '999999999999999999',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('route handlers: internal service cannot write a foreign tenant', () => {
+  it('canonical facts: cross-tenant write is 403 before the service runs', async () => {
+    const res = await canonicalPOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          entities: [],
+          facts: [],
+          relations: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('quality bridge-run: cross-tenant run is 403 before rules are provisioned', async () => {
+    const res = await bridgePOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          project_id: 'p1',
+          dataset_id: 'ds_1',
+          rows: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('evidence-outbox dispatch needs no tenant and is unchanged by the scope', async () => {
+    // No DB in this test env: the route authenticates first, then reports a
+    // dependency error -- anything except 401/403 proves the scope did not
+    // turn a tenant-less machine route into a denial.
+    const previous = process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    try {
+      const res = await evidenceDispatchPOST(
+        new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch', 'http://localhost'), {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: {
+            'content-type': 'application/json',
+            'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+            [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ limit: 1 }),
+        }),
+      );
+      expect([401, 403]).not.toContain(res.status);
+    } finally {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+      else process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = previous;
+    }
+  });
+});

tests/auth/middleware-internal-token.test.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ describe('middleware.ts: internal-token path for /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', (
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
   });
 
+  it('a valid X-Internal-Token lets the acquisition engine write canonical facts', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
   it('an invalid X-Internal-Token still falls through to the ordinary Bearer requirement (401, not a bypass)', async () => {
     const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong-secret' }));
     expect(res.status).toBe(401);

tests/document-workbench/idempotency-operation-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  bindOperationToUploadIdentity,
+  prepareDoc0UploadIdentity,
+  type Doc0UploadInput,
+} from '../../src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client';
+
+const input: Doc0UploadInput = {
+  tenantId: 't1', projectId: 'p1', actorId: 'a1', requestId: 'r1', idempotencyKey: 'k1',
+  filename: 'rapport.txt', mimeType: 'text/plain', classification: 'internal',
+  bytes: new TextEncoder().encode('Innehall'),
+};
+const opA = {
+  instruction: 'Extrahera leverantor', fields: [{ name: 'supplier', type: 'string' }],
+  modelId: 'm1', dataClass: 'low', format: 'json' as const,
+};
+const opB = { ...opA, instruction: 'Extrahera belopp' };
+
+describe('operation-scoped upload identity', () => {
+  it('same file + same operation binds to one identity', () => {
+    expect(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)))
+      .toEqual(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)));
+  });
+  it('same file + DIFFERENT instruction = DIFFERENT identity (not the same operation)', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(b.requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('changed model or data class also changes the operation identity', () => {
+    const c = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, modelId: 'm2' }));
+    const d = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, dataClass: 'high' }));
+    const e = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, format: 'csv' }));
+    expect(c.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(d.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(e.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('raw bytes checksum stays stable across operations', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.sourceSha256).toBe(b.sourceSha256);
+  });
+  it('prefixes the operation marker so odd filenames cannot collide', () => {
+    const bound = bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA);
+    expect(bound.filename.startsWith('rapport.txt#')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

tests/p0/canonical-facts.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical structured observations (sql/022): idempotent write, conflict
+ * preservation, tenant isolation and relation identity resolution.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { CanonicalFactService } from "@/src/services/canonical-fact-service";
+import { SiaxError } from "@/src/platform/errors";
+
+const T = "t_canonical_test";
+const ENTITY = { entity_type: "web_page", identity_namespace: "url", identity_value: "https://example.org" };
+
+function fact(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
+  return {
+    entity: ENTITY,
+    predicate: "web.title",
+    value: "Example Domain",
+    source_ref: "source:example",
+    extractor_version: "0pt.motor.extraction/v1",
+    observed_at: "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z",
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+describe("CanonicalFactService — write", () => {
+  it("creates the entity and the fact, and query returns it", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    const result = await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(result.entities).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(result.entities[0].identity_value).toBe("https://example.org");
+    expect(result.facts).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(result.duplicates).toBe(0);
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].predicate).toBe("web.title");
+    expect(rows[0].value_type).toBe("string");
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent: an identical replay is reported as a duplicate, not stored twice", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    const replay = await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(replay.duplicates).toBe(1);
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("preserves conflicting sources as separate observations", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ source_ref: "source:a", value: "A" })] });
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ source_ref: "source:b", value: "B" })] });
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.value).sort()).toEqual(["A", "B"]);
+  });
+
+  it("isolates tenants", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: "t_a", facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(await svc.query({ tenant_id: "t_b" })).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("resolves relation subject/object identities to entity ids", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    const result = await svc.write({
+      tenant_id: T,
+      relations: [{
+        subject: ENTITY,
+        predicate: "LINKS_TO",
+        object: { entity_type: "web_page", identity_namespace: "url", identity_value: "https://example.org/next" },
+        source_ref: "source:example",
+        extractor_version: "0pt.motor.extraction/v1",
+        observed_at: "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z",
+      }],
+    });
+    expect(result.entities).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(result.relations[0].subject_id).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(result.relations[0].object_id).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(result.relations[0].subject_id).not.toBe(result.relations[0].object_id);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a fact without observed_at or with an invalid confidence", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await expect(svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ observed_at: undefined })] })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
+    await expect(svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ confidence: 2 })] })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
+  });
+});

tests/siax-access/idempotency.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  operationFingerprint,
+  operationIdentity,
+  runIdempotentOperation,
+  type IdempotencyStore,
+} from "../../packages/siax-access/src/idempotency";
+
+describe("@siax/access universal idempotency", () => {
+  it("binds every result-affecting input into the fingerprint", () => {
+    const a = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera"]);
+    const b = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera-belopp"]);
+    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+  });
+  it("rejects malformed identity (same shape 0pt/DOC0 both enforce)", () => {
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "../bad", payload: [] })).toThrow();
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "ok", payload: "not-array" as never })).toThrow();
+  });
+  it("conflicts when a reused key carries a changed payload", () => {
+    const fp1 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "A"]);
+    const fp2 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "B"]);
+    expect(fp1).not.toBe(fp2);
+  });
+  it("replays a stored receipt verbatim on the exact fingerprint", async () => {
+    const stored = { x: 1 };
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => false,
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => stored,
+    };
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { throw new Error("must not rerun"); },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("replayed");
+    if (outcome.kind === "replayed") expect(outcome.receipt).toEqual(stored);
+  });
+  it("claims once and saves only after the dispatch", async () => {
+    const order: string[] = [];
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => { order.push("start"); return true; },
+      save: async () => { order.push("save"); },
+      receipt: async () => { order.push("receipt"); return undefined; },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { order.push("dispatch"); return { x: ++dispatched }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+    expect(order).toEqual(["start", "dispatch", "save"]);
+  });
+  it("reports a store error as conflict, never as a fresh start", async () => {
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("conflict");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(0);
+  });
+  it("does not rerun the dispatch when start succeeds but save later fails", async () => {
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = { start: async () => true, save: async () => { throw new Error("journal write failed"); }, receipt: async () => undefined };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+  });
+});