8 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
admin	3d2fc6f913	fix(recovery): restore source removed by production documentation merge	2026-11-10 03:42:10 +01:00
admin	a4189333af	docs(production): standardiserad produktionsberedskap och gap-analys ... Lägger docs/production-readiness.md och siax/production-gaps.json enligt SIAX Master Definition of Done. Underlag: git-, kod- och live-evidens 2026-11-11. Nivån är evidensbaserad, inte ett leveransgodkännande.	2026-11-10 03:07:36 +01:00
admin	d40360aabc	feat(auth): dual-accept CL0UD workload identity on the machine routes ... The internal machine routes (`quality/bridge-run`, `canonical/facts`, `internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch`, `internal/er/candidates`, `search/definitions`) trusted a shared `X-Internal-Token` with NO tenant authority: middleware let it through without setting any verified tenant, so `assertTenantMatchesVerified` was a no-op and a caller-chosen `tenant_id` in the body was authoritative. This closes that gap while keeping the engine working during the transition to CL0UD workload tokens: - `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — the server-configured `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` scope, a scope header that only middleware may set, and a parser that strips/ignores client values. - `src/auth/cl0ud-workload.ts` — a real `jose`/JWKS verifier for CL0UD workload JWTs (`iss`/`aud`/`exp`), deriving `tenant_id` and `capabilities` from verified claims only. Fail-closed when a token is presented but the issuer/JWKS/audience/tenant claim does not verify. - `middleware.ts` — strips every `x-0pt-verified-*` header on all forwarded paths. Legacy internal tokens get the single configured tenant as scope (an ambiguous multi-tenant list is refused with 401 instead of widened); a Bearer CL0UD workload token is verified and its claims become the verified tenant/subject/capabilities. - `src/http/tenant-guard.ts` — enforces the service scope on tenant-scoped writes (deny when the tenant is outside the scope) and adds `assertWorkloadCapabilities` for capability-scoped principals. - `quality/bridge-run` now calls `assertTenantMatchesVerified` like `canonical/facts` already did. Tests: `tests/auth/workload-identity-dual-accept.test.ts` (10 cases) covers forged-header stripping, ambiguous-scope refusal, wrong audience, missing tenant claim, cross-tenant denial and missing-capability denial. Real CL0UD provisioning (service accounts + published JWKS) is still required before a workload token exists in production; until then the legacy token path is the only one that authenticates, now tenant-scoped.	2026-11-09 18:34:34 +01:00
SIAX Agent	b97ad0b2f4	fix(auth): bind internal-service tenant authority to server config ... The first revision of this fix copied a CLIENT header (X-0pt-Internal-Tenant) or a single INTERNAL_TENANT_ID into x-0pt-verified-tenant. That is not an authorization source: any holder of the shared internal token could still name any tenant, leaving the original cross-tenant write reachable through a different header. - INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS (server env) is now the only tenant authority for the X-Internal-Token principal; empty => no authority (fail closed, 403). - Middleware strips inbound x-0pt-verified-{tenant,sub} and the service scope header on every path, including the dev escape hatch. - x-0pt-verified-service-tenants carries the allowlist; the tenant guard checks membership and denies anything outside it. - POST /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run now runs the same tenant guard as canonical/facts (it auto-provisions tenant-scoped rules). - 16 new regression tests; auth + cross-tenant + canonical + bridge suites 87/87; tsc --noEmit clean.	2026-11-07 15:32:51 +01:00
admin	b3239487b7	feat(document-workbench): wire customer upload, structuring, credits and readiness ... - POST /api/0pt/documents/upload: real multipart bytes into DOC0 through the durable attempt journal and the existing coordinator; verified tenant/actor only, project authorization fail-closed. - POST /api/0pt/documents/structure: DOC0 segments -> INF0 -> evidence-bound validation -> optional JSON/CSV export, with credit reserve/settle. - Credits: balance, server-owned price book, Stripe Checkout and idempotent webhook reconciliation via a Stripe re-read of session + payment intent. - /portal/dokument and /portal/krediter: SIAX-styled workspace. - @siax/access: universal, framework-neutral OpenFGA project relationship primitive reusable by DOC0/N0D/other products. - Readiness: real Redis PING probe instead of presence-only; queue is now a live dependency when configured. - Dockerfile: copy every workspace manifest so --frozen-lockfile works. - Format/build hygiene: .prettierignore, .worktrees ignored, valid manifest YAML.	2026-11-02 14:46:10 +01:00
admin	bd1c20edb2	feat: add guarded document workbench foundations	2026-11-02 01:26:36 +01:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	dc6aaa0e10	fix(data-os): P014 — close tenant-isolation + idempotency gaps, execute real restore drill ... Tenant isolation (security-critical): every app/api/0pt/** route reading tenant_id from client-controlled query/body never cross-checked it against the token middleware.ts already verified (x-0pt-verified-tenant). Adds a shared assertTenantMatchesVerified guard and wires it into all 20+ affected routes. Also closes two full-leak-by-omission bugs found in this pass (documents/capture and lakehouse/mappings GETs returned every tenant's rows when tenant_id was simply omitted) and two "no tenant check at all" reads (rate-policies/[id], lakehouse/mappings/[id]) reachable by ID alone. Duplicate-delivery idempotency (correctness-critical): POST /api/orders now honors Idempotency-Key (sql/006, replay-or-409-on-conflict, Postgres + in-memory); the Python orchestrator's POST /orders/{id}/run — the actual delivery trigger — is now idempotent under an asyncio lock, closing a real concurrent-request race, not just the sequential-retry case. Engine-duplication resolution: adaptive_router.py's docstring wrongly invited a bypass ("see b0ts for scraping") contradicting the product's own compliance stance; corrected, and given real (additive, not escalating) block-signal tracking so a rate-limited/blocked source is excluded from the plan instead of hammered. Also fixes a previously-undiscovered production bug: the Python engine's only call into the TS quality bridge (X-Internal-Token) was unconditionally 401'd by middleware.ts, which never checked that credential — the advisory quality bridge was unreachable in any environment enforcing auth. Restore drill: executed for real against throwaway Docker Postgres containers (not simulated). Found and fixed two real blockers along the way: sql/004 referenced opt_datasets, which no migration ever created (chain was never actually runnable end to end); lib/db.ts hardcoded ssl:"require", making any non-TLS Postgres (incl. compose.dev.yaml's own local-dev container) unreachable. After both fixes: full migration chain applies cleanly, pg_dump/pg_restore round-trip is byte-identical (row counts + content checksums), and real application code (lib/orders-store.ts, SourceRegistryService's Postgres repository) reads the restored data back correctly, including cross-tenant isolation still holding. 82 new tests (55 TS + 27 Python), all passing; full existing suite (291 TS + 55 Python) still green; typecheck clean on every changed/added file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-03 12:00:43 +02:00
Simon AxelssonandClaude Sonnet 5	07b13bd833	feat(data-os): Source Registry Postgres persistence + full HTTP route surface ... Replaces the in-memory (per-instance, not even per-process-shared) Maps in SourceService/SourceRegistryService with real Postgres persistence, and adds the register/query/describe/health/rights/provenance/freshness HTTP routes that never existed (grep for SourceRegistryService in app/ previously returned nothing). - sql/002_source_registry.sql: opt_sources, opt_source_rights, opt_source_provenance, opt_source_health_checks, opt_source_freshness. Numbered 002 (not 006) because 004's opt_source_rate_policies already forward-references opt_sources, which no sql/ file defined until now — fixes 004's pre-existing broken migration ordering (opt_datasets remains a separate, unrelated, still-open gap in 004, flagged not fixed). - src/repositories/*: SourceRepository / SourceRegistryRepository seams, each with an in-memory implementation (business logic extracted verbatim) and a Postgres implementation, chosen via resolveStoreMode — production still fails hard with no DATABASE_URL (Master-DoD §3), but a configured production now actually works instead of always being blocked. - SourceService / SourceRegistryService: storage moved behind the repository seam; getHealth/getFreshness are now async and tenant-scoped at the accessor itself (needed once they're reachable directly over HTTP, not only after an earlier caller's tenant check). - src/services/source-registry.ts: shared singleton instances for the sources/* route group, fixing the "each route module owned its own private registry" defect (source-rate-policies and .../query previously couldn't see a source registered via POST /api/0pt/sources). - New routes: POST/GET /api/0pt/sources, GET /api/0pt/sources/[id], GET+PUT .../rights, GET+PUT .../provenance, GET+POST .../health, GET .../freshness. - Business logic unchanged: fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant NOT_FOUND (no existence oracle, §50), bounded 100-row health history. Tested against a real Postgres container (not mocked) — tests/p0/source-registry-postgres.realinfra.test.ts, env-gated on SOURCE_REGISTRY_TEST_DATABASE_URL, skips honestly when unset. All 249 pre-existing P0 tests + 7 new realinfra tests pass; also smoke-tested the full HTTP route surface end-to-end against next dev + live Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 20:42:41 +02:00